extension rule in Missouri

2018Thus, "[w]hether an entity is a government agent is a threshold consideration in governmental immunity analysis." Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dept. v. Green's Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790 , 802 (Ky. 2009).

2018This extension of immunity stems from the immunity bestowed upon the agency for which they work: "the officer's or employee's actions are afforded the same immunity, if any to which the agency, itself, would be entitled[.]" Id. at 522 .

2016Rule 29.15(g) allows up to 90 days to file an amended inotion, including a 30-day extension, ii'om counsel’s entry of appearance Under the facts here and Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 44.0](a), with an extension the rule allowed until June 19, 2013, to file an amended motion Though Movant’s post-conviction counsel requested a 45-day extension and the parties disagree about the meaning of the trial court’s order granting it; because the amended motion was filed on May 30, 2013, and because the trial court accepted and ruled upon the motion, We consider it timely. § Federhofer v, State, 462 S

1995Id. at 677 .

1992Woods v. Helmi, 758 S.W.2d 219 (Tenn.App.1988).

1985The court said, 369 P.2d at p. 403 , “We cannot agree that a contractor employed to do work on land not in a public street or right-of-way, there being no visible evidence of a buried pipeline, was bound to search the records and is charged with constructive notice of the contents of such records.” Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Bailey, supra, also involved a recorded pipe line easement and is to similar effect. *451 The trial court, in finding that the agreement made it the duty of the contractor to obtain relief from the easement, relied primarily on paragraph llg, which reads: “11.

1981Appellants’ argument is based upon an extension of the rule enunciated in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1962).

1981Appellants’ argument is based upon an extension of the rule enunciated in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1962).

1978Id. n.101. [19] Case law frequently states that "[t]he character of the threats [in a case of duress] is not so material, it being sufficient to constitute legal duress, if they deprive the party purporting to be obligated of his free moral agency." E. g., Coleman v. Crescent Insulated Wire & Cable Co., supra, 168 S.W.2d at 1066 .

1978The court recognized that in several other jurisdictions the rule of strict liability in tort was extended to include bailors and lessors, but proceeded to denial of extension of the rule to Mr. Katz by an observation that “[n]o instance has been found in which this extension of the rule has been applied to a municipally-owned, noncommercial, nonprofit amusement facility maintained for the use of the public.” 460 S.W.2d 1 . c. 612. 2 See also Giberson v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 504 S.W.2d 1 . c. 10, in its observation that Katz v. Slade “determined that liability under the rule should not be im

1978The court recognized that in several other jurisdictions the rule of strict liability in tort was extended to include bailors and lessors, but proceeded to denial of extension of the rule to Mr. Katz by an observation that “[n]o instance has been found in which this extension of the rule has been applied to a municipally-owned, noncommercial, nonprofit amusement facility maintained for the use of the public.” 460 S.W.2d 1 . c. 612. 2 See also Giberson v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 504 S.W.2d 1 . c. 10, in its observation that Katz v. Slade “determined that liability under the rule should not be im

1969In Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 , 46 S.Ct. 566 , 70 L.Ed. 1054 (1925), a case not applicable on the facts but persuasive here, the Supreme Court of the United States said at 499, 46 S.Ct. at 568 : “The safeguards against self-incrimination are for the benefit of those who do not wish to become witnesses in their own behalf, and not for those who do. * * * We can discern nothing in the policy of the law against self-incrimination which would require the extension of immunity to any trial, or to any tribunal, other than that in which the defendant preserves it by refusing to testify.” T

1969In Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 , 46 S.Ct. 566 , 70 L.Ed. 1054 (1925), a case not applicable on the facts but persuasive here, the Supreme Court of the United States said at 499, 46 S.Ct. at 568 : “The safeguards against self-incrimination are for the benefit of those who do not wish to become witnesses in their own behalf, and not for those who do. * * * We can discern nothing in the policy of the law against self-incrimination which would require the extension of immunity to any trial, or to any tribunal, other than that in which the defendant preserves it by refusing to testify.” T

1961Cotton v. Ship-By-Truck Co., 337 Mo. 270 , 85 S.W.2d 80 ; State ex rel.

1961Cotton v. Ship-By-Truck Co., 337 Mo. 270 , 85 S.W.2d 80 ; State ex rel.

1923His giiasi-trusteeship imposes upon him an enforceable legal duty to do-these things, and his failure to perform his duty falls under an extension of the rule which prohibits waste. [Robertson v. Collier, 1 Hill Ch. 370 ; Damm v. Damm, 109 Mich. 619 ; Magness v. Harris, 80 Ark. 583 ; Jones v. Sherrard, 22 N. C. 179 ; Fuller v. Devolld, 144 Mo. App. l. c. 95, 96, and cases cited.] This is not the situation of co-tenants.

