extension rule in Connecticut

1997Second, in Niece et al. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. et al., 419 N.Y.S. 799 , 801 100 Misc.2d 595 (1978), the very same judge who decided Broome County expressed some reservations about the extension of the doctrine beyond goods and merchandise.

1997Second, in Niece et al v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., et al, 419 N.Y.S. 799 , 801 100 Misc.2d 595 (1978) the very same judge who decided Broome County expressed some reservations about the extension of the doctrine beyond goods and merchandise.

1983Under those circumstances, to hold that the extension clause did not become operative because the plaintiff failed on September 1, 1978 to notify the defendants by registered or certified mail that WAWA was a prospect with whom the plaintiff had “theretofore negotiated” would be placing the form of the notice above its substance. “ ‘[T]he law rarely, if ever, requires the observance of an idle formality, especially after the party for whose benefit the original stipulation was made, has rendered conformity thereto unnecessary and practically superfluous.’ ” Quigley v. Stanton, 130 Conn. 491, 4

1983Under those circumstances, to hold that the extension clause did not become operative because the plaintiff failed on September 1, 1978 to notify the defendants by registered or certified mail that WAWA was a prospect with whom the plaintiff had “theretofore negotiated” would be placing the form of the notice above its substance. “ ‘[T]he law rarely, if ever, requires the observance of an idle formality, especially after the party for whose benefit the original stipulation was made, has rendered conformity thereto unnecessary and practically superfluous.’ ” Quigley v. Stanton, 130 Conn. 491, 4

2016Although the petitioner argued that the rule in Padilla was merely an extension of the principle governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Strickland v. Washington , supra, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , we were not persuaded.

2016Although the petitioner argued that the rule in Padilla was merely an extension of the principle governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Strickland v. Washington , supra, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , we were not persuaded.

2005For example, in DeLoach v. Myers, 215 Ga. 255, 261 , 109 S.E.2d 777 (1959), the Georgia Supreme Court relied on our reasoning in Doyle to conclude that the trial court under review had “erred in allowing the decedent’s attorney to testify as to confidential communications arising out of the preparation of an unexecuted will for her, in this action for specific performance of an alleged oral contract to make a will, brought against her administrator and adverse to the interests of her estate.” The court also cited cases from other jurisdictions in accord with our conclusion in Doyle , in additi

2005For example, in DeLoach v. Myers, 215 Ga. 255, 261 , 109 S.E.2d 777 (1959), the Georgia Supreme Court relied on our reasoning in Doyle to conclude that the trial court under review had “erred in allowing the decedent’s attorney to testify as to confidential communications arising out of the preparation of an unexecuted will for her, in this action for specific performance of an alleged oral contract to make a will, brought against her administrator and adverse to the interests of her estate.” The court also cited cases from other jurisdictions in accord with our conclusion in Doyle , in additi

2004The medical defendants also rely on this court’s decision in Zamstein v. Marvasti, 240 Conn. 549 , 692 A.2d 781 (1997), and contend that the public policy behind the child protection statutes requires the extension of immunity to physicians who act in good faith and perform independent medical examinations at the behest of the department to determine the existence of a reasonable suspicion of child abuse.

2004The medical defendants also rely on this court’s decision in Zamstein v. Marvasti, 240 Conn. 549 , 692 A.2d 781 (1997), and contend that the public policy behind the child protection statutes requires the extension of immunity to physicians who act in good faith and perform independent medical examinations at the behest of the department to determine the existence of a reasonable suspicion of child abuse.

2004In the present case, the underlying material facts are undisputed, and “the case distills to an issue of statutoiy interpretation over which our review is plenary.” 9 Barrett v. Montesano, 269 Conn. 787, 792 , 849 A.2d 839 (2004).

2004In the present case, the underlying material facts are undisputed, and “the case distills to an issue of statutoiy interpretation over which our review is plenary.” 9 Barrett v. Montesano, 269 Conn. 787, 792 , 849 A.2d 839 (2004).

2004The court considered the public policy reasons surrounding the extension of the doctrine to prosecutors “for acts done in [their] official capacity on grounds that [their] office is vested with a vast quantum of discretion which is necessary for the vindication of the public interest.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 565 .

2004The court concluded that the prosecutor, unlike the public defender, is an officer of the state “under a duty to see that impartial justice is done to the accused as well as to the state . . . .” (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Id., 567 .

2002The rule is not an extension of the principle of `legal cause' nor an extension of the doctrine of `last clear chance.'" In Dennison v. Klotz , 12 Conn. App. 570 , 582 , 532 A.2d 1311 , cert. denied, 206 Conn. 803 , 535 A.2d 1317 (1988), the court recognized the viability of "Section 322 [of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which] rests on the premise that the defendant, by conduct or by an instrumentality under his control, inflicted harm on the plaintiff." The section was deemed inapplicable in Dennison , however, only because "there was simply no act by either defendant passenger which inf

2002The rule is not an extension of the principle of `legal cause' nor an extension of the doctrine of `last clear chance.'" In Dennison v. Klotz , 12 Conn. App. 570 , 582 , 532 A.2d 1311 , cert. denied, 206 Conn. 803 , 535 A.2d 1317 (1988), the court recognized the viability of "Section 322 [of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which] rests on the premise that the defendant, by conduct or by an instrumentality under his control, inflicted harm on the plaintiff." The section was deemed inapplicable in Dennison , however, only because "there was simply no act by either defendant passenger which inf

2002CT Page 3027 The defendant cites Grzys v. Connecticut Company , supra, 123 Conn. 605 , as authority that the second count cannot survive a motion to strike, but that case, which involves the propriety of a jury charge, is in a different procedural posture than the present case.

