113 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2026 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2019Retaliation, R.C. 2921.05(A), states “[n]o person, purposely and by force or by unlawful threat of harm to any person or property, shall retaliate against a * * * witness who was involved in a * * * criminal action or proceeding because the * * * witness discharged the duties of the * * * witness.” Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0048 17 {¶53} Fundamentally, these offenses do not pass even the first level of the Johnson test, supra. 2010-Ohio-6314 at ¶ 48 . 2019Retaliation, R.C. 2921.05(A), states “[n]o person, purposely and by force or by unlawful threat of harm to any person or property, shall retaliate against a * * * witness who was involved in a * * * criminal action or proceeding because the * * * witness discharged the duties of the * * * witness.” Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0048 17 {¶53} Fundamentally, these offenses do not pass even the first level of the Johnson test, supra. 2010-Ohio-6314 at ¶ 48 . | 2 | 11 |
State v. Earley (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2020State v. Earley, 145 Ohio St.3d 281 , 2015-Ohio-4615 , 49 N.E.3d 266 , ¶ 11. 2020State v. Earley, 145 Ohio St.3d 281 , 2015-Ohio-4615 , 49 N.E.3d 266 , ¶ 11. | 2 | 3 |
State ex rel. Chavis v. Sycamore City School District Board of Educationgreen2 sentences1995See Chavis, supra, 71 Ohio St.3d at 34 , 641 N.E.2d at 196 (denial of writ of mandamus appropriate as to teachers’ claims for credits for years of service as tutors because collective bargaining agreements’ grievance and arbitration procedure constituted adequate remedy at law). 1995See Chavis, supra, 71 Ohio St.3d at 34 , 641 N.E.2d at 196 (denial of writ of mandamus appropriate as to teachers’ claims for credits for years of service as tutors because collective bargaining agreements’ grievance and arbitration procedure constituted adequate remedy at law). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Ruffgreen2 sentences2017State v. Miranda, 138 Ohio St.3d 184 , 2014-Ohio-451 , 5 N.E.3d 603, ¶ 8 (noting the Johnson test, which applied R.C. 2941.25, was not the sole statutory codification regarding the multiplicity of sentencing in Ohio); State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114 , 2015-Ohio-995 , 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 16 (the analysis in Johnson emphasized the conduct-based inquiry was incomplete because it only accounted for R.C. 2941.25(A) and not division (B)). 2017State v. Miranda, 138 Ohio St.3d 184 , 2014-Ohio-451 , 5 N.E.3d 603, ¶ 8 (noting the Johnson test, which applied R.C. 2941.25, was not the sole statutory codification regarding the multiplicity of sentencing in Ohio); State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114 , 2015-Ohio-995 , 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 16 (the analysis in Johnson emphasized the conduct-based inquiry was incomplete because it only accounted for R.C. 2941.25(A) and not division (B)). | 1 | 5 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2016The Johnson test required the trial court to determine: (1) whether it is possible to commit one offense and commit the other with the same conduct, and (2) whether the offenses were committed by the same conduct, or “a single act, committed with a single state of mind.” Id. at ¶ 48-49, quoting State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447 , 2008-Ohio-4569 , 895 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 50 . 2016The Johnson test required the trial court to determine: (1) whether it is possible to commit one offense and commit the other with the same conduct, and (2) whether the offenses were committed by the same conduct, or “a single act, committed with a single state of mind.” Id. at ¶ 48-49, quoting State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447 , 2008-Ohio-4569 , 895 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 50 . | 1 | 3 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2015Specifically, he argues that counsel should have presented additional evidence to persuade the trial court that the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for excusing prospective juror Nos. 9 and 45 were pretextual. {¶ 47} We reject Johnson’s claim of ineffective assistance because there is no evidence that counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” as determined by “prevailing professional norms,” in this regard. 12 January Term, 2015 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 2015Specifically, he argues that counsel should have presented additional evidence to persuade the trial court that the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for excusing prospective juror Nos. 9 and 45 were pretextual. {¶ 47} We reject Johnson’s claim of ineffective assistance because there is no evidence that counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” as determined by “prevailing professional norms,” in this regard. 12 January Term, 2015 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). | 1 | 2 |
