individual claim in Oregon

2022No. 4J, 301 Or 358 , 368- 69, 723 P2d 298 (1986), that Article I, sections 2 and 3, of the Oregon Constitution allow for an individual claim to a reli- gious exemption from the application of a general law: “With regard to rules that are generally applicable and neutral toward religion, however, the only issues for us to consider are whether there was ‘statutory authority to make such a regulation,’ or whether we should grant ‘an individual claim to exemption on religious grounds.’ ” See State v. Hickman, 358 Or 1, 15-16 , 358 P3d 987 (2015) (quoting Cooper, 301 Or at 368-69 ); State v. Brumwe

2022No. 4J, 301 Or 358 , 368- 69, 723 P2d 298 (1986), that Article I, sections 2 and 3, of the Oregon Constitution allow for an individual claim to a reli- gious exemption from the application of a general law: “With regard to rules that are generally applicable and neutral toward religion, however, the only issues for us to consider are whether there was ‘statutory authority to make such a regulation,’ or whether we should grant ‘an individual claim to exemption on religious grounds.’ ” See State v. Hickman, 358 Or 1, 15-16 , 358 P3d 987 (2015) (quoting Cooper, 301 Or at 368-69 ); State v. Brumwe

2022No. 4J, 301 Or 358 , 368- 69, 723 P2d 298 (1986), that Article I, sections 2 and 3, of the Oregon Constitution allow for an individual claim to a reli- gious exemption from the application of a general law: “With regard to rules that are generally applicable and neutral toward religion, however, the only issues for us to consider are whether there was ‘statutory authority to make such a regulation,’ or whether we should grant ‘an individual claim to exemption on religious grounds.’ ” See State v. Hickman, 358 Or 1, 15-16 , 358 P3d 987 (2015) (quoting Cooper, 301 Or at 368-69 ); State v. Brumwe

2022No. 4J, 301 Or 358 , 368- 69, 723 P2d 298 (1986), that Article I, sections 2 and 3, of the Oregon Constitution allow for an individual claim to a reli- gious exemption from the application of a general law: “With regard to rules that are generally applicable and neutral toward religion, however, the only issues for us to consider are whether there was ‘statutory authority to make such a regulation,’ or whether we should grant ‘an individual claim to exemption on religious grounds.’ ” See State v. Hickman, 358 Or 1, 15-16 , 358 P3d 987 (2015) (quoting Cooper, 301 Or at 368-69 ); State v. Brumwe

2016Specifically, ORS 746.230(l)(d) makes it an unfair claims settlement practice for an insurer to “[r]efus[e] to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based on all available information.” Ivanov states that, while the PIP statutes “do not expressly require [a medical examination] in every instance, [a medical examination] may nevertheless be required as part of a reasonable investigation, depending on the facts of an individual claim.” 344 Or at 431 .

2016Co., 344 Or 421, 430 , 185 P3d 417 (2008) (an insurer is obligated to conduct a reasonable investigation before denying a claim, ORS 746.230; failure to do so means the denial of a claim (even if timely) will not cut off the presumption that claimed medical expenses are reasonable and necessary, and an IME may “be required as part of a reasonable investigation, depending on the facts of an individual claim”). 2 As to plaintiffs second argument, we agree that there are factual disputes as to whether plaintiffs failure to comply with defendant’s request for an EUO constituted a breach of the pol

2016Id. at 417 .” State v. Babson, 355 Or 383, 391 , 326 P3d 559 (2014) (some internal quotation marks omitted).

2014Id. at 417 .

2014While the UGB amendment process requires more stringent evaluation of the factors, as in UGB amendment proceedings, the Commission concludes ‘ [n] o single factor is of such importance as to be determinative *** nor are the individual factors necessarily thresholds that must be met.’ Citizens Against Irresponsible Growth v. Metro, 179 Or App [12, 17, 38 P3d 956 (2002)].

2011In Citizens Against Irresponsible Growth v. Metro, 179 Or App 12, 17 , 38 P3d 956 (2002), we concluded that the locational factors in Goal 14 “do not stand alone but represent * * * several factors to be considered and balanced when amending a UGB. * * * No single factor is of such importance as to be determinative in a[ ] UGB amendment proceeding, nor are the individual factors necessarily thresholds that must be met.” Similarly, in 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Metro, 174 Or App 406, 409-10 , 26 P3d 151 (2001), we noted that “the locational factors are not independent approval criteria.

2001In order to establish the latter, father would have to show that “the government * * * made or applied * * " [ ORS 107.1081 so as to grant or deny privileges or immunities to * * [him as an individual] without legitimate reasons related to * * * This I individual situation.” State v. Clark, 291 Or 231, 239 , 630 P2d 810 , cert den 454 US 1084 , 102 S Ct 640 , 70 L Ed 2d 619 (1981).

2001In order to establish the latter, father would have to show that “the government * * * made or applied * * " [ ORS 107.1081 so as to grant or deny privileges or immunities to * * [him as an individual] without legitimate reasons related to * * * This I individual situation.” State v. Clark, 291 Or 231, 239 , 630 P2d 810 , cert den 454 US 1084 , 102 S Ct 640 , 70 L Ed 2d 619 (1981).

