Johnson claim in Indiana

2020This evidence may be circumstantial, and “there is no requirement that all of the elements of the crime [must be] proven prior to introduction of the confessions.” Shinnock, 76 N.E.3d at 844 . [15] During trial, after the parties argued whether the confession was admissible, the trial court here overruled Johnson’s objection citing support from Scott v. State, 632 N.E.2d 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), and Groves v. State, 479 N.E.2d 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).

2019We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, reversing “only when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Shinnock v. State, 76 N.E.3d 841, 843 (Ind. 2017). [16] Johnson claims—and the State does not dispute—the challenged testimony could not be admitted under Evidence Rule 702, which pertains to expert witnesses.

2019Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73 , Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-334 | November 21, 2019 Page 12 of 19 75 (Ind. 2008).6 This is true even if the trial court, after accepting a plea agreement containing a provision waiving the right to appeal, misadvises the defendant at sentencing that he does have the right to appeal. 7 Id. at 77 . [23] Although it is clear that the right to challenge one’s sentence may be validly waived on appeal, the question presented here is whether the terms of Johnson’s plea agreement constituted such a valid waiver of his appellate rights. [24] In addressi

2019Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73 , Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-334 | November 21, 2019 Page 12 of 19 75 (Ind. 2008).6 This is true even if the trial court, after accepting a plea agreement containing a provision waiving the right to appeal, misadvises the defendant at sentencing that he does have the right to appeal. 7 Id. at 77 . [23] Although it is clear that the right to challenge one’s sentence may be validly waived on appeal, the question presented here is whether the terms of Johnson’s plea agreement constituted such a valid waiver of his appellate rights. [24] In addressi

2009Id. at 1119 (citation omitted).

2009Id.

2025The Indiana Supreme Court has defined the term, see Hancock, 65 N.E.3d at 587 , and acknowledged the “longstanding legal principle [which] presumes that citizens know the law and must obey it.” Bellwether Props., LLC v. Duke Energy Ind., Inc., 87 N.E.3d 462, 467 (Ind. 2017). “[C]entral to the presumption that persons know the law is that the law is accessible[,] id., and we note that Indiana caselaw and the Indiana criminal code are available to the public via multiple mediums such as the internet and publicly accessible law libraries.

2025The Indiana Supreme Court has defined the term, see Hancock, 65 N.E.3d at 587 , and acknowledged the “longstanding legal principle [which] presumes that citizens know the law and must obey it.” Bellwether Props., LLC v. Duke Energy Ind., Inc., 87 N.E.3d 462, 467 (Ind. 2017). “[C]entral to the presumption that persons know the law is that the law is accessible[,] id., and we note that Indiana caselaw and the Indiana criminal code are available to the public via multiple mediums such as the internet and publicly accessible law libraries.

2025Discussion and Decision [6] “We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss a charging information for an abuse of discretion.” A.-H.Y. v. State, 975 N.E.2d 1273, 1276 (Ind. 2012). “‘An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.’” Id. (quoting Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1237 (Ind. 2012)).

2025Discussion and Decision [6] “We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss a charging information for an abuse of discretion.” A.-H.Y. v. State, 975 N.E.2d 1273, 1276 (Ind. 2012). “‘An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.’” Id. (quoting Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1237 (Ind. 2012)).

2025Discussion and Decision [6] “We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss a charging information for an abuse of discretion.” A.-H.Y. v. State, 975 N.E.2d 1273, 1276 (Ind. 2012). “‘An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.’” Id. (quoting Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1237 (Ind. 2012)).

2020See Bell v. State, 81 N.E.3d 233 , 4 Contrary to Johnson’s claim, this case is not like Jacobs v. State, 76 N.E.3d 846 (Ind. 2017).

2020In that case, our Supreme Court held that while the police had sufficient cause to be suspicious of the defendant in general, “that suspicion was not sufficiently linked to any articulable criminal activity.” Id. at 852 .

2020See Bell v. State, 81 N.E.3d 233 , 4 Contrary to Johnson’s claim, this case is not like Jacobs v. State, 76 N.E.3d 846 (Ind. 2017).

2020See Collins v. State, 911 N.E.2d 2 The United States Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to counsel to pursue discretionary state appeals, such as a petition to transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court, see Ind. Appellate Rule 57(H) (“The grant of transfer is a matter of judicial discretion.”), and therefore a defendant cannot “be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by his retained counsel’s failure to file the application timely.” Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 588 (1982). 3 Johnson does not specifically argue that there is a reasonable pr

2020See Collins v. State, 911 N.E.2d 2 The United States Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to counsel to pursue discretionary state appeals, such as a petition to transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court, see Ind. Appellate Rule 57(H) (“The grant of transfer is a matter of judicial discretion.”), and therefore a defendant cannot “be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by his retained counsel’s failure to file the application timely.” Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 588 (1982). 3 Johnson does not specifically argue that there is a reasonable pr

2019See id.

2019State v. Smith, 71 N.E.3d 368, 370 (Ind. 2017) (citing Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. 2004)).

2019State v. Smith, 71 N.E.3d 368, 370 (Ind. 2017) (citing Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. 2004)).

2018We have consistently explained that “[f]undamental error is an extremely narrow exception to the waiver rule, and the defendant faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged error is so prejudicial to the defendant’s rights as to make a fair trial impossible.” Grimes v. State, 84 N.E.3d 635, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. [13] Here, the only evidence supporting Johnson’s claim of self-defense comes from his police interview on the morning of the shooting.

2017Terry v. State, 857 N.E.2d 396, 409 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. [10] Johnson’s claim is based on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 (1976).

2017See id. at 1014 .

2017In Doyle, the United States Supreme Court held that “under the Fourteenth Amendment a prosecutor may not use the silence of a defendant who has been arrested” and given Miranda warnings “to impeach the defendant.” Trice v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1180, 1182 (Ind. 2002) (citing Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619 , 96 S.Ct. at 2245 ).

2017See Stewart, 768 N.E.2d at 435 . [15] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

2016See Puckett, 956 N.E.2d at 1188 (noting that the offender admitted to violating the terms of his probation and that the trial court’s discussion did not reveal anything particularly egregious about the offender’s violation of failing to register as a sex offender and concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the offender to serve the entirety *1232 of his previously-suspended sentence); see also Sullivan v. State, 56 N.E.3d 1157, 1162 (Ind.Ct.App.2016) (noting the offender did not dispute that he did not report as required' by his community corrections placement and con