extension rule in California

2009(Whaley, at p. 798.) Even under the preamended version of the SVPA, an extension hearing was a new and independent proceeding that required a new determination of SVP status (People v. Munoz (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 421, 429-430 [28 Cal.Rptr.3d *933 295]), so application of the indeterminate term provisions to current recommitment proceedings does not constitute retroactive application of the amendment.

2007(People v. Munoz (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 421, 429 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 295 ].) Rather, an extension hearing is a new and independent proceeding at which the petitioner must prove the person meets the criteria of an SVP. {Ibid.) The petitioner must prove the person is an SVP, not that the person is still one. 4 ( 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 430 .) “[E]ach recommitment requires petitioner independently to prove that the defendant has a currently diagnosed mental disorder making him or her a danger.

1981More importantly, the purpose of the extension hearing in which the statements were used does not comprehend the defendant's incrimination. (3) Whether an MDSO extension hearing is denominated a civil proceeding (see In re Bevill (1968) 68 Cal.2d 854, 858 [ 69 Cal. Rptr. 599 , 442 P.2d 679 ]) or a criminal proceeding (see People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, 314, 324 [ 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 , 535 P.2d 352 ]), its objective is confined by section 6316.2 to a determination whether defendant by reason of mental disease, defect or disorder is predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses to the

1981More importantly, the purpose of the extension hearing in which the statements were used does not comprehend the defendant's incrimination. (3) Whether an MDSO extension hearing is denominated a civil proceeding (see In re Bevill (1968) 68 Cal.2d 854, 858 [ 69 Cal. Rptr. 599 , 442 P.2d 679 ]) or a criminal proceeding (see People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, 314, 324 [ 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 , 535 P.2d 352 ]), its objective is confined by section 6316.2 to a determination whether defendant by reason of mental disease, defect or disorder is predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses to the

1981More importantly, the purpose of the extension hearing in which the statements were used does not comprehend the defendant's incrimination. (3) Whether an MDSO extension hearing is denominated a civil proceeding (see In re Bevill (1968) 68 Cal.2d 854, 858 [ 69 Cal. Rptr. 599 , 442 P.2d 679 ]) or a criminal proceeding (see People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, 314, 324 [ 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 , 535 P.2d 352 ]), its objective is confined by section 6316.2 to a determination whether defendant by reason of mental disease, defect or disorder is predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses to the

1981Whether an MDSO extension hearing is denominated a civil proceeding (see In re Bevill (1968) 68 Cal.2d 854, 858 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 599 , 442 P.2d 679 ]) or a criminal proceeding (see People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, 314, 324 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 488 , 535 P.2d 352 ]), its objective is confined by section 6316.2 to a determination whether defendant by reason of mental disease, defect or disorder is predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses to the degree that he presents a serious threat of substantial harm to the health and safety of others.

2020“Fundamental fairness in this context is an extension of the principle that, ‘[t]he privilege which protects attorney-client communications may not be used both as a sword and a shield.’” (Dietz, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 793 .) The court in Dietz “noted the inherent unfairness in allowing a plaintiff to bring a claim, which, by its very nature necessitates a defense based on confidential information, where the plaintiff has either directly supplied such confidential information to the defendant, as in Solin [v. O’Melveny & Myers (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 451 ], or where the plaintiff seeks to

2009(Solin, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 463.) Fundamental fairness in this context is an extension of the principle that, “[t]he privilege which protects attorney-client communications may not be used both as a sword and a shield.” (Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co. (9th Cir. 1992) 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 .) The Courts of Appeal in both McDermott and Solin relied heavily on this notion, which is embodied in Evidence Code section 958. 12 More specifically, both the McDermott and Solin courts noted the inherent unfairness in allowing a plaintiff to bring a claim, which, by its very nature necessitates a def

2017Watson v. Watson (1952) 39 Cal.2d 305 , 307, 246 P.2d 19 [husband estopped from challenging divorce decree that he obtained from his first wife]; Harlan , supra , 70 Cal.App.2d at p. 661 , 161 P.2d 490 [husband estopped from challenging wife's divorce decree that he procured for her]; Estate of Shank (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 808 , 809-812, 316 P.2d 710 [party to divorce decree estopped from challenging its validity even though he did not procure it].) Such an extension of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel would be inequitable because it would preclude an innocent second spouse from challenging the v

