extension privilege in Alabama

2011Although the parties consented to an extension at the hearing held on August 20, “any purported extension after the ninety days is a nullity.” Caterpillar, 708 So.2d at 143 .

2011In order to invoke the privilege it is necessary to show that the compelled, disclosures will themselves confront the claimant with ‘substantial hazards of self-incrimination.’ “The components of this requirement were articulated in Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70 (1965), and later in Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968), and Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968). [10] In Albertson the Court held that an order requiring registration by individual members of a Communist organization violated the privilege.

2011In order to invoke the privilege it is necessary to show that the compelled, disclosures will themselves confront the claimant with ‘substantial hazards of self-incrimination.’ “The components of this requirement were articulated in Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70 (1965), and later in Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968), and Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968). [10] In Albertson the Court held that an order requiring registration by individual members of a Communist organization violated the privilege.

2011In order to invoke the privilege it is necessary to show that the compelled, disclosures will themselves confront the claimant with ‘substantial hazards of self-incrimination.’ “The components of this requirement were articulated in Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70 (1965), and later in Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968), and Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968). [10] In Albertson the Court held that an order requiring registration by individual members of a Communist organization violated the privilege.

2011In order to invoke the privilege it is necessary to show that the compelled, disclosures will themselves confront the claimant with ‘substantial hazards of self-incrimination.’ “The components of this requirement were articulated in Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70 (1965), and later in Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968), and Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968). [10] In Albertson the Court held that an order requiring registration by individual members of a Communist organization violated the privilege.

2009The prosecutor for the City of Gulf Shores stated in its response: “3. [Gann] lacks standing to assert, therefore this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear, [Gann’s] claims in Section One of her Motion to Dismiss. [Gann] argues that ‘the property right of a proprietor to operate his business and regulate the use of his property under the principles of self government is simply negated; sacrificed not to prevent a conflict of the rights of others, but supposedly to promote a remote and highly problematic risk of some future evil.’ ([Gann’s] Brief at 1, emphasis added). “4. [Gann] has

2009Shelley contends that no rational distinction exists between the extension of immunity to deputy sheriffs in cases such as Ex parte Blankenship, 893 So.2d 303 (Ala.2004), and Ex parte Davis, 9 So.3d 480 (Ala.2008), and his claim to immunity in this case.

2009Shelley contends that no rational distinction exists between the extension of immunity to deputy sheriffs in cases such as Ex parte Blankenship, 893 So.2d 303 (Ala.2004), and Ex parte Davis, 9 So.3d 480 (Ala.2008), and his claim to immunity in this case.

1987Explanation has been advanced for the liberal extension of the exception in sex crimes to show the "accused's specific emotional propensity," State v. McDaniel, 80 Ariz. 381 , 298 P.2d 798 (1956), or his "emotional predisposition or passion," Hodge v. United States, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 332 , 126 F.2d 849 (1942).

1987Explanation has been advanced for the liberal extension of the exception in sex crimes to show the "accused's specific emotional propensity," State v. McDaniel, 80 Ariz. 381 , 298 P.2d 798 (1956), or his "emotional predisposition or passion," Hodge v. United States, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 332 , 126 F.2d 849 (1942).

1987Explanation has been advanced for the liberal extension of the exception in sex crimes to show the "accused's specific emotional propensity," State v. McDaniel, 80 Ariz. 381 , 298 P.2d 798 (1956), or his "emotional predisposition or passion," Hodge v. United States, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 332 , 126 F.2d 849 (1942).

1987Explanation has been advanced for the liberal extension of the exception in sex crimes to show the "accused's specific emotional propensity," State v. McDaniel, 80 Ariz. 381 , 298 P.2d 798 (1956), or his "emotional predisposition or passion," Hodge v. United States, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 332 , 126 F.2d 849 (1942).

1987The Alabama Supreme Court specifically rejected such a position in Brasher v. State, 249 Ala. 96, 100 , 30 So.2d 31 (1947), which held that the prosecution may not "introduce evidence of other offenses committed by the accused with third persons for the purpose of identification when such evidence merely tends to show disposition, inclination, propensity or depravity." The liberalization of the identity exception in all "sex cases" is simply not justified.

1987The Alabama Supreme Court specifically rejected such a position in Brasher v. State, 249 Ala. 96, 100 , 30 So.2d 31 (1947), which held that the prosecution may not "introduce evidence of other offenses committed by the accused with third persons for the purpose of identification when such evidence merely tends to show disposition, inclination, propensity or depravity." The liberalization of the identity exception in all "sex cases" is simply not justified.

1986App.2d 267 , 218 N.E.2d 225 (1966), the Illinois Appellate Court dealt with a case involving a similar extension clause.

1982We can discern nothing in the policy of the law against self-incrimination which would require the extension of immunity to any trial, or to any tribunal, other than that in which the defendant preserves it by refusing to testify." Raffel , 46 S.Ct. at 568 .

1977In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. , 418 U.S. 323 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), however, the Court retreated from this extension of the privilege to private persons, using the rationale *Page 460 that "the States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private individual." 418 U.S. at 345 -46 , 94 S.Ct. at 3010 .

1977In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. , 418 U.S. 323 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), however, the Court retreated from this extension of the privilege to private persons, using the rationale *Page 460 that "the States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private individual." 418 U.S. at 345 -46 , 94 S.Ct. at 3010 .

