extension rule in Pennsylvania

1990The court in Lamb began its analysis by quoting from Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 469 Pa. 214 , 364 A.2d 1345 (1976). [T]he trial court may grant an extension under rule 1100(c) only upon a record showing: (1) the due diligence of the prosecution, and (2) the certification that the trial is scheduled for the earliest date consistent with the court’s business; provided that if the delay is due to the court’s inability to try the defendant within the prescribed period, the record must also show the cause of the court delay and reason why the delay cannot be avoided.

1990The court in Lamb began its analysis by quoting from Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 469 Pa. 214 , 364 A.2d 1345 (1976). [T]he trial court may grant an extension under rule 1100(c) only upon a record showing: (1) the due diligence of the prosecution, and (2) the certification that the trial is scheduled for the earliest date consistent with the court’s business; provided that if the delay is due to the court’s inability to try the defendant within the prescribed period, the record must also show the cause of the court delay and reason why the delay cannot be avoided.

2023Importantly, “notwithstanding the clear import of § 1922(4) that it applies only where this Court has furnished a construction, this Court has recognized the extension in principle of § 1922(4)’s presumption to cases decided by the Superior Court.” Commonwealth v. Dickson, 918 A.2d 95, 107 (Pa. 2007), quoting In re Lock’s Estate, 244 A.2d 677, 682-83 (Pa. 1968) (“It has been held, and rightly so, that where a decision of the Superior Court construing a statute was never modified by the Supreme Court, the presumption was that when the legislature subsequently enacted a 8 It is necessary to emph

2023Importantly, “notwithstanding the clear import of § 1922(4) that it applies only where this Court has furnished a construction, this Court has recognized the extension in principle of § 1922(4)’s presumption to cases decided by the Superior Court.” Commonwealth v. Dickson, 918 A.2d 95, 107 (Pa. 2007), quoting In re Lock’s Estate, 244 A.2d 677, 682-83 (Pa. 1968) (“It has been held, and rightly so, that where a decision of the Superior Court construing a statute was never modified by the Supreme Court, the presumption was that when the legislature subsequently enacted a 8 It is necessary to emph

2017Recognizing a cause of action for breach of confidentiality in the factual context of the case at bar will undermine this policy.”); Clodgo by Clodgo v. Bowman, 411 Pa.Super. 267 , 601 A.2d 342, 345-46 (1992) ("The rationale for the immunity applies just as strongly to medical malpractice actions as to any other type of civil action.”). 12 .

2017Recognizing a cause of action for breach of confidentiality in the factual context of the case at bar will undermine this policy.”); Clodgo by Clodgo v. Bowman, 411 Pa.Super. 267 , 601 A.2d 342, 345-46 (1992) ("The rationale for the immunity applies just as strongly to medical malpractice actions as to any other type of civil action.”). 12 .

1985We note, as well, that counsel for appellant did not question the specific representation of the Commonwealth, at the extension hearing of August 2, 1979, that it had been ready to proceed to trial on each of the three earlier scheduled trial dates, but, instead, merely expressed a general assertion that the Commonwealth had failed to establish the exercise of due diligence in bringing appellant to trial. 315 Pa.Super. at 552 , 462 A.2d at 729-30 (footnote omitted); see also Kite, supra, 321 Pa.Super. at 417 n. 4, 468 A.2d at 778 n. 4 (“The record in this matter indicates that Judge Hirsh thor

1985We note, as well, that counsel for appellant did not question the specific representation of the Commonwealth, at the extension hearing of August 2, 1979, that it had been ready to proceed to trial on each of the three earlier scheduled trial dates, but, instead, merely expressed a general assertion that the Commonwealth had failed to establish the exercise of due diligence in bringing appellant to trial. 315 Pa.Super. at 552 , 462 A.2d at 729-30 (footnote omitted); see also Kite, supra, 321 Pa.Super. at 417 n. 4, 468 A.2d at 778 n. 4 (“The record in this matter indicates that Judge Hirsh thor

2023Importantly, “notwithstanding the clear import of § 1922(4) that it applies only where this Court has furnished a construction, this Court has recognized the extension in principle of § 1922(4)’s presumption to cases decided by the Superior Court.” Commonwealth v. Dickson, 918 A.2d 95, 107 (Pa. 2007), quoting In re Lock’s Estate, 244 A.2d 677, 682-83 (Pa. 1968) (“It has been held, and rightly so, that where a decision of the Superior Court construing a statute was never modified by the Supreme Court, the presumption was that when the legislature subsequently enacted a 8 It is necessary to emph

