Johnson claim in Pennsylvania

2026See Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978 A.2d 995, 998 (Pa. Super. 2009) (stating that where counsel files an Anders brief, this Court will review discretionary sentencing claim despite the failure to raise a substantial question to determine whether counsel is entitled to withdraw).

2018See Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978 A.2d 995, 998 (Pa. Super. 2009) (stating that while appellant failed to raise a substantial question on his discretionary aspects of sentencing claim, this Court would address the merits of the claim due to appellant’s counsel’s petition to withdraw as counsel); Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 783 A.2d 784, 787 (Pa. Super. 2001) (concluding that Anders requires review of issues otherwise waived on appeal).

2025See Commonwealth v. Perry, 883 A.2d 599, 602 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding that appellant raised a substantial question by arguing that the trial court’s sole focus on the seriousness of his offense was contrary to the fundamental norms of the sentencing process).

2015“This Court has held that an excessive sentence claim — in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors — raises a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa.Super.2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Perry, 883 A.2d 599, 602 (Pa.Super.2005)). 2 Thus, we will address the merits of Johnson’s claim.

2018See Caldwell, supra. Nevertheless, in light of the fact that Attorney Fiscus has filed an Anders brief and Petition to Withdraw, we will briefly address Johnson’s challenge to his sentence.

2016See Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 770 ; see also Commonwealth v. Bonner, 135 A.3d 592, 604 (Pa. Super. 2016) (concluding that a claim that appellant’s standard range, consecutive sentences were excessive and the trial court failed to consider appellant’s rehabilitative needs raised a substantial question); Dodge, 77 A.3d at 1273 (finding that “[a]ppellant’s claim that the [trial] court disregarded rehabilitation and the nature and circumstances of the offense in handing down its sentence presents a substantial question for our review.”).

2018See Commonwealth v. Keaton, 45 A.3d 1050, 1061 (Pa. 2012) (“Failure to establish any prong of the test will defeat an ineffectiveness claim.”).

2018See, Commonwealth v. Keaton, 615 Pa. 675 , 45 A.3d 1050 (2012) (trial court was justified in denying capital murder defendant's motion for change of court-appointed counsel when after hearing defendant's reasons for wanting different counsel and hearing counsel's side of the issue court concluded although defendant and trial counsel obviously disliked working together, there was no reason counsel was incapable of zealously representing defendant); Commonwealth v. Cook, 597 Pa. 572 , 952 A.2d 594 (2008) (appointment of independent 2 At the I /5/ 17, I /13/17, and 3/7/17 proceedings Judge Kiniry

2026See Becker, 202 A.3d at 722 .5 Johnson’s next claim asserts the trial court improperly cited Doman v. Brogan, 592 A.2d 104 (Pa. Super. 1991), which he asserts is factually distinguishable from this case.

2026See Becker, 202 A.3d at 722.5 Johnson’s next claim asserts the trial court improperly cited Doman v. Brogan, 592 A.2d 104 (Pa. Super. 1991), which he asserts is factually distinguishable from this case.

2026See Eisenberg, 98 A.3d at 1275 .

2026With respect to Johnson’s claim challenging his trial counsel’s failure to investigate and impeach the jailhouse informant (George Lewis), the Court’s focus should be on the prejudice prong.2 Prejudice exists if there is a “reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance.” Daniels, 104 A.3d at 281 (citations omitted).

2026A reasonable probability is less than “more likely than not[.]” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693, 697 (1984)).

2026However, in making that determination, we observed that the defendant’s “identity as the robber and killer has never seriously been put into contest,” and “the fact of [the] crime was apparent from the physical evidence, and [the defendant] ha[d] never provided any plausible explanation that would persuasively suggest any other person’s involvement in the relevant events.”153 150 PCRA Ct. Op. at 28. 151 162 A.3d 394, 401 (Pa. 2017). 152 Id. at 400 . 153 Id. at 401 . [J-31-2025] - 60 Here, by contrast, identity is central to Johnson’s defense, and the DNA evidence in question is the only physic

2026However, in making that determination, we observed that the defendant’s “identity as the robber and killer has never seriously been put into contest,” and “the fact of [the] crime was apparent from the physical evidence, and [the defendant] ha[d] never provided any plausible explanation that would persuasively suggest any other person’s involvement in the relevant events.”153 150 PCRA Ct. Op. at 28. 151 162 A.3d 394, 401 (Pa. 2017). 152 Id. at 400 . 153 Id. at 401 . [J-31-2025] - 60 Here, by contrast, identity is central to Johnson’s defense, and the DNA evidence in question is the only physic

2026See Becker, 202 A.3d at 722 .5 Johnson’s next claim asserts the trial court improperly cited Doman v. Brogan, 592 A.2d 104 (Pa. Super. 1991), which he asserts is factually distinguishable from this case.

2026See Becker, 202 A.3d at 722.5 Johnson’s next claim asserts the trial court improperly cited Doman v. Brogan, 592 A.2d 104 (Pa. Super. 1991), which he asserts is factually distinguishable from this case.

2026A reasonable probability is less than “more likely than not[.]” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693, 697 (1984)).

2025See Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 339 (Pa. Super. 2015) (finding “an excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a substantial question.”) (citation omitted).

2025See Hart, 174 A.3d at 664-65; see also Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 311 (Pa. Super. 2023) (stating that credibility determinations and the resolution of conflicting evidence are exclusively within the province of the trial court - 10 - when sitting as the factfinder, and that this Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder).

2024Before reviewing the merits of Johnson’s claim, we must determine whether: “(1) the appeal is timely; (2) the appellant has preserved his issue; (3) his brief includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of an appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of his sentence; and (4) the concise statement raises a substantial question whether the sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Green, 204 A.3d 469, 488 (Pa.Super. 2019); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) (stating that an appellant who challenges -6- the discretionary aspects of a sentence “

2024See Jones, supra. In his second sub-issue, Johnson argues that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause to search for the dark jacket with “White” written on the back and his cellphone data.

2024See Harlan, supra. In his third sub-issue, Johnson argues that the search warrant “should have been suppressed because [the] warrant []lacked particularity and [was] overbroad.” Brief for Appellant, at 9.

2023See Commonwealth v. Porter, 35 A.3d 4 , 21-22 (Pa. 2012) (finding lack of diligence where defendant failed to explain why he could not have spoken to known witness in the decades between the trial and the discovery of new fact).