extension doctrine in New Jersey

2022Hawkins, 141 N.J. at 220-21 .

2017Hawkins, supra, 141 N.J. at 220-21 .

2014Ibid.

2014Ibid.

2012But once there was no longer an objective basis to believe that an emergency was at hand, “[t]he privacy interests of the home [were] entitled to the highest degree of respect----” Evers, supra, 175 N.J. at 384 , 815 A.2d 432 . 10 We warned in Frankel that the unique facts that led to the home entry in that case under the emergency-aid doctrine should not be “over read.” 179 N.J. at 611, 847 A.2d 561 . 11 The extension of that doctrine in this case would eviscerate the special status of the home as a protected sanctuary in our constitutional framework.

2012But once there was no longer an objective basis to believe that an emergency was at hand, “[t]he privacy interests of the home [were] entitled to the highest degree of respect----” Evers, supra, 175 N.J. at 384 , 815 A.2d 432 . 10 We warned in Frankel that the unique facts that led to the home entry in that case under the emergency-aid doctrine should not be “over read.” 179 N.J. at 611, 847 A.2d 561 . 11 The extension of that doctrine in this case would eviscerate the special status of the home as a protected sanctuary in our constitutional framework.

2012But once there was no longer an objective basis to believe that an emergency was at hand, “[t]he privacy interests of the home [were] entitled to the highest degree of respect----” Evers, supra, 175 N.J. at 384 , 815 A.2d 432 . 10 We warned in Frankel that the unique facts that led to the home entry in that case under the emergency-aid doctrine should not be “over read.” 179 N.J. at 611, 847 A.2d 561 . 11 The extension of that doctrine in this case would eviscerate the special status of the home as a protected sanctuary in our constitutional framework.

2001Application of that sound principle in the circumstance of an informant's statement used in a police officer's affidavit in support of a search warrant application is illustrated by United States v. Morgan, 581 F. 2d 933 (D.C.Cir.1978).

2001Application of that sound principle in the circumstance of an informant’s statement used in a police officer’s affidavit in support of a search warrant application is illustrated by United States v. Morgan, 581 F. 2d 933 (D.C.Cir.1978).

1995We noted: “We will proceed on a step-by-step basis recognizing that the doctrine is one of judicial fairness and will be invoked in that spirit.” Crispin, supra, 96 N.J. at 343 , 476 A.2d 250 .

1995We noted: “We will proceed on a step-by-step basis recognizing that the doctrine is one of judicial fairness and will be invoked in that spirit.” Crispin, supra, 96 N.J. at 343 , 476 A.2d 250 .

1994The Court also noted that the extension of this doctrine does not risk exceeding ordinary judicial power, as courts have always had "broad judicial authority over joinder." Ibid.

1994Having presented its reasons for extending the entire controversy doctrine to mandate joinder of claims, the Cogdell Court applied the facts of the case before it to the new interpretation of the doctrine and concluded that the plaintiffs should have joined the hospital and its staff in the first suit and therefore were precluded from initiating a second suit against those defendants. 116 N.J. at 25-26 , 560 A. 2d 1169 .

1993The unambiguous intent of the extension clause is also that the broker would have no right to earn a commission when a contract of sale is signed and title is closed after the extension period expired in the absence of bad faith by the seller, or collusion between the seller and purchaser, to defeat the broker's commission claim by delaying execution of the sales contract until after the expiration date. *182 Had plaintiff, as drafter of the listing agreement, desired to retain the right to earn a commission on sales for which it was the efficient producing cause even though such sales were ma

1993The unambiguous intent of the extension clause is also that the broker would have no right to earn a commission when a contract of sale is signed and title is closed after the extension period expired in the absence of bad faith by the seller, or collusion between the seller and purchaser, to defeat the broker's commission claim by delaying execution of the sales contract until after the expiration date. *182 Had plaintiff, as drafter of the listing agreement, desired to retain the right to earn a commission on sales for which it was the efficient producing cause even though such sales were ma

1993In construing the listing agreement between plaintiff and defendant in this case, and in particular the extension clause, the court should accord the agreement "a rational meaning in keeping with the express general purpose." Joseph Hilton & Assocs., Inc. v. Evans., 201 N.J.

1993Super. 156, 171 , 492 A. 2d 1062 (App.Div. 1985).

