extension clause in Louisiana

2022Knapper v. Connick, 96- 0434 ( La. 10/ 15/ 96), 681 So. 2d 944, 950 .

2022Knapper v. Connick, 96- 0434 ( La. 10/ 15/ 96), 681 So. 2d 944, 950 .

2014This Court expounded upon Housley , which required proof of a “causal connection between” the alleged tortious conduct and the resulting injury, by stating that Housley represented “an extension of this presumption into the realm of general delictual actions.” Juneau v. Straumyer, 94-0903, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/15/94), 647 So.2d 1294, 1298 .

2014This Court further held that the causal connection must be demonstrated “through evidence — medical, circumstantial, or common knowledge” and provide “a reasonable possibility of causation between the accident and the claimed injury.” Id., 94-0903, p. 6, 647 So.2d at 1299 .

2007After noting the criticism that the Sherer decision had attracted, this court acknowledged: The "one day, one conviction" rule of State ex rel Jackson v. Henderson, supra , relied on in Sherer , provides little support for and certainly does not compel the extension of the rule made in Sherer .

1991Nor is he a second offender as to only one and a first offender as to the other." The "one day, one conviction" rule of State ex rel Jackson v. Henderson, supra , [2] relied on in Sherer , provides little support for and certainly does not compel the extension of the rule made in Sherer .

2010However, we note that the Third Circuit rejected the Harkey minimal interest requirement in Tammariello Properties, Inc. v. Medical Realty Co., Inc., 549 So.2d 1259 (La.App. 3d Cir.1989), finding the requisite contact referenced in the extension clause had occurred.

2010The extension clause authorized the collection of a commission "[i]f, after the expiration of this agreement, owner sells the property to any person who had contacted owner directly or had been introduced to the Property by Broker ... during the time hereof or to any person with whom Broker ... has had negotiations for such sale." Tammariello Properties, Inc., 549 So.2d at 1262-63 . .

2010In Gertrude Gardner, Inc. v. Bryant, 446 So.2d 451, 452 (La.App. 4th Cir.), unit denied, 450 So.2d 358 (La.1984), the specified activity of the extension clause required the realtor to “quote” the property during the term of the listing agreement.

2010In addressing Harkey , the court stated, “Commentators have read the Harkey case to ‘require the broker to prove two things in order to recover his commission under the extension clause: (1) that he carried on the kind of activity specified in the extension clause, and (2) that the activity created some minimal interest in the purchaser which contributed to the eventual sale.’ ” Id.

2007Specifically, Kennedy , XXXX-XXXX at p. 19, 935 So.2d at 683 , provided the following policy reasons as support for the extension of such a privilege: It would be self-defeating for society to impose civil liability on a citizen for inaccurately reporting criminal conduct with no intent to mislead.

2005Deumite v. State, 95-1263 (La.2/28/96), 668 So.2d 727 ; Deumite v. State, 94-1210 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/14/97) , 692 So.2d 1127 (on remand), writ denied, 97-1409 (La.9/26/97), 701 So.2d 984 .

2005Deumite v. State, 95-1263 (La.2/28/96), 668 So.2d 727 ; Deumite v. State, 94-1210 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/14/97) , 692 So.2d 1127 (on remand), writ denied, 97-1409 (La.9/26/97), 701 So.2d 984 .

2005Deumite v. State, 95-1263 (La.2/28/96), 668 So.2d 727 ; Deumite v. State, 94-1210 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/14/97) , 692 So.2d 1127 (on remand), writ denied, 97-1409 (La.9/26/97), 701 So.2d 984 .

1996For instance, in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 , 113 S.Ct. 2606 , 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that while the actions of a prosecutor that are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process and which occur in the course of a prosecutor's role as an advocate for the state are entitled to absolute immunity, where prosecutors act in an investigatory, administrative, ministerial or other role that has no functional tie to the judicial process, only a qualified immunity is afforded. [15] We agree that a functional analysis of the role a

1996For instance, in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 , 113 S.Ct. 2606 , 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that while the actions of a prosecutor that are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process and which occur in the course of a prosecutor's role as an advocate for the state are entitled to absolute immunity, where prosecutors act in an investigatory, administrative, ministerial or other role that has no functional tie to the judicial process, only a qualified immunity is afforded. [15] We agree that a functional analysis of the role a

1992As explained in Boteler v. Taquino, 517 So.2d 377 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1987), referred to by the trial court, redhibition under Article 2529 is not based on the existence of a defect in the thing sold but rather is an extension of the principle that consent to a contract may be vitiated by error, fraud or duress at its inception.

1992Guided by Louisiana State Bar Association v. Edwins, supra, and applying its principles in the present context, the privilege applied to those advancements made in this case.

1984In Ruiz v. Kiehm’s Pharmacy, 37 So.2d 720 (La.App.Orl.Cir.1948) the word quote, as used in this context, was defined.

1981The validity of the extension of immunity and the underlying state interests which support it were discussed in Perez v. Continental Casualty Co., 367 So.2d 1284 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1979) writs denied 369 So.2d 157 .

1981The validity of the extension of immunity and the underlying state interests which support it were discussed in Perez v. Continental Casualty Co., 367 So.2d 1284 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1979) writs denied 369 So.2d 157 .

