31 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Reich v. Jesco, Inc.green2 sentences2003In order to establish fraudulent concealment, "there must be shown some act or conduct of an affirmative nature designed to prevent and which does prevent discovery of the claim." Reich v. *84 Jesco, Inc., 526 So.2d 550, 552 (Miss. 1988). 2002In order to establish fraudulent concealment, "there must be shown some act or conduct of an affirmative nature designed to prevent and which does prevent discovery of the claim."Reich v. Jesco, Inc., 526 So.2d 550, 552 (Miss.1988). | 4 | 4 |
McClain v. Stategreen2 sentences2007A motion for directed verdict or JNOV challenges the legal suffi ciency of the evidence, “since each requires consideration of the evidence before the court when made.” McClain v. State, 625 So.2d 774, 778 (Miss.1993). 1994McClain v. State, 625 So.2d 774, 778 (Miss. 1993). | 2 | 2 |
James v. Stategreen1 sentence2026See James v. State, 731 So. 2d 1135, 1137 (¶9) (Miss. 1999); see also Francis v. State, 377 So. 3d 952 , 955 (¶17) (Miss. 2023). 3 five years after his conviction and failed to demonstrate that any statutory exceptions applies to the time-bar, the circuit court properly dismissed Johnson’s motion. | 1 | 1 |
Scales v. Lackey Memorial Hosp.green1 sentence2025See Rainer, 282 So. 3d at 757 (¶20) (“This Court will only reverse a trial court where its decision [denying a continuance under Rule 56(f)] can be characterized as an abuse of discretion.” (quoting Scales, 988 So. 2d at 434 (¶19)). | 1 | 1 |
Powell v. McLaingreen1 sentence2023See Powell, 105 So. 3d at 315 . 6 and asserting specific privileges. | 1 | 1 |
Black v. Ansahgreen2 sentences2022Black v. Ansah, 876 So. 2d 395, 396 (¶3) (Miss. 2022Black v. Ansah, 876 So. 2d 395, 396 (¶3) (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
Franklin v. Stategreen1 sentence2020“An analysis of [Johnson’s] constitutional right to a speedy trial must be made apart from his statutory right.” Franklin v. State, 136 So. 3d 1021, 1032 (¶42) (Miss. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
Goff v. Stategreen1 sentence2017Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court 9.06 states in part: “If before or during trial the court, of its own motion or upon motion of an attorney, has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the court shall order the defendant to submit to a mental examination . . . .” Whether a reasonable ground exists “to believe that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial rests largely within the discretion of the trial [court].” Harden v. State, 59 So. 3d 594, 601 (¶14) (Miss. 2011) (quoting Goff v. State, 14 So. 3d 625, 644 (¶66) (Miss. 2009)). | 1 | 1 |
Harden v. Stategreen1 sentence2017Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court 9.06 states in part: “If before or during trial the court, of its own motion or upon motion of an attorney, has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the court shall order the defendant to submit to a mental examination . . . .” Whether a reasonable ground exists “to believe that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial rests largely within the discretion of the trial [court].” Harden v. State, 59 So. 3d 594, 601 (¶14) (Miss. 2011) (quoting Goff v. State, 14 So. 3d 625, 644 (¶66) (Miss. 2009)). | 1 | 1 |
Wade v. Stategreen1 sentence2009There is no “one-size-fits-all” answer to the circuit judge’s question: “Each case must depend upon its own facts and circumstances.” Wade v. State, 724 So.2d 1007, 1011 (¶ 13) (Miss.Ct.App.1998) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Craft v. Stategreen1 sentence2009See Craft v. State, 966 So.2d 856, 857 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2007). | 1 | 1 |
Bullard v. Stategreen1 sentence2008In addition, “[a]n error is considered harmless when it is ... not prejudicial to the substantive rights of the appealing party and does not affect the final outcome of the case.” Bullard v. State, 923 So.2d 1043, 1046 (¶9) (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (citing Jefferson v. State, 818 So.2d 1099, 1112 (¶ 36) (Miss.2002)). | 1 | 1 |
Jefferson v. Stategreen1 sentence2008In addition, “[a]n error is considered harmless when it is ... not prejudicial to the substantive rights of the appealing party and does not affect the final outcome of the case.” Bullard v. State, 923 So.2d 1043, 1046 (¶9) (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (citing Jefferson v. State, 818 So.2d 1099, 1112 (¶ 36) (Miss.2002)). | 1 | 1 |
Stringer v. AMERICAN BANKERS INS.green1 sentence2007See Stringer, 822 So.2d at 1015 (¶ 12). | 1 | 1 |
Groseclose v. Stategreen1 sentence2002Groseclose v. State, 440 So.2d 297, 300 (Miss.1983). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen1 sentence1999Jones v. State, 635 So.2d 884, 887 (Miss. 1994). | 1 | 1 |
Van Buren v. Stategreen1 sentence1993Van Buren v. State, 498 So.2d 1224, 1229 (Miss. 1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Dixon
green
