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31 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1909–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Woodard v. Laurens Countygreen2 sentences2019See Woodard, 265 Ga. at 406 (1) (because a waiver of sovereign immunity was a “mere privilege,” tort plaintiffs were not authorized to challenge disparities in the extension of that privilege on equal protection grounds). 3. 2016The plain and unambiguous text of the 1991 constitutional amendment shows that only the General Assembly has the authority to waive the State’s sovereign immunity. [Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 748 (3) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994)] (subsection (e) of the amendment “confers upon the legislature the authority to waive sovereign immunity”); see also Woodard v. Laurens County, 265 Ga. 404 (1) ( 456 SE2d 581 ) (1995) (“A waiver of sovereign immunity is a mere privilege, not a right, and the extension of that privilege is solely a matter of legislative grace.”). | 4 | 5 |
Levin v. American Furniture Co.green2 sentences1952That the obligation may or may not have been reduced to an exact or definite finding or liability does not seem to be the only reason for the security to be disqualified in another bond in the same proceeding, but the fact that the security is already bound under a bond would, in effect, result in one becoming his own security if he should be allowed to become a security on the appeal bond.” “It has been held in several cases that one cannot in effect become his own surety, where the law requires him to give a bond; and by an extension of the principle, that, where one has already become a sur 1952That the obligation may or may not have been reduced to an exact or definite finding or liability does not seem to be the only reason for the security to be disqualified in another bond in the same proceeding, but the fact that the security is already bound under a bond would, in effect, result in one becoming his own security if he should be allowed to become a security on the appeal bond.” “It has been held in several cases that one cannot in effect become his own surety, where the law requires him to give a bond; and by an extension of the principle, that, where one has already become a sur | 3 | 3 |
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. City of Garden Citygreen2 sentences2021See also CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 277 Ga. 248, 250 (1) ( 588 SE2d 688 ) (2003) (“any waiver of sovereign immunity is a mere privilege, not a right, and the extension of that privilege is solely a matter of legislative grace”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2021See also CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 277 Ga. 248, 250 (1) ( 588 SE2d 688 ) (2003) (“any waiver of sovereign immunity is a mere privilege, not a right, and the extension of that privilege is solely a matter of legislative grace”) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Kim v. Wallsgreen2 sentences2017See Kim v. Walls, 275 Ga. 177, 179 ( 563 SE2d 847 ) (2002) (citing Cohen). 2017See Kim v. Walls, 275 Ga. 177, 179 ( 563 SE2d 847 ) (2002) (citing Cohen). | 2 | 2 |
Gilbert v. Richardsongreen2 sentences2016The plain and unambiguous text of the 1991 constitutional amendment shows that only the General Assembly has the authority to waive the State’s sovereign immunity. [Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 748 (3) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994)] (subsection (e) of the amendment “confers upon the legislature the authority to waive sovereign immunity”); see also Woodard v. Laurens County, 265 Ga. 404 (1) ( 456 SE2d 581 ) (1995) (“A waiver of sovereign immunity is a mere privilege, not a right, and the extension of that privilege is solely a matter of legislative grace.”). 2016The plain and unambiguous text of the 1991 constitutional amendment shows that only the General Assembly has the authority to waive the State’s sovereign immunity. [Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 748 (3) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994)] (subsection (e) of the amendment “confers upon the legislature the authority to waive sovereign immunity”); see also Woodard v. Laurens County, 265 Ga. 404 (1) ( 456 SE2d 581 ) (1995) (“A waiver of sovereign immunity is a mere privilege, not a right, and the extension of that privilege is solely a matter of legislative grace.”). | 2 | 2 |