2001In order to establish the latter, father would have to show that "the government * * * made or applied * * * [ORS 107.108] so as to grant or deny privileges or immunities to * * * [him as an individual] without legitimate reasons related to * * * [his] individual situation." State v. Clark, 291 Or. 231, 239 , 630 P.2d 810 , cert. den. 454 U.S. 1084 , 102 S.Ct. 640 , 70 L.Ed.2d 619 (1981).

2001In order to establish the latter, father would have to show that “the government * * * made or applied * * " [ ORS 107.1081 so as to grant or deny privileges or immunities to * * [him as an individual] without legitimate reasons related to * * * This I individual situation.” State v. Clark, 291 Or 231, 239 , 630 P2d 810 , cert den 454 US 1084 , 102 S Ct 640 , 70 L Ed 2d 619 (1981).

2001In order to establish the latter, father would have to show that "the government * * * made or applied * * * [ORS 107.108] so as to grant or deny privileges or immunities to * * * [him as an individual] without legitimate reasons related to * * * [his] individual situation." State v. Clark, 291 Or. 231, 239 , 630 P.2d 810 , cert. den. 454 U.S. 1084 , 102 S.Ct. 640 , 70 L.Ed.2d 619 (1981).

2001In order to establish the latter, father would have to show that “the government * * * made or applied * * " [ ORS 107.1081 so as to grant or deny privileges or immunities to * * [him as an individual] without legitimate reasons related to * * * This I individual situation.” State v. Clark, 291 Or 231, 239 , 630 P2d 810 , cert den 454 US 1084 , 102 S Ct 640 , 70 L Ed 2d 619 (1981).

2001In order to establish the latter, father would have to show that "the government * * * made or applied * * * [ORS 107.108] so as to grant or deny privileges or immunities to * * * [him as an individual] without legitimate reasons related to * * * [his] individual situation." State v. Clark, 291 Or. 231, 239 , 630 P.2d 810 , cert. den. 454 U.S. 1084 , 102 S.Ct. 640 , 70 L.Ed.2d 619 (1981).

2001In order to establish the latter, father would have to show that “the government * * * made or applied * * " [ ORS 107.1081 so as to grant or deny privileges or immunities to * * [him as an individual] without legitimate reasons related to * * * This I individual situation.” State v. Clark, 291 Or 231, 239 , 630 P2d 810 , cert den 454 US 1084 , 102 S Ct 640 , 70 L Ed 2d 619 (1981).

1993App. 314 , 505 P.2d 939 (1973), and an individual claim to exemption on religious grounds. * * * But ORS 342.650 is not neutral toward religion.

1993Then we would have only an issue of statutory authority to make such a regulation, see Hysong v. Gallitzin School Dist., 164 Pa 629, 30 A 482 (1894); Neuhaus v. Federico, 12 Or App 314 , 505 P2d 939 (1973), and an individual claim to exemption on religious grounds. * * * But ORS 342.650 is not neutral toward religion.

1991A district court must first determine that it is dealing with a ‘final judgment.’ It must be a ‘judgment’ in the sense that it is a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be ‘final’ in the sense that it is ‘an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action.’ 351 US at 436 , 100 L Ed 1297 , 76 S Ct 895 .” The distinction noted in May v. Josephine Memorial Hospital, supra, and in Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., supra, is supported by an authoritative treatise.

1991A district court must first determine that it is dealing with a ‘final judgment.’ It must be a ‘judgment’ in the sense that it is a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be ‘final’ in the sense that it is ‘an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action.’ 351 US at 436 , 100 L Ed 1297 , 76 S Ct 895 .” The distinction noted in May v. Josephine Memorial Hospital, supra, and in Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., supra, is supported by an authoritative treatise.

1973The question must be determined upon the individual test of the accused * * ’ 171 Or at 671 .

1972The question must be determined upon the individual test of the accused ® ” 171 Or at 671 .

2022No. 4J, 301 Or 358 , 368- 69, 723 P2d 298 (1986), that Article I, sections 2 and 3, of the Oregon Constitution allow for an individual claim to a reli- gious exemption from the application of a general law: “With regard to rules that are generally applicable and neutral toward religion, however, the only issues for us to consider are whether there was ‘statutory authority to make such a regulation,’ or whether we should grant ‘an individual claim to exemption on religious grounds.’ ” See State v. Hickman, 358 Or 1, 15-16 , 358 P3d 987 (2015) (quoting Cooper, 301 Or at 368-69 ); State v. Brumwe

2022No. 4J, 301 Or 358 , 368- 69, 723 P2d 298 (1986), that Article I, sections 2 and 3, of the Oregon Constitution allow for an individual claim to a reli- gious exemption from the application of a general law: “With regard to rules that are generally applicable and neutral toward religion, however, the only issues for us to consider are whether there was ‘statutory authority to make such a regulation,’ or whether we should grant ‘an individual claim to exemption on religious grounds.’ ” See State v. Hickman, 358 Or 1, 15-16 , 358 P3d 987 (2015) (quoting Cooper, 301 Or at 368-69 ); State v. Brumwe

2021When a required disclosure is poten- tially incriminating, resolving whether the privilege applies requires “balancing the public need on the one hand, and the individual claim to constitutional protections on the other.” Byers, 402 US at 427 . 770 State v. Benson Our analysis under the federal constitutional provi- sions reaches the same result as our analysis under Oregon law.

