Johnson motion in Arkansas

2017At the close of the hearing, the circuit court denied Johnson’s motion and explained, With regard to Defendant’s Exhibit #2, which is the Facebook post of Jimmy Aldridge, again the Court finds that this Facebook post of Mr. Aldridge 7 Cite as 2017 Ark. 206 does not in any fashion establish or suggest perjury on any material issue at trial.

2016Wheeler v. State, 2015 Ark. 233 , 463 S.W.3d 678 (per curiam); see also Justus v. State, 2012 Ark. 91 , 2012 WL 664259 .

2016Wheeler v. State, 2015 Ark. 233 , 463 S.W.3d 678 (per curiam); see also Justus v. State, 2012 Ark. 91 , 2012 WL 664259 .

2011This court clarified its treatment of motions for rule on clerk and motions for belated appeals in McDonald v. State, 356 Ark. 106 , 146 S.W.3d 883 (2004).

2011This court clarified its treatment of motions for rule on clerk and motions for belated appeals in McDonald v. State, 356 Ark. 106 , 146 S.W.3d 883 (2004).

2010Citing Caldwell v. State, 295 Ark. 149 , 747 S.W.2d 99 (1988), the State urges that specific performance is not an appropriate remedy when Johnson failed to show that he detrimentally relied on the State's offer.

2010Citing Caldwell v. State, 295 Ark. 149 , 747 S.W.2d 99 (1988), the State urges that specific performance is not an appropriate remedy when Johnson failed to show that he detrimentally relied on the State's offer.

2009In his first point on appeal, Vent argues that the circuit court should not have entered a default judgment against him because default judgments “are not favorites of the law and should be avoided whenever possible.” See, e.g., JurisDictionUSA v. Loislaw.com, Inc., 357 Ark. 403 , 183 S.W.3d 560 (2004) (citing B & F Eng’g, Inc. v. Cotroneo, 309 Ark. 175 , 830 S.W.2d 835 (1992)).

2009In his first point on appeal, Vent argues that the circuit court should not have entered a default judgment against him because default judgments “are not favorites of the law and should be avoided whenever possible.” See, e.g., JurisDictionUSA v. Loislaw.com, Inc., 357 Ark. 403 , 183 S.W.3d 560 (2004) (citing B & F Eng’g, Inc. v. Cotroneo, 309 Ark. 175 , 830 S.W.2d 835 (1992)).

2009In his first point on appeal, Vent argues that the circuit court should not have entered a default judgment against him because default judgments “are not favorites of the law and should be avoided whenever possible.” See, e.g., JurisDictionUSA v. Loislaw.com, Inc., 357 Ark. 403 , 183 S.W.3d 560 (2004) (citing B & F Eng’g, Inc. v. Cotroneo, 309 Ark. 175 , 830 S.W.2d 835 (1992)).

2009In his first point on appeal, Vent argues that the circuit court should not have entered a default judgment against him because default judgments “are not favorites of the law and should be avoided whenever possible.” See, e.g., JurisDictionUSA v. Loislaw.com, Inc., 357 Ark. 403 , 183 S.W.3d 560 (2004) (citing B & F Eng’g, Inc. v. Cotroneo, 309 Ark. 175 , 830 S.W.2d 835 (1992)).

2003Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part. 1 Bonds Brothers is not a party to this appeal. 2 For clarity and ease of writing, we hereafter refer to Appellants collectively as “Johnson.” 3 Our holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the Workers’ Compensation Act to Johnson’s claim against Bonds Fertilizer does not affect the trial court’s, and consequently this court’s, jurisdiction to determine Johnson’s separate claims against Union Pacific, as those claims are not covered under the Act. 4 Contrary to Johnson’s argument, this court’s holding in

2003Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part. 1 Bonds Brothers is not a party to this appeal. 2 For clarity and ease of writing, we hereafter refer to Appellants collectively as “Johnson.” 3 Our holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the Workers’ Compensation Act to Johnson’s claim against Bonds Fertilizer does not affect the trial court’s, and consequently this court’s, jurisdiction to determine Johnson’s separate claims against Union Pacific, as those claims are not covered under the Act. 4 Contrary to Johnson’s argument, this court’s holding in

2001In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that a suspect’s statement during interrogation that “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer” did not require cessation of the questioning because a suspect must unambiguously request counsel.

1996Reel v. State, 318 Ark. 565 , 886 S.W.2d 615 (1994).

1996Reel v. State, 318 Ark. 565 , 886 S.W.2d 615 (1994).

1991In Berna v. State, 282 Ark. 563 , 670 S.W.2d 434 (1984), we opined that overwhelming evidence of guilt may be considered along with allegations of error, and we held that, “No longer is it presumed that simply because an error is committed it is prejudicial error.” In Johnson v. State, 303 Ark. 313 , 796 S.W.2d 342 (1990), we overlooked error largely on the basis of inconsistent positions taken by Johnson’s brief with respect to that error.

1991In Berna v. State, 282 Ark. 563 , 670 S.W.2d 434 (1984), we opined that overwhelming evidence of guilt may be considered along with allegations of error, and we held that, “No longer is it presumed that simply because an error is committed it is prejudicial error.” In Johnson v. State, 303 Ark. 313 , 796 S.W.2d 342 (1990), we overlooked error largely on the basis of inconsistent positions taken by Johnson’s brief with respect to that error.

1991In Berna v. State, 282 Ark. 563 , 670 S.W.2d 434 (1984), we opined that overwhelming evidence of guilt may be considered along with allegations of error, and we held that, “No longer is it presumed that simply because an error is committed it is prejudicial error.” In Johnson v. State, 303 Ark. 313 , 796 S.W.2d 342 (1990), we overlooked error largely on the basis of inconsistent positions taken by Johnson’s brief with respect to that error.

1991In Berna v. State, 282 Ark. 563 , 670 S.W.2d 434 (1984), we opined that overwhelming evidence of guilt may be considered along with allegations of error, and we held that, “No longer is it presumed that simply because an error is committed it is prejudicial error.” In Johnson v. State, 303 Ark. 313 , 796 S.W.2d 342 (1990), we overlooked error largely on the basis of inconsistent positions taken by Johnson’s brief with respect to that error.

1991In Mitchell v. State, 295 Ark. 341 , 750 S.W.2d 936 (1988), we wrote we would not “count” the error of failure of the prosecution to make a tape recording of Mitchell’s confession available to him, noting the “overwhelming evidence of guilt,” but we emphasized the “good faith” of the police officers who had erased the tape so that it could be reused.

1991In Mitchell v. State, 295 Ark. 341 , 750 S.W.2d 936 (1988), we wrote we would not “count” the error of failure of the prosecution to make a tape recording of Mitchell’s confession available to him, noting the “overwhelming evidence of guilt,” but we emphasized the “good faith” of the police officers who had erased the tape so that it could be reused.