Johnson test in Oregon

2024Under the Johnson framework, “the defendant has the initial burden to establish a minimal factual nexus between the illegality and the challenged evidence.” DeJong, 368 Or at 642 .

2024Under the Johnson framework, “the defendant has the initial burden to establish a minimal factual nexus between the illegality and the challenged evidence.” DeJong, 368 Or at 642 .

2022Defendant objected, asserting that he had the right to confront the victim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 656 State v. Martin Defendant asked the trial court to apply the test from State v. Wibbens, 238 Or App 737, 741-42 , 243 P3d 790 (2010), and State v. Johnson, 221 Or App 394 , 190 P3d 455 , rev den, 345 Or 418 (2008), (the “Johnson test”), which weighs the probationer’s interest in confrontation against the government’s good cause for denying it.

2022Defendant objected, asserting that he had the right to confront the victim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 656 State v. Martin Defendant asked the trial court to apply the test from State v. Wibbens, 238 Or App 737, 741-42 , 243 P3d 790 (2010), and State v. Johnson, 221 Or App 394 , 190 P3d 455 , rev den, 345 Or 418 (2008), (the “Johnson test”), which weighs the probationer’s interest in confrontation against the government’s good cause for denying it.

2009Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence § 401.03, 141-42 (5th ed 2007) (“The determination of relevance * * * allows the trial court to draw upon its own experience, knowledge, and common sense in determining whether a logical relationship exists between offered evidence and the fact to be proven.”). 11 Accordingly, the first part of the Johnson test was satisfied here. *636 The third part of the Johnson test requires that the letters’ probative value “not be substantially outweighed by the dangers or considerations set forth in OEC 403.” 313 Or at 195 .

2009Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence § 401.03, 141-42 (5th ed 2007) (“The determination of relevance * * * allows the trial court to draw upon its own experience, knowledge, and common sense in determining whether a logical relationship exists between offered evidence and the fact to be proven.”). 11 Accordingly, the first part of the Johnson test was satisfied here. *636 The third part of the Johnson test requires that the letters’ probative value “not be substantially outweighed by the dangers or considerations set forth in OEC 403.” 313 Or at 195 .

2022Defendant objected, asserting that he had the right to confront the victim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 656 State v. Martin Defendant asked the trial court to apply the test from State v. Wibbens, 238 Or App 737, 741-42 , 243 P3d 790 (2010), and State v. Johnson, 221 Or App 394 , 190 P3d 455 , rev den, 345 Or 418 (2008), (the “Johnson test”), which weighs the probationer’s interest in confrontation against the government’s good cause for denying it.

2022Defendant objected, asserting that he had the right to confront the victim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 656 State v. Martin Defendant asked the trial court to apply the test from State v. Wibbens, 238 Or App 737, 741-42 , 243 P3d 790 (2010), and State v. Johnson, 221 Or App 394 , 190 P3d 455 , rev den, 345 Or 418 (2008), (the “Johnson test”), which weighs the probationer’s interest in confrontation against the government’s good cause for denying it.

2022Defendant objected, asserting that he had the right to confront the victim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 656 State v. Martin Defendant asked the trial court to apply the test from State v. Wibbens, 238 Or App 737, 741-42 , 243 P3d 790 (2010), and State v. Johnson, 221 Or App 394 , 190 P3d 455 , rev den, 345 Or 418 (2008), (the “Johnson test”), which weighs the probationer’s interest in confrontation against the government’s good cause for denying it.

2009See, e.g., Amaya, 336 Or. at 628 , 89 P.3d 1163 ; cf. State v. Toevs, 327 Or. 525, 536-37 , 964 P.2d 1007 (1998) (concluding that a reasonable person in the defendant's position could have believed that his freedom of movement had been restricted because of a continuous manifestation *1141 of police authority after the defendant was told that he could leave).

2009See, e.g., Amaya, 336 Or. at 628 , 89 P.3d 1163 ; cf. State v. Toevs, 327 Or. 525, 536-37 , 964 P.2d 1007 (1998) (concluding that a reasonable person in the defendant's position could have believed that his freedom of movement had been restricted because of a continuous manifestation *1141 of police authority after the defendant was told that he could leave).

2002On January 23, 2001, defendant submitted a supplemental memorandum to the court, asserting, among other arguments, that State v. Pepper, 105 Or App 107 , 803 P2d 1213 (1990), supported dismissal of the case, because nothing in the record indicated that Johnson had suspected that defendant had committed a felony. 6 The trial court concluded that Johnson’s stop and citation of defendant was authorized under ORS 810.410(2), providing in part that a police officer “may issue a citation to *540 a person for a traffic violation at any place within or outside the jurisdictional authority of the gover

2002On January 23, 2001, defendant submitted a supplemental memorandum to the court, asserting, among other arguments, that State v. Pepper, 105 Or App 107 , 803 P2d 1213 (1990), supported dismissal of the case, because nothing in the record indicated that Johnson had suspected that defendant had committed a felony. 6 The trial court concluded that Johnson’s stop and citation of defendant was authorized under ORS 810.410(2), providing in part that a police officer “may issue a citation to *540 a person for a traffic violation at any place within or outside the jurisdictional authority of the gover

1999State v. Moore, 324 Or 396, 407 , 927 P2d 1073 (1996).

1999State v. Moore, 324 Or 396, 407 , 927 P2d 1073 (1996).