Johnson factors in North Dakota

2013“A trial court abuses its discretion only when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, or when its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination.” Id. (citation omitted). [¶35] The district court denied Johnson’s motion, holding Johnson failed to “provide any exceptional circumstances that might justify Rule 60(b) relief.” The court noted, “[Johnson] has attempted to submit additional evidence that could have been previously provided by due diligence and then [attempts] to simply re-argue the original motions.

2013“A trial court abuses its discretion only when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, or when its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination.” Id. (citation omitted). [¶ 35] The district court denied Johnson’s motion, holding Johnson failed to “provide any exceptional circumstances that might justify Rule 60(b) relief.” The court noted, “[Johnson] has attempted to submit additional evidence that could have been previously provided by due diligence and then [attempts] to simply re-argue the original motions.

2025In State v. Johnson, the defendant’s conviction was affirmed after “Johnson’s instruction on the definition of a threat or threatening required the jury to consider Johnson’s conduct from the perspective of a reasonable person in the recipient’s position and is consistent with our prior cases.” 2021 ND 161 , 4 ¶ 13, 964 N.W.2d 500 ; see also State v. Dahl, 2009 ND 204, ¶ 7 , 776 N.W.2d 37 (“This Court has suggested that, when considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a harassment case, we consider the ‘reasonable recipient,’ rather than the ‘reasonable speaker.’”).

2025In State v. Johnson, the defendant’s conviction was affirmed after “Johnson’s instruction on the definition of a threat or threatening required the jury to consider Johnson’s conduct from the perspective of a reasonable person in the recipient’s position and is consistent with our prior cases.” 2021 ND 161 , 4 ¶ 13, 964 N.W.2d 500 ; see also State v. Dahl, 2009 ND 204, ¶ 7 , 776 N.W.2d 37 (“This Court has suggested that, when considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a harassment case, we consider the ‘reasonable recipient,’ rather than the ‘reasonable speaker.’”).

2014In Johnson , 2006 ND 122, ¶¶ 17-18 , 714 N.W.2d 832 , this Court analyzed the requirements to establish laches and concluded the district court had not abused its discretion in permitting the State to amend its answer to allege the defense of laches and in denying Johnson’s motion to amend his application to assert an untimely claim that his guilty plea was not entered intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily.

2014In Johnson , 2006 ND 122, ¶¶ 17-18 , 714 N.W.2d 832 , this Court analyzed the requirements to establish laches and concluded the district court had not abused its discretion in permitting the State to amend its answer to allege the defense of laches and in denying Johnson’s motion to amend his application to assert an untimely claim that his guilty plea was not entered intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily.

2005Schaefer, 2000 ND 187, ¶ 10 , 618 N.W.2d 175 . [¶ 19] Because of our resolution of the issues pertaining to summary judgment, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s motion for post-summary-judgment relief.

2005Schaefer, 2000 ND 187, ¶ 10 , 618 N.W.2d 175 . [¶ 19] Because of our resolution of the issues pertaining to summary judgment, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s motion for post-summary-judgment relief.

2005Heckelsmiller, 2004 ND 191, ¶ 5 , 687 N.W.2d 454 . [¶ 12] Johnson’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit.

2005Heckelsmiller, 2004 ND 191, ¶ 5 , 687 N.W.2d 454 . [¶ 12] Johnson’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit.

1995Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, n. 9 , 103 S.Ct. at 1939, n. 9 , cautioned, however, that “many of these [Johnson ] factors usually are subsumed within the initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley thus adopted a “hybrid” approach for calculating reasonable attorney fees, Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 564 , 106 S.Ct. at 3098 , an approach that combines elements of the lodestar calculation with the Johnson factors.

1995Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, n. 9 , 103 S.Ct. at 1939, n. 9 , cautioned, however, that “many of these [Johnson ] factors usually are subsumed within the initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley thus adopted a “hybrid” approach for calculating reasonable attorney fees, Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 564 , 106 S.Ct. at 3098 , an approach that combines elements of the lodestar calculation with the Johnson factors.

1995In Blum, 465 U.S. 886 , 104 S.Ct. 1541 , the Court held that reasonable attorney fees must be calculated according to the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community, regardless of whether the claimant is represented by private or by non-profit counsel.

1995In Blum, 465 U.S. 886 , 104 S.Ct. 1541 , the Court held that reasonable attorney fees must be calculated according to the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community, regardless of whether the claimant is represented by private or by non-profit counsel.

1995A plurality of the Court said in City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 , 106 S.Ct. 2686 , 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986), that counsel for prevailing claimants should be paid at a reasonable hourly rate for all time reasonably expended in pursuing a civil rights action when the claimants received only $33,500 in actual damages but obtained $245,456 in attorney fees.

1995A plurality of the Court said in City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 , 106 S.Ct. 2686 , 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986), that counsel for prevailing claimants should be paid at a reasonable hourly rate for all time reasonably expended in pursuing a civil rights action when the claimants received only $33,500 in actual damages but obtained $245,456 in attorney fees.

1985The court also denied Johnson’s motion to amend her complaint to allege fraud against Bolinske.” On appeal in Johnson, supra, we reversed the district court’s granting of summary judgment after determining that the language of the disputed provision of the leases was ambiguous and that a question of fact therefore existed which precluded summary judgment.

1985The court also denied Johnson’s motion to amend her complaint to allege fraud against Bolinske.” On appeal in Johnson, supra, we reversed the district court’s granting of summary judgment after determining that the language of the disputed provision of the leases was ambiguous and that a question of fact therefore existed which precluded summary judgment.

1985Johnson relied heavily on Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 , 100 S.Ct. 1585 , 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980), in support of his argument. 3 On March 5, 1985, Johnson’s motion for correction of sentence was denied.

1985Johnson relied heavily on Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 , 100 S.Ct. 1585 , 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980), in support of his argument. 3 On March 5, 1985, Johnson’s motion for correction of sentence was denied.

1981The rule adopted by this court regarding the time at which a cause of action accrues for the purposes of Section 28-01-18(3), N.D.C.C., was set forth in Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507 (N.D.1968).