Johnson factors in Texas

2018For example, the Andersen factors do not assist in any in-depth analysis of the hours reasonably expended on the litigation, this Court must 1 Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 , 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974) (the “Johnson factors”),1 abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989). 6 resolve issues of reasonable hourly rates, reasonable hours expended on the task in questions, and the adequacy of the billing records allowing a court to determine what exactly was done.

2015Under the lodestar method, a determination of what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee involves two steps: 1. the trial court is to calculate the lodestar itself by multiplying the reasonable hours spent by counsel in the case by the reasonable hourly rate for such work; and 2. the trial court can adjust the base lodestar up or down (apply a multiplier) if relevant factors12 indicate an adjustment is necessary to reach a reasonable fee in the case. 12These factors are commonly referred to as the Johnson factors in federal court, based on Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (

2013Johnson, *484 488 F.2d at 717-19 ; see also Dillard Department Stores, Inc., 72 S.W.3d at 412 (noting that if some of the Johnson factors are accounted for in the lodestar amount, they should not be considered when making adjustments).

2013Johnson, *484 488 F.2d at 717-19 ; see also Dillard Department Stores, Inc., 72 S.W.3d at 412 (noting that if some of the Johnson factors are accounted for in the lodestar amount, they should not be considered when making adjustments).

2019The United States Supreme Court refined the lodestar method in *492 Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424 , 103 S.Ct. 1933 , 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), adopting a hybrid approach for calculating reasonable attorney's fees that shared elements of both the lodestar method and Johnson factors.

2019The United States Supreme Court refined the lodestar method in *492 Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424 , 103 S.Ct. 1933 , 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), adopting a hybrid approach for calculating reasonable attorney's fees that shared elements of both the lodestar method and Johnson factors.

2013In conclusion, we directed the trial court to grant Johnson’s motion for enforcement and to award her: (1) $ 142,500 in unpaid contractual alimony; (2) appropriate pre-judgment interest, see Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 528 (Tex. 1998) (permitting the award of pre-judgment interest based on general principles of equity); (3) reasonable attorney’s fees; and (4) costs of court. 2 Johnson stipulated to the lack of a marriage in order to avoid federal prosecution for collecting, throughout her thirteen-year cohabitation with Ventling, federal military wi

2013At a 2011 hearing, Johnson’s counsel represented to the trial court that “the law was amended . . . to make it possible for widows to marry. . . .” We express no opinion on the matter. 3 grant Johnson’s motion for enforcement and to award her: (1) $ 142,500 in unpaid contractual alimony; (2) appropriate prejudgment interest, see Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 528 (Tex. 1998) (permitting the award of prejudgment interest based on general principles of equity); (3) reasonable attorney’s fees; and (4) costs of court.

2011See Gutierrez, 543 F.3d at 255-56 .

2011See Gutierrez, 543 F.3d at 255-56 .

2007See FirstMerit Bank, N.A. , 52 S.W.3d at 758 (elements of fraud include injury suffered from reliance on false representation). 11.

2007See FirstMerit Bank, N.A. , 52 S.W.3d at 758 (elements of fraud include injury suffered from reliance on false representation). 11: The certified mail return receipt shows Stewart signed for the letter on March 25, 1983.

2018Winn, 559 U.S. 542 , 553–54 (2010), in discussing the federal “Johnson factors”1 – which are nearly identical to the Andersen factors, cautions against the sole use of the Johnson factors to calculate a reasonable attorney’s fee.

2018Winn, 559 U.S. 542 , 553–54 (2010), in discussing the federal “Johnson factors”1 – which are nearly identical to the Andersen factors, cautions against the sole use of the Johnson factors to calculate a reasonable attorney’s fee.

2017Motors Acceptance Corp., 576 F.2d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1978). 70 McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 649 F.3d 374, 384 (5th Cir. 2011) (criticizing district court for allowing discovery of defense counsel’s fees because “[n]o prior Fifth Circuit authority requires this comparison, nor does common experience” given the fundamentally different roles of opposing counsel, and that if “there were logical comparability, this court’s decisions would have recognized it in the Johnson factors [which are similar to Texas’s Arthur Andersen factors] or in past lodestar decisions”). 23 in a case.71 Such consider

2017Motors Acceptance Corp., 576 F.2d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1978). 70 McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 649 F.3d 374, 384 (5th Cir. 2011) (criticizing district court for allowing discovery of defense counsel’s fees because “[n]o prior Fifth Circuit authority requires this comparison, nor does common experience” given the fundamentally different roles of opposing counsel, and that if “there were logical comparability, this court’s decisions would have recognized it in the Johnson factors [which are similar to Texas’s Arthur Andersen factors] or in past lodestar decisions”). 23 in a case.71 Such consider

2015Johnson does not complain of these rulings in this Court. –4– light at 1000 feet and the conclusion that Pell’s actions did not violate her constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 3 A. Applicable Law The purpose of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is to “safeguard an individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy from unreasonable governmental intrusions.” See Richardson v. State, 865 S.W.2d 944, 948 (Tex. Crim.