Benson v. Shinesgreen2 sentences1952See also Benson v. Shines, 107 Ga. 406 ( 33 S. E. 439 ). 1952See also Benson v. Shines, 107 Ga. 406 ( 33 S. E. 439 ). | 1 | 2 |
Vergara v. Stategreen2 sentences2025The most recent precedent directly on point is Vergara, where we expressly “reject[ed] the State’s argument that [former] OCGA § 24-3-50 does not apply to Vergara’s statements to law enforcement because they constitute incriminating statements rather than a confession.” 283 Ga. at 177 29 (1) (citation omitted).9 There, we said that “[i]t has long been the law in this State that the rule as to the admissibility of an incriminating statement is the same as that applied to a confession” and overruled several cases “[t]o the extent that [they] hold otherwise.” 283 Ga. at 177 (1).10 However, to sup 2025The most recent precedent directly on point is Vergara, where we expressly “reject[ed] the State’s argument that [former] OCGA § 24-3-50 does not apply to Vergara’s statements to law enforcement because they constitute incriminating statements rather than a confession.” 283 Ga. at 177 29 (1) (citation omitted).9 There, we said that “[i]t has long been the law in this State that the rule as to the admissibility of an incriminating statement is the same as that applied to a confession” and overruled several cases “[t]o the extent that [they] hold otherwise.” 283 Ga. at 177 (1).10 However, to sup | 1 | 1 |
Massey v. Masseygreen1 sentence2024Accord Massey, 294 Ga. at 165 (2) (recognizing the extension of that rule to immediate appeals from non-final judgments authorized under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (2)). | 1 | 1 |
Snipes v. Marcene P. Powell & Associates, Inc.green2 sentences2007This Court has previously held that the use of the term “introduced,” as used in the extension clause found in the Listing Agreement, was intended “to obligate sellers to pay commissions ... where the broker [initially] told the buyer about the property, provided the buyer with information about the property, or showed the buyer the property.” Snipes v. Marcene P. Powell & Assoc., 273 Ga. App. 814, 817 (1) (a) ( 616 SE2d 152 ) (2005). 2007This Court has previously held that the use of the term “introduced,” as used in the extension clause found in the Listing Agreement, was intended “to obligate sellers to pay commissions ... where the broker [initially] told the buyer about the property, provided the buyer with information about the property, or showed the buyer the property.” Snipes v. Marcene P. Powell & Assoc., 273 Ga. App. 814, 817 (1) (a) ( 616 SE2d 152 ) (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Redding v. Stategreen2 sentences1999Redding v. State, 219 Ga. App. 182, 184 (3) ( 464 SE2d 824 ) (1995). 1999Redding v. State, 219 Ga. App. 182, 184 (3) ( 464 SE2d 824 ) (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Riddle v. Ashegreen1 sentence1998A waiver of sovereign immunity is a mere privilege, not a right, and the extension of that privilege is solely a matter of legislative grace.” (Citations omitted.) Riddle, supra at 67 (3). | 1 | 1 |
Sikes v. Candler Countygreen2 sentences1995Sikes v. Candler County, 247 Ga. 115, 117 (2) ( 274 SE2d 464 ) (1981). 1995Sikes v. Candler County, 247 Ga. 115, 117 (2) ( 274 SE2d 464 ) (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Orr v. Stategreen1 sentence1994The language used in OCGA § 24-4-6 appeared in Orr v. State, 34 Ga. 342, 345 (1866), in the course of a discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence in that case to support the conviction. | 1 | 1 |
Howard v. Stategreen1 sentence1973We find no statutory provision touching the grant of immunity, but as was asserted in Howard v. State, 60 Ga. App. 229, 237 ( 4 SE2d 418 ), quoted approvingly in Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 403 ( 150 SE2d 240 ): " 'The extension of immunity to a particeps criminis who has turned State’s evidence has existed from time immemorial . . .’ and 'such a promise affects only the witness to whom it is made. | 1 | 1 |