1961Hi ^ Hi " This court said in Floyd v. Rambo, 250 Ala. 101 , 33 So.2d 360 , 362: “The general policy of the statute is to secure to the materialman and laborer a just reward of his labor and material and is based upon the general equitable principle that one should not enjoy the benefits thereof without making just compensation therefor. * * ” And in our late case of Wilkinson v. Rowe, 266 Ala. 675 , 98 So.2d 435, 437 , we quoted from Montandon & Co. v. Deas, 14 Ala. 33 , as follows: “ * * * This act should receive a liberal construction, as it is but an extension of the doctrine of lien, so mu

1961Hi ^ Hi " This court said in Floyd v. Rambo, 250 Ala. 101 , 33 So.2d 360 , 362: “The general policy of the statute is to secure to the materialman and laborer a just reward of his labor and material and is based upon the general equitable principle that one should not enjoy the benefits thereof without making just compensation therefor. * * ” And in our late case of Wilkinson v. Rowe, 266 Ala. 675 , 98 So.2d 435, 437 , we quoted from Montandon & Co. v. Deas, 14 Ala. 33 , as follows: “ * * * This act should receive a liberal construction, as it is but an extension of the doctrine of lien, so mu

1961Hi ^ Hi " This court said in Floyd v. Rambo, 250 Ala. 101 , 33 So.2d 360 , 362: “The general policy of the statute is to secure to the materialman and laborer a just reward of his labor and material and is based upon the general equitable principle that one should not enjoy the benefits thereof without making just compensation therefor. * * ” And in our late case of Wilkinson v. Rowe, 266 Ala. 675 , 98 So.2d 435, 437 , we quoted from Montandon & Co. v. Deas, 14 Ala. 33 , as follows: “ * * * This act should receive a liberal construction, as it is but an extension of the doctrine of lien, so mu

1961Hi ^ Hi " This court said in Floyd v. Rambo, 250 Ala. 101 , 33 So.2d 360 , 362: “The general policy of the statute is to secure to the materialman and laborer a just reward of his labor and material and is based upon the general equitable principle that one should not enjoy the benefits thereof without making just compensation therefor. * * ” And in our late case of Wilkinson v. Rowe, 266 Ala. 675 , 98 So.2d 435, 437 , we quoted from Montandon & Co. v. Deas, 14 Ala. 33 , as follows: “ * * * This act should receive a liberal construction, as it is but an extension of the doctrine of lien, so mu

1961Hi ^ Hi " This court said in Floyd v. Rambo, 250 Ala. 101 , 33 So.2d 360 , 362: “The general policy of the statute is to secure to the materialman and laborer a just reward of his labor and material and is based upon the general equitable principle that one should not enjoy the benefits thereof without making just compensation therefor. * * ” And in our late case of Wilkinson v. Rowe, 266 Ala. 675 , 98 So.2d 435, 437 , we quoted from Montandon & Co. v. Deas, 14 Ala. 33 , as follows: “ * * * This act should receive a liberal construction, as it is but an extension of the doctrine of lien, so mu

1918The justice said: “To hold 1 that the solicitor’s lieu attached to the land recovered by the heirs of Cunningham' would be introductory of a new principle, and an extension of the doctrine of the solicitor’s lien beyond an adjudged case, and would in effect be to ¿create an equitable mortgage which would be exposed to all the objections that have or can be made to the doctrine of equitable mortgages in England, and even more under our registry system, without having the same plausible ground to stand upon, which is the presumed agreement to execute a legal mortgage.” To the same effect was Sma

1915It is perhaps immaterial whether we say that public policy, which supports the doctrine of respondeat superior, does not justify such extension of the rule; or say that the public policy which ¡encourages enterprises for charitable purposes requires ■exemption from the operation of a rule based on legal .fiction, and which as applied to the owners of such ■enterprises, is clearly opposed to substantial justice. .It is enough that a charitable corporation like the defendant — whatever may be the. principle that controls its liability for corporate neglect in the performance of •a corporate duty

1915It is perhaps immaterial whether we say that public policy, which supports the doctrine of respondeat superior, does not justify such extension of the rule; or say that the public policy which ¡encourages enterprises for charitable purposes requires ■exemption from the operation of a rule based on legal .fiction, and which as applied to the owners of such ■enterprises, is clearly opposed to substantial justice. .It is enough that a charitable corporation like the defendant — whatever may be the. principle that controls its liability for corporate neglect in the performance of •a corporate duty

1890In McCarthy v. Nicrosi, 72 Ala. 332 , speaking in reference to the avoidance of an infant’s deed, or other executed contract,'it is said: “The usual rule is, that any such contract may be affirmed, by unequivocally recognizing its continued existence and binding forcé.

1888In Edwards v. Rogers, 81 Ala. 568 , we declined to commit ourselves to an extension of the exception to cases where there is a verbal agreement between the grantee and a person other than the grantor, that the conveyance shall operate as security for a debt due by such third person to the grantee.

1865This extension of privilege is exceptional, and proves the strong leaning of the court against reversals for the omission found in this record.—See Moore v. Horn, 5 Ala. 234 ; Woodward v. Clegge, 8 Ala. 317 .

1865This extension of privilege is exceptional, and proves the strong leaning of the court against reversals for the omission found in this record.—See Moore v. Horn, 5 Ala. 234 ; Woodward v. Clegge, 8 Ala. 317 .

1853The case of Chambers et al. v. Perry, 17 Ala. Rep. 729, 730 , is a greater extension of the principle asserted by Magee v. Toland, than was made in McDaniel v. Whitman, supra. In this case also, the husband was the survivor, and the wife had property, in which three others were jointly interested, in the hands of her guardian, appointed by a decree of the Chancery Court, and which decree provided that the female ward and her husband, should she marry before she arrived at the age of 21 years, might apply to the register of said court to have distribution made, who should appoint five discreet