2015Johnson does not complain of these rulings in this Court. –4– light at 1000 feet and the conclusion that Pell’s actions did not violate her constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 3 A. Applicable Law The purpose of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is to “safeguard an individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy from unreasonable governmental intrusions.” See Richardson v. State, 865 S.W.2d 944, 948 (Tex. Crim.

2014See Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327 ; State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim.

2005See Carmouche , 10 S.W.3d at 327-28 .

2012See KB Home, 295 S.W.3d at 657 (noting question whether defendant was prevailing party was not before court).

2012See KB Home, 295 S.W.3d at 657 (noting question whether defendant was prevailing party was not before court).

2012See Enron Corp. , 586 F. Supp. 2d at 756–57 (citing Shipes v. Trinity Indus. , 987 F.2d 311 , 321–22 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 991 (1993)); see also Perdue , 130 S. Ct. at 1673 (reasoning that the “lodestar includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors constituting a ‘reasonable’ attorney’s fee”).

2012See Enron Corp. , 586 F. Supp. 2d at 756–57 (citing Shipes v. Trinity Indus. , 987 F.2d 311 , 321–22 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 991 (1993)); see also Perdue , 130 S. Ct. at 1673 (reasoning that the “lodestar includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors constituting a ‘reasonable’ attorney’s fee”).

2012See Enron Corp. , 586 F. Supp. 2d at 756–57 (citing Shipes v. Trinity Indus. , 987 F.2d 311 , 321–22 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 991 (1993)); see also Perdue , 130 S. Ct. at 1673 (reasoning that the “lodestar includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors constituting a ‘reasonable’ attorney’s fee”).

2012To rely on Johnson factors both to justify high rates and to justify the application of a multiplier would result in a duplicative award of fees. both specific evidence on the record and detailed findings by the lower courts.‖ Shipes, 987 F.2d at 320. 6 At the request of Stratton, the trial court conducted an exhaustive hearing on December 17, 2010, and thereafter declined to modify the original Order and Final Judgment.

2012“While the lodestar is relevant to determining a fee award, it is not the sole basis for determining that award; the Johnson factors are applicable to deciding whether the lodestar is reasonable, as well as to adjusting that award by a multiplier once the lodestar is calculated.” In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig. , 586 F. Supp. 2d 732, 755 (S.D.

2012“While the lodestar is relevant to determining a fee award, it is not the sole basis for determining that award; the Johnson factors are applicable to deciding whether the lodestar is reasonable, as well as to adjusting that award by a multiplier once the lodestar is calculated.” In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig. , 586 F. Supp. 2d 732, 755 (S.D.

2012Penney Co ., 98 F.3d 817, 823 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that it would not reverse the decision of a court that fails to discuss a Johnson factor “so long as the record clearly indicates that the district court has utilized the Johnson framework as the basis of its analysis, has not proceeded in a summary fashion, and has arrived at an amount that can be said to be just compensation”) (quoting Cobb v. Miller , 818 F.2d 1227, 1232 (5th Cir. 1987)); Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co. , 624 F.2d 575, 584 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that “we should go slow in finding that” a trial judge abused his

2012Penney Co ., 98 F.3d 817, 823 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that it would not reverse the decision of a court that fails to discuss a Johnson factor “so long as the record clearly indicates that the district court has utilized the Johnson framework as the basis of its analysis, has not proceeded in a summary fashion, and has arrived at an amount that can be said to be just compensation”) (quoting Cobb v. Miller , 818 F.2d 1227, 1232 (5th Cir. 1987)); Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co. , 624 F.2d 575, 584 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that “we should go slow in finding that” a trial judge abused his

2011See Leonard v. Abbott, 171 S.W.3d 451, 456-58 (Tex.App.--Austin 2005, pet. denied); accord Dolenz v. Boundy, No. 05-08-01052-CV, 2009 Tex. App. Lexis 9196, at *9 (Tex.App.--Dallas, December 2, 2009, no pet.) (mem.op.) (both rejecting open courts challenges to Chapter 11).

