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55 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1888–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Foster v. Teacher Retirement Systemgreen2 sentences2015We need not establish today whether some degree of control by the government would extend its immunity protection to a private party; we hold only that no control is determinative. 11 Finally, Brown & Gay cites Foster v. Teacher Retirement System, 273 S.W.3d 883 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008, no pet.), to support the extension of immunity in this case. 2015We need not establish today whether some degree of control by the government would extend its immunity protection to a private party; we hold only that no control is determinative.11 Finally, Brown & Gay cites Foster v. Teacher Retirement System, 273 S.W.3d 883 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.), to support the extension of immunity in this case. | 3 | 6 |
Brown & Gay Engineering, Inc. v. Zuleima Olivares, Individually and as the Representative of the Estate of Pedro Olivares, Jr., & Pedro Olivaresgreen2 sentences2025See Olivares, 461 S.W.3d at 124– 28 (discussing extension of sovereign immunity to private parties); Foster, 273 S.W.3d at 889-90; see also Chambers-Liberty Cntys. 2025See Olivares, 461 S.W.3d at 124– 28 (discussing extension of sovereign immunity to private parties); Foster, 273 S.W.3d at 889-90; see also Chambers-Liberty Cntys. | 2 | 4 |
Susan Davis Van Dyke v. the Navigator Groupgreen2 sentences2026To the contrary, the doctrine was initially applied to incorporeal rights and only later began to be applied to land. 3 Accordingly, the application of the doctrine to non-possessory interests is but a reflection of its historic origins while the application to possessory interests was in fact the extension of the doctrine. 4 Of itself, extension of the lost grant presumption to corporeal interests should pose no problems; just as non-possessory interests can be the subject of an express grant as readily as can possessory claims, rules of evidence relating to the latter should be equally appli 2026To the contrary, the doctrine was initially applied to incorporeal rights and only later began to be applied to land. 3 Accordingly, the application of the doctrine to non-possessory interests is but a reflection of its historic origins while the application to possessory interests was in fact the extension of the doctrine. 4 Of itself, extension of the lost grant presumption to corporeal interests should pose no problems; just as non-possessory interests can be the subject of an express grant as readily as can possessory claims, rules of evidence relating to the latter should be equally appli | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Watkinsgreen1 sentence2026To the contrary, the doctrine was initially applied to incorporeal rights and only later began to be applied to land. 3 Accordingly, the application of the doctrine to non-possessory interests is but a reflection of its historic origins while the application to possessory interests was in fact the extension of the doctrine. 4 Of itself, extension of the lost grant presumption to corporeal interests should pose no problems; just as non-possessory interests can be the subject of an express grant as readily as can possessory claims, rules of evidence relating to the latter should be equally appli | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Caradinegreen2 sentences2026To the contrary, the doctrine was initially applied to incorporeal rights and only later began to be applied to land. 3 Accordingly, the application of the doctrine to non-possessory interests is but a reflection of its historic origins while the application to possessory interests was in fact the extension of the doctrine. 4 Of itself, extension of the lost grant presumption to corporeal interests should pose no problems; just as non-possessory interests can be the subject of an express grant as readily as can possessory claims, rules of evidence relating to the latter should be equally appli 2026To the contrary, the doctrine was initially applied to incorporeal rights and only later began to be applied to land. 3 Accordingly, the application of the doctrine to non-possessory interests is but a reflection of its historic origins while the application to possessory interests was in fact the extension of the doctrine. 4 Of itself, extension of the lost grant presumption to corporeal interests should pose no problems; just as non-possessory interests can be the subject of an express grant as readily as can possessory claims, rules of evidence relating to the latter should be equally appli | 1 | 1 |
Patrick Von Dohlen, Brian Greco, Kevin Jason Khattar, Michael Knuffke, and Daniel Petri v. City of San Antoniogreen1 sentence2024See Dohlen, 643 S.W.3d at 392 (citing Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 330 ); Olivares, 461 S.W.3d at 124 ; Foster, 273 S.W.3d at 889-90; see also Chambers-Liberty Cntys. | 1 | 1 |
Tooke v. City of Mexiagreen1 sentence2024See Dohlen, 643 S.W.3d at 392 (citing Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 330 ); Olivares, 461 S.W.3d at 124 ; Foster, 273 S.W.3d at 889-90; see also Chambers-Liberty Cntys. | 1 | 1 |
City of Durham v. REIDSVILLE ENGINEERING COMPANYgreen1 sentence2024Still, King maintains arbitral immunity does apply to professional engineers acting “as a third-party neutral” or “as a mediator and/or arbitrator,” and that this extension of immunity is necessary so that engineers “will not be governed by fear of lawsuits, and can freely engage their own professional judgment as to the merits of the matters they must decide.” He urges us to follow a North Carolina case that concluded supervising engineers could not be held liable for damages to either party in the absence of bad faith because under the terms of the contract, the engineers “would be acting in | 1 | 1 |
