extension doctrine in Oregon

2024Curry, 326 Or App at 270 (quot- ing Sperou, 365 Or at 137 ); see also id. at 273 (Aoyagi, P. J., concurring) (“Sperou effected a significant extension of the principle animating Lupoli[.]”).

2024Although Sperou was under advisement at the time of petitioner’s trial, petitioner did not submit any evidence to the post-conviction court to show that, at the time of his trial, criminal defense attorneys were making those types of vouching objections to witnesses’ or prosecutors’ refer- ences to “victims.” See Hagberg v. Coursey, 269 Or App 377, 381 , 344 P3d 1118 , rev den, 358 Or 69 (2015) (noting that the petitioner had submitted evidence from an expert witness, a criminal defense lawyer, who testified that the legal issue “was a subject of discussion within the criminal defense bar, and

2024Although Sperou was under advisement at the time of petitioner’s trial, petitioner did not submit any evidence to the post-conviction court to show that, at the time of his trial, criminal defense attorneys were making those types of vouching objections to witnesses’ or prosecutors’ refer- ences to “victims.” See Hagberg v. Coursey, 269 Or App 377, 381 , 344 P3d 1118 , rev den, 358 Or 69 (2015) (noting that the petitioner had submitted evidence from an expert witness, a criminal defense lawyer, who testified that the legal issue “was a subject of discussion within the criminal defense bar, and

2007ORCP 15 also does not aid defendant. 7 We assume defendant refers specifically to ORCP 15 D, which provides: “The court may, in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, allow an answer or reply to be made, or allow any other pleading or motion after the time limited by the procedural rules, or by an order enlarge such time.” In Husted v. SCI Oregon Funeral Services, Inc., 209 Or App 45, 49 , 146 P3d 376 (2006), we held that ORCP 15 D did not excuse the plaintiffs untimely filing of her attorney fee statement under ORCP 68 C(4)(a), because the plaintiff had never sought an extension

2007ORCP 15 also does not aid defendant. 7 We assume defendant refers specifically to ORCP 15 D, which provides: “The court may, in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, allow an answer or reply to be made, or allow any other pleading or motion after the time limited by the procedural rules, or by an order enlarge such time.” In Husted v. SCI Oregon Funeral Services, Inc., 209 Or App 45, 49 , 146 P3d 376 (2006), we held that ORCP 15 D did not excuse the plaintiffs untimely filing of her attorney fee statement under ORCP 68 C(4)(a), because the plaintiff had never sought an extension

1994As we clearly explained in Abercrombie: "Plaintiffs proceeded on three alternative theories: That defendant waived the previously specified time of performance, that defendant is estopped by the extension to claim otherwise and that the extension constitutes a modification of the original closing date provisions and the earlier written extensions." 122 Or.App. at 358 , 858 P.2d 152 .

1994As we clearly explained in Abercrombie: "Plaintiffs proceeded on three alternative theories: That defendant waived the previously specified time of performance, that defendant is estopped by the extension to claim otherwise and that the extension constitutes a modification of the original closing date provisions and the earlier written extensions." 122 Or.App. at 358 , 858 P.2d 152 .

1981Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629 , 281 P.2d 233 (1955), is illustrative.

1981Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629 , 281 P.2d 233 (1955), is illustrative.

1979On the other hand, if the extension of the rule would achieve some deterrence, this "must still be balanced against the potential injury to the function of the proceedings in which the allegedly illegal obtained evidence is to be admitted or used.” 518 F2d 53-54, citing United States v. Calandra, 414 US 338, 349 , 98 S Ct 613 , 38 LE 2d 56 (1974).

1979On the other hand, if the extension of the rule would achieve some deterrence, this "must still be balanced against the potential injury to the function of the proceedings in which the allegedly illegal obtained evidence is to be admitted or used.” 518 F2d 53-54, citing United States v. Calandra, 414 US 338, 349 , 98 S Ct 613 , 38 LE 2d 56 (1974).

1974In Blanchette v. Arrow Towing Co., 242 Or 590 , 410 P2d 1010 (1966), we stated: “* * * [I] t was not intended in the Miller case to announce a doctrinaire rule that every rear-end collision case must necessarily be submitted to the jury.

