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15 Tennessee opinions name it 4 courts 1999–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Crawfordred2 sentences2019This court noted that [t]he Bishop court relied upon the previous standard of State v. Crawford, which required the State to prove facts and circumstances “so strong and cogent as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of the defendant, and that beyond a reasonable doubt.” 225 Tenn. 478 , 470 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Tenn. 1971). 2019This court noted that [t]he Bishop court relied upon the previous standard of State v. Crawford, which required the State to prove facts and circumstances “so strong and cogent as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of the defendant, and that beyond a reasonable doubt.” 225 Tenn. 478 , 470 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Tenn. 1971). | 1 | 1 |
Sowell v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See Sowell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Tenn. Crim. 2019See Sowell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Howell v. Stategreen2 sentences2019The ACCA defined a “violent felony” as 5 We note that even though the post-conviction court in this case applied the “colorable claim” standard, which is less stringent than the clear and convincing evidence standard that should be applied to motions to reopen under section 40-30-117(a), see Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450, 460 (Tenn. 2004), the State has not challenged the propriety of the post-conviction court’s decision to grant the motion to reopen on the Johnson claim. 6 Noting that this matter was initiated as a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings, this Court directed the partie 2019The ACCA defined a “violent felony” as 5 We note that even though the post-conviction court in this case applied the “colorable claim” standard, which is less stringent than the clear and convincing evidence standard that should be applied to motions to reopen under section 40-30-117(a), see Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450, 460 (Tenn. 2004), the State has not challenged the propriety of the post-conviction court’s decision to grant the motion to reopen on the Johnson claim. 6 Noting that this matter was initiated as a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings, this Court directed the partie | 1 | 1 |
Michelle RYE Et Al. v. WOMEN’S CARE CENTER OF MEMPHIS, MPLLC Et Al.green1 sentence2018See Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101 (2018); see also Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 264 (Tenn. 2015). | 1 | 1 |
Burton v. Warren Farmers Cooperativegreen1 sentence2016As motions for directed verdicts are not appropriate in bench trials, see Burton v. Warren Farmers Co-op, 129 S.W.3d 513, 520 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002), the trial court correctly treated Johnson’s motion as one for an involuntary dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02, see id.; see also Wilson v. Monroe Cnty., 411 S.W.3d 431, 438-39 (Tenn.Ct.App.2013). | 1 | 1 |
Fred v. Wilson v. Monroe County, Tennesseegreen1 sentence2016As motions for directed verdicts are not appropriate in bench trials, see Burton v. Warren Farmers Co-op, 129 S.W.3d 513, 520 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002), the trial court correctly treated Johnson’s motion as one for an involuntary dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02, see id.; see also Wilson v. Monroe Cnty., 411 S.W.3d 431, 438-39 (Tenn.Ct.App.2013). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lee R. Johnsongreen1 sentence2002See id. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Saint Francis Hospital, Inc.green1 sentence1999Francis Hosp., Inc., 759 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tenn. App. 1988) is the correct test only because Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-1-304(a) provides that "no employee shall be discharged or terminated solely for refusing to participate in, or for refusing to remain silent, about illegal activities." (emphasis added) Thus considering this case in the limited context of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-1-304 and not in the context of retaliatory discharge in general, the four factor Johnson test is valid. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Belsito v. Clark
green
2 sentences2005Id. 2005Id. | 3 | 2005–2005 |
Sneed v. Board of Professional Responsibility
green
1 sentence2025CONCLUSION We “take[] seriously [our] obligation to supervise and regulate the practice of law.” Sneed, 301 S.W.3d at 618 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
COLEMEN v. State
green
2 sentences2019In Coleman v. State, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the procedural limitations of raising claims in a motion to reopen and subsequent amendments, which include “the statute of limitations, the restrictions on re-opening petitions for post- conviction relief once they have been ruled on, and the prohibition against re-litigating issues that have been previously determined.” 341 S.W.3d 221 , 255 (Tenn. 2011). 2019In Coleman v. State, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the procedural limitations of raising claims in a motion to reopen and subsequent amendments, which include “the statute of limitations, the restrictions on re-opening petitions for post- conviction relief once they have been ruled on, and the prohibition against re-litigating issues that have been previously determined.” 341 S.W.3d 221 , 255 (Tenn. 2011). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Johnson v. United States