1923His giiasi-trusteeship imposes upon him an enforceable legal duty to do-these things, and his failure to perform his duty falls under an extension of the rule which prohibits waste. [Robertson v. Collier, 1 Hill Ch. 370 ; Damm v. Damm, 109 Mich. 619 ; Magness v. Harris, 80 Ark. 583 ; Jones v. Sherrard, 22 N. C. 179 ; Fuller v. Devolld, 144 Mo. App. l. c. 95, 96, and cases cited.] This is not the situation of co-tenants.

1923His giiasi-trusteeship imposes upon him an enforceable legal duty to do-these things, and his failure to perform his duty falls under an extension of the rule which prohibits waste. [Robertson v. Collier, 1 Hill Ch. 370 ; Damm v. Damm, 109 Mich. 619 ; Magness v. Harris, 80 Ark. 583 ; Jones v. Sherrard, 22 N. C. 179 ; Fuller v. Devolld, 144 Mo. App. l. c. 95, 96, and cases cited.] This is not the situation of co-tenants.

1904There are many decisions which oppose the extension of the rule so as to include instances of actionable remarks spoken in passion, whatever the effect on the hearers, and refuse to recognize the speaker’s passion as an excuse further than to lessen the damages. [Flagg v. Roberts, 67 Ill. 485 ; Shattuc v. McArthur, 25 Fed. 133 ; McClintock v. Curb, 4 Iowa 453 ; Finch v. Finch, 21 S. C. 543.] The Louisiana decisions have shown the most charity to angry slanderers who spoke under provocation, and some of the rulings in that State have been pronounced exceptional. [Brewer v. Chase, 121 Mich. 526

1904There are many decisions which oppose the extension of the rule so as to include instances of actionable remarks spoken in passion, whatever the effect on the hearers, and refuse to recognize the speaker’s passion as an excuse further than to lessen the damages. [Flagg v. Roberts, 67 Ill. 485 ; Shattuc v. McArthur, 25 Fed. 133 ; McClintock v. Curb, 4 Iowa 453 ; Finch v. Finch, 21 S. C. 543.] The Louisiana decisions have shown the most charity to angry slanderers who spoke under provocation, and some of the rulings in that State have been pronounced exceptional. [Brewer v. Chase, 121 Mich. 526

1904There are many decisions which oppose the extension of the rule so as to include instances of actionable remarks spoken in passion, whatever the effect on the hearers, and refuse to recognize the speaker’s passion as an excuse further than to lessen the damages. [Flagg v. Roberts, 67 Ill. 485 ; Shattuc v. McArthur, 25 Fed. 133 ; McClintock v. Curb, 4 Iowa 453 ; Finch v. Finch, 21 S. C. 543.] The Louisiana decisions have shown the most charity to angry slanderers who spoke under provocation, and some of the rulings in that State have been pronounced exceptional. [Brewer v. Chase, 121 Mich. 526

1904There are many decisions which oppose the extension of the rule so as to include instances of actionable remarks spoken in passion, whatever the effect on the hearers, and refuse to recognize the speaker’s passion as an excuse further than to lessen the damages. [Flagg v. Roberts, 67 Ill. 485 ; Shattuc v. McArthur, 25 Fed. 133 ; McClintock v. Curb, 4 Iowa 453 ; Finch v. Finch, 21 S. C. 543.] The Louisiana decisions have shown the most charity to angry slanderers who spoke under provocation, and some of the rulings in that State have been pronounced exceptional. [Brewer v. Chase, 121 Mich. 526

1890It was also pointed out that the supreme court had, in one definition of the circumstances under Which exemplary damages can be given, included the case of “gross negligence (Franz v. Hilterbrand, 45 Mo. 121 ); but that, in the later case of Brown v. Road Co., 89 Mo. 152 , that court had denied this extension of the rule by holding that air instruction authorizing such damages was erroneous, where there wras ' ‘ nothing in the evidence to show that the failure of defendant * * * was either wanton or malicious, one or the other of which elements must appear to justify the awarding of punitive d

1890It was also pointed out that the supreme court had, in one definition of the circumstances under Which exemplary damages can be given, included the case of “gross negligence (Franz v. Hilterbrand, 45 Mo. 121 ); but that, in the later case of Brown v. Road Co., 89 Mo. 152 , that court had denied this extension of the rule by holding that air instruction authorizing such damages was erroneous, where there wras ' ‘ nothing in the evidence to show that the failure of defendant * * * was either wanton or malicious, one or the other of which elements must appear to justify the awarding of punitive d

1890We reaffirmed the principles of this decision in Pruitt v. Cheltenham Quarry Co., 33 Mo. App. 18 , and the Kansas City Court of Appeals reaffirmed and applied it in Trauerman v. Lippincott, 39 Mo. App. 478, 487 .

1890We reaffirmed the principles of this decision in Pruitt v. Cheltenham Quarry Co., 33 Mo. App. 18 , and the Kansas City Court of Appeals reaffirmed and applied it in Trauerman v. Lippincott, 39 Mo. App. 478, 487 .

1875Drake, supra.) But the plaintiff’s allegations do not require the extension of the rule, so far, in the case at bar-; as here the fact of notice is expressly alleged.