Johnson claim in Washington

2014Former RCW 46.20.342(l)(c)(iv) includes, as an underlying basis for suspension supporting a DWLS 3rd charge, suspension imposed because an individual did not “comply with the terms of a notice of traffic infraction or citation, as provided in ¡former] RCW 46.20.289.” (Emphasis added.) “To be reasonable, an interpretation must, at a minimum, account for all the words in a statute.” Five Corners Family Farmers v. State, 173 Wn.2d 296, 312 , 268 P.3d 892 (2011).

2014Former RCW 46.20.342(l)(c)(iv) includes, as an underlying basis for suspension supporting a DWLS 3rd charge, suspension imposed because an individual did not “comply with the terms of a notice of traffic infraction or citation, as provided in ¡former] RCW 46.20.289.” (Emphasis added.) “To be reasonable, an interpretation must, at a minimum, account for all the words in a statute.” Five Corners Family Farmers v. State, 173 Wn.2d 296, 312 , 268 P.3d 892 (2011).

2013We find this reasoning equally applicable to Johnson’s claim. ¶22 Nevertheless, Johnson maintains that Lasswell v. City of Johnston City, 436 F. Supp. 2d 974 (S.D.

2013Nevertheless, Johnson maintains that Lasswell v. City of Johnston City, 436 F.Supp.2d 974 (S.D.

2012Johnson, 529 U.S. at 702 , 120 S.Ct. 1795 . ¶ 43 The Johnson Court's later discussion of whether the 1994 amendment increased the measure of punishment for Johnson's violation of supervised release was entirely separate from its discussion of retroactivity.

2012Johnson, 529 U.S. at 702 . ¶43 The Johnson Court’s later discussion of whether the 1994 amendment increased the measure of punishment for Johnson’s violation of supervised release was entirely separate from its discussion of retroactivity.

2011Johnson, 147 Wash.App. at 287 , 194 P.3d 1009 .

2011Johnson, 147 Wash.App. at 287 , 194 P.3d 1009 .

2010App. 641 , 226 P.3d 783 (2010); see also ER 103(a)(1) (error may not be predicated on ruling admitting evidence absent a timely motion stating the specific ground for the objection); State v. Mierz, 127 Wn.2d 460, 468 , 901 P.2d 286 (1995) (defendant waives right to challenge admission of evidence gained in an illegal search or seizure by failing to move to suppress the evidence at trial). 18 Accordingly, we uphold the trial court’s denial of Johnson’s motion to suppress without addressing the State’s other arguments.

2010App. 641 , 226 P.3d 783 (2010); see also ER 103(a)(1) (error may not be predicated on ruling admitting evidence absent a timely motion stating the specific ground for the objection); State v. Mierz, 127 Wn.2d 460, 468 , 901 P.2d 286 (1995) (defendant waives right to challenge admission of evidence gained in an illegal search or seizure by failing to move to suppress the evidence at trial). 18 Accordingly, we uphold the trial court’s denial of Johnson’s motion to suppress without addressing the State’s other arguments.

2007State v. Cho, 108 Wash.App. 315, 320 , 30 P.3d 496 (2001).

2007State v. Cho, 108 Wn.

2006Johnson v. Morris, 87 Wn.2d 922, 927-28 , 557 P.2d 1299 (1976) (citations omitted); accord State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d 614, 629 , 106 P.3d 196 (2005). f 14 Applying the Johnson rule to the Williams decision, Halgren argues that the trial court never had the authority to order the CR 35 examination and the results were therefore inadmissible.

2006Johnson v. Morris, 87 Wn.2d 922, 927-28 , 557 P.2d 1299 (1976) (citations omitted); accord State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d 614, 629 , 106 P.3d 196 (2005). f 14 Applying the Johnson rule to the Williams decision, Halgren argues that the trial court never had the authority to order the CR 35 examination and the results were therefore inadmissible.

2026A bill of particulars is “intended to amplify [the information] and to aid the defendant in the preparation of a proper defense.” Id. 29 No. 59978-3-II The trial court denied Johnson’s motion for a bill of particulars except as to the alleged deliberate cruelty aggravator for each count.

2024Johnson relies on In re Personal Restraint of Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d 861, 876 , 50 P.3d 618 (2002) for the proposition that a miscalculated offender score is a fundamental defect that results in a complete miscarriage of justice requiring resentencing.

