extension clause in Indiana

1926And, in Swails v. Swails (1884), 98 Ind. 511, 514 , the court says: “The doctrine of ademption applies only to legacies, and not to specific devises of real estate.” Attention was also called to Campbell v. Martin (1882), 87 Ind. 577 , where the court in discussing the doctrine of ademption, said: “But we know of no reason whatever for the extension of this doctrine, and making it applicable to devises of real estate. ” Section 3462 Burns 1926,2 R.

1884The court, in the discussion of the question of ademption in Campbell v. Martin, 87 Ind. 577 , said: “ But we know of no reason whatever for the extension of this doctrine, and making it applicable to devises of real estate.” In the case of State, ex rel., v. Crossley, 69 Ind. 203 , there was a legacy of money, and not a devise of real estate.

2000In support of his argument, Bailey relies on Slayton v. State, 534 N.E.2d 1130 (Ind. Ct.App.1989).

1994This is an extension of the rule expressed in The Indianapolis & Vincennes Railroad Co. v. Reynolds (1888), 116 Ind. 356, 360 , 19 N.E. 141 , that the phrase "right of way" has no fixed legal meaning "as to its extent," the width of a right-of-way for a railroad, like any other easement, being a subject of contract, which when general or ambiguous and the intent of the parties cannot be ascertained, may be proven by extrinsic evidence.

1994This is an extension of the rule expressed in The Indianapolis & Vincennes Railroad Co. v. Reynolds (1888), 116 Ind. 356, 360 , 19 N.E. 141 , that the phrase "right of way" has no fixed legal meaning "as to its extent," the width of a right-of-way for a railroad, like any other easement, being a subject of contract, which when general or ambiguous and the intent of the parties cannot be ascertained, may be proven by extrinsic evidence.

1989This Court has stated that "[t]he duty to exercise care for the safety of another arises as a matter of law out of some relation existing between the parties, and it is the province of the court to determine whether such a relation gives rise to such duty." Miller v. Griesel (1974), 261 Ind. 604, 611 , 308 N.E.2d 701, 706 .

1989This Court has stated that "[t]he duty to exercise care for the safety of another arises as a matter of law out of some relation existing between the parties, and it is the province of the court to determine whether such a relation gives rise to such duty." Miller v. Griesel (1974), 261 Ind. 604, 611 , 308 N.E.2d 701, 706 .

1987The husband becomes a debtor to the mother trustee as the installments accrue, and the father cannot reduce or avoid his civil liability for the accrued debt by showing the trustee has expended for the benefit of the child amounts less than ordered." The extension of this principle to the rule governing out-of-court support agreements was made clear in Grace v. Quigg, supra, 150 Ind.App. at 379 , 276 N.E.2d at 599 : "Corbridge ... indicate[s] that the parent having custody in such a proceeding as this is merely the trustee of the support payments and, therefore, would have no right to contract

1987The husband becomes a debtor to the mother trustee as the installments accrue, and the father cannot reduce or avoid his civil liability for the accrued debt by showing the trustee has expended for the benefit of the child amounts less than ordered." The extension of this principle to the rule governing out-of-court support agreements was made clear in Grace v. Quigg, supra, 150 Ind.App. at 379 , 276 N.E.2d at 599 : "Corbridge ... indicate[s] that the parent having custody in such a proceeding as this is merely the trustee of the support payments and, therefore, would have no right to contract

1987Admitting such testimony is an extension of the rule that the defendant's motion for change of venue "should not be arbitrarily denied *1092 without affording the defendant an opportunity to bolster the credibility of such with supporting testimony." Brown v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 161, 173 , 247 N.E.2d 76, 83 .

1987Admitting such testimony is an extension of the rule that the defendant's motion for change of venue "should not be arbitrarily denied *1092 without affording the defendant an opportunity to bolster the credibility of such with supporting testimony." Brown v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 161, 173 , 247 N.E.2d 76, 83 .

1985What the State asks here would result in an extension of the exception far beyond the bounds of its rationale." 314 N.E.2d at 752 .

1985What the State asks here would result in an extension of the exception far beyond the bounds of its rationale." 314 N.E.2d at 752 .

1981This definition of negotiations serves as a reasonable basis for the trial court to require more than what occurred here, given the broadness of the term and its admittedly ambiguous nature. *1309 Our attention is directed to Sutton v. Rotn, Wehrly, Heiny, Inc., (1981) Ind.App., 418 N.E.2d 229 where a similar extension clause was involved.

1981However, that case provides no guidance to our review of the present case because the evidence of negotiations was “uncontroverted” and the issue of negotiations was resolved summarily. 418 N.E.2d at 233 .

1951This was too late. • ■ In our opinion the reasoning in the case of Falley and Another v. Giles, supra, is applicable in this case.

1948Willets v. Ridgway (1857), 9 Ind. 867 ; The Carmel Natural Gas and Improvement Company v. Small (1897), 150 Ind. 427 , 47 N. E. 11 , 50 N. E. 476 .

1948Willets v. Ridgway (1857), 9 Ind. 867 ; The Carmel Natural Gas and Improvement Company v. Small (1897), 150 Ind. 427 , 47 N. E. 11 , 50 N. E. 476 .

1926And, in Swails v. Swails (1884), 98 Ind. 511, 514 , the court says: “The doctrine of ademption applies only to legacies, and not to specific devises of real estate.” Attention was also called to Campbell v. Martin (1882), 87 Ind. 577 , where the court in discussing the doctrine of ademption, said: “But we know of no reason whatever for the extension of this doctrine, and making it applicable to devises of real estate. ” Section 3462 Burns 1926,2 R.

1922Little v. Hackett (1885), 116 U. S. 366 , 6 Sup. Ct. 391, 29 L.

1922Little v. Hackett (1885), 116 U. S. 366 , 6 Sup. Ct. 391, 29 L.

1899Assessments for such improvements are themselves a species of taxation, and that they are so recognized by the law making power in this instance is manifested by the expression 'as other taxes/’ The extension of the claim upon the tax duplicate, like other taxes, places it in the same category with these and creates a lien upon the owners’ property the same as if the claim wure the result of a state, county or township tax levy.” In the case of Cullen v. Strauz, 124 Ind. 340 , the Supreme Court held that ditch assessments placed upon a tax duplicate became delinquent if not paid when the state

1899In the case of Manor v. Board, etc., 137 Ind. 367 , the Supreme Court held that a county treasurer is entitled to his per centum, under section 5028 R.

1884The court, in the discussion of the question of ademption in Campbell v. Martin, 87 Ind. 577 , said: “ But we know of no reason whatever for the extension of this doctrine, and making it applicable to devises of real estate.” In the case of State, ex rel., v. Crossley, 69 Ind. 203 , there was a legacy of money, and not a devise of real estate.