Johnson v. Moore (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2020Montgomery No. 28162, 2019-Ohio-1801, ¶ 6 ; Johnson, 149 Ohio St.3d 716 , 2017-Ohio- 2792, 77 N.E.3d 967, ¶ 7 . {¶ 6} Johnson’s brief contains thirty assignments of error. 2020Montgomery No. 28162, 2019-Ohio-1801, ¶ 6 ; Johnson, 149 Ohio St.3d 716 , 2017-Ohio- 2792, 77 N.E.3d 967, ¶ 7 . {¶ 6} Johnson’s brief contains thirty assignments of error. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Allengreen2 sentences2026State v. Allen, 2024-Ohio-970, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.). 2026State v. Allen, 2024-Ohio-970, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Croffgreen1 sentence2025Johnson assigns three errors for our review. 3 Case Nos. 2024-L-053 and 2024-L-054 {¶10} In his first assigned error, Johnson argues: {¶11} “The trial court erred when it denied Johnson’s motion to suppress evidence after hearing.” {¶12} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Croff, 2017-Ohio-8629, ¶ 22 (11th Dist.), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); State v. Polk, 2017-Ohio-2735, ¶ 12 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lutongreen1 sentence2024Additionally, the trial court did not dismiss Johnson’s motion for an extension of time because Johnson did not file a motion. “[A] party cannot present new arguments for the first time on appeal that were not raised below, and a trial court cannot be said to have abused its discretion by failing to consider arguments that were never presented to it.” State v. Moore, 2020- Ohio-3459, ¶ 58 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Luton, 2018-Ohio-4708, ¶ 65 (8th Dist.); see also State v. Pratts, 2016-Ohio-8053 , ¶ 43 (8th Dist.) (“A party may not raise for the first time on appeal an argument that could ha | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2022State v. Johnson, 155 Ohio App.3d 145 , 2003-Ohio-5637 , 799 N.E.2d 650, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.) (“Johnson II”). 2022State v. Johnson, 155 Ohio App.3d 145 , 2003-Ohio-5637 , 799 N.E.2d 650, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.) (“Johnson II”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. D'Ambrosiogreen1 sentence2022Prosecutor’s use of leading questions {¶167} Johnson next argues that the prosecutor’s use of leading questions, which was not objected to by his trial counsel, was unfairly prejudicial. {¶168} “A leading question ‘instructs [the] witness how to answer or puts into his mouth words to be echoed back.” State v. D’Ambrosio, 67 Ohio St.3d 185, 190, 616 , N.E.2d 909 (1993), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 888. {¶169} Evid.R. 611(C) provides that, Stark County, Case No. 2021 CA 00116 60 Leading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary | 1 | 1 |
State v. Halegreen2 sentences2022State v. Frazier, 115 Ohio St.3d 139 , 2007-Ohio-5048 , 873 N.E.2d 1263 , ¶148; State v. Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d 118 , 2008-Ohio- 3426, 892 N.E.2d 864, ¶103 (“Hale contends that counsel may not waive a client’s right to be present, but he is incorrect”). 2022State v. Frazier, 115 Ohio St.3d 139 , 2007-Ohio-5048 , 873 N.E.2d 1263 , ¶148; State v. Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d 118 , 2008-Ohio- 3426, 892 N.E.2d 864, ¶103 (“Hale contends that counsel may not waive a client’s right to be present, but he is incorrect”). | 1 | 1 |
| Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Millea v. Metro-North Railroadgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Mooregreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Greergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Langgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Grubegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mannion v. Sandelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Walker v. Loop Fish & Oyster Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Dennisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Mirandagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Richardsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Whitfield v. International Truck & Engine Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Neder v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Allengreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. State Personnel Bd. of Reviewgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Grossgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Summerville v. City of Forest Parkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Oil & Gas Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Stallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| State v. Richardsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Underwood
green