2011See Leonard v. Abbott, 171 S.W.3d 451, 456-58 (Tex.App.--Austin 2005, pet. denied); accord Dolenz v. Boundy, No. 05-08-01052-CV, 2009 Tex. App. Lexis 9196, at *9 (Tex.App.--Dallas, December 2, 2009, no pet.) (mem.op.) (both rejecting open courts challenges to Chapter 11).

2011First, his brief refers to the trial court’s error as “fundamental error.” He cites to the discussion of fundamental error in Operation Rescue-National v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & SE Tex., Inc., 975 S.W.2d 546, 569 (Tex. 1998), in which the court discussed complaints that may be addressed on appeal even though not raised in the trial court.

2011First, his brief refers to the trial court's error as "fundamental error." He cites to the discussion of fundamental error in Operation Rescue-National v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & SE Tex., Inc., 975 S.W.2d 546, 569 (Tex. 1998), in which the court discussed complaints that may be addressed on appeal even though not raised in the trial court.

2010Corp., 652 S.W.2d at 364 ; Hill, 40 S.W.3d at 678 . 4 Johnson’s motion for rehearing purports to incorporate by reference three documents he claims to have filed in the agency proceeding.

2010Corp., 652 S.W.2d at 364 ; Hill, 40 S.W.3d at 678 . 4 Johnson’s motion for rehearing purports to incorporate by reference three documents he claims to have filed in the agency proceeding.

2010See Villagomez , 210 S.W.3d at 728 .

2010See Villagomez, 210 S.W.3d at 728 .

2010Estelle Unit, 23 S.W.3d 420, 422 ( Tex.App .—Houston [1 st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (court may presume claim is substantially similar under § 14.003(b )( 4) to previous claim filed by inmate in absence of affidavit describing previous claims). [7] Johnson’s brief contains also other conclusory statements, including assertions that the trial court’s application of chapter 11 violates the separation of powers under the Texas Constitution and that the trial court’s order constitutes a crime.

2010Estelle Unit, 23 S.W.3d 420, 422 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (court may presume claim is substantially similar under § 14.003(b)(4) to previous claim filed by inmate in absence of affidavit describing previous claims). 7 Johnson’s brief contains also other conclusory statements, including assertions that the trial court’s application of chapter 11 violates the separation of powers under the Texas Constitution and that the trial court’s order constitutes a crime.

2006See State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).

2006See State v. Ross , 32 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Tex. Crim.

2002Standard of Review "A settlement agreement is a contract, and its construction is governed by legal principles applicable to contracts generally." Doniz v. McLaughlin , 981 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).

2002STANDARD OF REVIEW “A settlement agreement is a contract, and its construction is governed by legal principles applicable to contracts generally.” Donzis v. McLaughlin, 981 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).

2011A. Standard of review Although Johnson’s brief recites now-defunct caselaw suggesting separate standards of review for legal and factual sufficiency, see Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim.

2010See Brooks v. State, No. PD-0210-09, 2010 WL 3894613, at **1, 14 (Tex. Crim.

2007Keller , 125 S.W.3d at 604–05 (citing Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 318–19, 99 S. Ct. 2781 , 2788–89 (1979), and Johnson v. State , 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim.

2007Keller , 125 S.W.3d at 604–05 (citing Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 318–19, 99 S. Ct. 2781 , 2788–89 (1979), and Johnson v. State , 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim.

2001After calculating *529 the lodestar amount, “the district court can adjust the amount upward or downward to account for the well-established Johnson factors.” Id. (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974)).

2001After calculating *529 the lodestar amount, “the district court can adjust the amount upward or downward to account for the well-established Johnson factors.” Id. (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974)).

2026Cf. In re K.B., 143 S.W.3d 194, 200 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.) (determining that evidence was legally insufficient for rational juror to find beyond reasonable doubt that metal pipe was deadly weapon because there was no evidence of proximity between victim and pipe, of pipe’s size and shape, of manner in which defendant used pipe, or of any injuries to victim caused by pipe). 11 B.

2026Cf. In re K.B., 143 S.W.3d 194, 200 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.) (determining that evidence was legally insufficient for rational juror to find beyond reasonable doubt that metal pipe was deadly weapon because there was no evidence of proximity between victim and pipe, of pipe’s size and shape, of manner in which defendant used pipe, or of any injuries to victim caused by pipe). 11 B.