2017Watson v. Watson (1952) 39 Cal.2d 305 , 307, 246 P.2d 19 [husband estopped from challenging divorce decree that he obtained from his first wife]; Harlan , supra , 70 Cal.App.2d at p. 661 , 161 P.2d 490 [husband estopped from challenging wife's divorce decree that he procured for her]; Estate of Shank (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 808 , 809-812, 316 P.2d 710 [party to divorce decree estopped from challenging its validity even though he did not procure it].) Such an extension of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel would be inequitable because it would preclude an innocent second spouse from challenging the v

2017Watson v. Watson (1952) 39 Cal.2d 305 , 307, 246 P.2d 19 [husband estopped from challenging divorce decree that he obtained from his first wife]; Harlan , supra , 70 Cal.App.2d at p. 661 , 161 P.2d 490 [husband estopped from challenging wife's divorce decree that he procured for her]; Estate of Shank (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 808 , 809-812, 316 P.2d 710 [party to divorce decree estopped from challenging its validity even though he did not procure it].) Such an extension of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel would be inequitable because it would preclude an innocent second spouse from challenging the v

2017Watson v. Watson (1952) 39 Cal.2d 305 , 307, 246 P.2d 19 [husband estopped from challenging divorce decree that he obtained from his first wife]; Harlan , supra , 70 Cal.App.2d at p. 661 , 161 P.2d 490 [husband estopped from challenging wife's divorce decree that he procured for her]; Estate of Shank (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 808 , 809-812, 316 P.2d 710 [party to divorce decree estopped from challenging its validity even though he did not procure it].) Such an extension of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel would be inequitable because it would preclude an innocent second spouse from challenging the v

2017Watson v. Watson (1952) 39 Cal.2d 305 , 307, 246 P.2d 19 [husband estopped from challenging divorce decree that he obtained from his first wife]; Harlan , supra , 70 Cal.App.2d at p. 661 , 161 P.2d 490 [husband estopped from challenging wife's divorce decree that he procured for her]; Estate of Shank (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 808 , 809-812, 316 P.2d 710 [party to divorce decree estopped from challenging its validity even though he did not procure it].) Such an extension of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel would be inequitable because it would preclude an innocent second spouse from challenging the v

2017Watson v. Watson (1952) 39 Cal.2d 305 , 307, 246 P.2d 19 [husband estopped from challenging divorce decree that he obtained from his first wife]; Harlan , supra , 70 Cal.App.2d at p. 661 , 161 P.2d 490 [husband estopped from challenging wife's divorce decree that he procured for her]; Estate of Shank (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 808 , 809-812, 316 P.2d 710 [party to divorce decree estopped from challenging its validity even though he did not procure it].) Such an extension of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel would be inequitable because it would preclude an innocent second spouse from challenging the v

2013(In re Ramirez (1985) 39 Cal.3d 931, 936 .) Stated another way, ‘[a] statute has retrospective effect when it substantially changes the legal consequences of past events. [Citation.]’ (Western Security Bank v. Superior Court [(1997)] 15 Cal.4th [232,] 243, italics added.) ‘Thus, the critical question for determining retroactivity usually is whether the last act or event necessary to trigger application of the statute occurred before or after the statute’s effective date. [Citations.] A law is not retroactive “merely because some of the facts or conditions upon which its application depends cam

2013(Garcetti v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 685, 694 .) The conduct or event (for want of a better term) to which the SVPA attaches legal consequences is the person’s mental condition at the time of adjudication, not at the time the . . . petition is filed.” (Carroll, at p. 514, fn. omitted.) Thus, defendant “was subject to recommitment for an indeterminate term because of the status of his mental condition after [the] amendments became effective” (Carroll, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 514 ) and the amendments were not retroactively applied to him.