2 sentences2000Johnson has filed a timely appeal to this Court to review his conviction and presents the following issues: (1) whether the trial court committed plain error in denying Johnson's motion to bar prosecution of the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, contrary to the holding in United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 , 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993), and in violation of the United States and Mississippi Constitutions, (2) whether the trial court committed plain error in refusing to charge the jury with defense requested jury instruction D-12, and (3) whether the trial court erred in charg 2000Johnson has filed a timely appeal to this Court to review his conviction and presents the following issues: (1) whether the trial court committed plain error in denying Johnson's motion to bar prosecution of the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, contrary to the holding in United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 , 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993), and in violation of the United States and Mississippi Constitutions, (2) whether the trial court committed plain error in refusing to charge the jury with defense requested jury instruction D-12, and (3) whether the trial court erred in charg | 2 | 1998–2000 |
City of Mound Bayou v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2025Id. at 1214 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Charlotte Dailey v. Mississippi Department of Employment Security
green
1 sentence2024To determine whether the ALJ abused its discretion in denying the admission of the CPUC exhibits, the circuit court applied the rationale in Dailey v. MDES, 271 So. 3d 715 (Miss. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Braxton v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2021Id. at 1236 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Estes v. State
green
1 sentence2019“In essence, the filing of the notice of appeal perfected the appeal and divested the lower court of jurisdiction.” Id. 9 support Johnson’s claim of juror bias, which was developed post trial. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Barker v. State
green
2 sentences2010Although, Johnson's brief cites us to the appropriate legal authority, Barker v. State, 241 So.2d 355 (Miss.1970), Johnson has provided no argument regarding how Barker was violated. 2010Although, Johnson’s brief cites us to the appropriate legal authority, Barker v. State, 241 So.2d 355 (Miss.1970), Johnson has provided no argument regarding how Barker was violated. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Deere & Company v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2007Id. 4 Deere opposed Johnson’s motion, claiming (contrary to its position in the matter before us today) the issues in the two lawsuits were different. 5 ¶16. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Johnson v. State
green
1 sentence1992Johnson, 511 So.2d 1333 . [5] Miss. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Phillips v. State
green
1 sentence1992Three justices entered a strong dissent on grounds that the sentence was disproportionate to the crime and the accused, in light of the fact that an accomplice pled guilty to manslaughter and served but two and one-half years. 379 So.2d at 513 . [3] Interestingly, the Court stated that "a writ of error coram nobis [was] the form of remedy available to a defendant, in the event he is convicted and sentenced under the habitual offender statute, and subsequently is successful in his collateral attack based upon constitutional defects of that conviction." Phillips, 421 So.2d at 483 . [4] Other gro | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Culberson v. State
green
1 sentence1992Three justices entered a strong dissent on grounds that the sentence was disproportionate to the crime and the accused, in light of the fact that an accomplice pled guilty to manslaughter and served but two and one-half years. 379 So.2d at 513 . [3] Interestingly, the Court stated that "a writ of error coram nobis [was] the form of remedy available to a defendant, in the event he is convicted and sentenced under the habitual offender statute, and subsequently is successful in his collateral attack based upon constitutional defects of that conviction." Phillips, 421 So.2d at 483 . [4] Other gro | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State Ex Rel. Smith v. Smith
green
2 sentences1990In summary, we hold Johnson's claim for assault and battery, asserted in Count I of his complaint, is barred by Section 15-1-35's one-year statute of limitations and, in connection therewith, State For the Use of Smith v. Smith, 156 Miss. 288 , 125 So. 825 (1930) and progeny stand modified to the extent articulated herein above. 1990In summary, we hold Johnson's claim for assault and battery, asserted in Count I of his complaint, is barred by Section 15-1-35's one-year statute of limitations and, in connection therewith, State For the Use of Smith v. Smith, 156 Miss. 288 , 125 So. 825 (1930) and progeny stand modified to the extent articulated herein above. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Davis v. State
green
2 sentences1988For example, in Davis v. State, 374 So.2d 1293 (Miss. 1979), this Court upheld denial of a handwriting expert because "the guilt or innocence of the defendant was scarcely, if at all, dependent *594 upon the state's expert witness... ." Id. at 1297 . 1988For example, in Davis v. State, 374 So.2d 1293 (Miss. 1979), this Court upheld denial of a handwriting expert because "the guilt or innocence of the defendant was scarcely, if at all, dependent *594 upon the state's expert witness... ." Id. at 1297 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Harris v. State
green
1 sentence1985Relying upon Harris, supra, we are entitled to disregard this assignment, as the state urges us to do. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.