81 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Banks v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Cole v. State, 701 So. 2d 845, 853 (Fla. 1997) (no abuse of discretion where trial court denied motion for mistrial after witness unexpectedly mentioned defendant’s irrelevant criminal history); Banks v. State, 46 So. 3d 989, 997-98 (Fla. 2010) (where trial witness said, unexpectedly, that she had “seen the tape of [the defendant] stabbing Mr. William Johnson,” but the stabbing of Mr. William Johnson was irrelevant to the trial). 9 9. 2024See Cole v. State, 701 So. 2d 845, 853 (Fla. 1997) (no abuse of discretion where trial court denied motion for mistrial after witness unexpectedly mentioned defendant’s irrelevant criminal history); Banks v. State, 46 So. 3d 989, 997-98 (Fla. 2010) (where trial witness said, unexpectedly, that she had “seen the tape of [the defendant] stabbing Mr. William Johnson,” but the stabbing of Mr. William Johnson was irrelevant to the trial). 9 9. | 2 | 2 |
Cole v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Cole v. State, 701 So. 2d 845, 853 (Fla. 1997) (no abuse of discretion where trial court denied motion for mistrial after witness unexpectedly mentioned defendant’s irrelevant criminal history); Banks v. State, 46 So. 3d 989, 997-98 (Fla. 2010) (where trial witness said, unexpectedly, that she had “seen the tape of [the defendant] stabbing Mr. William Johnson,” but the stabbing of Mr. William Johnson was irrelevant to the trial). 9 9. 2024See Cole v. State, 701 So. 2d 845, 853 (Fla. 1997) (no abuse of discretion where trial court denied motion for mistrial after witness unexpectedly mentioned defendant’s irrelevant criminal history); Banks v. State, 46 So. 3d 989, 997-98 (Fla. 2010) (where trial witness said, unexpectedly, that she had “seen the tape of [the defendant] stabbing Mr. William Johnson,” but the stabbing of Mr. William Johnson was irrelevant to the trial). 9 9. | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2023To the contrary, many cases do say that “[p]ostconviction relief cannot be based on speculative assertions.” Jones v. State, 845 So. 2d 55, 64 (Fla. 2003). 2013See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 104 So.3d 1010, 1029 (Fla.2012) (“Considering that no death warrant has been signed in this case, the postconviction court’s summary denial of Johnson’s claim was proper.”); Butler v. State, 100 So.3d 638, 672 (Fla.2012) (“[A] claim of incompetency to be executed cannot be asserted until a death warrant has been issued.”) (quoting Green v. State, 975 So.2d 1090, 1115-16 (Fla.2008)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1726 , 185 L.Ed.2d 789 (2013); Phillips v. State, 894 So.2d 28, 36 (Fla.2004) (“[T]his claim cannot be raised until an execution is imminent.”); Jones | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Johnson v. State, 104 So.3d 1010, 1029 (Fla.2012) (“[BJecause multiple errors did not occur in this case, Johnson’s claim of cumulative error must fail.”). 2014See Johnson v. State, 104 So. 3d 1010, 1029 (Fla. 2012) (“[B]ecause multiple errors did not occur in this case, Johnson’s claim of cumulative error must fail.”). | 2 | 2 |
Lukehart v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Lukehart v. State, 70 So.3d 503, 513 (Fla.2011). 2012See Lukehart v. State, 70 So.3d 503, 513 (Fla.2011). | 2 | 2 |
Keister v. POLEN, BROWARD COUNTYgreen2 sentences2008See also Keister v. Polen, 471 So.2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). *1163 The significant commonality of all three cases is that in not one of them did the final judgment retain jurisdiction in the circuit court to consider both entitlement to attorney's fees and the amount. 2002See Keister v. Polen, 471 So.2d 656, 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); see also Feltman v. Feltman, 721 So.2d 424 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). | 2 | 2 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2005A. Applicable Law As we most recently stated in State v. Duncan, 894 So.2d 817 (Fla.2004): Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)], this Court held that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied: A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to be considered meritorious, must include two general components. 2005A. Applicable Law As we most recently stated in State v. Duncan, 894 So.2d 817 (Fla.2004): Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)], this Court held that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied: A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to be considered meritorious, must include two general components. | 1 | 3 |
Hensley v. Eckerhartgreen2 sentences2026See also Perdue, 559 U.S. at 550-51; Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 , 430 n.3 (1983) (acknowledging the twelve factors Johnson articulated for a trial court to consider in determining a reasonable fee); Appalachian, Inc. v. Ackmann, 507 So. 2d 150 , 154 n. 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (“Rowe is a lineal descendent of Johnson v. Georgia 5 Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)"). 2026See also Perdue, 559 U.S. at 550-51; Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 , 430 n.3 (1983) (acknowledging the twelve factors Johnson articulated for a trial court to consider in determining a reasonable fee); Appalachian, Inc. v. Ackmann, 507 So. 2d 150 , 154 n. 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (“Rowe is a lineal descendent of Johnson v. Georgia 5 Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)"). | 1 | 2 |
Johnson v. Mississippigreen2 sentences2023Indeed, Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584-85 (1988), requires “reexamination of [a] death sentence” only where the death sentence is “based in part on a reversed conviction.” Because Dillbeck’s 1979 conviction stands, Johnson provides no avenue to invalidate the prior violent felony aggravator that is based on his 1979 conviction. - 18 - Yet Dillbeck argues that the circuit court erred by denying his Johnson claim without first giving him the chance to use the alleged new evidence to invalidate his 1979 conviction. 2012Johnson’s claim is analogous to the claim addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 583-90 , 108 S.Ct. 1981 , 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988), which granted postconviction relief on a defendant’s claim that the sentencing court’s finding of the prior violent felony aggravator based on a reversed conviction was unconstitutional. | 1 | 2 |
cluster 2358green2 sentences2026See also Perdue, 559 U.S. at 550-51; Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 , 430 n.3 (1983) (acknowledging the twelve factors Johnson articulated for a trial court to consider in determining a reasonable fee); Appalachian, Inc. v. Ackmann, 507 So. 2d 150 , 154 n. 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (“Rowe is a lineal descendent of Johnson v. Georgia 5 Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)"). 2026See also Perdue, 559 U.S. at 550-51; Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 , 430 n.3 (1983) (acknowledging the twelve factors Johnson articulated for a trial court to consider in determining a reasonable fee); Appalachian, Inc. v. Ackmann, 507 So. 2d 150 , 154 n. 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (“Rowe is a lineal descendent of Johnson v. Georgia 5 Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)"). | 1 | 1 |
ALVIN ARTEAGA v. STATE OF FLORIDAgreen1 sentence2024See Arteaga v. State, 246 So. 3d 533, 536 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018). | 1 | 1 |
Hutchinson v. Stategreen1 sentence2024“A typical postconviction motion should not be dismissed with prejudice when the defendant volunteers to dismiss it unless there is prejudice to the State or some justification for resolving the motion on the merits.” McCray v. State, 104 So. 3d 1201, 1201 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); see also Hutchinson v. State, 921 So. 2d 780, 781 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). | 1 | 1 |
McCray v. Stategreen1 sentence2024“A typical postconviction motion should not be dismissed with prejudice when the defendant volunteers to dismiss it unless there is prejudice to the State or some justification for resolving the motion on the merits.” McCray v. State, 104 So. 3d 1201, 1201 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); see also Hutchinson v. State, 921 So. 2d 780, 781 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See Davis v. State, 31 So. 3d 277, 278 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (holding that a key witness's admission to a third person that the witness testified falsely regarding Mr. Davis's involvement in a shooting stated a facially sufficient claim of newly discovered evidence). -2- motion for rehearing.2 See Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. 1999) (holding that when a postconviction court summarily denies a claim raised in a rule 3.850 motion, an appellate court "must accept the defendant's factual allegations to the extent they are not refuted by the record"). | 1 | 1 |
Peede v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See Davis v. State, 31 So. 3d 277, 278 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (holding that a key witness's admission to a third person that the witness testified falsely regarding Mr. Davis's involvement in a shooting stated a facially sufficient claim of newly discovered evidence). -2- motion for rehearing.2 See Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. 1999) (holding that when a postconviction court summarily denies a claim raised in a rule 3.850 motion, an appellate court "must accept the defendant's factual allegations to the extent they are not refuted by the record"). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2018See Fecske v. State, 757 So. 2d 548, 549 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“As a general rule, lack of affirmative medical treatment of the victim, whose initial injury was proximately caused by the defendant’s actions, does not constitute an intervening cause relieving the defendant of criminal responsibility for the victim’s death.”); Rose v. State, 591 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (recognizing that the Johnson rule “has been followed consistently”); Barnes v. State, 528 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (“The rule in 4 Florida has long been that where an assailant inflicts a wound which is in its 2018See Fecske v. State, 757 So. 2d 548, 549 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“As a general rule, lack of affirmative medical treatment of the victim, whose initial injury was proximately caused by the defendant’s actions, does not constitute an intervening cause relieving the defendant of criminal responsibility for the victim’s death.”); Rose v. State, 591 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (recognizing that the Johnson rule “has been followed consistently”); Barnes v. State, 528 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (“The rule in 4 Florida has long been that where an assailant inflicts a wound which is in its | 1 | 1 |
Tunsil v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Fecske v. State, 757 So. 2d 548, 549 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“As a general rule, lack of affirmative medical treatment of the victim, whose initial injury was proximately caused by the defendant’s actions, does not constitute an intervening cause relieving the defendant of criminal responsibility for the victim’s death.”); Rose v. State, 591 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (recognizing that the Johnson rule “has been followed consistently”); Barnes v. State, 528 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (“The rule in 4 Florida has long been that where an assailant inflicts a wound which is in its 2018See Fecske v. State, 757 So. 2d 548, 549 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“As a general rule, lack of affirmative medical treatment of the victim, whose initial injury was proximately caused by the defendant’s actions, does not constitute an intervening cause relieving the defendant of criminal responsibility for the victim’s death.”); Rose v. State, 591 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (recognizing that the Johnson rule “has been followed consistently”); Barnes v. State, 528 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (“The rule in 4 Florida has long been that where an assailant inflicts a wound which is in its | 1 | 1 |