green
2 sentences2018This Court adopted and applied the Johnson rule in Gomez I , holding that when the law changes between the time of trial and appeal, the question of "[w]hether an error is 'plain' or 'obvious' is determined by reference to the law existing as of the time of appellate consideration." 163 S.W.3d at 653-54 (citing Johnson , 520 U.S. at 468 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 ). 2018This Court adopted and applied the Johnson rule in Gomez I , holding that when the law changes between the time of trial and appeal, the question of "[w]hether an error is 'plain' or 'obvious' is determined by reference to the law existing as of the time of appellate consideration." 163 S.W.3d at 653-54 (citing Johnson , 520 U.S. at 468 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Henderson v. United States
green
2 sentences2018More recently, in Henderson v. United States , the Supreme Court decided the issue reserved in Olano -what law must an appellate court reference when the law was unsettled at the time of trial but settled by the time of appeal. 568 U.S. at 273 , 133 S.Ct. 1121 . 2018More recently, in Henderson v. United States , the Supreme Court decided the issue reserved in Olano -what law must an appellate court reference when the law was unsettled at the time of trial but settled by the time of appeal. 568 U.S. at 273 , 133 S.Ct. 1121 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Gomez
green
2 sentences2018This Court adopted and applied the Johnson rule in Gomez I , holding that when the law changes between the time of trial and appeal, the question of "[w]hether an error is 'plain' or 'obvious' is determined by reference to the law existing as of the time of appellate consideration." 163 S.W.3d at 653-54 (citing Johnson , 520 U.S. at 468 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 ). 2018This Court adopted and applied the Johnson rule in Gomez I , holding that when the law changes between the time of trial and appeal, the question of "[w]hether an error is 'plain' or 'obvious' is determined by reference to the law existing as of the time of appellate consideration." 163 S.W.3d at 653-54 (citing Johnson , 520 U.S. at 468 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. Nixon
green
1 sentence2017Citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), counsel argued that Mr. Johnson need only “establish that there could be information that’s material and relevant on there.” He observed that the discovery materials were replete with information that “there was a lot of text messaging and social media communications that were going on about this party that night” and that, Ms. Lawn in particular, participated in social media and text messaging communications immediately after leaving C.C. in Mr. Johnson’s bedroom in the company of the defendants. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Zagorski v. State
green
1 sentence2013The trial court, pursuant to Zagorski v. State, 983 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn.1998), questioned Mr. Johnson about his decision to waive mitigation evidence. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
McCracken v. Brentwood United Methodist Church
green
1 sentence2009As discussed by our Supreme Court in Harris v. Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741 (Tenn. 2000), “the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure do not authorize motions ‘to reconsider’ a grant of summary judgment” Id. at 743 (citing McCracken v. Brentwood United Methodist Church, 958 S.W.2d 792 , 794 n. 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Harris v. Chern
green
2 sentences2009As discussed by our Supreme Court in Harris v. Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741 (Tenn. 2000), “the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure do not authorize motions ‘to reconsider’ a grant of summary judgment” Id. at 743 (citing McCracken v. Brentwood United Methodist Church, 958 S.W.2d 792 , 794 n. 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). 2009As discussed by our Supreme Court in Harris v. Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741 (Tenn. 2000), “the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure do not authorize motions ‘to reconsider’ a grant of summary judgment” Id. at 743 (citing McCracken v. Brentwood United Methodist Church, 958 S.W.2d 792 , 794 n. 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2005In State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469 (Tenn. 2004), the high court applied the Johnson rule to the vicarious application of the (I)(5) especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel factor and determined that because the statutory language [of the (I)(5) factor] focuses upon the nature and circumstances of the crime, rather than the actions, intent, and conduct of the defendant, the factor may be vicariously applied. 2005In State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469 (Tenn. 2004), the high court applied the Johnson rule to the vicarious application of the (I)(5) especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel factor and determined that because the statutory language [of the (I)(5) factor] focuses upon the nature and circumstances of the crime, rather than the actions, intent, and conduct of the defendant, the factor may be vicariously applied. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.