2019To that end, ORS 659A.030(1)(a) prohibits "an employer, because of an individual's *** religion *** to refuse to hire or employ the individual or to bar *** the individual from employment." Religious discrimination in employment constitutes an "unlawful employment practice." Id. *163 Notwithstanding that proscription, the Oregon legislature has exempted religious organizations from that mandate if certain conditions are met.

2014Mercy Medical Center, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 12 OTR 305 , 307 1992.

2013In contrast, in Derenco, the court held that the proof in the case “indicates that it [was] ‘unlikely’ that ‘numerous’ members of the class possessed such knowl edge[, viz., of the defendant’s use of the money],” Id. at 572 (emphasis added), and in Guinasso, we held that it was unlikely that “significant numbers of borrowers” knew of lenders’ customary practices. 89 Or App at 278 .

2009As we explained in State v. Allen, 198 Or App 392, 396 , 108 P3d 651 , adh’d to as clarified on recons, 202 Or App 565 , 123 P3d 331 (2005), rev den, 342 Or 46 (2006), an upward departure sentence based on a defendant’s supervisory status “requires further inferences about the malevolent quality of the offender and the failure of his [supervisory] status to serve as an effective deterrent.” Here, defendant was on probation for a prior conviction for telephonic harassment of the same victim.

2009As we explained in State v. Allen, 198 Or App 392, 396 , 108 P3d 651 , adh’d to as clarified on recons, 202 Or App 565 , 123 P3d 331 (2005), rev den, 342 Or 46 (2006), an upward departure sentence based on a defendant’s supervisory status “requires further inferences about the malevolent quality of the offender and the failure of his [supervisory] status to serve as an effective deterrent.” Here, defendant was on probation for a prior conviction for telephonic harassment of the same victim.

2009As we explained in State v. Allen, 198 Or App 392, 396 , 108 P3d 651 , adh’d to as clarified on recons, 202 Or App 565 , 123 P3d 331 (2005), rev den, 342 Or 46 (2006), an upward departure sentence based on a defendant’s supervisory status “requires further inferences about the malevolent quality of the offender and the failure of his [supervisory] status to serve as an effective deterrent.” Here, defendant was on probation for a prior conviction for telephonic harassment of the same victim.

2009As we explained in State v. Allen, 198 Or App 392, 396 , 108 P3d 651 , adh’d to as clarified on recons, 202 Or App 565 , 123 P3d 331 (2005), rev den, 342 Or 46 (2006), an upward departure sentence based on a defendant’s supervisory status “requires further inferences about the malevolent quality of the offender and the failure of his [supervisory] status to serve as an effective deterrent.” Here, defendant was on probation for a prior conviction for telephonic harassment of the same victim.

2007“THE COURT: Well, that’s unconscionable.” The court went on to explain that the possibility that the arbitrator might find class relief to be unavailable would, in essence, deprive many employees with relatively small wage claims of their day in court: “THE COURT: In the context of wage claims in particular, * * * denying class action where the individual claim amounts may be insufficient to warrant private Attorney General intervention, meaning insufficient to make it economically feasible for private attorneys to take each and every case to arbitration and expect to get an attorney fee award

2007“THE COURT: Well, that’s unconscionable.” The court went on to explain that the possibility that the arbitrator might find class relief to be unavailable would, in essence, deprive many employees with relatively small wage claims of their day in court: “THE COURT: In the context of wage claims in particular, * * * denying class action where the individual claim amounts may be insufficient to warrant private Attorney General intervention, meaning insufficient to make it economically feasible for private attorneys to take each and every case to arbitration and expect to get an attorney fee award

2005To establish that appellant is dangerous to herself, the state must show that appellant’s mental disorder has “resulted in harm to [her] self * * * or created situations likely to result in harm.” State v. Christofferson, 47 Or App 1087, 1090 , 615 P2d 1152 (1980); see also State v. Sea, 137 Or App 333, 338 , 904 P2d 182 (1995).

2005To establish that appellant is dangerous to herself, the state must show that appellant’s mental disorder has “resulted in harm to [her] self * * * or created situations likely to result in harm.” State v. Christofferson, 47 Or App 1087, 1090 , 615 P2d 1152 (1980); see also State v. Sea, 137 Or App 333, 338 , 904 P2d 182 (1995).

2001It also quoted Blackstone's statement that "`[t]he last duty of parents to their children is that of giving them an education suitable to their station in life; a duty pointed out by reason, and of far the greatest importance of any.'" Id. (quoting 1 Blackstone's Commentaries, *450 (Lewis ed 1898)). [4] Father argues both that he is a member of a class that is discriminated against in violation of Article I, section 20, and that he also is discriminated against as an individual in violation of that provision.