| Rose v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fecske v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
Levasseur v. Levasseurgreen1 sentence2018See Jones v. State, 239 So. 3d 1294, 1294 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (dismissing an appeal that challenged the defendant’s sentence, not her conviction, because the defendant had already served her sentence); Miller v. State, 79 So. 3d 209, 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (dismissing an appeal of an order revoking probation and sentencing the defendant to five years’ 11 imprisonment because the defendant had already served his sentence). _____________________________ Andy Thomas, Public Defender, M. | 1 | 1 |
Barnes v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Fecske v. State, 757 So. 2d 548, 549 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“As a general rule, lack of affirmative medical treatment of the victim, whose initial injury was proximately caused by the defendant’s actions, does not constitute an intervening cause relieving the defendant of criminal responsibility for the victim’s death.”); Rose v. State, 591 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (recognizing that the Johnson rule “has been followed consistently”); Barnes v. State, 528 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (“The rule in 4 Florida has long been that where an assailant inflicts a wound which is in its 2018See Fecske v. State, 757 So. 2d 548, 549 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“As a general rule, lack of affirmative medical treatment of the victim, whose initial injury was proximately caused by the defendant’s actions, does not constitute an intervening cause relieving the defendant of criminal responsibility for the victim’s death.”); Rose v. State, 591 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (recognizing that the Johnson rule “has been followed consistently”); Barnes v. State, 528 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (“The rule in 4 Florida has long been that where an assailant inflicts a wound which is in its | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen1 sentence2018See id. at 642 . | 1 | 1 |
| Miller v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Timothy W. Fletcher v. State of Floridagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fasenmyer v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hughes v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sanchez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Odomgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Webb v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hale v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Green v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Phillips v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Butler v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kilgore v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sexton v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Linn v. Fossumgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sparks v. Allstate Construction, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Webb v. Priestgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Walls v. State
green
2 sentences2014Walls, 926 So.2d at 1175-76 . 12 The record also does not support Johnson’s claim that law enforcement made promises to Johnson in exchange for his cooperation. 2014Walls, 926 So. 2d at 1175-76 . 12 The record also does not support Johnson’s claim that law enforcement made promises to Johnson in exchange for his cooperation. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2012Johnson raised the following claims before the posteonvietion court: (1) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by mishandling mental health experts; (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by manipulating the trial schedule of Johnson’s four trials and failing to make timely disclosure of exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), rendering defense counsel ineffective in conducting Johnson’s defense; (3) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by offering evidence of sperm after an Federal Bureau of Inve 2012Johnson raised the following claims before the posteonvietion court: (1) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by mishandling mental health experts; (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by manipulating the trial schedule of Johnson’s four trials and failing to make timely disclosure of exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), rendering defense counsel ineffective in conducting Johnson’s defense; (3) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by offering evidence of sperm after an Federal Bureau of Inve | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences2012On direct appeal, this Court denied Johnson’s claim “that the standard [penalty phase jury] instructions impermissibly place the burden of proof on the defendant to prove a case for mitigation once aggravating circumstances have been established by the State.” Johnson, 660 So.2d at 647 . 1995Johnson's brief relies upon cross-referenced briefs and the record from another case now pending in this Court, Johnson v. State, 660 So.2d 637 (1995). | 2 | 1995–2012 |
State v. Duncan
green
2 sentences2005A. Applicable Law As we most recently stated in State v. Duncan, 894 So.2d 817 (Fla.2004): Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)], this Court held that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied: A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to be considered meritorious, must include two general components. 2005A. Applicable Law As we most recently stated in State v. Duncan, 894 So.2d 817 (Fla.2004): Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)], this Court held that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied: A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to be considered meritorious, must include two general components. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Baldwin v. State of California