1979Co., 215 La. 280 , 40 So.2d 243 (1949), the amount of compensation, to whom it is due, and the conditions under which it may be demanded address themselves to the law-making body of the state." The plaintiff, while not attacking the constitutionality of the employer's immunity, contends that the extension of such immunity to officers, directors, stockholders, and employees of the employer is unconstitutional as being a denial of the equal protection of the law as provided by Article 1, Section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, which provides: "No person shall be denied the equal protect

1979Co., 215 La. 280 , 40 So.2d 243 (1949), the amount of compensation, to whom it is due, and the conditions under which it may be demanded address themselves to the law-making body of the state." The plaintiff, while not attacking the constitutionality of the employer's immunity, contends that the extension of such immunity to officers, directors, stockholders, and employees of the employer is unconstitutional as being a denial of the equal protection of the law as provided by Article 1, Section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, which provides: "No person shall be denied the equal protect

1977The rules as stated above are consistent with the holdings in Frischhertz Electric Company v. Strickland Transportation Company, 262 La. 791 , 264 So.2d 646 (1942); Rabon v. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 292 So.2d 332 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1974); Aetna Insurance Company v. General Terminals Transfer and Storage, Inc., 225 So.2d 72 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1969); Caillier v. Texas and Pacific Railway Company, 303 So.2d 871 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1974), and Arwady v. Texas & N.O.R.

1977The defendant in State v. Watson, La., 301 So.2d 653 (1974), advanced a similar argument.

1977The rules as stated above are consistent with the holdings in Frischhertz Electric Company v. Strickland Transportation Company, 262 La. 791 , 264 So.2d 646 (1942); Rabon v. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 292 So.2d 332 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1974); Aetna Insurance Company v. General Terminals Transfer and Storage, Inc., 225 So.2d 72 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1969); Caillier v. Texas and Pacific Railway Company, 303 So.2d 871 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1974), and Arwady v. Texas & N.O.R.

1977The rules as stated above are consistent with the holdings in Frischhertz Electric Company v. Strickland Transportation Company, 262 La. 791 , 264 So.2d 646 (1942); Rabon v. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 292 So.2d 332 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1974); Aetna Insurance Company v. General Terminals Transfer and Storage, Inc., 225 So.2d 72 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1969); Caillier v. Texas and Pacific Railway Company, 303 So.2d 871 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1974), and Arwady v. Texas & N.O.R.

1977The rules as stated above are consistent with the holdings in Frischhertz Electric Company v. Strickland Transportation Company, 262 La. 791 , 264 So.2d 646 (1942); Rabon v. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 292 So.2d 332 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1974); Aetna Insurance Company v. General Terminals Transfer and Storage, Inc., 225 So.2d 72 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1969); Caillier v. Texas and Pacific Railway Company, 303 So.2d 871 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1974), and Arwady v. Texas & N.O.R.

1977The rules as stated above are consistent with the holdings in Frischhertz Electric Company v. Strickland Transportation Company, 262 La. 791 , 264 So.2d 646 (1942); Rabon v. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 292 So.2d 332 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1974); Aetna Insurance Company v. General Terminals Transfer and Storage, Inc., 225 So.2d 72 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1969); Caillier v. Texas and Pacific Railway Company, 303 So.2d 871 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1974), and Arwady v. Texas & N.O.R.

1976In Coppage v. Camelo, 330 So.2d 695 (La.

1976In Cramer v. Guerico, 331 So.2d 550 (La.

1976App., 1st Cir. 1976) wherein the court was interpreting the meaning of an extension clause, the court restates several precepts for the interpretation of agreements: "When called upon to enforce or interpret a contract, the court must seek for and ascertain the mutual intention of the parties, if that be possible. . . ." "It is the court's duty to construe agreements in accordance with the parties' common intention rather than adhere to the literal meaning of the terms thereof.. . ." Id. page 554.

1974Reversal of this conviction and sentence is erroneous because the opinion approves an extension of the rule of pretrial discovery of evidence in the possession of the State upon the faulty reasoning that the tape recorded phone conversations are in-culpatory statements as that term is used in Article 768 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and as defined in State v. Fink, 255 La. 385 , 231 So.2d 360 (1970).

1974Reversal of this conviction and sentence is erroneous because the opinion approves an extension of the rule of pretrial discovery of evidence in the possession of the State upon the faulty reasoning that the tape recorded phone conversations are in-culpatory statements as that term is used in Article 768 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and as defined in State v. Fink, 255 La. 385 , 231 So.2d 360 (1970).

1974It is my opinion that the extension of the rule announced in State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126 (La.1973), which this opinion represents, will be impossible to apply in actual practice.

1971My concern in State v. Crook, 253 La. 961 , 221 So.2d 473 , was replaced with consternation in State v. Bolden, 257 La. 60 , 241 So.2d 490 , where the majority held admissible to show present intent evidence of a rape two years before the offense charged.

1971My concern in State v. Crook, 253 La. 961 , 221 So.2d 473 , was replaced with consternation in State v. Bolden, 257 La. 60 , 241 So.2d 490 , where the majority held admissible to show present intent evidence of a rape two years before the offense charged.

1971My concern in State v. Crook, 253 La. 961 , 221 So.2d 473 , was replaced with consternation in State v. Bolden, 257 La. 60 , 241 So.2d 490 , where the majority held admissible to show present intent evidence of a rape two years before the offense charged.

1971My concern in State v. Crook, 253 La. 961 , 221 So.2d 473 , was replaced with consternation in State v. Bolden, 257 La. 60 , 241 So.2d 490 , where the majority held admissible to show present intent evidence of a rape two years before the offense charged.