2 sentences2014Athens No. 12CA46, 2013-Ohio-5611, ¶ 23 , citing State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365 , 2010-Ohio-1 , 922 N.E.2d 923 , ¶ 29 (specifying this obligation when a plea agreement is silent on the merger issue). {¶19} In Woolum at ¶ 24-25, we reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court to conduct the Johnson analysis: In the case sub judice, the record indicates that the question of allied offenses of similar import was minimally discussed at sentencing. 2014Athens No. 12CA46, 2013-Ohio-5611, ¶ 23 , citing State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365 , 2010-Ohio-1 , 922 N.E.2d 923 , ¶ 29 (specifying this obligation when a plea agreement is silent on the merger issue). {¶19} In Woolum at ¶ 24-25, we reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court to conduct the Johnson analysis: In the case sub judice, the record indicates that the question of allied offenses of similar import was minimally discussed at sentencing. | 7 | 2012–2014 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2014“In fact, the appellate court should defer to the factual findings of the trial court, provided they are supported by some competent, credible evidence.” Id. {¶25} Appellant’s argument in support of this final argument does not address the Johnson test or any other legal analysis or standard. 2014“In fact, the appellate court should defer to the factual findings of the trial court, provided they are supported by some competent, credible evidence.” Id. {¶25} Appellant’s argument in support of this final argument does not address the Johnson test or any other legal analysis or standard. | 3 | 2013–2014 |
State v. Yarbrough
green
2 sentences2013State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365 , 2010-Ohio-1 , 922 N.E.2d 923 , ¶ 26, 31, citing State v. Yarbrough, 104 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2004-Ohio-6087 , 817 N.E.2d 845 ; R.C. 2953.08(A)(4). {¶54} Here, under the first prong of the Johnson inquiry, it is possible to commit felonious assault by means of a deadly weapon and discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises. 2013State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365 , 2010-Ohio-1 , 922 N.E.2d 923 , ¶ 26, 31, citing State v. Yarbrough, 104 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2004-Ohio-6087 , 817 N.E.2d 845 ; R.C. 2953.08(A)(4). {¶54} Here, under the first prong of the Johnson inquiry, it is possible to commit felonious assault by means of a deadly weapon and discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises. | 3 | 2012–2013 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2025Johnson assigns three errors for our review. 3 Case Nos. 2024-L-053 and 2024-L-054 {¶10} In his first assigned error, Johnson argues: {¶11} “The trial court erred when it denied Johnson’s motion to suppress evidence after hearing.” {¶12} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Croff, 2017-Ohio-8629, ¶ 22 (11th Dist.), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); State v. Polk, 2017-Ohio-2735, ¶ 12 . 2021Geauga No. 99-G-2249, 2000 WL 973411 , *2 (July 14, 2000), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). {¶9} The trial court overruled Ms. Johnson’s motion to suppress, finding that the “parties stipulate that [the] only basis for motion was basis to initiate stop. | 2 | 2021–2025 |
State v. Logan
green
2 sentences2014Therefore, we will proceed to the second step of the Johnson analysis and determine whether the offenses were committed by the same conduct. {¶101} In State v. Logan, the Supreme Court of Ohio provided guidance concerning when kidnapping and another offense of the same or similar import will merge: In establishing whether kidnapping and another offense of the same or similar kind are committed with a separate animus as to each pursuant to R.C. 2941.25(B), this court adopts the following guidelines: (a) Where the restraint or movement of the victim is merely incidental to a separate underlying 2014Therefore, we will proceed to the second step of the Johnson analysis and determine whether the offenses were committed by the same conduct. {¶101} In State v. Logan, the Supreme Court of Ohio provided guidance concerning when kidnapping and another offense of the same or similar import will merge: In establishing whether kidnapping and another offense of the same or similar kind are committed with a separate animus as to each pursuant to R.C. 2941.25(B), this court adopts the following guidelines: (a) Where the restraint or movement of the victim is merely incidental to a separate underlying | 2 | 2011–2014 |
State v. Marlow
neutral
2 sentences2014Clermont No. CA2012-07- 051, 2013-Ohio-778, ¶ 10 . {¶ 10} If it is possible to commit the offenses with the same conduct, the second inquiry under the Johnson test focuses on whether the offenses were in fact committed by -4- Clermont CA2013-12-092 the same conduct; that is, by a single act, performed with a single state of mind. 2014Clermont No. CA2012-07- 051, 2013-Ohio-778, ¶ 10 . {¶ 10} If it is possible to commit the offenses with the same conduct, the second inquiry under the Johnson test focuses on whether the offenses were in fact committed by -4- Clermont CA2013-12-092 the same conduct; that is, by a single act, performed with a single state of mind. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Brautigam
neutral
2 sentences2012No. 26134, 2012-Ohio-2599, ¶ 8 , citing Underwood at paragraph one of the syllabus, (holding that a defendant may make an allied offense argument for the first time on appeal), and Johnson at ¶ 49 . 4 {¶8} Consistent with this Court’s precedent, we decline to apply the Johnson analysis in the first instance. 2012No. 26134, 2012-Ohio-2599, ¶ 8 , citing Underwood at paragraph one of the syllabus, (holding that a defendant may make an allied offense argument for the first time on appeal), and Johnson at ¶ 49 . 4 {¶8} Consistent with this Court’s precedent, we decline to apply the Johnson analysis in the first instance. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co.