green
2 sentences1982The Johnson analysis was applied by a more recent California case, Baldwin v. State, 6 Cal.3d 424 , 99 Cal. Rptr. 145 , 491 P.2d 1121 (1972), to a question involving whether design immunity, once having attached, is perpetually effective regardless of any subsequent change in circumstances of which the public entity had notice. 1982The Johnson analysis was applied by a more recent California case, Baldwin v. State, 6 Cal.3d 424 , 99 Cal. Rptr. 145 , 491 P.2d 1121 (1972), to a question involving whether design immunity, once having attached, is perpetually effective regardless of any subsequent change in circumstances of which the public entity had notice. | 2 | 1982–1982 |
Appalachian, Inc. v. Ackmann
green
2 sentences2026See also Perdue, 559 U.S. at 550-51; Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 , 430 n.3 (1983) (acknowledging the twelve factors Johnson articulated for a trial court to consider in determining a reasonable fee); Appalachian, Inc. v. Ackmann, 507 So. 2d 150 , 154 n. 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (“Rowe is a lineal descendent of Johnson v. Georgia 5 Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)"). 2026See also Perdue, 559 U.S. at 550-51; Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 , 430 n.3 (1983) (acknowledging the twelve factors Johnson articulated for a trial court to consider in determining a reasonable fee); Appalachian, Inc. v. Ackmann, 507 So. 2d 150 , 154 n. 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (“Rowe is a lineal descendent of Johnson v. Georgia 5 Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)"). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
cluster 315529
green
2 sentences2026In doing so, the trial court made two important findings: ● First, the trial court’s order on rehearing indicated that “the outcome of this Court’s fee analysis would be the same” even if the court had applied federal law rather than Rowe, noting that “the Rowe factors ‘mirror’ the factors used in the federal lodestar approach—an approach that stems from Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).” The trial court concluded that its “lodestar analysis under Rowe tracks the Johnson factors as a matter of law and fact, making the analysis equally valid under both Rowe 2026In doing so, the trial court made two important findings: ● First, the trial court’s order on rehearing indicated that “the outcome of this Court’s fee analysis would be the same” even if the court had applied federal law rather than Rowe, noting that “the Rowe factors ‘mirror’ the factors used in the federal lodestar approach—an approach that stems from Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).” The trial court concluded that its “lodestar analysis under Rowe tracks the Johnson factors as a matter of law and fact, making the analysis equally valid under both Rowe | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences2023Id. 2023Id. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Hayes v. State
green
1 sentence2020Id. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Hurst v. Florida
green
2 sentences2018ANALYSIS Johnson raised twelve issues in his initial appeal and supplemental briefs: (1) *737 whether the trial court erred in denying Johnson's motion to prohibit the State from seeking the death penalty; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying Johnson's motion for judgment of acquittal; (3) whether the trial court erred in finding the avoid arrest aggravating factor; (4) whether the trial court erred in finding the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator; (5) whether the trial court erred in finding the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator; (6) whether the trial court abused it 2018ANALYSIS Johnson raised twelve issues in his initial appeal and supplemental briefs: (1) *737 whether the trial court erred in denying Johnson's motion to prohibit the State from seeking the death penalty; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying Johnson's motion for judgment of acquittal; (3) whether the trial court erred in finding the avoid arrest aggravating factor; (4) whether the trial court erred in finding the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator; (5) whether the trial court erred in finding the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator; (6) whether the trial court abused it | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Sholl green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Ohio v. Johnson green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Johnson v. State green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Davis v. McDonough green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Shearod green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Sanchez v. State green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Ross v. Attorney Grievance Comm'n neutral | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Alexander, Zelmanski, Danner & Fioritto, PLLC v. Haddad green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Giglio v. United States green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Cook v. City of Jacksonville green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Millon Air, Inc. v. Ferrin neutral | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Holmes v. State green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Reddix v. State green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Guerra v. State green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Ring v. Arizona green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Johnson v. State green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Abreau green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.