2023Importantly, “notwithstanding the clear import of § 1922(4) that it applies only where this Court has furnished a construction, this Court has recognized the extension in principle of § 1922(4)’s presumption to cases decided by the Superior Court.” Commonwealth v. Dickson, 918 A.2d 95, 107 (Pa. 2007), quoting In re Lock’s Estate, 244 A.2d 677, 682-83 (Pa. 1968) (“It has been held, and rightly so, that where a decision of the Superior Court construing a statute was never modified by the Supreme Court, the presumption was that when the legislature subsequently enacted a 8 It is necessary to emph

2018See Narehood v. Keiter , 22 Pa. D. & C.3d 391 , 393 (Pa. Com.

2018See Narehood v. Keiter, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d 391, 393 (Pa. Com.

2017See Clodgo v. Bowman, 411 Pa.Super. 267 , 601 A.2d 342, 345 (1992), appeal granted, 532 Pa. 640 , 614 A.2d 1138 (1992), appeal dismissed as .having been, improvidently granted, 533 Pa. 352 , 625 A.2d 612 (1993), (“The form of the cause of action is not relevant to application of-the privilege.

2017See Clodgo v. Bowman, 411 Pa.Super. 267 , 601 A.2d 342, 345 (1992), appeal granted, 532 Pa. 640 , 614 A.2d 1138 (1992), appeal dismissed as .having been, improvidently granted, 533 Pa. 352 , 625 A.2d 612 (1993), (“The form of the cause of action is not relevant to application of-the privilege.

2017See LLMD of Michigan, Inc., 740 A.2d at 189 (“The witness immunity doctrine has been applied by the Superior Court in actions other than for defamation when the court has determined that the extension of immunity is in furtherance of the policy underlying the doctrine.”); Moses, 549 A.2d at 957 (“While it is true that immunity from civil liability in judicial proceedings has been applied most frequently in defamation actions, many courts, including those in Pennsylvania, have extended the immunity from civil liability to other alleged torts when they occur in connection with judicial proceedin

2017See McGuire v. Shubert, 722 A.2d 1087, 1091 (Pa. Super. 1998) (“We find that the policy bases for applying the doctrine of absolute immunity ... are not present in the instant appeal.”); Moses, 549 A.2d at 957 ("Such an extension of immunity evinces the *535 strong policy behind the privilege....

2017Our Supreme Court has stated that judicial privilege “has been applied by the Superior Court in actions other than for defamation when the court has determined that the extension of immunity is in furtherance of the policy underlyiny the doctrine.” LLMD of Michigan, Inc. v. Jackson-Cross Co., 559 Pa. 297 , 740 A.2d 186, 189 (1999) (citations omitted; emphasis added). 11 .

2017Our Supreme Court has stated that judicial privilege “has been applied by the Superior Court in actions other than for defamation when the court has determined that the extension of immunity is in furtherance of the policy underlyiny the doctrine.” LLMD of Michigan, Inc. v. Jackson-Cross Co., 559 Pa. 297 , 740 A.2d 186, 189 (1999) (citations omitted; emphasis added). 11 .

1985We note, as well, that counsel for appellant did not question the specific representation of the Commonwealth, at the extension hearing of August 2, 1979, that it had been ready to proceed to trial on each of the three earlier scheduled trial dates, but, instead, merely expressed a general assertion that the Commonwealth had failed to establish the exercise of due diligence in bringing appellant to trial. 315 Pa.Super. at 552 , 462 A.2d at 729-30 (footnote omitted); see also Kite, supra, 321 Pa.Super. at 417 n. 4, 468 A.2d at 778 n. 4 (“The record in this matter indicates that Judge Hirsh thor

1985We note, as well, that counsel for appellant did not question the specific representation of the Commonwealth, at the extension hearing of August 2, 1979, that it had been ready to proceed to trial on each of the three earlier scheduled trial dates, but, instead, merely expressed a general assertion that the Commonwealth had failed to establish the exercise of due diligence in bringing appellant to trial. 315 Pa.Super. at 552 , 462 A.2d at 729-30 (footnote omitted); see also Kite, supra, 321 Pa.Super. at 417 n. 4, 468 A.2d at 778 n. 4 (“The record in this matter indicates that Judge Hirsh thor