green
2 sentences2006That such danger had existed for a sufficient length of time reasonably to justify the inference that the failure to warn against it or remove it was attributable to a want of ordinary care." Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co. (1943), 141 Ohio St. 584 , 589 , 49 N.E.2d 925 . {¶ 7} Burrows did not establish the first or second elements of the Johnson test — that is, she offered no evidence to show that Marc's caused the spill or that it had notice of the spill and failed to give its customers notice of its presence. {¶ 8} Under some circumstances, the length of time that a substance has been on a 2006That such danger had existed for a sufficient length of time reasonably to justify the inference that the failure to warn against it or remove it was attributable to a want of ordinary care." Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co. (1943), 141 Ohio St. 584 , 589 , 49 N.E.2d 925 . {¶ 7} Burrows did not establish the first or second elements of the Johnson test — that is, she offered no evidence to show that Marc's caused the spill or that it had notice of the spill and failed to give its customers notice of its presence. {¶ 8} Under some circumstances, the length of time that a substance has been on a | 2 | 2005–2006 |
Cuyler v. Sullivan
green
1 sentence2025The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Johnson’s motion for a new trial. {¶ 34} Although the trial court couched its basis for denying Mr. Johnson’s motion for a new trial in terms of res judicata, on review of the record before us, we find, instead, that the motion for a new trial should have been denied because Mr. Johnson failed to show his conflict of interest claim entitled him to relief under Crim.R. 33(A)(6). {¶ 35} To establish a Sixth Amendment violation for a conflict of interest, a defendant raising a post-trial ineffective assistance of counsel claim “must demo | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Polk (Slip Opinion)
green
1 sentence2025Johnson assigns three errors for our review. 3 Case Nos. 2024-L-053 and 2024-L-054 {¶10} In his first assigned error, Johnson argues: {¶11} “The trial court erred when it denied Johnson’s motion to suppress evidence after hearing.” {¶12} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Croff, 2017-Ohio-8629, ¶ 22 (11th Dist.), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); State v. Polk, 2017-Ohio-2735, ¶ 12 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine
green
1 sentence2024While she retains the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that Cincy Automall intentionally discriminated against her, see Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 , that burden is not yet operative in the context of summary judgment. {¶ 46} In sum, the trial court's grant of summary judgment was predicated on a mischaracterization of Johnson's claim and a misapplication of the burden of proof in summary-judgment proceedings.4 These errors, compounded by the failure of Cincy Automall to meet its initial evidentiary burden, necessitate a reversal of the summary judgment on the sex-discrimination cl | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Stratman v. Sutantio, Unpublished Decision (9-12-2006)
green
1 sentence2024Group, 2004-Ohio-579 (10th Dist.), and Stratman v. Sutantio, 2006-Ohio-4712 (10th Dist.). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Kinsey v. Erie Ins. Co., Unpublished Decision (2-10-2004)
green
1 sentence2024Group, 2004-Ohio-579 (10th Dist.), and Stratman v. Sutantio, 2006-Ohio-4712 (10th Dist.). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Johnson
neutral
1 sentence2023Montgomery No. 26795, 2016-Ohio-4889 , even if there had been an irregularity in 2015, there was no abuse of discretion because it was unlikely that the newly discovered evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial, and thus the issue raised in Johnson’s renewed third motion for leave had already been litigated. {¶ 9} The trial court further explained that the court was not denying Johnson’s third motion for leave due to any failure to file it within a reasonable time as set forth in Bethel, but, rather, that Johnson’s motion was barred by res judicata and thus there was no need to add | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Thompson (Slip Opinion)
green
1 sentence2023State v. Thompson, 147 Ohio St.3d 29 , 2016-Ohio- 2769, ¶ 13. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Frazier
green
1 sentence2022State v. Frazier, 115 Ohio St.3d 139 , 2007-Ohio-5048 , 873 N.E.2d 1263 , ¶148; State v. Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d 118 , 2008-Ohio- 3426, 892 N.E.2d 864, ¶103 (“Hale contends that counsel may not waive a client’s right to be present, but he is incorrect”). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Armstrong v. John R. Jurgensen Co.
green
1 sentence2022Jurgensen Company, 136 Ohio St.3d 58 , District Hearing Officer finds that Injured Worker has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the additional allowance of “MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDER” is causally related to the currently allowed physical conditions associated with Injured Worker’s 06/23/2016 industrial accident with the Employer and orders this condition is GRANTED based on the medical examination report findings from Paul Deardorff, Ph.D. dated 10/10/2018. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Johnson neutral | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Mitseff v. Wheeler green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Thompkins red | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Thornsbury neutral | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Blakemore v. Blakemore green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Johnson neutral | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| District of Columbia v. Heller green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Awan green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Farris green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Gordon (Slip Opinion) green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Embry, Unpublished Decision (11-29-2004) green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Johnson neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Grimes (Slip Opinion) green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Tyree neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Reynolds green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Williams v. State neutral | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. DePew green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| City of Hilliard v. Elfrink green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Johnson green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Kirkland (Slip Opinion) green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Grissom green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Boyce green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Woolum neutral | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.