extension doctrine in Maryland

2003It is difficult to conceive how, in society where rights and duties are relative and mutual, there can be tolerated those who are privileged to do injury legibus soluti; and still more difficult to imagine how such a privilege could be instituted or tolerated upon the principles of social good....'" [Citations omitted.] [Alterations added.] We noted in Walker v. D'Alesandro, 212 Md. 163, 172 , 129 A.2d 148, 153 (1957), that "This Court long ago expressed opposition to the extension of the doctrine of absolute privilege ( Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233 ) to persons occupying offices not previous

2003It is difficult to conceive how, in society where rights and duties are relative and mutual, there can be tolerated those who are privileged to do injury legibus soluti; and still more difficult to imagine how such a privilege could be instituted or tolerated upon the principles of social good....’” [Citations omitted.] [Alterations added.] We noted in Walker v. D’Alesandro, 212 Md. 163, 172 , 129 A.2d 148, 153 (1957), that “This Court long ago expressed opposition to the extension of the doctrine of absolute privilege (Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233 ) to persons occupying offices not previousl

1998The author of the defamatory statements urged an extension of the privilege to cover “testimony before bodies investigating allegations of scientific misconduct,” and argued that the public issue at stake included “the interest of society in the soundness of [scientific] research.” Id. at 108 , 648 A.2d at 1077 .

1998The author of the defamatory statements urged an extension of the privilege to cover “testimony before bodies investigating allegations of scientific misconduct,” and argued that the public issue at stake included “the interest of society in the soundness of [scientific] research.” Id. at 108 , 648 A.2d at 1077 .

1997Thus, despite the possible financial impact upon the father (and therefore, the family) by the successful prosecution of a suit against his business partner by a minor child, we concluded that “preservation of the family interests [justifying the parent-child immunity doctrine] does not require [the extension of the doctrine] to bar any recovery from a parent’s partner.” Id. at 357 , 550 A.2d at 955 .

1997Thus, despite the possible financial impact upon the father (and therefore, the family) by the successful prosecution of a suit against his business partner by a minor child, we concluded that “preservation of the family interests [justifying the parent-child immunity doctrine] does not require [the extension of the doctrine] to bar any recovery from a parent’s partner.” Id. at 357 , 550 A.2d at 955 .

1995In dicta, and without citing a single case, the Court in Russell quoted from an encyclopedia of the time as follows ( 106 Md. at 143-144 , 66 A. at 700 ): “ Tn ordinary cases the recovery of exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages will not be allowed in an action of deceit; but such damages may be allowed where the wrong involves some violation of duty springing from a relation of trust or confidence, or where the fraud is gross, or the case presents other extraordinary or exceptional circumstances clearly indicating malice and wilfulness and calling for an extension of the doctrine.’” In F

1995In dicta, and without citing a single case, the Court in Russell quoted from an encyclopedia of the time as follows ( 106 Md. at 143-144 , 66 A. at 700 ): “ Tn ordinary cases the recovery of exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages will not be allowed in an action of deceit; but such damages may be allowed where the wrong involves some violation of duty springing from a relation of trust or confidence, or where the fraud is gross, or the case presents other extraordinary or exceptional circumstances clearly indicating malice and wilfulness and calling for an extension of the doctrine.’” In F

1912Num erous eases have been cited upen the theory that these bodies would come within the scope of the rule laid down in such cases as the Baptist Church v. Shively, 67 Md. 493 ; and Crisp v. Crisp, 65 Md. 422 ; but to place any such construction upon the Charter of the Methodist Book Depository would involve an extension of that doctrine far beyond anything which was in contemplation when those cases were decided.

1912Numerous *Page 95 cases have been cited upon the theory that these bodies would come within the scope of the rule laid down in such cases as the Baptist Church v. Shively, 67 Md. 493 ; and Crisp v. Crisp, 65 Md. 422 ; but to place any such construction upon the Charter of the Methodist Book Depository would involve an extension of that doctrine far beyond anything which was in contemplation when those cases were decided.

1912Num erous eases have been cited upen the theory that these bodies would come within the scope of the rule laid down in such cases as the Baptist Church v. Shively, 67 Md. 493 ; and Crisp v. Crisp, 65 Md. 422 ; but to place any such construction upon the Charter of the Methodist Book Depository would involve an extension of that doctrine far beyond anything which was in contemplation when those cases were decided.

