Johnson motion in South Carolina

2018As to the denial of Johnson's motion for a directed verdict: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Buckmon, 347 S.C. 316, 321 , 555 S.E.2d 402, 404 (2001) ("If there is any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, [this court] must find the case was properly submitted to the jury."); State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 593 , 606 S.E.2d 475, 4

2018As to the denial of Johnson's motion for a directed verdict: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Buckmon, 347 S.C. 316, 321 , 555 S.E.2d 402, 404 (2001) ("If there is any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, [this court] must find the case was properly submitted to the jury."); State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 593 , 606 S.E.2d 475, 4

2024Johnson's motion to set 1 380 S.C. 563, 573 , 671 S.E.2d 87, 92-93 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding employer and employee met the surprise or excusable neglect requirement under Rule 60(b)(1) when the plaintiffs had negotiated with the employer and employee's insurer, sent the insurer a draft complaint naming the employer and employee as defendants, and stated they would send insurer a copy of the complaint but brought suit against only the employee without informing the insurer or employer), aff'd, 395 S.C. 85 , 716 S.E.2d 887 (2011). aside the default argued the Greens did not properly serve their c

2024Johnson's motion to set 1 380 S.C. 563, 573 , 671 S.E.2d 87, 92-93 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding employer and employee met the surprise or excusable neglect requirement under Rule 60(b)(1) when the plaintiffs had negotiated with the employer and employee's insurer, sent the insurer a draft complaint naming the employer and employee as defendants, and stated they would send insurer a copy of the complaint but brought suit against only the employee without informing the insurer or employer), aff'd, 395 S.C. 85 , 716 S.E.2d 887 (2011). aside the default argued the Greens did not properly serve their c

2021Cf. Riley, 414 S.C. at 193–95, 777 S.E.2d at 829–30 (observing that the plaintiff presented expert testimony that the decedent's family suffered over $228,000 in economic damages; stating that the circuit court "was well aware that the [$300,000] jury verdict included an award of noneconomic damages, yet . . . articulated compelling circumstances that [the circuit court] believed warranted the nisi additur;" and holding that there was no abuse of discretion); Waring, 341 S.C. at 260 , 533 S.E.2d at 912 ("As to Johnson's claim the jury's verdict may have been intended to represent a portion of

2021Cf. Riley, 414 S.C. at 193–95, 777 S.E.2d at 829–30 (observing that the plaintiff presented expert testimony that the decedent's family suffered over $228,000 in economic damages; stating that the circuit court "was well aware that the [$300,000] jury verdict included an award of noneconomic damages, yet . . . articulated compelling circumstances that [the circuit court] believed warranted the nisi additur;" and holding that there was no abuse of discretion); Waring, 341 S.C. at 260 , 533 S.E.2d at 912 ("As to Johnson's claim the jury's verdict may have been intended to represent a portion of

2021The jury's award of exactly the amount of Waring's medical expenses, to the penny, is an attempt to reimburse her for those very expenses."); Williams v. Robertson Gilchrist Const. Co., 301 S.C. 153, 155 , 390 S.E.2d 483, 484 (Ct. App. 1990), overruled on other grounds by O'Neal v. Bowles, 314 S.C. 525 , 431 S.E.2d 555 (1993) (concurring in the circuit court's conclusion that a damages award in the exact amount of the economic losses as presented by the plaintiff's expert economist indicated the jury's disregard of testimony concerning a funeral bill and non-economic losses); Jones v. Ingles S

2021The jury's award of exactly the amount of Waring's medical expenses, to the penny, is an attempt to reimburse her for those very expenses."); Williams v. Robertson Gilchrist Const. Co., 301 S.C. 153, 155 , 390 S.E.2d 483, 484 (Ct. App. 1990), overruled on other grounds by O'Neal v. Bowles, 314 S.C. 525 , 431 S.E.2d 555 (1993) (concurring in the circuit court's conclusion that a damages award in the exact amount of the economic losses as presented by the plaintiff's expert economist indicated the jury's disregard of testimony concerning a funeral bill and non-economic losses); Jones v. Ingles S

2021The jury's award of exactly the amount of Waring's medical expenses, to the penny, is an attempt to reimburse her for those very expenses."); Williams v. Robertson Gilchrist Const. Co., 301 S.C. 153, 155 , 390 S.E.2d 483, 484 (Ct. App. 1990), overruled on other grounds by O'Neal v. Bowles, 314 S.C. 525 , 431 S.E.2d 555 (1993) (concurring in the circuit court's conclusion that a damages award in the exact amount of the economic losses as presented by the plaintiff's expert economist indicated the jury's disregard of testimony concerning a funeral bill and non-economic losses); Jones v. Ingles S

