Johnson motion in Delaware

2023We will therefore address the substance of Johnson’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (9) To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show “both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice.”11 To show deficient performance, a defendant must demonstrate that trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.12 Recognizing that hindsight can have a “distorting effect[],” we apply a strong presumption that trial counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.13 And “[i]f an attorney 8 Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160

2022Johnson’s claims are unavailing. 3 (6) We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.1 The procedural bars of Rule 61 must be considered before any substantive claims are addressed.2 Rule 61(i)(1) bars a motion for postconviction relief “filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final….”3 This time limitation does not apply, however, to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or, if the movant was convicted after a trial, he pleads with particularity either (i) new evidence of actual innocence or (ii) a

2024On this record there is no error due to the Defendant’s failure to sign a waiver of indictment. 6 Id. at 632. 7 Id. 8 Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 64 (1977). evidence is not sufficient to establish clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.9 In fact, Johnson’s claim that the plea was coerced is inconsistent with the affidavit of counsel.

2023Oct. 30, 2023) (ORDER) (quoting Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 , 389 (2010)). 12 Green, 238 A.3d at 174. 13 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ; Gattis v. State, 697 A.2d 1174, 1178 (Del. 1997) (citing Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996)). 6 makes a strategic choice ‘after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options,’ that decision is virtually unchallengeable[.]”14 (10) To establish prejudice, a “defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

2023Oct. 30, 2023) (ORDER) (quoting Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 , 389 (2010)). 12 Green, 238 A.3d at 174. 13 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ; Gattis v. State, 697 A.2d 1174, 1178 (Del. 1997) (citing Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996)). 6 makes a strategic choice ‘after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options,’ that decision is virtually unchallengeable[.]”14 (10) To establish prejudice, a “defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

2023Mot. for Postconviction Relief, Mar. 30, 2022 (D.I. 107). 6 State’s Response, Nov. 3, 2022 (D.I. 114). 7 Reply Br., Dec. 19, 2022 (D.I. 115). 8 Maxion v. State, 686 A.2d 148, 150 (Del. 1996); State v. Jones, 2002 WL 31028584 , at *2 (Del.

2023We will therefore address the substance of Johnson’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (9) To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show “both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice.”11 To show deficient performance, a defendant must demonstrate that trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.12 Recognizing that hindsight can have a “distorting effect[],” we apply a strong presumption that trial counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.13 And “[i]f an attorney 8 Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160

2023We will therefore address the substance of Johnson’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (9) To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show “both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice.”11 To show deficient performance, a defendant must demonstrate that trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.12 Recognizing that hindsight can have a “distorting effect[],” we apply a strong presumption that trial counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.13 And “[i]f an attorney 8 Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160

2023The Superior Court denied Johnson’s motion, and this appeal followed. (4) We review the Superior Court’s denial of a Rule 35(b) motion for abuse of discretion.1 Under this “highly deferential” standard, the test is whether “the trial court acted within a zone of reasonableness or stayed within a range of choice.”2 We likewise review the denial of a motion for correction of an illegal sentence for abuse of discretion.3 A sentence is illegal if it exceeds statutory limits, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is intern

2023The Superior Court denied Johnson’s motion, and this appeal followed. (4) We review the Superior Court’s denial of a Rule 35(b) motion for abuse of discretion.1 Under this “highly deferential” standard, the test is whether “the trial court acted within a zone of reasonableness or stayed within a range of choice.”2 We likewise review the denial of a motion for correction of an illegal sentence for abuse of discretion.3 A sentence is illegal if it exceeds statutory limits, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is intern

2022In his sworn affidavit filed in response to Johnson’s motion for postconviction relief, trial counsel averred that he determined that there were no grounds for further scrutiny 8 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 9 Id. at 687-88 . 10 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 11 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 12 Opening Br. at 7. 5 of Johnson’s mental health after he (i) spent hours speaking with Johnson, (ii) discussed Johnson’s mental health with Johnson’s prior counsel, and (iii) reviewed Johnson’s case with a psycho-forensic evalu