2024Johnson relies on In re Personal Restraint of Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d 861, 876 , 50 P.3d 618 (2002) for the proposition that a miscalculated offender score is a fundamental defect that results in a complete miscarriage of justice requiring resentencing.

2024Modica, 136 Wn.

2019The affidavit also establishes that Phillip did not want to discuss with police whether he had traveled to Auburn This fact may have indicated to police that further investigation was warranted, but it does not establish a connection sufficient to infer that evidence of the crime would likely be found in Phillips cell phone records “Absent a sufficient basis in fact from which to conclude evidence of illegal activity will likely be found at the place to be searched, a reasonable nexus is not established as a matter of law” Them, 138 Wn 2d at 147 [41 See ~g, State v Smith, 93 Wn 2d 329, 352, 61

2019The affidavit also establishes that Phillip did not want to discuss with police whether he had traveled to Auburn This fact may have indicated to police that further investigation was warranted, but it does not establish a connection sufficient to infer that evidence of the crime would likely be found in Phillips cell phone records “Absent a sufficient basis in fact from which to conclude evidence of illegal activity will likely be found at the place to be searched, a reasonable nexus is not established as a matter of law” Them, 138 Wn 2d at 147 [41 See ~g, State v Smith, 93 Wn 2d 329, 352, 61

2019The affidavit also establishes that Phillip did not want to discuss with police whether he had traveled to Auburn This fact may have indicated to police that further investigation was warranted, but it does not establish a connection sufficient to infer that evidence of the crime would likely be found in Phillips cell phone records “Absent a sufficient basis in fact from which to conclude evidence of illegal activity will likely be found at the place to be searched, a reasonable nexus is not established as a matter of law” Them, 138 Wn 2d at 147 [41 See ~g, State v Smith, 93 Wn 2d 329, 352, 61

2019The affidavit also establishes that Phillip did not want to discuss with police whether he had traveled to Auburn This fact may have indicated to police that further investigation was warranted, but it does not establish a connection sufficient to infer that evidence of the crime would likely be found in Phillips cell phone records “Absent a sufficient basis in fact from which to conclude evidence of illegal activity will likely be found at the place to be searched, a reasonable nexus is not established as a matter of law” Them, 138 Wn 2d at 147 [41 See ~g, State v Smith, 93 Wn 2d 329, 352, 61

2017He explained that "[Johnson's] psychiatric issues became more notable as the claim evolved, I 11 Ruse, 138 Wn.2d at 7 ("The worker must prove a condition of the job. . . caused the disability."); Cyr v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 47 Wn.2d 92, 95 , 286 P.2d 1038 (1955) ("The causal relationship between an injury and a subsequent disability or death must be established by medical testimony."); Kralevich v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 23 Wn.2d 640, 656 , 161 P.2d 661 (1945) (explaining that while witnesses may generally testify about the existence of a condition, the cause of the condition is "a scien

2017He explained that "[Johnson's] psychiatric issues became more notable as the claim evolved, I 11 Ruse, 138 Wn.2d at 7 ("The worker must prove a condition of the job. . . caused the disability."); Cyr v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 47 Wn.2d 92, 95 , 286 P.2d 1038 (1955) ("The causal relationship between an injury and a subsequent disability or death must be established by medical testimony."); Kralevich v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 23 Wn.2d 640, 656 , 161 P.2d 661 (1945) (explaining that while witnesses may generally testify about the existence of a condition, the cause of the condition is "a scien

2017He explained that "[Johnson's] psychiatric issues became more notable as the claim evolved, I 11 Ruse, 138 Wn.2d at 7 ("The worker must prove a condition of the job. . . caused the disability."); Cyr v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 47 Wn.2d 92, 95 , 286 P.2d 1038 (1955) ("The causal relationship between an injury and a subsequent disability or death must be established by medical testimony."); Kralevich v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 23 Wn.2d 640, 656 , 161 P.2d 661 (1945) (explaining that while witnesses may generally testify about the existence of a condition, the cause of the condition is "a scien

2017He explained that "[Johnson's] psychiatric issues became more notable as the claim evolved, I 11 Ruse, 138 Wn.2d at 7 ("The worker must prove a condition of the job. . . caused the disability."); Cyr v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 47 Wn.2d 92, 95 , 286 P.2d 1038 (1955) ("The causal relationship between an injury and a subsequent disability or death must be established by medical testimony."); Kralevich v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 23 Wn.2d 640, 656 , 161 P.2d 661 (1945) (explaining that while witnesses may generally testify about the existence of a condition, the cause of the condition is "a scien