Evans v. Stategreen2 sentences1973We find no statutory provision touching the grant of immunity, but as was asserted in Howard v. State, 60 Ga. App. 229, 237 ( 4 SE2d 418 ), quoted approvingly in Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 403 ( 150 SE2d 240 ): " 'The extension of immunity to a particeps criminis who has turned State’s evidence has existed from time immemorial . . .’ and 'such a promise affects only the witness to whom it is made. 1973We find no statutory provision touching the grant of immunity, but as was asserted in Howard v. State, 60 Ga. App. 229, 237 ( 4 SE2d 418 ), quoted approvingly in Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 403 ( 150 SE2d 240 ): " 'The extension of immunity to a particeps criminis who has turned State’s evidence has existed from time immemorial . . .’ and 'such a promise affects only the witness to whom it is made. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Davisgreen1 sentence1973See, e.g., the special concurrence in Smith v. Davis, 121 Ga. App. 704 , supra, p. 709. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blue v. Blue
green
2 sentences2014Blue v. Blue, 279 Ga. 550 (1) ( 615 SE2d 540 ) (2005). 2014Blue v. Blue, 279 Ga. 550 (1) ( 615 SE2d 540 ) (2005). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Gordon v. Robertson
green
2 sentences1942Gordon v. Robertson, 26 Ga. 410 ; Eufaula Home Ins. 1909Gordon v. Robertson, 26 Ga. 410; Eufaula Home Ins. v. Plant & Cubbedge, 36 Ga. 623, 624 ; Benson v. Shines, 107 Ga. 407 ( 33 S. E. 439 ); Napier v. Woodall, 118 Ga. 830 ( 45 S. E. 684 ). | 2 | 1909–1942 |
Blumenfeld v. Borenstein
green
2 sentences1988If this court endorsed a rule imputing professional wrongdoing to an attorney on the basis of marital status alone, it would be difficult to avoid the extension of that rule to other relationships as well. 247 Ga. at 408-9 . 1988If this court endorsed a rule imputing professional wrongdoing to an attorney on the basis of marital status alone, it would be difficult to avoid the extension of that rule to other relationships as well. 247 Ga. at 408-9 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Russell v. Taylor
neutral
1 sentence1980The case of Russell v. Taylor, 222 Ala. 312 (131 S 887) (1930), is cited in support of that proposition. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Morris v. South Carolina State Highway Department
green
1 sentence1977This view of waivers of sovereign immunity is supported by rulings from other jurisdictions: "... inasmuch as the right to sue is purely statutory, the legislature has the power not only to restrict such right but to withhold it, or withdraw it altogether.” Morris v. South Carolina State Highway Dept., 264 S. C. 369 ( 215 SE2d 430 ). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Wims v. State
green
1 sentence1973We find no statutory provision touching the grant of immunity, but as was asserted in Howard v. State, 60 Ga. App. 229, 237 ( 4 SE2d 418 ), quoted approvingly in Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 403 ( 150 SE2d 240 ): " 'The extension of immunity to a particeps criminis who has turned State’s evidence has existed from time immemorial . . .’ and 'such a promise affects only the witness to whom it is made. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
People v. McShann
green
2 sentences1968If the purpose of the privilege is to protect the public interest in effective law enforcement (see Roviaro v. U. S., 353 U. S. 53 (77 SC 623, 1 LE2d 639); People v. McShann, 50 Cal. 2d 802 ( 330 P2d 33 ); State v. Hardy (Fla. App.), 114 S2d 344), or, as Wigmore suggests, if it applies "wherever the situation is one where without this encouragement the citizens who have special information of a violation of law might be deterred otherwise from voluntarily reporting it to the appropriate official" (8 Wigmore, supra, at 768), the record fails to demonstrate any need for the extension of the rule 1968If the purpose of the privilege is to protect the public interest in effective law enforcement (see Roviaro v. U. S., 353 U. S. 53 (77 SC 623, 1 LE2d 639); People v. McShann, 50 Cal. 2d 802 ( 330 P2d 33 ); State v. Hardy (Fla. App.), 114 S2d 344), or, as Wigmore suggests, if it applies "wherever the situation is one where without this encouragement the citizens who have special information of a violation of law might be deterred otherwise from voluntarily reporting it to the appropriate official" (8 Wigmore, supra, at 768), the record fails to demonstrate any need for the extension of the rule | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Roviaro v. United States
green
