extension rule in New York

1992Indeed, under the Glanzer and Ultramares rationale, accountants' third-party liability was considered to be an extension of the rule of Lawrence v Fox ( 20 N.Y. 268 ) and Seaver v Ransom ( 224 N.Y. 233 ) for third-party beneficiary contractual responsibility ( Glanzer v Shepard , 233 NY, at 241 , supra ; Ultramares Corp. v Touche , supra , at 182).

1992Indeed, under the Glanzer and Ultramares rationale, accountants’ third-party liability was considered to be an extension of the rule of Lawrence v Fox ( 20 NY 268 ) and Seaver v Ransom ( 224 NY 233 ) for third-party beneficiary contractual responsibility (Glanzer v Shepard, 233 NY, at 241 , supra; Ultramares Corp. v Touche, supra, at 182).

1992Indeed, under the Glanzer and Ultramares rationale, accountants' third-party liability was considered to be an extension of the rule of Lawrence v Fox ( 20 N.Y. 268 ) and Seaver v Ransom ( 224 N.Y. 233 ) for third-party beneficiary contractual responsibility ( Glanzer v Shepard , 233 NY, at 241 , supra ; Ultramares Corp. v Touche , supra , at 182).

1992Indeed, under the Glanzer and Ultramares rationale, accountants’ third-party liability was considered to be an extension of the rule of Lawrence v Fox ( 20 NY 268 ) and Seaver v Ransom ( 224 NY 233 ) for third-party beneficiary contractual responsibility (Glanzer v Shepard, 233 NY, at 241 , supra; Ultramares Corp. v Touche, supra, at 182).

1984(See Jewish Consumptives’ Relief Soc. v Town of Woodbury, 230 App Div 228 , supra.) The CPLR article 78 proceeding herein in asking this court to declare the two declaratory rulings a nullity is in the nature of a declaratory judgment.

1962However, where the extension of the principle of the State law by means of the local law results in a situation where what would be permissible under the State law becomes a violation of the local law, the latter law is unauthorized (Jewish Consumptives’ Relief Soc. v. Town of Woodbury, 230 App. Div. 228 , affd. 256 N. Y. 619 ). * Here, that is plainly the case.

1969Co., 25 N. J. 541.) New York courts have shown a tendency to restrict the extension of the doctrine of absolute privilege, limiting that rule to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings (Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N. Y. 440 ; and Pecue v. West, 233 N. Y. 316 ); (see, also, 2 N Y P J I 722-727 for a discussion of absolute privilege, and the cases therein cited).

1955Semble contra: Pecue v. West, 233 N. Y. 316 ].) Obviously, the extension of this privilege to Mr. Keating, if the views of Wigmore were adopted, would not avail him in the situation in which he found himself in the Grand Jury.

1996Although the extension of this rule adopted in People v Bartolomeo ( 53 NY2d 225 ) was later abandoned (see, People v Bing, 76 NY2d 331 ), the general principle has not been abrogated, insofar as it applies to the questioning of an individual who is in custody on a pending charge and who is known to have retained or requested counsel in connection therewith (see, People v Steward, 88 NY2d 496, 501 ; cf., People v Bing, supra, at 350).

1989The importance our State’s highest court attaches to the right of counsel is highlighted by the extension of this rule against uncounseled waiver: where the police have actual knowledge of a pending unrelated case against a suspect they are assumed to know he is represented by an attorney and may not question him in the absence of that attorney (People v Bartolomeo, 53 NY2d 225 [1981]).

1982(See Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade v City of New York, supra; Jewish Consumptives Relief Soc. v Town of Woodbury, 230 App Div 228 , affd 256 NY 619 .) In the instant case the local law prohibits an individual from dealing in the wholesale trade of shellfish though licensed by the Department of Environmental Conservation of the State of New York and thus permitted by State law, and so prohibits what the State law allows.

1962However, where the extension of the principle of the State law by means of the local law results in a situation where what would be permissible under the State law becomes a violation of the local law, the latter law is unauthorized (Jewish Consumptives’ Relief Soc. v. Town of Woodbury, 230 App. Div. 228 , affd. 256 N. Y. 619 ). * Here, that is plainly the case.

1969Co., 25 N. J. 541.) New York courts have shown a tendency to restrict the extension of the doctrine of absolute privilege, limiting that rule to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings (Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N. Y. 440 ; and Pecue v. West, 233 N. Y. 316 ); (see, also, 2 N Y P J I 722-727 for a discussion of absolute privilege, and the cases therein cited).