2021The jury's award of exactly the amount of Waring's medical expenses, to the penny, is an attempt to reimburse her for those very expenses."); Williams v. Robertson Gilchrist Const. Co., 301 S.C. 153, 155 , 390 S.E.2d 483, 484 (Ct. App. 1990), overruled on other grounds by O'Neal v. Bowles, 314 S.C. 525 , 431 S.E.2d 555 (1993) (concurring in the circuit court's conclusion that a damages award in the exact amount of the economic losses as presented by the plaintiff's expert economist indicated the jury's disregard of testimony concerning a funeral bill and non-economic losses); Jones v. Ingles S

2018See State v. Rowlands , 343 S.C. 454 , 457-58, 539 S.E.2d 717 , 719 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Whether a mistrial is manifestly necessary is a fact specific inquiry."); id . ("It is not a mechanically applied standard, but rather is a determination that must be made in the context of the specific difficulty facing the trial judge." (quoting Gilliam v. Foster , 75 F.3d 881 , 895 (4th Cir. 1996) ) ); State v. Bantan , 387 S.C. 412 , 417, 692 S.E.2d 201 , 203-04 (Ct. App. 2010) ("The trial court should exhaust other methods to cure possible prejudice before aborting a trial."). **459 C.

2018See State v. Rowlands , 343 S.C. 454 , 457-58, 539 S.E.2d 717 , 719 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Whether a mistrial is manifestly necessary is a fact specific inquiry."); id . ("It is not a mechanically applied standard, but rather is a determination that must be made in the context of the specific difficulty facing the trial judge." (quoting Gilliam v. Foster , 75 F.3d 881 , 895 (4th Cir. 1996) ) ); State v. Bantan , 387 S.C. 412 , 417, 692 S.E.2d 201 , 203-04 (Ct. App. 2010) ("The trial court should exhaust other methods to cure possible prejudice before aborting a trial."). **459 C.

2018As to the denial of Johnson's motion for a directed verdict: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Buckmon, 347 S.C. 316, 321 , 555 S.E.2d 402, 404 (2001) ("If there is any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, [this court] must find the case was properly submitted to the jury."); State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 593 , 606 S.E.2d 475, 4

2018As to the denial of Johnson's motion for a directed verdict: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Buckmon, 347 S.C. 316, 321 , 555 S.E.2d 402, 404 (2001) ("If there is any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, [this court] must find the case was properly submitted to the jury."); State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 593 , 606 S.E.2d 475, 4

2018See State v. Wiley , 387 S.C. 490 , 495, 692 S.E.2d 560 , 563 (Ct. App. 2010) ("The decision to grant or deny a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court."); id . ("The trial court's decision will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion amounting to an error of law."); State v. Moore , 257 S.C. 147 , 152-53, 184 S.E.2d 546 , 549 (1971) ("We think that when a jury or members thereof see an accused outside the courtroom in chains or handcuffs the situation is psychologically different and less likely to create prejudice in the minds of the jurors." (quoting Sta

2018See State v. Wiley , 387 S.C. 490 , 495, 692 S.E.2d 560 , 563 (Ct. App. 2010) ("The decision to grant or deny a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court."); id . ("The trial court's decision will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion amounting to an error of law."); State v. Moore , 257 S.C. 147 , 152-53, 184 S.E.2d 546 , 549 (1971) ("We think that when a jury or members thereof see an accused outside the courtroom in chains or handcuffs the situation is psychologically different and less likely to create prejudice in the minds of the jurors." (quoting Sta

2018See State v. Rowlands , 343 S.C. 454 , 457-58, 539 S.E.2d 717 , 719 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Whether a mistrial is manifestly necessary is a fact specific inquiry."); id . ("It is not a mechanically applied standard, but rather is a determination that must be made in the context of the specific difficulty facing the trial judge." (quoting Gilliam v. Foster , 75 F.3d 881 , 895 (4th Cir. 1996) ) ); State v. Bantan , 387 S.C. 412 , 417, 692 S.E.2d 201 , 203-04 (Ct. App. 2010) ("The trial court should exhaust other methods to cure possible prejudice before aborting a trial."). **459 C.