1970In the habendum it serves to perpetuate the lease beyond the fixed term for as long thereafter as it would be mutually profitable to the parties. [Citations.] A different function is performed where the term appears in the development provisions, for there it operates primarily for the benefit of the lessee, as a limitation upon his obligation to drill and pay royalties.” The court then stated: “By the great weight of authority, the term, ‘paying quantities,’ when used in the extension clause of an oil lease habendum means production in quantities sufficient to yield a return in excess of oper

1950The meaning of the term “paying quantities” is stated in Transport Oil Co. v. Exeter Oil Co., 84 Cal.App.2d 616, 622 [ 191 P.2d 129 ], as follows: “By the great weight of authority, the term ‘paying quantities,’ when used in the extension clause of an oil lease habendum means production in quantities sufficient to yield a return in excess of operating costs, even though drilling and equipment costs may never be repaid and the undertaking considered as a whole may ultimately result in a loss. ...” The contention is made that it was error to include in the calculations made by the trial judge a

2024An extension of the privilege was held warranted because the privilege is “designed to aid in the effective functioning of government,” and important governmental functions do not lose their importance “simply because they are exercised by officers of lower rank in the executive hierarchy.” ( Barr, supra, at p. 573 .) The Barr decision did not extend the federal privilege to all lower ranking officials.

2024It suggested a case-by-case test based on factors such as “the duties with which the particular officer sought to be made to respond in damages is entrusted” and “the relation of the act complained of to ‘matters committed by law to his control or supervision.’” (Barr, supra, 360 U.S. at p. 573 (plur. opn. of Harlan, J.); see id. at p. 578 (dis. opn. of Warren, C.J.) [criticizing plurality for “set[ting] up a vague standard under which no government employee can tell with any certainty whether he will receive absolute immunity for his acts”].) The Barr plurality also said, “[T]he occasions upo

2024The Kill Zone Theory Generally, “[t]o prove the crime of attempted murder, the prosecution must establish ‘the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.’ ” (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602 (Canizales).) “When a single act is charged as an attempt on the lives of two or more persons, the intent to kill element must be examined independently as to each alleged attempted murder victim; an intent to kill cannot be ‘transferred’ from one attempted murder victim to another under the transferred intent doctrine.

2024The theory embraces the concept of a concurrent intent to kill, where the nature and scope of the attack directed at a primary victim may raise an inference that the defendant intended to harm the primary victim by harming everyone in that victim’s vicinity, thus creating a “kill zone.” ( Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 602-603.) Adopted in People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313 (Bland), “the kill zone theory meant that a prosecutor charging attempted murder in a multivictim case had an additional, alternative ground by which to prove the requisite intent to kill.

2023(Holt v. Brock (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 611 , 620–621 (Holt); Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 843, 851 (Howard).) Quasi-judicial immunity is an extension of the doctrine of judicial immunity to persons other than judges who act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.

2023(Id. at pp. 649–650 [referring to former subd. (i), now subd. (j)]; see Lumbermens, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 312–313 [this subdivision provides a “30–day grace period for hearings,” and under § 1306, subd. (a), court must enter summary judgment after appearance period expires unless court has set aside forfeiture].) The appearance period is the time to establish the grounds for relief, so a party must establish the facts of its section 1305 motion “before [the appearance] period expires”, notwithstanding an extension of the hearing date.

2023(Holt, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 620–621.) The United States Supreme Court has explained that the 25 application of judicial immunity in other (quasi-judicial) contexts “is justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches.” (Forrester v. White (1988) 484 U.S. 219, 227 (Forrester).) As with judicial immunity, quasi-judicial immunity is intended to protect independent and impartial decisionmaking.

2020(In re I.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 249, 261 (I.V.).) 1 Fourth Amendment Waiver and Electronic Device Condition Rebollar challenges condition 6.n. requiring him to submit his “person, vehicle, residence, property, personal effects, computers, and recordable media including electronic devices to search at any time with or without a warrant, and with or without reasonable cause when required by [probation officer] or law enforcement officer.” (Italics added.) He contends the 5 condition is unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 (Lent) and is unconstitutionally overbroad and va

2020(In re I.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 249, 261 (I.V.).) 1 Fourth Amendment Waiver and Electronic Device Condition Rebollar challenges condition 6.n. requiring him to submit his “person, vehicle, residence, property, personal effects, computers, and recordable media including electronic devices to search at any time with or without a warrant, and with or without reasonable cause when required by [probation officer] or law enforcement officer.” (Italics added.) He contends the 5 condition is unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 (Lent) and is unconstitutionally overbroad and va

2015(Id. at pp. 1230-1231; cf. In re Luis C. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1402-1403 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 429 ] (Luis C.) [applying Haynie to extension of a juvenile commitment under Welf. & Inst.

2015(Id. at pp. 1230-1231; cf. In re Luis C. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1402-1403 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 429 ] (Luis C.) [applying Haynie to extension of a juvenile commitment under Welf. & Inst.