2 sentences1968If the purpose of the privilege is to protect the public interest in effective law enforcement (see Roviaro v. U. S., 353 U. S. 53 (77 SC 623, 1 LE2d 639); People v. McShann, 50 Cal. 2d 802 ( 330 P2d 33 ); State v. Hardy (Fla. App.), 114 S2d 344), or, as Wigmore suggests, if it applies "wherever the situation is one where without this encouragement the citizens who have special information of a violation of law might be deterred otherwise from voluntarily reporting it to the appropriate official” (8 Wigmore, supra, at 768), the record fails to demonstrate any need for the extension of the rule 1968If the purpose of the privilege is to protect the public interest in effective law enforcement (see Roviaro v. U. S., 353 U. S. 53 (77 SC 623, 1 LE2d 639); People v. McShann, 50 Cal. 2d 802 ( 330 P2d 33 ); State v. Hardy (Fla. App.), 114 S2d 344), or, as Wigmore suggests, if it applies "wherever the situation is one where without this encouragement the citizens who have special information of a violation of law might be deterred otherwise from voluntarily reporting it to the appropriate official" (8 Wigmore, supra, at 768), the record fails to demonstrate any need for the extension of the rule | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Ingram v. Prescott
green
2 sentences1966It is admissible insofar as it affects the credibility of the witness to whom immunity has been promised; beyond this it does not affect the defendant on trial.” As stated in Ingram v. Prescott, 111 Fla. 320 (149 S 369), “From the earliest times, it has been found necessary for the detection and punishment of crime, for the State to resort to the criminals themselves for testimony with which to convict their confederates in crime. . . 1966It is admissible insofar as it affects the credibility of the witness to whom immunity has been promised; beyond this it does not affect the defendant on trial." As stated in Ingram v. Prescott, 111 Fla. 320 (149 S 369), "From the earliest times, it has been found necessary for the detection and punishment of crime, for the State to resort to the criminals themselves for testimony with which to convict their confederates in crime... | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Hodson v. Scoggins
green
2 sentences1964Hodson v. Scoggins, 102 Ga. App. 44 ( 115 SE2d 715 ). 1964Hodson v. Scoggins, 102 Ga. App. 44 ( 115 SE2d 715 ). | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Kilcoyne v. Southern Oil Co.
neutral
1 sentence1942In Levin v. American Furniture Co., 133 Ga. 670, 674 ( 56 S. E. 888 ), this court through Lumpkin, J., said: “It has been held in several cases that one can not in effect become his own surety, where the law requires him to give a bond; and by an extension of the principle, that, where one has already become a surety on a bond required to be given in the progress of a case, and from a judgment, the result of which is to fix liability upon him along with his principal, an appeal is taken, he can not become surety on the appeal bond. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Hays v. Hogan
neutral
2 sentences1935Thus, in Hays v. Hogan, 180 Mo. App. 237 , 165 S. W. 1125 , it is said: ‘We think that when an automobile . . is being used by another member of the family than the owner, but with the owner’s consent, that he should not be heard to say that such other is not his agent or servant. 1935Thus, in Hays v. Hogan, 180 Mo. App. 237 , 165 S. W. 1125 , it is said: ‘We think that when an automobile . . is being used by another member of the family than the owner, but with the owner’s consent, that he should not be heard to say that such other is not his agent or servant. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Eufaula Home Insurance v. Plant & Cubbedge
neutral
1 sentence1909Gordon v. Robertson, 26 Ga. 410; Eufaula Home Ins. v. Plant & Cubbedge, 36 Ga. 623, 624 ; Benson v. Shines, 107 Ga. 407 ( 33 S. E. 439 ); Napier v. Woodall, 118 Ga. 830 ( 45 S. E. 684 ). | 1 | 1909–1909 |
| Harris v. Bank of Little Rock green | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Means v. Subers
green
1 sentence1909Gordon v. Robertson, 26 Ga. 410; Eufaula Home Ins. v. Plant & Cubbedge, 36 Ga. 623, 624 ; Benson v. Shines, 107 Ga. 407 ( 33 S. E. 439 ); Napier v. Woodall, 118 Ga. 830 ( 45 S. E. 684 ). | 1 | 1909–1909 |
| Napier Bros. v. Woodall green | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.