1974In Blanchette v. Arrow Towing Co., 242 Or 590 , 410 P2d 1010 (1966), we stated: “* * * [I] t was not intended in the Miller case to announce a doctrinaire rule that every rear-end collision case must necessarily be submitted to the jury.

1974This is an extension of the rule announced in Miller v. Harder, 240 Or 418 , 402 P2d 84 (1965), which, as the majority states, overruled Lehr v. Gresham Berry Growers et al, 231 Or 202 , 372 P2d 488 (1962).

1974This is an extension of the rule announced in Miller v. Harder, 240 Or 418 , 402 P2d 84 (1965), which, as the majority states, overruled Lehr v. Gresham Berry Growers et al, 231 Or 202 , 372 P2d 488 (1962).

1974This is an extension of the rule announced in Miller v. Harder, 240 Or 418 , 402 P2d 84 (1965), which, as the majority states, overruled Lehr v. Gresham Berry Growers et al, 231 Or 202 , 372 P2d 488 (1962).

1974This is an extension of the rule announced in Miller v. Harder, 240 Or 418 , 402 P2d 84 (1965), which, as the majority states, overruled Lehr v. Gresham Berry Growers et al, 231 Or 202 , 372 P2d 488 (1962).

1971The plaintiff seeks an extension of the rule adopted by the Oregon Supreme Court in Willamette Univ. v. Tax Com., 245 Or 342 , 422 P2d 260 (1966).

1971The plaintiff seeks an extension of the rule adopted by the Oregon Supreme Court in Willamette Univ. v. Tax Com., 245 Or 342 , 422 P2d 260 (1966).

1963Recognition of the absurdity of such distinctions has played a considerable part in the extension of the doctrine to new situations." Prosser, Torts, pp. 295-96 (2d ed 1955). 2 Harper & James § 22.14, p. 1256 (1956) suggests that the manner of applying the doctrine of last clear chance may depend upon the judicial attitude towards the idea of comparative negligence and the extent to which compensation and fault should constitute the basis for liability. [4] Coughlin v. State Bank of Portland, 117 Or 83 , 243 P 78 (1926); Lane v. Portland Ry., L. & P. Co., 58 Or 364 , 114 P 940 (1911).

1963Recognition of the absurdity of such distinctions has played a considerable part in the extension of the doctrine to new situations." Prosser, Torts, pp. 295-96 (2d ed 1955). 2 Harper & James § 22.14, p. 1256 (1956) suggests that the manner of applying the doctrine of last clear chance may depend upon the judicial attitude towards the idea of comparative negligence and the extent to which compensation and fault should constitute the basis for liability. [4] Coughlin v. State Bank of Portland, 117 Or 83 , 243 P 78 (1926); Lane v. Portland Ry., L. & P. Co., 58 Or 364 , 114 P 940 (1911).

1963Recognition of the absurdity of such distinctions has played a considerable part in the extension of the doctrine to new situations." Prosser, Torts, pp. 295-96 (2d ed 1955). 2 Harper & James § 22.14, p. 1256 (1956) suggests that the manner of applying the doctrine of last clear chance may depend upon the judicial attitude towards the idea of comparative negligence and the extent to which compensation and fault should constitute the basis for liability. [4] Coughlin v. State Bank of Portland, 117 Or 83 , 243 P 78 (1926); Lane v. Portland Ry., L. & P. Co., 58 Or 364 , 114 P 940 (1911).

1963Recognition of the absurdity of such distinctions has played a considerable part in the extension of the doctrine to new situations." Prosser, Torts, pp. 295-96 (2d ed 1955). 2 Harper & James § 22.14, p. 1256 (1956) suggests that the manner of applying the doctrine of last clear chance may depend upon the judicial attitude towards the idea of comparative negligence and the extent to which compensation and fault should constitute the basis for liability. [4] Coughlin v. State Bank of Portland, 117 Or 83 , 243 P 78 (1926); Lane v. Portland Ry., L. & P. Co., 58 Or 364 , 114 P 940 (1911).

1961See Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra; United Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 US 656 , 74 S Ct 833 , 98 L ed 1025; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 US 468 , 75 S Ct 480 , 99 L ed 546; Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 US 617 , 78 S Ct 923 , 2 L ed 2d 1018; San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 353 US 26 , 77 S Ct 607 , 1 L ed 2d 618; and San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 US 236 , 79 S Ct 773 , 3 L ed 2d 775.