1983“The trial court may grant an extension under rule 1100(c) only upon a record showing: (1) the due diligence of the prosecution, and (2) the certification that the trial is scheduled for the earliest date consistent with the court’s business; provided that if the delay is due to the court’s inability to try the defendant within the prescribed period, the record must also show the cause of the court delay and reason why the delay cannot be avoided.” Commonwealth v. Lamb, 309 Pa.Super. 415, 422 , 455 A.2d 678, 682 (1983), quoting Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 469 Pa. 214, 222 , 364 A.2d 1345, 1349-1

1983“The trial court may grant an extension under rule 1100(c) only upon a record showing: (1) the due diligence of the prosecution, and (2) the certification that the trial is scheduled for the earliest date consistent with the court’s business; provided that if the delay is due to the court’s inability to try the defendant within the prescribed period, the record must also show the cause of the court delay and reason why the delay cannot be avoided.” Commonwealth v. Lamb, 309 Pa.Super. 415, 422 , 455 A.2d 678, 682 (1983), quoting Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 469 Pa. 214, 222 , 364 A.2d 1345, 1349-1

1985See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 473 Pa. 400 , 374 A.2d 1274 (1977) (failure to attend hearing despite notification); Commonwealth v. Cullen, 340 Pa.Super. 233 , 489 A.2d 929 (1985) (petition for allocatur filed) (same); Commonwealth v. Bulling, supra (failure to move orally or in writing for dismissal in opposition to Commonwealth's fourth extension request); Commonwealth v. McFadden, 300 Pa.Super. 299 , 446 A.2d 624 (1982) (failure to move for dismissal or contest petition); Commonwealth v. Goldwire, 279 Pa.Super. 451 , 421 A.2d 286 (1980) (no answer filed; defense attorney went to hearing but di

1985See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 473 Pa. 400 , 374 A.2d 1274 (1977) (failure to attend hearing despite notification); Commonwealth v. Cullen, 340 Pa.Super. 233 , 489 A.2d 929 (1985) (petition for allocatur filed) (same); Commonwealth v. Bulling, supra (failure to move orally or in writing for dismissal in opposition to Commonwealth's fourth extension request); Commonwealth v. McFadden, 300 Pa.Super. 299 , 446 A.2d 624 (1982) (failure to move for dismissal or contest petition); Commonwealth v. Goldwire, 279 Pa.Super. 451 , 421 A.2d 286 (1980) (no answer filed; defense attorney went to hearing but di

1978Appellant initially argues that a defendant’s presence at an extension hearing is not pre-requisite to a valid grant, as long as notice of the hearing has been sent to him through his attorney. 7 In Commonwealth v. Taylor, 473 Pa. 400 , 374 A.2d 1274 (1977), the Supreme Court held that where defendant’s attorney was given adequate notice of the Commonwealth’s extension application but failed to appear at the hearing, the defendant was deemed to have consented to the extension.

1978Appellant initially argues that a defendant’s presence at an extension hearing is not pre-requisite to a valid grant, as long as notice of the hearing has been sent to him through his attorney. 7 In Commonwealth v. Taylor, 473 Pa. 400 , 374 A.2d 1274 (1977), the Supreme Court held that where defendant’s attorney was given adequate notice of the Commonwealth’s extension application but failed to appear at the hearing, the defendant was deemed to have consented to the extension.

1984See Commonwealth v. Dixon, 295 Pa.Super. 425 , 441 A.2d 1305 (1982); Commonwealth v. Freeman, 280 Pa.Super. 462 , 421 A.2d 814 (1980). “'Rule 1100 requires evidence’ and not merely allegations in support of a petition to extend.

1984See Commonwealth v. Dixon, 295 Pa.Super. 425 , 441 A.2d 1305 (1982); Commonwealth v. Freeman, 280 Pa.Super. 462 , 421 A.2d 814 (1980). “'Rule 1100 requires evidence’ and not merely allegations in support of a petition to extend.