1912Numerous *Page 95 cases have been cited upon the theory that these bodies would come within the scope of the rule laid down in such cases as the Baptist Church v. Shively, 67 Md. 493 ; and Crisp v. Crisp, 65 Md. 422 ; but to place any such construction upon the Charter of the Methodist Book Depository would involve an extension of that doctrine far beyond anything which was in contemplation when those cases were decided.

2007The extension of the privilege to reports prepared for use in judicial proceedings was announced in Adams v. Peck, 288 Md. 1 , 415 A.2d 292 (1980).

2007The extension of the privilege to reports prepared for use in judicial proceedings was announced in Adams v. Peck, 288 Md. 1 , 415 A.2d 292 (1980).

2006Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.1972). 3 *128 Courts adopting the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction have recognized that this use of the fact of a conspiracy to attribute the contacts of one co-conspirator to another co-conspirator for jurisdictional purposes is an extension of the principle that the acts of one civil co-conspirator are attributed to other co-conspirators for purposes of determining the civil liability of the participants in the conspiracy.

2005Both scheduling conflicts, see State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 457 , 470 A.2d 1269 (1984), and clerical errors, see McIntyre v. State, 17 Md.App. 526, 529 , 302 A.2d 672 (1973), have long been recognized as grounds, in other contexts, for justifying the extension of a hearing or a trial date.

2005Both scheduling conflicts, see State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 457 , 470 A.2d 1269 (1984), and clerical errors, see McIntyre v. State, 17 Md.App. 526, 529 , 302 A.2d 672 (1973), have long been recognized as grounds, in other contexts, for justifying the extension of a hearing or a trial date.

2005Both scheduling conflicts, see State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 457 , 470 A.2d 1269 (1984), and clerical errors, see McIntyre v. State, 17 Md.App. 526, 529 , 302 A.2d 672 (1973), have long been recognized as grounds, in other contexts, for justifying the extension of a hearing or a trial date.

2005Both scheduling conflicts, see State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 457 , 470 A.2d 1269 (1984), and clerical errors, see McIntyre v. State, 17 Md.App. 526, 529 , 302 A.2d 672 (1973), have long been recognized as grounds, in other contexts, for justifying the extension of a hearing or a trial date.

2002See, e.g., People v. Ryan, 30 Ill.2d 456 , 197 N.E.2d 15 (1964); Vann v. State, 85 So.2d 133 (Fla.1956).

2001Eagan is an extension of the exception to the doctrine applied in Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61 , 77 A.2d 923 (1951), where a child “suffered cruel or unusually malicious conduct at the hands of a parent.” Renko, 346 Md. at 468 n. 4, 697 A.2d at 470 n. 4.

2001Eagan is an extension of the exception to the doctrine applied in Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61 , 77 A.2d 923 (1951), where a child “suffered cruel or unusually malicious conduct at the hands of a parent.” Renko, 346 Md. at 468 n. 4, 697 A.2d at 470 n. 4.

2001Eagan is an extension of the exception to the doctrine applied in Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61 , 77 A.2d 923 (1951), where a child “suffered cruel or unusually malicious conduct at the hands of a parent.” Renko, 346 Md. at 468 n. 4, 697 A.2d at 470 n. 4.

2001Eagan is an extension of the exception to the doctrine applied in Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61 , 77 A.2d 923 (1951), where a child “suffered cruel or unusually malicious conduct at the hands of a parent.” Renko, 346 Md. at 468 n. 4, 697 A.2d at 470 n. 4.

2000An extension of the doctrine in accordance with the “proximate cause” theory, we said, would not further the basic purpose of the doctrine, of “deterring felons from killing by holding them strictly responsible for killings they or their co-felons commit.” Id. at 450 , 444 A.2d at 1040 .

2000An extension of the doctrine in accordance with the “proximate cause” theory, we said, would not further the basic purpose of the doctrine, of “deterring felons from killing by holding them strictly responsible for killings they or their co-felons commit.” Id. at 450 , 444 A.2d at 1040 .