1961See Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra; United Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 US 656 , 74 S Ct 833 , 98 L ed 1025; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 US 468 , 75 S Ct 480 , 99 L ed 546; Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 US 617 , 78 S Ct 923 , 2 L ed 2d 1018; San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 353 US 26 , 77 S Ct 607 , 1 L ed 2d 618; and San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 US 236 , 79 S Ct 773 , 3 L ed 2d 775.

1961See Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra; United Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 US 656 , 74 S Ct 833 , 98 L ed 1025; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 US 468 , 75 S Ct 480 , 99 L ed 546; Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 US 617 , 78 S Ct 923 , 2 L ed 2d 1018; San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 353 US 26 , 77 S Ct 607 , 1 L ed 2d 618; and San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 US 236 , 79 S Ct 773 , 3 L ed 2d 775.

1961See Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra; United Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 US 656 , 74 S Ct 833 , 98 L ed 1025; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 US 468 , 75 S Ct 480 , 99 L ed 546; Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 US 617 , 78 S Ct 923 , 2 L ed 2d 1018; San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 353 US 26 , 77 S Ct 607 , 1 L ed 2d 618; and San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 US 236 , 79 S Ct 773 , 3 L ed 2d 775.

1961See Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra; United Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 US 656 , 74 S Ct 833 , 98 L ed 1025; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 US 468 , 75 S Ct 480 , 99 L ed 546; Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 US 617 , 78 S Ct 923 , 2 L ed 2d 1018; San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 353 US 26 , 77 S Ct 607 , 1 L ed 2d 618; and San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 US 236 , 79 S Ct 773 , 3 L ed 2d 775.

1961See Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra; United Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 US 656 , 74 S Ct 833 , 98 L ed 1025; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 US 468 , 75 S Ct 480 , 99 L ed 546; Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 US 617 , 78 S Ct 923 , 2 L ed 2d 1018; San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 353 US 26 , 77 S Ct 607 , 1 L ed 2d 618; and San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 US 236 , 79 S Ct 773 , 3 L ed 2d 775.

1961See Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra; United Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 US 656 , 74 S Ct 833 , 98 L ed 1025; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 US 468 , 75 S Ct 480 , 99 L ed 546; Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 US 617 , 78 S Ct 923 , 2 L ed 2d 1018; San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 353 US 26 , 77 S Ct 607 , 1 L ed 2d 618; and San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 US 236 , 79 S Ct 773 , 3 L ed 2d 775.

1961See Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra; United Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 US 656 , 74 S Ct 833 , 98 L ed 1025; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 US 468 , 75 S Ct 480 , 99 L ed 546; Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 US 617 , 78 S Ct 923 , 2 L ed 2d 1018; San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 353 US 26 , 77 S Ct 607 , 1 L ed 2d 618; and San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 US 236 , 79 S Ct 773 , 3 L ed 2d 775.

1961See Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra; United Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 US 656 , 74 S Ct 833 , 98 L ed 1025; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 US 468 , 75 S Ct 480 , 99 L ed 546; Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 US 617 , 78 S Ct 923 , 2 L ed 2d 1018; San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 353 US 26 , 77 S Ct 607 , 1 L ed 2d 618; and San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 US 236 , 79 S Ct 773 , 3 L ed 2d 775.

1961See Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra; United Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 US 656 , 74 S Ct 833 , 98 L ed 1025; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 US 468 , 75 S Ct 480 , 99 L ed 546; Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 US 617 , 78 S Ct 923 , 2 L ed 2d 1018; San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 353 US 26 , 77 S Ct 607 , 1 L ed 2d 618; and San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 US 236 , 79 S Ct 773 , 3 L ed 2d 775.

1959Some support for the extension of this doctrine to private nuisances can be found in Bourne v. Wilson-Case Lumber Co., supra, and Stoddard v. Snodgrass, 117 Or 262, 241 P 73 .

1959Some support for the extension of this doctrine to private nuisances can be found in Bourne v. Wilson-Case Lumber Co., supra, and Stoddard v. Snodgrass, 117 Or 262, 241 P 73 .

1938In that case, Mr. Justice Bailey, spealdng for the court, quoted extensively from Boyce v. Hawn, 52 S. D. 53 ( 216 N. W. 589 ), a leading case on the extension of the doctrine here sought to be applied by the homestead debtor.