1988In Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538 , 119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (Ct.App. 1975), the California Court of Appeals stated: (L)ogically, there is no objection to an extension of the rule ... so as to permit recovery by parents for lost pleasure, society, comfort and companionship sustained by reason of injuries inflicted upon their child ...

1988In Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538 , 119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (Ct.App. 1975), the California Court of Appeals stated: (L)ogically, there is no objection to an extension of the rule ... so as to permit recovery by parents for lost pleasure, society, comfort and companionship sustained by reason of injuries inflicted upon their child ...

1988(N)o reasonable distinction can be drawn between the right of parents, in appropriate circumstances, to seek recovery for lost comfort, society and companionship of an injured and totally helpless child and the right of a spouse, in similar circumstances, to seek recovery for loss of consortium.... [ 119 Cal. Rptr. at 643 ] Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394 , 225 N.W. 2d 495 (Sup.Ct. 1975), was one of the first cases in the country to recognize this and allow a per quod claim by the parents of an injured child.

1988(N)o reasonable distinction can be drawn between the right of parents, in appropriate circumstances, to seek recovery for lost comfort, society and companionship of an injured and totally helpless child and the right of a spouse, in similar circumstances, to seek recovery for loss of consortium.... [ 119 Cal. Rptr. at 643 ] Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394 , 225 N.W. 2d 495 (Sup.Ct. 1975), was one of the first cases in the country to recognize this and allow a per quod claim by the parents of an injured child.

1985Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538 (1984) involved an extension of the principle of Linn v. Rand to a social host who served liquor to an intoxicated adult guest.

1982The distinction is stated in the much-cited case of City of Paterson v. Baker, 51 N.J.

1981State v. Gonzalez, 75 N.J. 181, 186 , 380 A.2d 1128 (1977).

1981State v. Gonzalez, 75 N.J. 181, 186 , 380 A.2d 1128 (1977).

1979Some boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy." [ Prosser, *589 Torts (3 ed. 1964), § 41 at 240-241, quoted with approval in Caputzal, supra, 48 N.J. at 78 ] We think that what was said in Burd v. Vercruyssen, supra , is in large measure applicable to the instant case: It is clear that a deceased's parents have no right to sue for mental anguish under the wrongful death act.

1979Some boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy." [ Prosser, *589 Torts (3 ed. 1964), § 41 at 240-241, quoted with approval in Caputzal, supra, 48 N.J. at 78 ] We think that what was said in Burd v. Vercruyssen, supra , is in large measure applicable to the instant case: It is clear that a deceased's parents have no right to sue for mental anguish under the wrongful death act.

1979Some boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy." [ Prosser, *589 Torts (3 ed. 1964), § 41 at 240-241, quoted with approval in Caputzal, supra, 48 N.J. at 78 ] We think that what was said in Burd v. Vercruyssen, supra , is in large measure applicable to the instant case: It is clear that a deceased's parents have no right to sue for mental anguish under the wrongful death act.

1977The court in Rainier's Dairies , when it discussed the extension of the doctrine to quasi -judicial proceedings, noted: * * * the potential harm which may result from the absolute privilege is somewhat mitigated by the formal requirements such as notice and hearing, the comprehensive control exercised by the trial judge whose action is reviewable on appeal, and the availability of retarding influences such as false swearing and perjury prosecutions; and the view has been expressed that it is only the potential harm as thus mitigated which may properly be considered outweighed by the public int

1975The authority for this view is an extension of the doctrine contained in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 ; 16 L.

1975The authority for this view is an extension of the doctrine contained in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 ; 16 L.

1975Ed. 2d 694 ; 86 S. C. 1602 (1966), as announced in Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N. D.

1975The authority for this view is *535 an extension of the doctrine contained in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 ; 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 ; 86 S.C. 1602 (1966), as announced in Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D.

1962Super., at p. 179 , Lordi v. Spiotta, supra, 133 N.J.L., at pp. 584-586, that the occupier of land must not set a trap for a licensee.

1962The foregoing principle has been looked upon as an extension of the rule, Mistretta v. Alessi, supra, 45 N.J.

1950Dolan v. Rodgers, 44 N.E. 167 ( N.Y. 1896); Vandegrift v. Cowles Engineering Co., 55 N.E. 941 ( N.Y. 1900); Restatement, Contracts, § 295.

1950Dolan v. Rodgers, 44 N.E. 167 ( N.Y. 1896); Vandegrift v. Cowles Engineering Co., 55 N.E. 941 ( N.Y. 1900); Restatement, Contracts, § 295.