10 New Hampshire opinions name it 1 courts 1970–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Hampshire courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bricker v. Cranegreen2 sentences1985Collateral estoppel, which is an extension of the doctrine of res judicata, bars the same parties . . . from contesting in a subsequent proceeding on a different cause of action any question or fact actually litigated and determined against them in a prior suit.” Id. at 253 , 387 A.2d at 323 (citations omitted). 1985Collateral estoppel, which is an extension of the doctrine of res judicata, bars the same parties . . . from contesting in a subsequent proceeding on a different cause of action any question or fact actually litigated and determined against them in a prior suit.” Id. at 253 , 387 A.2d at 323 (citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
MacPherson v. Weinergreen2 sentences2017“For a showing of ‘good cause’ the trial court must . . . assess whether the current conditions are such that there is still a concern for the safety and well-being of the plaintiff.” MacPherson v. Weiner, 158 N.H. 6, 10 (2008). 2017See MacPherson, 158 N.H. at 10 . | 1 | 1 |
Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co.green2 sentences1997Further, the majority’s holding insulates architects and contractors from liability despite our long-standing “refusal to protect particular classes of defendants.” Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898, 904 , 451 A.2d 1308, 1312 (1982). 1997Further, the majority’s holding insulates architects and contractors from liability despite our long-standing “refusal to protect particular classes of defendants.” Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898, 904 , 451 A.2d 1308, 1312 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Proulxgreen2 sentences1982“Collateral estoppel, which is an extension of the doctrine of res judicata, bars relitigation of factual issues which have already been determined . . . .” State v. Proulx, 110 N.H. 187, 189 , 263 A.2d 673, 675 (1970); see State v. Hastings, 121 N.H. 465, 467 , 430 A.2d 1131, 1132 (1981); see also Scheele v. Village District of Eidelweiss, 122 N.H. 1015, 1019 , 453 A.2d 1281, 1284 (1982). 1982“Collateral estoppel, which is an extension of the doctrine of res judicata, bars relitigation of factual issues which have already been determined . . . .” State v. Proulx, 110 N.H. 187, 189 , 263 A.2d 673, 675 (1970); see State v. Hastings, 121 N.H. 465, 467 , 430 A.2d 1131, 1132 (1981); see also Scheele v. Village District of Eidelweiss, 122 N.H. 1015, 1019 , 453 A.2d 1281, 1284 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hastingsgreen2 sentences1982“Collateral estoppel, which is an extension of the doctrine of res judicata, bars relitigation of factual issues which have already been determined . . . .” State v. Proulx, 110 N.H. 187, 189 , 263 A.2d 673, 675 (1970); see State v. Hastings, 121 N.H. 465, 467 , 430 A.2d 1131, 1132 (1981); see also Scheele v. Village District of Eidelweiss, 122 N.H. 1015, 1019 , 453 A.2d 1281, 1284 (1982). 1982“Collateral estoppel, which is an extension of the doctrine of res judicata, bars relitigation of factual issues which have already been determined . . . .” State v. Proulx, 110 N.H. 187, 189 , 263 A.2d 673, 675 (1970); see State v. Hastings, 121 N.H. 465, 467 , 430 A.2d 1131, 1132 (1981); see also Scheele v. Village District of Eidelweiss, 122 N.H. 1015, 1019 , 453 A.2d 1281, 1284 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Robert C.green2 sentences1982Like the doctrine of res judicata, it “has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue . . . and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); see In re Robert C., 120 N.H. 221, 224 , 412 A.2d 1037, 1039 (1980). 1982Like the doctrine of res judicata, it “has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue . . . and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); see In re Robert C., 120 N.H. 221, 224 , 412 A.2d 1037, 1039 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shoregreen2 sentences1982Like the doctrine of res judicata, it "has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue . . . and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); see In re Robert C., 120 N.H. 221, 224 , 412 A.2d 1037, 1039 (1980). [3, 4] "Collateral estoppel applies equally in civil and criminal proceedings." State v. Kowal, 116 N.H. 699, 700 , 366 A.2d 877, 878 (1976). 