Verburgt v. Dornergreen1 sentence2022Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tex. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Bayou Terrace Investment Corp. v. Lylesgreen1 sentence2022Howard, 628 S.W.3d at 334 n.7 (stating that privilege does not preclude statutory remedies); Lyles, 881 S.W.2d at 818 (applying judicial-proceedings privilege against appellants while noting that there are “other avenues of relief if, as they claim, the lis pendens was wrongfully filed.”); see Campbell v. Martell, No. 05-19-01413-CV, 2021 WL 1731754 , at *11 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 3, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.);4 see also TEX. | 1 | 1 |
Bailey v. Gardnergreen1 sentence2015Appraisal Dist., 321 S.W.3d 648, 654 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (quoting Bailey v. Gardner, 154 S.W.3d 917, 920 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)). | 1 | 1 |
BMC Software Belgium, NV v. Marchandgreen1 sentence2015Cf. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 800 (Tex. 2002) (reviewing denial of motion for continuance for a clear abuse of discretion). | 1 | 1 |
Grondona v. Suttongreen1 sentence2015See Grondoma v. Sutton, 991 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied). | 1 | 1 |
Bilinsco Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Districtgreen1 sentence2015Appraisal Dist., 321 S.W.3d 648, 654 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (quoting Bailey v. Gardner, 154 S.W.3d 917, 920 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)). | 1 | 1 |
Davison, Anthony Raygreen2 sentences2013App. 2013). 2 See id. at 691-92 (“[T]here are exceptions to this practice, and when the proper resolution of the remaining issue is clear, we will sometimes dispose of the case in the name of judicial economy.”) 3 See Volosen v. State, 227 S.W.3d 77, 80 (Tex. Crim. 2013GILL — 2 We ordinarily review only the “decisions” of the courts of appeals.1 I am aware that there are exceptions,2 and that, over the past half-decade or so, one such exception that the Court has explicitly carved out is that a party who prevails in the trial court but then loses in the court of appeals may raise an argument for the first time in his own petition for discretionary review to justify reversing the court of appeals’s judgment—even though he did not raise that argument in his reply brief below.3 Perhaps what the Court invokes today to justify addressing the State’s constitutiona | 1 | 1 |
Volosen v. Stategreen1 sentence2013App. 2013). 2 See id. at 691-92 (“[T]here are exceptions to this practice, and when the proper resolution of the remaining issue is clear, we will sometimes dispose of the case in the name of judicial economy.”) 3 See Volosen v. State, 227 S.W.3d 77, 80 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
NEXION HEALTH AT BEECHNUT, INC. v. Paulgreen1 sentence2013See id. | 1 | 1 |
| University of Texas Medical Branch v. Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Reilly v. Rangers Management, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Lenape Resources Corp. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| San Antonio MacHine & Supply Co. v. Allengreen | 1 | 1 |
| McDonald v. Leegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Putnal v. Inmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Woodhouse v. Powlesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Burns v. Ohiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Pittsburg v. Pondergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Seely v. White Motor Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
K.D.F. v. Rex
green
2 sentences2022The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and concluded that Brown & Gay as a private contractor was not immune from suit for the consequences of its own actions taken in the exercise of its own independent discretion: We have never directly addressed the extension of immunity to private government contractors, but our analysis in K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. 1994), is instructive. .... . . . . [W]e held that another private company that “operate[d] solely upon the direction of [the governmental entity]” and “exercise[d] no discretion in its activities” was i 2022The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and concluded that Brown & Gay as a private contractor was not immune from suit for the consequences of its own actions taken in the exercise of its own independent discretion: We have never directly addressed the extension of immunity to private government contractors, but our analysis in K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. 1994), is instructive. .... . . . . [W]e held that another private company that “operate[d] solely upon the direction of [the governmental entity]” and “exercise[d] no discretion in its activities” was i | 4 | 2015–2022 |
Ackerson v. Bean Dredging LlC
green
2 sentences2015For example, in Ackerson v. Bean Dredging LLC, federal contractors were sued for damages allegedly caused by dredging in conjunction with the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet project. 589 F.3d 196 (5th Cir.2009). 2015For example, in Ackerson v. Bean Dredging LLC, federal contractors were sued for damages allegedly caused by dredging in conjunction with the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet project. 589 F.3d 196 (5th Cir.2009). | 4 | 2015–2015 |
George Corey, Trust Fund v. New York Stock Exchange
green
2 sentences2003Corey , 691 F.2d at 1211 . 2003Corey, 691 F.2d at 1211 . | 3 | 2003–2003 |
Wayne Duddlesten, Inc. v. Highland Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2011Duddlesten , 110 S.W.3d at 96–97; Methodist , 2009 WL 3003251, at *7 ; Cain , 239 S.W.3d at 897–98. 2011Duddlesten, 110 S.W.3d at 96-97 ; Methodist, 329 S.W.3d at 520-21 ; Cain, 239 S.W.3d at 897-98 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Cain v. Safeco Lloyds Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences2011Duddlesten , 110 S.W.3d at 96–97; Methodist , 2009 WL 3003251, at *7 ; Cain , 239 S.W.3d at 897–98. 2011Duddlesten, 110 S.W.3d at 96-97 ; Methodist, 329 S.W.3d at 520-21 ; Cain, 239 S.W.3d at 897-98 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Methodist Hospital v. Zurich American Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2011Duddlesten , 110 S.W.3d at 96–97; Methodist , 2009 WL 3003251, at *7 ; Cain , 239 S.W.3d at 897–98. 2011Duddlesten, 110 S.W.3d at 96-97 ; Methodist, 329 S.W.3d at 520-21 ; Cain, 239 S.W.3d at 897-98 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Adams v. New York
green