1998The Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply to Civil Deportation Proceedings In holding that the Exclusionary Rule did not apply to yet another type of civil proceeding — a deportation hearing — the case of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 , 104 S.Ct. 3479 , 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984), built on the foundation of Janis .

1998The Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply to Civil Deportation Proceedings In holding that the Exclusionary Rule did not apply to yet another type of civil proceeding — a deportation hearing — the case of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 , 104 S.Ct. 3479 , 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984), built on the foundation of Janis .

1997With respect to the extension of that immunity to State agencies, counties, and municipalities, Judge Eldridge, writing for the Court of Appeals in Board v. Town of Riverdale, 320 Md. 384, 388-89 , 578 A.2d 207 (1990), explained: State agencies have normally been treated as if they were the State of Maryland for purposes of immunity, so that they enjoy the same immunity from ordinary tort and contracts suits which the State enjoys.

1997With respect to the extension of that immunity to State agencies, counties, and municipalities, Judge Eldridge, writing for the Court of Appeals in Board v. Town of Riverdale, 320 Md. 384, 388-89 , 578 A.2d 207 (1990), explained: State agencies have normally been treated as if they were the State of Maryland for purposes of immunity, so that they enjoy the same immunity from ordinary tort and contracts suits which the State enjoys.

1994The other factor considered by the Court of Appeals in both Miner and Odyniec , as well as in cases where extension of the privilege was rejected, was whether “the forum offers ‘sufficient judicial safeguards so as to minimize the likelihood of harm to potentially defamed ... individuals.’ ” Odyniec, 322 Md. at 528 , 588 A.2d 786 (quoting Gersh v. Ambrose, 291 Md. 188, 192 , 434 A.2d 547 (1981)).

1994The other factor considered by the Court of Appeals in both Miner and Odyniec , as well as in cases where extension of the privilege was rejected, was whether “the forum offers ‘sufficient judicial safeguards so as to minimize the likelihood of harm to potentially defamed ... individuals.’ ” Odyniec, 322 Md. at 528 , 588 A.2d 786 (quoting Gersh v. Ambrose, 291 Md. 188, 192 , 434 A.2d 547 (1981)).

1994Id. at 522 , 255 A.2d at 422 .

1994Id. at 522 , 255 A.2d at 422 .

1988This conclusion is in accord with the sentiment we expressed years ago in Baker v. Keiser, 75 Md. at 339 , 23 A. 735 , and quoted with approval in Brown v. Macgill, 87 Md. at 165, 39 A. 613 : This Court went as far as it could in the Towers’ case to effect the intention of the testator which was so expressly declared; but proper adherence to the policy of the law in the State, will not allow the extension of the doctrine of the Towers’ case beyond the limitations of that decision, nor to a case not falling clearly within its reasons and reasoning____” *640 Before we can reach a final determina

1988This conclusion is in accord with the sentiment we expressed years ago in Baker v. Keiser, 75 Md. at 339 , 23 A. 735 , and quoted with approval in Brown v. Macgill, 87 Md. at 165, 39 A. 613 : This Court went as far as it could in the Towers’ case to effect the intention of the testator which was so expressly declared; but proper adherence to the policy of the law in the State, will not allow the extension of the doctrine of the Towers’ case beyond the limitations of that decision, nor to a case not falling clearly within its reasons and reasoning____” *640 Before we can reach a final determina

1988This conclusion is in accord with the sentiment we expressed years ago in Baker v. Keiser, 75 Md. at 339 , 23 A. 735 , and quoted with approval in Brown v. Macgill, 87 Md. at 165, 39 A. 613 : This Court went as far as it could in the Towers’ case to effect the intention of the testator which was so expressly declared; but proper adherence to the policy of the law in the State, will not allow the extension of the doctrine of the Towers’ case beyond the limitations of that decision, nor to a case not falling clearly within its reasons and reasoning____” *640 Before we can reach a final determina

1988Before the Court of Special Appeals Brent argued that inasmuch as Laura was incompetent and her disability permanent, “she will probably never be able to [terminate the trust].” Brent, 71 Md.App. at 272 , 525 A.2d 241 .

1988Before the Court of Special Appeals Brent argued that inasmuch as Laura was incompetent and her disability permanent, “she will probably never be able to [terminate the trust].” Brent, 71 Md.App. at 272 , 525 A.2d 241 .