1983There the Court held that the Commonwealth’s entitlement to an extension must be determined on the basis of the record made at the extension hearing, and that if the Commonwealth has failed to establish its right at the extension hearing, it will not be permitted a “second bite.” I am cognizant of the suggestion in Commonwealth v. Carr, 292 Pa.Super. 137 , 436 A.2d 1189 (1981) (LIPEZ, J., dissenting), that the Commonwealth may take a second bite if the bite is at the post-verdict motion stage instead of—as in Abridge—on remand.

1983There the Court held that the Commonwealth’s entitlement to an extension must be determined on the basis of the record made at the extension hearing, and that if the Commonwealth has failed to establish its right at the extension hearing, it will not be permitted a “second bite.” I am cognizant of the suggestion in Commonwealth v. Carr, 292 Pa.Super. 137 , 436 A.2d 1189 (1981) (LIPEZ, J., dissenting), that the Commonwealth may take a second bite if the bite is at the post-verdict motion stage instead of—as in Abridge—on remand.

2023Id. (“The Court simply did not consider the extension of the rule to complex factual scenarios . . . .”).

2023In so doing, we noted that Mamalis “sharply distinguished contribution among joint tortfeasors from the system of vicarious liability and indemnity,” but we expressed hesitancy as to its rationale, commenting that Mamalis “departed from the definitional language of” “joint tort-feasors” in UCATA and “displaced the focus from the statutory litmus centered on the fact of liability alone in favor of the Court’s own focus on the mechanism by which the parties became liable (actual contribution to the plaintiff’s injury versus legal imputation).” Id. at 485 , 490 n.17.

2022And if we do not know whether Appellant’s vindictiveness claim is valid, see id. (“We are not tasked with assessing the accuracy of [Appellant’s] vindictiveness claim at this juncture.”), it is difficult to discern a basis on which to direct the Superior Court to overlook waiver, see id. (remanding for the Superior Court to consider the merits of Appellant’s Pearce claim). [J-31-2022] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 13 sentence, Appellant declined the opportunity to expand the factual record associated with his resentencing, and the PCRA court determined the new sentence was not motivated by vindictiveness.

2022And if we do not know whether Appellant’s vindictiveness claim is valid, see id. (“We are not tasked with assessing the accuracy of [Appellant’s] vindictiveness claim at this juncture.”), it is difficult to discern a basis on which to direct the Superior Court to overlook waiver, see id. (remanding for the Superior Court to consider the merits of Appellant’s Pearce claim). [J-31-2022] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 13 sentence, Appellant declined the opportunity to expand the factual record associated with his resentencing, and the PCRA court determined the new sentence was not motivated by vindictiveness.

2019PFAA proceedings, other than those pursuing indirect criminal contempt, are civil irmeture, � Commonwealth v. Nelson, 690 A.2d 728, 731 (Pa. Super. 1997).

2017See McGuire v. Shubert, 722 A.2d 1087, 1091 (Pa. Super. 1998) (“We find that the policy bases for applying the doctrine of absolute immunity ... are not present in the instant appeal.”); Moses, 549 A.2d at 957 ("Such an extension of immunity evinces the *535 strong policy behind the privilege....

2017See Pawlowski, 588 A.2d at 41 n.3 (“Of course, even an absolute privilege may be lost through over [-publication, ie. publication of the defamatory material to unauthorized persons.

2017See LLMD of Michigan, Inc., 740 A.2d at 189 (“The witness immunity doctrine has been applied by the Superior Court in actions other than for defamation when the court has determined that the extension of immunity is in furtherance of the policy underlying the doctrine.”); Moses, 549 A.2d at 957 (“While it is true that immunity from civil liability in judicial proceedings has been applied most frequently in defamation actions, many courts, including those in Pennsylvania, have extended the immunity from civil liability to other alleged torts when they occur in connection with judicial proceedin

2017See LLMD of Michigan, Inc., 740 A.2d at 189 (“The witness immunity doctrine has been applied by the Superior Court in actions other than for defamation when the court has determined that the extension of immunity is in furtherance of the policy underlying the doctrine.”); Moses, 549 A.2d at 957 (“While it is true that immunity from civil liability in judicial proceedings has been applied most frequently in defamation actions, many courts, including those in Pennsylvania, have extended the immunity from civil liability to other alleged torts when they occur in connection with judicial proceedin