6 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1994–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2023See Johnson, 53 Mass. App. Ct. at 421-422 . 2023See Johnson, 53 Mass. App. Ct. at 421-422 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Clementsgreen1 sentence2020The Commonwealth, as a result, granted Johnson immunity for his testimony at the defendant's trial. 3 In Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 75 (1984), this court explained that the Commonwealth must present "other evidence tending to prove the issue . . . presented." In Commonwealth v. Clements, 436 Mass. 190, 193 (2002), however, we clarified that, although the first two requirements concern admissibility, the need for corroborating evidence is relevant to the separate question of the sufficiency of the evidence. 17 On direct examination, Johnson testified that he never saw the man in the wh | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Randolphgreen1 sentence2020See Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 293-294 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Dayegreen1 sentence2020The Commonwealth, as a result, granted Johnson immunity for his testimony at the defendant's trial. 3 In Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 75 (1984), this court explained that the Commonwealth must present "other evidence tending to prove the issue . . . presented." In Commonwealth v. Clements, 436 Mass. 190, 193 (2002), however, we clarified that, although the first two requirements concern admissibility, the need for corroborating evidence is relevant to the separate question of the sufficiency of the evidence. 17 On direct examination, Johnson testified that he never saw the man in the wh | 1 | 1 |
David W. Winters v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc.green1 sentence2004Dr. Maynard argues that, notwithstanding the prior allowance of the Rule 6(b)(2) motion, Ms. Johnson still must satisfy the “good cause” standard under Rule 4(j), citing in support of this argument, Winters v. Teledyne Movible OffShore, Inc., 776 F.2d 1304, 1305 (5th Cir. 1985); Commissioner of Revenue v. Carrigan, 45 Mass.App.Ct. 309 , 314 n.5 (1998); Bratica v. Miller, 2000 Mass.Super.LEXIS 54; 1 and Bowen v. McDonough, 1998 Mass.Super.LEXIS 602, 9 Mass. L. | 1 | 1 |
Andrea Geiger v. Donald Allengreen1 sentence2004While Dr. Maynard is correct that inadvertence of counsel satisfies neither the Rule 4(j) “good cause” standard nor the Rule 6(b)(2) “excusable neglect” standard (Carrigan, 45 Mass.App.Ct. at 313 ; Geiger v. Allen, 850 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1988); Gordon v. Hunt, 116 F.R.D. 313, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)); and that potential prejudice to the plaintiff and lack of prejudice to the defendant should not be considerations when ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 4(j) (Hull v. Attleboro Sav. | 1 | 1 |
Gordon v. Huntgreen1 sentence2004While Dr. Maynard is correct that inadvertence of counsel satisfies neither the Rule 4(j) “good cause” standard nor the Rule 6(b)(2) “excusable neglect” standard (Carrigan, 45 Mass.App.Ct. at 313 ; Geiger v. Allen, 850 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1988); Gordon v. Hunt, 116 F.R.D. 313, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)); and that potential prejudice to the plaintiff and lack of prejudice to the defendant should not be considerations when ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 4(j) (Hull v. Attleboro Sav. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. DePalmagreen2 sentences1999See Commonwealth v. DePalma, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 798, 804 (1996) (no Johnson instruction necessary where defendant was active in purchasing drugs by giving dealer money, selecting specific drugs for purchase, and cutting packaging to examine drugs). 3. 1999See Commonwealth v. DePalma, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 798, 804 (1996) (no Johnson instruction necessary where defendant was active in purchasing drugs by giving dealer money, selecting specific drugs for purchase, and cutting packaging to examine drugs). 3. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2015Ibid. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Commissioner of Revenue v. Carrigan
green
2 sentences2004While Dr. Maynard is correct that inadvertence of counsel satisfies neither the Rule 4(j) “good cause” standard nor the Rule 6(b)(2) “excusable neglect” standard (Carrigan, 45 Mass.App.Ct. at 313 ; Geiger v. Allen, 850 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1988); Gordon v. Hunt, 116 F.R.D. 313, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)); and that potential prejudice to the plaintiff and lack of prejudice to the defendant should not be considerations when ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 4(j) (Hull v. Attleboro Sav. 2004Dr. Maynard argues that, notwithstanding the prior allowance of the Rule 6(b)(2) motion, Ms. Johnson still must satisfy the “good cause” standard under Rule 4(j), citing in support of this argument, Winters v. Teledyne Movible OffShore, Inc., 776 F.2d 1304, 1305 (5th Cir. 1985); Commissioner of Revenue v. Carrigan, 45 Mass.App.Ct. 309 , 314 n.5 (1998); Bratica v. Miller, 2000 Mass.Super.LEXIS 54; 1 and Bowen v. McDonough, 1998 Mass.Super.LEXIS 602, 9 Mass. L. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Bowen v. McDonough
neutral
1 sentence2004Dr. Maynard argues that, notwithstanding the prior allowance of the Rule 6(b)(2) motion, Ms. Johnson still must satisfy the “good cause” standard under Rule 4(j), citing in support of this argument, Winters v. Teledyne Movible OffShore, Inc., 776 F.2d 1304, 1305 (5th Cir. 1985); Commissioner of Revenue v. Carrigan, 45 Mass.App.Ct. 309 , 314 n.5 (1998); Bratica v. Miller, 2000 Mass.Super.LEXIS 54; 1 and Bowen v. McDonough, 1998 Mass.Super.LEXIS 602, 9 Mass. L. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
MacInnis v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences1994On the other hand, in MacInnis v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 403 Mass. 220 (1988), the Court had applied the Johnson Controls principle in a first-party context involving not late notice, as in Johnson Controls, but breach of a “consent-to-settlement” provision. 1994On the other hand, in MacInnis v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 403 Mass. 220 (1988), the Court had applied the Johnson Controls principle in a first-party context involving not late notice, as in Johnson Controls, but breach of a “consent-to-settlement” provision. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.