Johnson claim in Utah

2025Johnson argued it was “undisputed” she did not relocate to California and the only travel was Johnson “traveling to her work and the kids going with her for summer trips and once a month, at most, to California.” 20240857 5 2025 UT App 175 Kelly v. Johnson She asserted the only change was that the children were now older, which is not a change in circumstance. ¶10 The district court denied Johnson’s motion to dismiss.

2024England v. Labor Commission ¶60 Furthermore, given our conclusion that the Company’s petition for review is “frivolous,” we grant Johnson’s motion for an award of attorney fees and single costs, and we send this matter back to the Commission for determination of the amount of those fees and costs. 20230818-CA 27 2024 UT App 170

2023He explained that he had an attorney trust account while he practiced law but maintained that “when [he] stopped practicing, [he] just had a regular bank account.” Agent 2 asked if any money went into his attorney trust account after he stopped practicing, and he responded, “Yeah . . . probably—like, the first month, you know.” 20210838-CA 5 2023 UT App 145 State v. Johnson At trial, Agent 3 testified that he had reviewed Johnson’s bank records and found twelve deposits into Johnson’s attorney trust account “from the time that Mr. Johnson’s law license was suspended on July 15, [2015,]” “until

2019The dissent seeks to avoid this quoted language by fixating on the first part of the Johnson standard, which “requires an examination of the manner in which the killing occurred.” Id.

2019The dissent seeks to avoid this quoted language by fixating on the first part of the Johnson standard, which “requires an examination of the manner in which the killing occurred.” Id.

2014See id. 1154-57 (affirming the post-trial reconstruction of an entire set of missing jury instructions where trial court relied on its own memory and typical practices); see also State v. Davis, 2013 UT App 228, ¶¶ 89-95 , 311 P.3d 538 (discussing record reconstruction procedures); State v. Fowers, 2011 UT App 383, ¶ 19 , 265 P.3d 832 (relying, in part, on the trial court's memory of an off-the-record evidentiary ruling to evaluate an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). 44 Thus, on the issues originally raised by the parties, this appeal should result in a straightforward affirmance.

2014See id. 1154-57 (affirming the post-trial reconstruction of an entire set of missing jury instructions where trial court relied on its own memory and typical practices); see also State v. Davis, 2013 UT App 228, ¶¶ 89-95 , 311 P.3d 538 (discussing record reconstruction procedures); State v. Fowers, 2011 UT App 383, ¶ 19 , 265 P.3d 832 (relying, in part, on the trial court's memory of an off-the-record evidentiary ruling to evaluate an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). 44 Thus, on the issues originally raised by the parties, this appeal should result in a straightforward affirmance.

2014Id. ¶ 14. ¶25 Later, in In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38 , 266 P.3d 702 , the supreme court reiterated the Johnson principle when it stated that ‚*i+n determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, we focus on whether the court has authority over the general class of cases to which the particular case at issue belongs, rather than on the specific facts presented by any individual case.‛ Id. ¶¶ 33–34.

2014Id. ¶ 14. ¶25 Later, in In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38 , 266 P.3d 702 , the supreme court reiterated the Johnson principle when it stated that ‚*i+n determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, we focus on whether the court has authority over the general class of cases to which the particular case at issue belongs, rather than on the specific facts presented by any individual case.‛ Id. ¶¶ 33–34.

2013Rather, "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (8) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 18 Johnson's claim is not preserved because he did not raise it "in a timely fashion." See id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2013Rather, "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (8) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 18 Johnson's claim is not preserved because he did not raise it "in a timely fashion." See id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2012App. P. 24(j); Bernat v. Allphin, 2005 UT 1, ¶ 38 , 106 P.3d 707 ). ¶31 The section of Johnson’s brief addressing estoppel, waiver, and laches does not satisfy the requirements of rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

2012App. P. 24(j); Bernat v. Allphin, 2005 UT 1, ¶ 38 , 106 P.3d 707 ). ¶31 The section of Johnson’s brief addressing estoppel, waiver, and laches does not satisfy the requirements of rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

2012Second, "when the purpose of an amendment is to clarify the meaning of an earlier enactment, the amendment may be applied retroactively in pending actions" in "those narrow cireum-stances in which the state legislature disagrees with this court's interpretation of a law and attempts to clarify that law's meaning through the amendment process." Id. 11 & n. 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 17 Under this framework, Amended Seetion 402 cannot apply retroactively to Johnson's motion to reduce his convictions.

2006The role of the trial court at sentencing has been thoroughly discussed by the supreme court in Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993).

2006ORME, Judge. *892 BENCH, Presiding Judge (concurring): ¶ 26 In my recent dissent in Shaw Resources Limited, L.L.C. v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P.C., 2006 UT App 313,¶¶ 61-68 , 142 P.3d 560 , I pointed out that "[t]he traditional rule is that summary judgment is available only where the moving party can affirmatively demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material issues of fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. at ¶ 62 (quotations and citation omitted).

2006ORME, Judge. *892 BENCH, Presiding Judge (concurring): ¶ 26 In my recent dissent in Shaw Resources Limited, L.L.C. v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P.C., 2006 UT App 313,¶¶ 61-68 , 142 P.3d 560 , I pointed out that "[t]he traditional rule is that summary judgment is available only where the moving party can affirmatively demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material issues of fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. at ¶ 62 (quotations and citation omitted).

1997It noted that the ninety-day statute of limitations for habeas corpus actions contained in the Code, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992), had been declared invalid under the Utah State Constitution by the court of appeals in Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357 (Ct.App.1993), cert, denied sub nom.

1997We recognize that the ninety-day statute of limitations applicable to habeas corpus actions has been declared unconstitutional. *676 See Currier, 862 P.2d 1357 (holding that ninety-day statute of limitations on habeas actions is unreasonable limitation that violates article I, section 11 of Utah Constitution); see also Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 681 (Utah 1995) (upholding court of appeals’ ruling that petition for habeas corpus was not barred by statute of limitations because section 78-12-31.1 had been declared unconstitutional by Currier).

1997At that time, section 78-12-36 (1977) and this court’s decision in Smith, 803 P.2d 788 , would have tolled the statute of limitations as long as Johnson remained imprisoned.

1997In Fernandez, 783 P.2d at 549 , we held that where the same attorney allegedly gave ineffective counsel both at trial and on appeal, this may serve as a basis for a habeas corpus action under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

1994Because the invocation of our supervisory powers in Ireland demonstrates a commitment on the part of this court to prospectively prohibit the use of the offending language, the Ireland/Johnson rule is not entitled to retroactive application under our holding in Norton, 675 P.2d at 584 .

1994Because the invocation of our supervisory powers in Ireland demonstrates a commitment on the part of this court to prospectively prohibit the use of the offending language, the Ireland/Johnson rule is not entitled to retroactive application under our holding in Norton, 675 P.2d at 584 .