extension hearing in Massachusetts

2026See Iamele, 444 Mass. at 740 ("The judge is to consider the basis for the modified to incorporate a Probate and Family Court stipulation from the same date. 3 At the extension hearing, the plaintiff testified that the trial involved issues of custody arrangements, domestic violence, and failed drug tests. 2 initial order in evaluating the risk of future abuse should the existing order expire.

2023To the extent the defendant argues that the plaintiff's allegations of abuse were not credible, that argument fails because an extension hearing is not an opportunity for a defendant to "challenge the evidence underlying the initial order." Iamele, 444 Mass. at 740 .

2024Indeed, at the extension hearing, the defendant continued to rationalize his unwanted contact by saying that it was not "harassment," but rather was "a way to protect her." "[A]n order may remain necessary where the plaintiff's 'fear of [the defendant] was clear and palpable and . . . her sense of security would be substantially diminished were the order to expire.'" Yasmin Y., 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 258 , quoting Callahan v. Callahan, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 369, 375 (2014).

2024See Yanha Y., 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 187; Callahan, 85 Mass. App. Ct. at 374 . reports that the delinquency matter has since resolved by a plea agreement. 7 As it is unnecessary to our resolution of the case, we take no position on whether the defendant's friends' AirDropping photographs to G.C. in the cafeteria amounted to a violation of the portion of the 209A order directing the defendant not to contact G.C. "electronically or otherwise, either directly or through someone else." 7 Additionally, the judge's written findings demonstrate that she failed to consider the fact that the initial 209A

2026However, "[t]he effect a 209A order has on a defendant is not relevant to a judge's assessment of whether to issue a 209A order." Calliope C. v. Yanni Y., 103 Mass. App. Ct. 722 , 726 (2024). 5 The defendant contends that the extension hearing violated her due process rights because the judge failed to consider all her motions and evidence, and because he permitted the plaintiff to introduce evidence that was "irrelevant or prejudicial." Having a meaningful opportunity to be heard in a c. 209A proceeding "includes the defendant's right to testify, to present evidence, and to cross-examine the

2024Next, the defendant claims that he was not provided "a meaningful opportunity to be heard," see Idris I. v. Hazel H., 100 Mass. App. Ct. 784, 788 (2022), at the extension hearing on April 3, 2023, because he was "not afforded an opportunity to respond to false information" presented during the hearing.

2019In Commonwealth v. Grassie , 476 Mass. 202 , 219, 65 N.E.3d 1199 (2017), the court announced that it would convene a special committee to review "current practices employed by the various district attorneys and the Attorney General before considering an extension of the rule adopted in [ Walczak , 463 Mass. 808 , 979 N.E.2d 732 ,] to similar types of grand jury proceedings involving adults." The committee, which consisted of judges (both sitting and retired), prosecutors, defense lawyers, and a law school professor, submitted a report to the court.

2019In Commonwealth v. Grassie , 476 Mass. 202 , 219, 65 N.E.3d 1199 (2017), the court announced that it would convene a special committee to review "current practices employed by the various district attorneys and the Attorney General before considering an extension of the rule adopted in [ Walczak , 463 Mass. 808 , 979 N.E.2d 732 ,] to similar types of grand jury proceedings involving adults." The committee, which consisted of judges (both sitting and retired), prosecutors, defense lawyers, and a law school professor, submitted a report to the court.

2025"We review the extension of a c. 209A order 'for an abuse of discretion or other error of law.'" Latoya L. v. Kai K., 104 Mass. App. Ct. 173 , 177 (2024), quoting Constance C. v. Raymond R., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 390, 394 (2022). "[W]e will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact.

2023See Constance C. v. Raymond R., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 390, 394 (2022), quoting E.C.O. v. Compton, 464 Mass. 558, 562 (2013) (extension of 209A order reviewed "for an abuse of discretion or other error of law").

2008The purpose of such an extension clause is to “afford the broker some measure of protection if the [owner’s] property is sold to a person with whom the broker, prior to the expiration of the term of the listing agreement, had some form of dealing described in the agreement.” Upper Cape Realty Corp. v. Morris, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 53, 60 (2001), quoting Julius Tofias & Co. v. John B.

2002Compare Upper Cape Realty Corp. v. Morris, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 53, 59 (2001) (the word “introduce” in an extension clause of a written brokerage agreement did not require the broker to be the predominant cause of a sale).

2008Stetson Co., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 392, 396 (1985).

2001Stetson Co., supra at 396.

2025See Commonwealth v. Delaney, 425 Mass. 587 , 591 n.7 (1997) ("The adequacy of notice so far as due process is concerned is dependent on whether the form of notice is reasonably calculated to give . . . actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard" [quotations and citations omitted]).

1997Under Commonwealth v. Delaney, 425 Mass. 587 (1997), service of an initial TRO on a defendant provides adequate notice of a subsequent extension of that order, even when defendant fails to appear at the extension hearing and is not served with the extension order.

2025Because the defendant had not appeared at the most recent extension hearing, "[t]he last thing the defendant could be held to have known was that he could have no contact with [the victim] pursuant to a court order that expired on [May 7, 2021]." Commonwealth v. Molloy, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 306, 309 (1998).

