extension hearing in Wisconsin

2026STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e. “[C]onclusory opinions parroting the statutory language without actually discussing dangerousness … are insufficient to prove dangerousness in an extension hearing.” Winnebago County v. S.H., 2020 WI App 46, ¶17 , 393 Wis. 2d 511 , 947 N.W.2d 761 .

2026STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e. “[C]onclusory opinions parroting the statutory language without actually discussing dangerousness … are insufficient to prove dangerousness in an extension hearing.” Winnebago County v. S.H., 2020 WI App 46, ¶17 , 393 Wis. 2d 511 , 947 N.W.2d 761 .

2023See G.O.T., 151 Wis. 2d at 633 (explaining that "the trial court must hold the extension hearing before the [prior] commitment expires" because Wis. Stat. § 51.20 (13)(g)1. limits initial commitment order to a period "not to exceed 6 months" and extension orders to "a period not to exceed one year.").

2023See G.O.T., 151 Wis. 2d at 633 (explaining that "the trial court must hold the extension hearing before the [prior] commitment expires" because Wis. Stat. § 51.20 (13)(g)1. limits initial commitment order to a period "not to exceed 6 months" and extension orders to "a period not to exceed one year.").

2025STAT.] § 51.20(1)(a)2.” The D.J.W. decision, however, was driven by the fact that “[i]t was not clear at either the initial commitment hearing or the extension hearing on which subdivision paragraph of … § 51.20(1)(a)2. the commitment was based.” D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶36 .

2023Langlade Cnty. v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶¶23-24 , 391 Wis. 2d 231 , 942 N.W.2d 277 .

2023See Eau Claire County v. J.M.P., 2020AP2014-FT, unpublished slip op., ¶21 (Wis. Ct. App. June 22, 2021) (holding that a circuit court's competency is determined by the commitment order preceding the unlawful extension order, not the unlawful extension order itself). 3 ¶25 Before closing, we briefly explain why these conclusions are consistent with our decision in Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54 , 386 Wis. 2d 672 , 927 N.W.2d 509 .

2023See Eau Claire County v. J.M.P., 2020AP2014-FT, unpublished slip op., ¶21 (Wis. Ct. App. June 22, 2021) (holding that a circuit court's competency is determined by the commitment order preceding the unlawful extension order, not the unlawful extension order itself). 3 ¶25 Before closing, we briefly explain why these conclusions are consistent with our decision in Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54 , 386 Wis. 2d 672 , 927 N.W.2d 509 .

1991More importantly, in two recent CHIPS cases where there was a failure to timely complete an extension hearing at the post-dispositional stage, the court of appeals directly stated or implied that the issue is one of "competency" and not "subject matter jurisdiction." See In Interest of G.L.K., 153 Wis. 2d 245 , 247-48, 450 N.W.2d 498 (Ct. App. 1989); L.M.C., 146 Wis. 2d at 390-96.

1991More importantly, in two recent CHIPS cases where there was a failure to timely complete an extension hearing at the post-dispositional stage, the court of appeals directly stated or implied that the issue is one of "competency" and not "subject matter jurisdiction." See In Interest of G.L.K., 153 Wis. 2d 245 , 247-48, 450 N.W.2d 498 (Ct. App. 1989); L.M.C., 146 Wis. 2d at 390-96.

2025We explained that the judge’s use of the word “want” signified his personal desire, which referred “not to an extension hearing—at which to decide the merits of extension versus a civil judgment—but to the extension itself, an ultimate outcome.” Id. 13 No. 2022AP647-CR ¶31 A predetermined outcome was also present in Goodson, where the circuit court judge warned the defendant throughout the sentencing hearing that if “you deviate one inch from these [probation or extended supervision] rules, and you may think I’m kidding, but I’m not, you will come back here, and you will be given the maximum.”

2023We therefore concluded that “[t]he ordinary reasonable person would discern a great risk that the [circuit] court … had already made up its mind to extend probation long before the extension hearing took place.” Id. ¶26 Likewise, in Goodson, the circuit court warned the defendant at a sentencing hearing that “[i]f you deviate one inch from these [extended supervision or probation] rules, … you will come back here, and you will be given the maximum, period.” Goodson, 320 Wis. 2d 166, ¶2 .

2023In State v. Gudgeon, the circuit court wrote a note to the defendant’s probation agent and former counsel before an extension hearing stating “I want his probation extended,” which the court later did at the hearing. 2006 WI App 143, ¶¶3-4 , 295 Wis. 2d 189 , 720 N.W.2d 114 .

2023In State v. Gudgeon, the circuit court wrote a note to the defendant’s probation agent and former counsel before an extension hearing stating “I want his probation extended,” which the court later did at the hearing. 2006 WI App 143, ¶¶3-4 , 295 Wis. 2d 189 , 720 N.W.2d 114 .

2023H.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 645 . 7 No. 2022AP141 H.N.’s dispositional order had expired prior to the extension hearing, and the case concerned the circuit court’s failure to hold a hearing prior to the expiration of the order.

1993G.H., 150 Wis. 2d at 415-16, 441 N.W.2d at 231, affirms R.H. 162 Wis. 2d at 654-55, 469 N.W.2d at 853, held that a court loses competency in post-dispositional proceedings if it fails to hold an extension hearing within thirty days of the expiration of a dispositional order.