2002CT Page 3027 The defendant cites Grzys v. Connecticut Company , supra, 123 Conn. 605 , as authority that the second count cannot survive a motion to strike, but that case, which involves the propriety of a jury charge, is in a different procedural posture than the present case.

2002The rule is not an extension of the principle of `legal cause' nor an extension of the doctrine of `last clear chance.'" In Dennison v. Klotz , 12 Conn. App. 570 , 582 , 532 A.2d 1311 , cert. denied, 206 Conn. 803 , 535 A.2d 1317 (1988), the court recognized the viability of "Section 322 [of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which] rests on the premise that the defendant, by conduct or by an instrumentality under his control, inflicted harm on the plaintiff." The section was deemed inapplicable in Dennison , however, only because "there was simply no act by either defendant passenger which inf

2002The rule is not an extension of the principle of `legal cause' nor an extension of the doctrine of `last clear chance.'" In Dennison v. Klotz , 12 Conn. App. 570 , 582 , 532 A.2d 1311 , cert. denied, 206 Conn. 803 , 535 A.2d 1317 (1988), the court recognized the viability of "Section 322 [of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which] rests on the premise that the defendant, by conduct or by an instrumentality under his control, inflicted harm on the plaintiff." The section was deemed inapplicable in Dennison , however, only because "there was simply no act by either defendant passenger which inf

2001Our appellate courts frequently have stated that a party “may not pursue one course of action at trial for tactical reasons and later on appeal argue that the path he rejected should now be open to him.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Barber, 64 Conn. App. 659, 670 , 781 A.2d 464 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 925 , 783 A.2d 1030 (2001).

2001Our appellate courts frequently have stated that a party “may not pursue one course of action at trial for tactical reasons and later on appeal argue that the path he rejected should now be open to him.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Barber, 64 Conn. App. 659, 670 , 781 A.2d 464 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 925 , 783 A.2d 1030 (2001).

2001Our appellate courts frequently have stated that a party “may not pursue one course of action at trial for tactical reasons and later on appeal argue that the path he rejected should now be open to him.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Barber, 64 Conn. App. 659, 670 , 781 A.2d 464 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 925 , 783 A.2d 1030 (2001).

2001Our appellate courts frequently have stated that a party “may not pursue one course of action at trial for tactical reasons and later on appeal argue that the path he rejected should now be open to him.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Barber, 64 Conn. App. 659, 670 , 781 A.2d 464 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 925 , 783 A.2d 1030 (2001).

1992Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Canaan Oil Co., 202 Conn. 234, 249-50 , 520 A.2d 1008 (1987).

1992Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Canaan Oil Co., 202 Conn. 234, 249-50 , 520 A.2d 1008 (1987).

1986Co., 34 Conn. Sup. 46 , 375 A.2d 428 (1977).

1986Co., 34 Conn. Sup. 46 , 375 A.2d 428 (1977).

1970Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70 (1965).

1958Beerwort v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 144 Conn. 731, 734 , 137 A.2d 756 .

1958Beerwort v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 144 Conn. 731, 734 , 137 A.2d 756 .

1927Stickney v. Epstein, 100 Conn. 170, 179 , 123 Atl. 1 ; Chouinard v. Wooldridge, 102 Conn. 66, 75,127 , Atl. 908; Haugh v. Kirsch, 105 Conn. 429 , 135 Atl. 568 ; O’Keefe v. Fitzgerald, supra. Obviously, the basis of liability is the master-servant relationship and not that based on consanguinity.

1927Stickney v. Epstein, 100 Conn. 170, 179 , 123 Atl. 1 ; Chouinard v. Wooldridge, 102 Conn. 66, 75,127 , Atl. 908; Haugh v. Kirsch, 105 Conn. 429 , 135 Atl. 568 ; O’Keefe v. Fitzgerald, supra. Obviously, the basis of liability is the master-servant relationship and not that based on consanguinity.

1927Stickney v. Epstein, 100 Conn. 170, 179 , 123 Atl. 1 ; Chouinard v. Wooldridge, 102 Conn. 66, 75,127 , Atl. 908; Haugh v. Kirsch, 105 Conn. 429 , 135 Atl. 568 ; O’Keefe v. Fitzgerald, supra. Obviously, the basis of liability is the master-servant relationship and not that based on consanguinity.

1927Stickney v. Epstein, 100 Conn. 170, 179 , 123 Atl. 1 ; Chouinard v. Wooldridge, 102 Conn. 66, 75,127 , Atl. 908; Haugh v. Kirsch, 105 Conn. 429 , 135 Atl. 568 ; O’Keefe v. Fitzgerald, supra. Obviously, the basis of liability is the master-servant relationship and not that based on consanguinity.

1927The statement of Mr. Justice *535 Brewer in New Orleans v. Stempel, supra, at page 322— that “it is well settled that bank bills and municipal bonds are in such a concrete tangible form that they are subject to taxation where found, irrespective of the domicile of the owner; . . .

1912Beardsley v. Beecher, 47 Conn. 408, 414 .