2 sentences1983The Court first pointed out that Amos “advances no reasons applicable to a prosecution under our state laws and' procedure,” but conceding that “the subject matter ... is similar,” Judge Lattimore wrote for the Court: “[W]e respectfully state that we think the opinion in said case rests upon a misapprehension of the purpose of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as section 9, art. 1, of our state Constitution, and that the learned court was not justified in applying to the decision of the facts before it in the Amos Case, supra, the principles announced in the Weeks and B 1983The Court first pointed out that Amos “advances no reasons applicable to a prosecution under our state laws and' procedure,” but conceding that “the subject matter ... is similar,” Judge Lattimore wrote for the Court: “[W]e respectfully state that we think the opinion in said case rests upon a misapprehension of the purpose of the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as section 9, art. 1, of our state Constitution, and that the learned court was not justified in applying to the decision of the facts before it in the Amos Case, supra, the principles announced in the Weeks and B | 2 | 1922–1983 |
O'HERN v. State
green
2 sentences1980Stephenson v. State, 500 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); O'Hern v. State, 527 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (Concurring Opinion); Green v. State, 528 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975) (Concurring Opinion). 1980Stephenson v. State, 500 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); O’Hern v. State, 527 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (Concurring Opinion); Green v. State, 528 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (Concurring Opinion). | 2 | 1978–1980 |
Stephenson v. State
green
2 sentences1980Stephenson v. State, 500 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); O'Hern v. State, 527 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (Concurring Opinion); Green v. State, 528 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975) (Concurring Opinion). 1980Stephenson v. State, 500 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); O’Hern v. State, 527 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (Concurring Opinion); Green v. State, 528 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (Concurring Opinion). | 2 | 1978–1980 |
McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc.
green
2 sentences1971Appellant urges an extension of the rule announced in McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.Sup.). 1971The Supreme Court in McKisson, supra, adopted Section 402A of the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Torts (2d Ed) as the law in this State. | 2 | 1971–1971 |
Michael C. Howard and Virginia D. Hamilton v. Matterhorn Energy, LLC, and Mike Cherry
green
1 sentence2022Howard, 628 S.W.3d at 334 n.7 (stating that privilege does not preclude statutory remedies); Lyles, 881 S.W.2d at 818 (applying judicial-proceedings privilege against appellants while noting that there are “other avenues of relief if, as they claim, the lis pendens was wrongfully filed.”); see Campbell v. Martell, No. 05-19-01413-CV, 2021 WL 1731754 , at *11 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 3, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.);4 see also TEX. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Hmc Hotel Properties II Limited Partnership and Host Hotels & Resorts, L.P., F/K/A Host Marriott, L.P. v. Keystone-Texas Property Holding Corporation
green
2 sentences2018The authoring court further explained that section 586 was adopted based on “a public policy rationale in favor of attorneys as officers of the court.” Id. 2018In that case, the Fourth Court of Appeals reasoned that the privilege did not apply to out-of-court statements by non-attorneys “[b]ecause the extension of the privilege to out-of-court communications is based on the adoption of section 586 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (which only pertains to communications by attorneys).” Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Harris
green
1 sentence2015Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Riddle v. Ashe green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Travis County v. Pelzel & Associates, Inc. red | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Garner v. Louisiana green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Johnston v. State green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| McDonald v. State yellow | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Martin Hedrick Co. v. Gotcher green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Welchek v. State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Green v. State green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Herring v. Blakeley green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Smith v. Bennett green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Lane v. Brown green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Entsminger v. Iowa green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Gardner v. California green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Linkletter v. Walker red | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Williams v. Oklahoma City green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Irving Lumber Company v. Alltex Mortgage Company green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Irving Lumber Company v. Alltex Mortgage Company green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Cooper v. Blanck green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Verkennes v. Corniea green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Bonbrest v. Kotz green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc. green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Cruz v. Ansul Chemical Company green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Milam v. Texas Department of Public Safety neutral | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Texas Department of Public Safety v. Azar neutral | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Revard v. Wood neutral | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.