1982Like the doctrine of res judicata, it “has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue . . . and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); see In re Robert C., 120 N.H. 221, 224 , 412 A.2d 1037, 1039 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Scheele v. Village District of Eidelweissgreen2 sentences1982“Collateral estoppel, which is an extension of the doctrine of res judicata, bars relitigation of factual issues which have already been determined . . . .” State v. Proulx, 110 N.H. 187, 189 , 263 A.2d 673, 675 (1970); see State v. Hastings, 121 N.H. 465, 467 , 430 A.2d 1131, 1132 (1981); see also Scheele v. Village District of Eidelweiss, 122 N.H. 1015, 1019 , 453 A.2d 1281, 1284 (1982). 1982“Collateral estoppel, which is an extension of the doctrine of res judicata, bars relitigation of factual issues which have already been determined . . . .” State v. Proulx, 110 N.H. 187, 189 , 263 A.2d 673, 675 (1970); see State v. Hastings, 121 N.H. 465, 467 , 430 A.2d 1131, 1132 (1981); see also Scheele v. Village District of Eidelweiss, 122 N.H. 1015, 1019 , 453 A.2d 1281, 1284 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kowalgreen2 sentences1982Like the doctrine of res judicata, it "has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue . . . and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); see In re Robert C., 120 N.H. 221, 224 , 412 A.2d 1037, 1039 (1980). [3, 4] "Collateral estoppel applies equally in civil and criminal proceedings." State v. Kowal, 116 N.H. 699, 700 , 366 A.2d 877, 878 (1976). 1982Like the doctrine of res judicata, it "has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue . . . and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); see In re Robert C., 120 N.H. 221, 224 , 412 A.2d 1037, 1039 (1980). [3, 4] "Collateral estoppel applies equally in civil and criminal proceedings." State v. Kowal, 116 N.H. 699, 700 , 366 A.2d 877, 878 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
McGrath v. McGrathgreen2 sentences1978McGrath v. McGrath, 109 N.H. 312, 315 , 251 A.2d 336, 339 (1969). 1978McGrath v. McGrath, 109 N.H. 312, 315 , 251 A.2d 336, 339 (1969). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Hampshire. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Associates Engineers, Inc.
green
1 sentence1998The extension of this privilege recognizes that “an expert’s courtroom testimony is the last act in a long, complex process of evaluation and consultation with the litigant.” Bruce, 776 P.2d at 672 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Terlinde v. Neely
green
2 sentences1988The extension of this principle is based on “sound legal and policy considerations.” Terlinde, 275 S.C. at 397 , 271 S.E.2d at 769 . 1988The extension of this principle is based on “sound legal and policy considerations.” Terlinde, 275 S.C. at 397 , 271 S.E.2d at 769 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Shillady v. Elliot Community Hospital
green
2 sentences1977This court held that the discovery rule applies in so-called “foreign objects” cases in which a surgeon leaves an object inside a patient’s body, Shillady v. Elliot Community Hosp., 114 N.H. 321 , 320 A.2d 637 (1974). 1977This court held that the discovery rule applies in so-called “foreign objects” cases in which a surgeon leaves an object inside a patient’s body, Shillady v. Elliot Community Hosp., 114 N.H. 321 , 320 A.2d 637 (1974). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Hoag v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences1970Collateral estoppel, which is an extension of the doctrine of res judicata, bars relitigation of factual issues which have already been determined and, like the doctrine of double jeopardy, is “ designed to eliminate the expense, vexation, waste and possible inconsistent results of duplicatory litigation. ” Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U. S. 464, 470 , 2 L. 1970Collateral estoppel, which is an extension of the doctrine of res judicata, bars relitigation of factual issues which have already been determined and, like the doctrine of double jeopardy, is “ designed to eliminate the expense, vexation, waste and possible inconsistent results of duplicatory litigation. ” Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U. S. 464, 470 , 2 L. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Sanderson v. Balfour
green
1 sentence1970Ed. 2d 913, 919 , 78 S.Ct. 829, 834 ; Sanderson v. Balfour, 109 N. H. 213, 247 A.2d 185 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.