1953I am not unmindful of the fact that our own Court of Appeals, in Andrews v. Gardiner (supra) and Pecue v. West ( 233 N. Y. 316 ) has shown the tendency of our courts to limit the extension of the doctrine of absolute privilege. ■However, no New York case heretofore has considered what effect a statute such as section 537 of the Labor Law should have, on the doctrine of absolute privilege.

1957If we fix our gaze upon that aspect, we shall stress the element of contract, and treat the defendants’ promise as embracing the rendition of a service, which though ordered and paid for by one, was either wholly or in part for the benefit of another (DeCicco v. Schweizer, 221 N. Y. 431 ; Rector, etc., St.

1922If we fix our gaze upon that aspect, we shall stress the element of contract, and treat the defendants’ promise as embracing the rendition of a service, which though ordered and paid for by one, was either wholly or in part for the benefit of another (DeCicco v. Schweizer, 221 N. Y. 431 ; Rector, etc., St.

1957There was no contractual relationship and to apply the tort rule as stated in Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. (supra) would be an extension of that rule far beyond any previous application.

1934(Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N. Y. 160 .) There is much to be said in favor of the proposition advanced by counsel for the defendant, that if the defendant has incurred any liability it is to the village, if, as alleged, he performed in a careless and negligent manner the duty which the village imposed upon him by the above-quoted ordinance to remove the snow and ice from the sidewalk in front of the premises owned by him.

1920(Mentz v. Newwitter, 122 N. Y. 491 .) The extension of the rule, however, does not appear to hold in England.

1913(See Newton v. Bronson, 13 N. Y. 587, 595 .) We recognize that the authorities hold that the note or memorandum, to constitute a compliance with the statute, must give the names of the parties and state all the terms of the contract with reasonable certainty, either in itself or in “some othérwriting or thing” referred to therein, and without the aid of evidence of parol negotiations (Mentz v. Newwitter, 122 N. Y. 491 ; Ward v. Hasbrouck, 169 id. 407; Brauer v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 178 id. 389; Wilson v. Lewiston Mill Co., 150 id. 314; Evans v. Pelta, 146 App. Div. 749 ); but we do no

2024The record further establishes the potential merits of the lien foreclosure claim, and because the statute of limitations has expired, the denial of the extension would bar plaintiff from litigating the otherwise timely filed claim against Atlantic ( see id. ; Pennington v Da Nico Rest. , 123 AD3d 627, 627-628 [1st Dept 2014]).

2023The Hampton Realty decision did not involve a discrete provision like an extension clause, but rather the underlying brokerage agreement itself ( see Hampton Realty of Bridgehampton v Conklin , 220 AD2d at 387 ), in which duration may be seen as an essential contractual term, since, without a temporal limitation, the agreement might actually have the effect of "extend[ing] the agency indefinitely." Here, the brokerage agreement contained provisions limiting its duration, and, unlike a typical brokerage agreement, the Survival Clause contained inherent limits that served to adequately narrow it

2017Agency v Berted Realty Co., 70 NY2d 828 [1987]; Steve Elliot, LLC v Teplitsky, 59 AD3d 523 [2009]; Sopher v Martin, 243 AD2d 459 [1997]).

2017Agency v Berted Realty Co., 70 NY2d 828 [1987]; Steve Elliot, LLC v Teplitsky, 59 AD3d 523 [2009]; Sopher v Martin, 243 AD2d 459 [1997]).

2017The brokerage agreement also included an extension clause, or “tail provision,” which is commonly included in a real estate listing contract to protect a broker from loss of compensation when a property is sold by the owner after the termination of the listing contract to a person who was introduced to the property by the broker (see Ackerman v Dobbs, 181 AD2d 704 [1992]; *993 Picotte Real Estate v Gaughan, 107 AD2d 996, 997 [1985]).

2017Agency v Berted Realty Co., 70 NY2d 828 [1987]; Steve Elliot, LLC v Teplitsky, 59 AD3d 523 [2009]; Sopher v Martin, 243 AD2d 459 [1997]).

2014Since defendants did not meet *591 their burden to show that the contract language was clear, unambiguous and supportive only of the interpretation they espoused (see Sterling Resources Intl., LLC, 92 AD3d 538 ; Perrotti v Becker, Glynn, Melamed & Muffly LLP, 82 AD3d 495, 499 [1st Dept 2011]), they failed to establish that the five-month limitation refutes, as a matter of law, the broker’s claimed right to the commission (see generally Goshen v Mutual Life Ins.