2022See Winnebago County v. S.H., 2020 WI 12 No. 2021AP2026 App 46, ¶17, 393 Wis. 2d 511 , 947 N.W.2d 761 (“reliance on assumptions concerning a recommitment at some unidentified point in the past, and conclusory opinions parroting the statutory language without actually discussing dangerousness, are insufficient to prove dangerousness in an extension hearing.”).

2019See G.O.T. v. Rock Cty. , 151 Wis. 2d 629 , 633, 445 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that "[a]n initial commitment ... expires at the end of six months and cannot be extended beyond that period unless a statute permits its extension," and "[f]or that reason, the trial court must hold the extension hearing before the initial commitment expires"); Wis. Stat. § 51.20 (13)(g) 1, 3 (allowing for extension of consecutive orders of commitment); see also *690 City of Eau Claire v. Booth , 2016 WI 65 , ¶ 21, 370 Wis. 2d 595 , 882 N.W.2d 738 ("a circuit court may lose competency to enter judgment

2019See G.O.T. v. Rock Cty. , 151 Wis. 2d 629 , 633, 445 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that "[a]n initial commitment ... expires at the end of six months and cannot be extended beyond that period unless a statute permits its extension," and "[f]or that reason, the trial court must hold the extension hearing before the initial commitment expires"); Wis. Stat. § 51.20 (13)(g) 1, 3 (allowing for extension of consecutive orders of commitment); see also *690 City of Eau Claire v. Booth , 2016 WI 65 , ¶ 21, 370 Wis. 2d 595 , 882 N.W.2d 738 ("a circuit court may lose competency to enter judgment

2014The one-party con sent exception under Wis. Stat. § 968.31 (2)(b) appears to be an extension of the rule that the Fourth Amendment does not protect "a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it." See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); see also State v. Duchow, 2008 WI 57, ¶ 30 , 310 Wis. 2d 1 , 749 N.W.2d 913 ("A person's reasonable expectation of privacy is compromised when he or she knowingly exposes statements to others, rather than keeping them to himself or herself."). ¶ 25.

2014The one-party con sent exception under Wis. Stat. § 968.31 (2)(b) appears to be an extension of the rule that the Fourth Amendment does not protect "a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it." See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); see also State v. Duchow, 2008 WI 57, ¶ 30 , 310 Wis. 2d 1 , 749 N.W.2d 913 ("A person's reasonable expectation of privacy is compromised when he or she knowingly exposes statements to others, rather than keeping them to himself or herself."). ¶ 25.

2014The one-party con sent exception under Wis. Stat. § 968.31 (2)(b) appears to be an extension of the rule that the Fourth Amendment does not protect "a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it." See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); see also State v. Duchow, 2008 WI 57, ¶ 30 , 310 Wis. 2d 1 , 749 N.W.2d 913 ("A person's reasonable expectation of privacy is compromised when he or she knowingly exposes statements to others, rather than keeping them to himself or herself."). ¶ 25.

1998Compare Bergman, 64 Wis. 2d 747 with State v. Peterson, 195 Wis. 351, 359 , 218 N.W. 367 *342 (1928) (in investigation of alleged offense, district attorney holds a position analogous to judge who presides at trial because he must consult those who know the facts and thereby determine what course to pursue). [6] ¶ 32.

1998Compare Bergman, 64 Wis. 2d 747 with State v. Peterson, 195 Wis. 351, 359 , 218 N.W. 367 (1928) (in investigation of alleged offense, district attorney holds a position analogous to judge who presides at trial because he must consult those who know the facts and thereby determine what course to pursue). 6 ¶ 32.

1998Compare Bergman, 64 Wis. 2d 747 with State v. Peterson, 195 Wis. 351, 359 , 218 N.W. 367 *342 (1928) (in investigation of alleged offense, district attorney holds a position analogous to judge who presides at trial because he must consult those who know the facts and thereby determine what course to pursue). [6] ¶ 32.

1998Compare Bergman, 64 Wis. 2d 747 with State v. Peterson, 195 Wis. 351, 359 , 218 N.W. 367 *342 (1928) (in investigation of alleged offense, district attorney holds a position analogous to judge who presides at trial because he must consult those who know the facts and thereby determine what course to pursue). [6] ¶ 32.

1993D.F., 147 Wis. 2d at 498-99, 433 N.W.2d at 613-14, held that a trial court's failure to comply with the parental notification statute precluded termination of the parent's rights.

1993G.H., 150 Wis. 2d at 415-16, 441 N.W.2d at 231, affirms R.H. 162 Wis. 2d at 654-55, 469 N.W.2d at 853, held that a court loses competency in post-dispositional proceedings if it fails to hold an extension hearing within thirty days of the expiration of a dispositional order.

1993G.H., 150 Wis. 2d at 415-16, 441 N.W.2d at 231, affirms R.H. 162 Wis. 2d at 654-55, 469 N.W.2d at 853, held that a court loses competency in post-dispositional proceedings if it fails to hold an extension hearing within thirty days of the expiration of a dispositional order.