2018See State v. Rowlands , 343 S.C. 454 , 457-58, 539 S.E.2d 717 , 719 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Whether a mistrial is manifestly necessary is a fact specific inquiry."); id . ("It is not a mechanically applied standard, but rather is a determination that must be made in the context of the specific difficulty facing the trial judge." (quoting Gilliam v. Foster , 75 F.3d 881 , 895 (4th Cir. 1996) ) ); State v. Bantan , 387 S.C. 412 , 417, 692 S.E.2d 201 , 203-04 (Ct. App. 2010) ("The trial court should exhaust other methods to cure possible prejudice before aborting a trial."). **459 C.

2018As to the denial of Johnson's motion for a directed verdict: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Buckmon, 347 S.C. 316, 321 , 555 S.E.2d 402, 404 (2001) ("If there is any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, [this court] must find the case was properly submitted to the jury."); State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 593 , 606 S.E.2d 475, 4

2018As to the denial of Johnson's motion for a directed verdict: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292 , 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate."); State v. Buckmon, 347 S.C. 316, 321 , 555 S.E.2d 402, 404 (2001) ("If there is any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, [this court] must find the case was properly submitted to the jury."); State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 593 , 606 S.E.2d 475, 4

2018See State v. Wiley , 387 S.C. 490 , 495, 692 S.E.2d 560 , 563 (Ct. App. 2010) ("The decision to grant or deny a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court."); id . ("The trial court's decision will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion amounting to an error of law."); State v. Moore , 257 S.C. 147 , 152-53, 184 S.E.2d 546 , 549 (1971) ("We think that when a jury or members thereof see an accused outside the courtroom in chains or handcuffs the situation is psychologically different and less likely to create prejudice in the minds of the jurors." (quoting Sta

2018See State v. Wiley , 387 S.C. 490 , 495, 692 S.E.2d 560 , 563 (Ct. App. 2010) ("The decision to grant or deny a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court."); id . ("The trial court's decision will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion amounting to an error of law."); State v. Moore , 257 S.C. 147 , 152-53, 184 S.E.2d 546 , 549 (1971) ("We think that when a jury or members thereof see an accused outside the courtroom in chains or handcuffs the situation is psychologically different and less likely to create prejudice in the minds of the jurors." (quoting Sta

2018As to the admission of hearsay testimony: State v. Wise, 359 S.C. 14, 21 , 596 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004) ("In criminal cases, the appellate court sits only to review errors of law [that] have been properly preserved . . . ."); State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142 , 587 S.E.2d 691, 693-94 (2003) ("In order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court].

2018As to the admission of hearsay testimony: State v. Wise, 359 S.C. 14, 21 , 596 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004) ("In criminal cases, the appellate court sits only to review errors of law [that] have been properly preserved . . . ."); State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142 , 587 S.E.2d 691, 693-94 (2003) ("In order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court].

2018As to the admission of hearsay testimony: State v. Wise, 359 S.C. 14, 21 , 596 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004) ("In criminal cases, the appellate court sits only to review errors of law [that] have been properly preserved . . . ."); State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142 , 587 S.E.2d 691, 693-94 (2003) ("In order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court].

2018As to the admission of hearsay testimony: State v. Wise, 359 S.C. 14, 21 , 596 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004) ("In criminal cases, the appellate court sits only to review errors of law [that] have been properly preserved . . . ."); State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142 , 587 S.E.2d 691, 693-94 (2003) ("In order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court].

2012We agree. *429 “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.” State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 561 , 647 S.E.2d 144, 161 (2007).

2012We agree. *429 “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.” State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 561 , 647 S.E.2d 144, 161 (2007).

2011Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (5)(d),(e) (Supp. 2010) (providingthis court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commission as to the weight of the evidence, but may reverse where the decision is affected by an error of law or clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record); Hargrove v. Titan Textile Co. , 360 S.C. 276, 295 , 599 S.E.2d 604, 614 (Ct. App. 2004) ("A determination of whether a claimant's condition was accelerated or aggravated by an accidental injury is a factual matter for the [Commission]."); id. at 289, 599 S.E.2d at 611 ("

2011Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (5)(d),(e) (Supp. 2010) (providingthis court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commission as to the weight of the evidence, but may reverse where the decision is affected by an error of law or clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record); Hargrove v. Titan Textile Co. , 360 S.C. 276, 295 , 599 S.E.2d 604, 614 (Ct. App. 2004) ("A determination of whether a claimant's condition was accelerated or aggravated by an accidental injury is a factual matter for the [Commission]."); id. at 289, 599 S.E.2d at 611 ("