2022In his sworn affidavit filed in response to Johnson’s motion for postconviction relief, trial counsel averred that he determined that there were no grounds for further scrutiny 8 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 9 Id. at 687-88 . 10 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 11 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 12 Opening Br. at 7. 5 of Johnson’s mental health after he (i) spent hours speaking with Johnson, (ii) discussed Johnson’s mental health with Johnson’s prior counsel, and (iii) reviewed Johnson’s case with a psycho-forensic evalu

2022Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995) (noting that the Court may affirm a trial court’s judgment for reasons different than those articulated by the trial court). 4 (8) Even if Johnson’s motion for postconviction relief had been timely filed, however, Johnson’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail on the merits.

2022Johnson’s claims are unavailing. 3 (6) We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.1 The procedural bars of Rule 61 must be considered before any substantive claims are addressed.2 Rule 61(i)(1) bars a motion for postconviction relief “filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final….”3 This time limitation does not apply, however, to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or, if the movant was convicted after a trial, he pleads with particularity either (i) new evidence of actual innocence or (ii) a

2022Johnson’s claims are unavailing. 3 (6) We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.1 The procedural bars of Rule 61 must be considered before any substantive claims are addressed.2 Rule 61(i)(1) bars a motion for postconviction relief “filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final….”3 This time limitation does not apply, however, to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or, if the movant was convicted after a trial, he pleads with particularity either (i) new evidence of actual innocence or (ii) a

2021Although he presented additional claims to the Superior Court, on appeal he asserts only that (i) the Superior Court erred by accepting his guilty plea because Johnson was taking medication for mental health issues at the time of the plea and (ii) his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a competency hearing after Johnson disclosed during the plea colloquy that he was on medication. (4) This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.1 The Court must consider the procedural requirements of Superior Court Cri

2020“Rule 35(b) does not set forth any exception to the repetitive motion bar.”4 2 State v. Culp, 152 A.3d 141, 144 (Del. 2016). 3 Id. 4 Id. 3 Johnson’s motion was also untimely.

2020“Rule 35(b) does not set forth any exception to the repetitive motion bar.”4 2 State v. Culp, 152 A.3d 141, 144 (Del. 2016). 3 Id. 4 Id. 3 Johnson’s motion was also untimely.

2015We warn Johnson that if he continues to file frivolous claims in this Court, he will be enjoined from filing future claims without leave of the Court. 1 In re Witrock, 649 A.2d 1053, 1054 (Del. 1994). 2 Id. 3 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 2014 WL 5448891 , at *1 (Del.

2015We warn Johnson that if he continues to file frivolous claims in this Court, he will be enjoined from filing future claims without leave of the Court. 1 In re Witrock, 649 A.2d 1053, 1054 (Del. 1994). 2 Id. 3 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 2014 WL 5448891 , at *1 (Del.

1991See Fielder v. Thorn, Del.Fam., 525 A.2d 576, 579 (1987); Grayson v. Grayson, Del.Fam., 454 A.2d 1297, 1300 (1982) (”[t]he term 'significant connection' is authoritatively defined as maximum rather than minimum contact with the state and is intended to limit jurisdiction rather than to proliferate it.”) (emphasis in original).

1991See Fielder v. Thorn, Del.Fam., 525 A.2d 576, 579 (1987); Grayson v. Grayson, Del.Fam., 454 A.2d 1297, 1300 (1982) (”[t]he term 'significant connection' is authoritatively defined as maximum rather than minimum contact with the state and is intended to limit jurisdiction rather than to proliferate it.”) (emphasis in original).

1959Malone’s counterclaim was denied. *289 Malone appealed to the Supreme Court. 1 Storey 504 , 148 A. 2d 770, 773 (1959).

1959Malone’s counterclaim was denied. *289 Malone appealed to the Supreme Court. 1 Storey 504 , 148 A. 2d 770, 773 (1959).