2016May, 2014), Violation of a Harassment Prevention Order ("In order to prove the defendant guilty of this offense, the Commonwealth must prove . . . beyond a reasonable doubt . . . [t]hat the defendant knew that the pertinent term(s) of the order (was) (were) in effect, either by having received a copy of the order or by having learned of it in some other way"). 9 Conversely, in Commonwealth v. Molloy, 44 Mass. App. Ct. at 309 , the evidence of actual or constructive notice of the extension of a restraining order was insufficient where the order in question had not been served on the defendant,

2025Additionally, the defendant received all of plaintiffs' evidence ten days prior to the extension hearing. 6 affidavit nor the motion in limine submitted by counsel for the children, "the judge was accordingly entitled to credit the plaintiff[s'] essentially undisputed evidence." Vittone v. Clairmont, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 479 , 481 n.4 (2005) (no error in extending abuse prevention order when "[t]he defendant's attorney was present, did not object to proceeding without live testimony, did not cross-examine the plaintiff on her affidavit, and did not seek to put in evidence controverting either the

2014Similarly misplaced is Richard’s contention that Vittone v. Clairmont, 64 Mass. App. Ct. at 485 n.7, stands for the proposition that extension of an order is not possible when its subject is incarcerated because “imprisonment is, if not the ultimate restraining order, at least its functional equivalent.” 11 Viewed in context, the quoted statement stands as nothing more than an explanation for why the plaintiff there may have let the restraining order lapse for eight years before seeking renewal.

2024Indeed, at the extension hearing, the defendant continued to rationalize his unwanted contact by saying that it was not "harassment," but rather was "a way to protect her." "[A]n order may remain necessary where the plaintiff's 'fear of [the defendant] was clear and palpable and . . . her sense of security would be substantially diminished were the order to expire.'" Yasmin Y., 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 258 , quoting Callahan v. Callahan, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 369, 375 (2014).

2023See Yasmin Y. v. Queshon Q., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 252, 259 (2022). 4 Eli E., pro se.

2023See O'Brien v. Borowsky, 461 Mass. 415, 430 (2012).

2017Thus, at the extension hearing, the plaintiff was required to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that each of the defendants wilfully and maliciously committed three separate acts that were intended to cause her fear, intimidation, abuse, or damage to property, and that, "considered together, did in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse, or damage to property." O'Brien, 461 Mass. at 426 & n.8.

2025See Gianocostas, supra (decisions to grant or deny motions to dismiss on ground of forum non conveniens reviewed for abuse of discretion).

2025L. c. 209A." Lonergan-Gillen v. Gillen, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 746, 749 (2003).

2025See G.B. v. C.A., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 389, 397-398 (2018). 6 Finally, turning to the merits, W.S. contends that S.G. failed to prove a prima facie case of harassment under G.

2024See Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass. 58, 62 (2014) ("appeals from expired harassment prevention orders, like appeals from expired abuse Subsequent to the entry of the December 30, 2022 extension order, a panel of this court on appeal vacated the initial May 6, 2022 order.

2024This is especially so where the defendant agreed in the stipulation -- which he signed and which the Probate and Family Court judge accepted at the extension hearing -- that paragraph 2 would be "modified to allow email communications between the parties exclusively related to the children." 3 3 We also reject the defendant's argument that the jury's verdict violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws, which "is directed against legislative action only and does not reach erroneous or inconsistent decisions by the courts." Stokes v. Commonwealth, 368 Mass. 754, 772 (1975), quoting Frank

2024This is especially so where the defendant agreed in the stipulation -- which he signed and which the Probate and Family Court judge accepted at the extension hearing -- that paragraph 2 would be "modified to allow email communications between the parties exclusively related to the children." 3 3 We also reject the defendant's argument that the jury's verdict violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws, which "is directed against legislative action only and does not reach erroneous or inconsistent decisions by the courts." Stokes v. Commonwealth, 368 Mass. 754, 772 (1975), quoting Frank

2024See R.S. v. A.P.B., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 372 , 373 n.4 (2019).

2023See Constance C. v. Raymond R., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 390, 394 (2022), quoting E.C.O. v. Compton, 464 Mass. 558, 562 (2013) (extension of 209A order reviewed "for an abuse of discretion or other error of law").

2019See Crenshaw v. Macklin , 430 Mass. 633 , 636 (2000).

2019See S.T . v. E.M ., 80 Mass. App. Ct. 423 , 430 (2011).

2018See Frizado v. Frizado , 420 Mass. 592 , 596 (1995).

2018See Smith v. Jones , 75 Mass. App. Ct. 540 , 544 (2009) (judge has discretion to determine length of extension).

2016And, in Commonwealth v. Welch, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 408, 409-411 (2003), we held that there was insufficient evidence of a violation of an extended abuse prevention order where there was no evidence that either the order or an earlier ex parte order had been served, and the alleged victim's testimony concerning her telephone conversations with the defendant were so void of detail that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant had actual knowledge of the terms of the order or was put on sufficient notice to make reasonable inquiry concerning the issuance and terms of the order.7 7

2016And, in Commonwealth v. Welch, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 408, 409-411 (2003), we held that there was insufficient evidence of a violation of an extended abuse prevention order where there was no evidence that either the order or an earlier ex parte order had been served, and the alleged victim’s testimony concerning her telephone conversations with the defendant were so void of detail that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant had actual knowledge of the terms of the order or was put on sufficient notice to make reasonable inquiry concerning the issuance and terms of the order. 7 A

2016And, in Commonwealth v. Welch, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 408, 409-411 (2003), we held that there was insufficient evidence of a violation of an extended abuse prevention order where there was no evidence that either the order or an earlier ex parte order had been served, and the alleged victim’s testimony concerning her telephone conversations with the defendant were so void of detail that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant had actual knowledge of the terms of the order or was put on sufficient notice to make reasonable inquiry concerning the issuance and terms of the order. 7 A

2015To the contrary, however, in our view the attempt to limit application of the mode of operation approach to spillage and breakage of products offered for sale (and, thereby, to limit Sheehan to its facts) is at odds both with the court’s explanation of its holding, see ibid., and with the fundamental tort principles on which the mode of operation approach is based. 11 To return to first principles, “[a] landowner must act as a reasonable man in maintaining his property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness