individual claim in California

2025(E.g., Brooks v. AmeriHome Mortgage Co., LLC (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 624 , 629 [plaintiff’s complaint “alleged a single cause of action under PAGA and did not allege an individual claim for wage recovery”]; Young v. RemX, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 630, 633 [trial court “compelled arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claim, dismissed the class claims, bifurcated the representative PAGA claim, and stayed the PAGA claim pending the completion of arbitration”]; Reyes v. Macy’s Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1124 [“the PAGA claim is not an individual claim”].) Consequently, this opinion uses the

2024(See, e.g., Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119 , 1123–1124 [PAGA claim is not an individual claim but is a representative claim on behalf of the state, thus it was not within the scope of the defendant’s request that individual claims be submitted to arbitration]; see also Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal 4th at p. 383 [citing Reyes].) Eventually, there was a uniform conclusion that a court could not compel arbitration of any PAGA claim— either an individual claim or a non-individual claim.

2017That plaintiff and other employees might be able to bring individual 8 claims for Labor Code violations in separate arbitrations does not serve the purpose of the PAGA, even if an individual claim has collateral estoppel effects. ( Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 985–987.) Other employees would still have to assert their claims in individual proceedings.‘ (Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 489, 502 , fn. omitted.)‖ ( Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p.384.) The court then considered whether the state law rule prohibiting waiver of representative PAGA claims was preempted by the

2015That plaintiff and other employees might be able to bring individual claims for Labor Code violations in separate arbitrations does not serve the purpose of the PAGA, even if an individual claim has collateral estoppel effects. ( Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 985-987.) Other employees would still have to assert their claims in individual proceedings.’ (Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 489, 502 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 854 ], fn. omitted.)” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 384 .) The court then considered whether the state law rule prohibiting waiver of representative PAGA claims

2025(See Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 383–384, 391.) “[W]hether or not an individual claim is permissible under the PAGA, a prohibition of representative claims frustrates the PAGA’s objectives.

2025(Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 366 [Gentry rule]; Performance Team Freight Systems, Inc. v. Aleman (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1240 [§ 229].) Third, a PAGA claim has two components: an individual claim and a nonindividual claim.

2023(See, e.g., Raines v. Coastal Pacific Food Distributors, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 667, 670 [lower court erred in granting summary adjudication on PAGA claim based on the plaintiff ’s failure to prove injury from a section 226, subdivision (a) violation, as injury is required only for individual claim under section 226, subdivision (e), not a PAGA claim]; Lopez v. Friant & Associates, LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 773, 788 [“a plaintiff seeking civil penalties under PAGA for a violation of section 226[, subdivision] (a) does not have to satisfy the ‘injury’ and ‘knowing and intentional’ requireme

2018Donohue suggests that the holding in Lopez v. Friant & Associates, LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 773 , 224 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ( Lopez ) saves her PAGA claim (§ 2699) for wage statement violations (§ 226, subd. (a) ). 44 More specifically, she argues that, under Lopez , the trial court here erred in ruling that, because AMN was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on her individual (class) claims under section 226, AMN was also entitled to judgment as a matter of law on her representative (PAGA) claim under section 2699. 45 However, all Lopez held was that a plaintiff who asserts a representative cla

2012“Tension between the State’s demand for disclosures and the protection of the right against self-incrimination” is “resolved in terms of balancing the public need on the one hand, and the individual claim to constitutional protection on the other.” (California v. Byers (1971) 402 U.S. 424, 427 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 9 , 91 S.Ct. 1535 ] (plur. opn. by Burger, J.).) In conducting this balancing, the court has determined that the self-incrimination defense is not available when the incriminating disclosure is required “for compelling reasons unrelated to criminal law enforcement and as a part of a broadly

2012“Tension between the State’s demand for disclosures and the protection of the right against self-incrimination” is “resolved in terms of balancing the public need on the one hand, and the individual claim to constitutional protection on the other.” (California v. Byers (1971) 402 U.S. 424, 427 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 9 , 91 S.Ct. 1535 ] (plur. opn. by Burger, J.).) In conducting this balancing, the court has determined that the self-incrimination defense is not available when the incriminating disclosure is required “for compelling reasons unrelated to criminal law enforcement and as a part of a broadly

2025(Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 6 pp. 384-389.) It reasoned that a PAGA claim lies outside the FAA’s coverage because “the FAA aims to ensure an efficient forum for the resolution of private disputes, whereas a PAGA action is a dispute between an employer and [a] state [a]gency.” (Id. at p. 384.) Following the decision in Iskanian, California courts unanimously endorsed the view espoused in Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123-1124 , that every PAGA action is a representative action on behalf of the state and that “a single representative PAGA claim cannot be split into an a

2024It held that a waiver of the right to bring a PAGA action in any forum impermissibly “disable[s] one of the primary mechanisms for enforcing the Labor Code” and “harm[s] the state’s interests in ... receiving the proceeds of civil penalties used to deter violations,” which violates state public policy. ( Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 382–383.) The Iskanian court also rejected an argument that a predispute arbitration agreement may be enforced so long as it “prohibits only [non- 11 individual PAGA] claims, not individual PAGA claims for Labor Code violations that an employee suffered.” (Is

2025(See, e.g., Harger v. Structural Servs., Inc. (1996) 121 N.M. 657, 667 [ 916 P.2d 1234 , 1334] [“ ‘Every case presents its own combination of facts, from which the resultant must be arrived at.

2025(See, e.g., Harger v. Structural Servs., Inc. (1996) 121 N.M. 657, 667 [ 916 P.2d 1234 , 1334] [“ ‘Every case presents its own combination of facts, from which the resultant must be arrived at.

2025(See Borello, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 351 [“ ‘Generally, … the individual factors cannot be applied mechanically as separate tests; they are intertwined and their weight depends often on particular combinations.’ ”].) While the control-of-work element is the core of the test, and the right-to-discharge element is the most important secondary factor, the Borello test does not intrinsically require either to be resolved a certain way for an individual to be an independent contractor.

2025L. 295 , 335 [“However courts state the test of employee status, they routinely concede its failure to produce predictable results for many workers whose status is ambiguous”].) Some inconsistency may be inevitable given that the common law test is a multi-factored test, and case law teaches, “ ‘the individual factors cannot be applied mechanically as separate tests; they are intertwined and their weight depends often on particular combinations.’ ” (Borello, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 351 .) Thus, even a slight change in the facts can lead to different results.

2025Under our holding,” the court explained, “that rule is preempted, so Viking is entitled to compel arbitration of Moriana’s individual claim.” (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 662 .) After summarizing its holding in this fashion, the high court added a penultimate paragraph addressing one “remaining question”: “[W]hat [should] the lower courts . . . have done with Moriana’s non-individual claims[?]” (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 662 .) “[A]s we see it,” the opinion stated in answer to this state law question, “PAGA provides no mechanism to enable a court to adjudicate nonindividual P

2025Under PAGA’s standing requirement, a plaintiff can maintain non-individual PAGA claims in an action only by virtue of also maintaining an individual claim in that action.” (Id., at p. 663, citing § 2699, subds. (a), (c).) For this reason, the court in Viking upheld the validity of that portion of the rule of Iskanian regarding the continued validity of the nonindividual claims, ruling that they may not be dismissed simply because they are “representative.” (Viking, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 663 .) If the nonindividual claims could be dismissed in that manner, the result would be a prohibition of r

2016It is well established that “ ‘[predominance is a comparative concept, and “the necessity for class members to individually establish eligibility *1219 and damages does not mean individual fact questions predominate.” ’ ” ( Medrazo, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 99-100, quoting Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 334 ; accord, Collins v. Rocha (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232, 238 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 497 P.2d 225 ] [‘“that each class member might be required ultimately to justify an individual claim does not necessarily preclude the maintenance of a class action”]; see Reyes, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1278 [

2016It is well established that “ ‘[predominance is a comparative concept, and “the necessity for class members to individually establish eligibility *1219 and damages does not mean individual fact questions predominate.” ’ ” ( Medrazo, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 99-100, quoting Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 334 ; accord, Collins v. Rocha (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232, 238 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 497 P.2d 225 ] [‘“that each class member might be required ultimately to justify an individual claim does not necessarily preclude the maintenance of a class action”]; see Reyes, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1278 [

2016It is well established that “ ‘[predominance is a comparative concept, and “the necessity for class members to individually establish eligibility *1219 and damages does not mean individual fact questions predominate.” ’ ” ( Medrazo, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 99-100, quoting Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 334 ; accord, Collins v. Rocha (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232, 238 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 497 P.2d 225 ] [‘“that each class member might be required ultimately to justify an individual claim does not necessarily preclude the maintenance of a class action”]; see Reyes, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1278 [

2016It is well established that “ ‘[predominance is a comparative concept, and “the necessity for class members to individually establish eligibility *1219 and damages does not mean individual fact questions predominate.” ’ ” ( Medrazo, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 99-100, quoting Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 334 ; accord, Collins v. Rocha (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232, 238 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 497 P.2d 225 ] [‘“that each class member might be required ultimately to justify an individual claim does not necessarily preclude the maintenance of a class action”]; see Reyes, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1278 [

2021(See Daly v. Yessne (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 52, 63 ; Jara v. Suprema Meats, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1252-1253, 1257-1258 (Jara); see also Sutter v. General Petroleum Corp. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 525, 530 [“a stockholder may sue as an individual where he is directly and individually injured although the corporation may also have a cause of action for the same wrong”]; Goles v. Sawhney (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1018, fn. 3 [“A single cause of action by a shareholder can give rise to derivative claims, individual claims, or both.”]; Denevi v. LGCC, 31 LLC (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1222 [sa

2013(Denevi, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1222 .) Monahan also argues it may pursue an individual claim for gross negligence against Ghilotti based on a May 27, 2003, Letter of Intent, drafted by Ghilotti, regarding the work it proposed to perform at the project site.

2025Zaza insists Schrage nonetheless supports his standing to pursue an individual claim because “Schrage . . . cites Sutter v. General Petroleum Corp. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 525, 530 [(Sutter)] for the proposition that ‘a stockholder may sue as an individual where he is directly and individually injured although the corporation may also have a cause of action for the same wrong.’ ” Sutter, however, is distinguishable, as it involved a fraud perpetrated directly on the plaintiff before the formation of the corporation at issue.

2025(See 11 Sutter, supra, 28 Cal.2d at pp. 530–531; see also Hilliard v. Harbour (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1014 [“[t]he point of the Supreme Court opinion [in Sutter, supra,] is that while Sutter lost his investment, which was represented by the value of the stock, and its reduction in value was the measure of his loss, the damages all flowed from the defendants’ tort that preceded and induced the investment”].) And Schrage’s citation to Sutter—merely for purposes of explaining the distinction between direct and derivative claims—does not impact Schrage’s holding.

2003As we have stated, "the fact that each member of the class must prove his [or her] separate claim to a portion of any recovery by the class is only one factor to be considered in determining whether a class action is proper" and "[t]he requirement of a community of interest does not depend upon an identical recovery." ( Vasquez v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 809 , 94 Cal.Rptr. 796 , 484 P.2d 964 ( Vasquez ).) Even "that each class member might be required ultimately to justify an individual claim does not necessarily preclude the maintenance of a class action." ( Collins v. Rocha (1972

2003As we have stated, "the fact that each member of the class must prove his [or her] separate claim to a portion of any recovery by the class is only one factor to be considered in determining whether a class action is proper" and "[t]he requirement of a community of interest does not depend upon an identical recovery." ( Vasquez v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 809 , 94 Cal.Rptr. 796 , 484 P.2d 964 ( Vasquez ).) Even "that each class member might be required ultimately to justify an individual claim does not necessarily preclude the maintenance of a class action." ( Collins v. Rocha (1972

1972(Neely v. California State Personnel Bd., supra.) However, the notion that the executive power to hire and fire is absolute was explicitly rejected in Bagley , where we stated: “Although an individual can claim no constitutional right to obtain public employment or to receive any other publicly conferred benefit, the government cannot condition admission to such employment or receipt of such benefits upon any terms that it may choose to impose. . . . [T]he power of government, federal or state, to withhold benefits from its citizens does not encompass a supposed ‘lesser’ power to grant such be

1972Building upon the premise that the executive discretion in appointment or removal is absolute, these cases held that "an inquiry into extraneous facts to determine the possible improper motive of an executive or administrative board in dismissing an employee is not justified" ( Neuwald v. Brock, supra, 12 Cal.2d 662, 676 ; Kennedy v. State Personnel Board, supra ) except for purposes of impeaching witnesses. ( Neely v. California State Personnel Bd., supra . ) However, the notion that the executive power to hire and fire is absolute was explicitly rejected in Bagley , where we stated: "Althoug

2014(Compare Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119 , 1123–1124 [agreeing with Iskanian‘s position] with Quevedo v. Macy’s, Inc. (C.D.Cal. 2011) 798 F.Supp.2d 1122 , 1141–1142 [an employee may bring an individual PAGA action and waive the right to bring it on behalf of other employees].) But whether or not an individual claim is permissible under the PAGA, a prohibition of representative claims frustrates the PAGA‘s objectives.

2014(Compare Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119 , 1123–1124 [agreeing with Iskanian‘s position] with Quevedo v. Macy’s, Inc. (C.D.Cal. 2011) 798 F.Supp.2d 1122 , 1141–1142 [an employee may bring an individual PAGA action and waive the right to bring it on behalf of other employees].) But whether or not an individual claim is permissible under the PAGA, a prohibition of representative claims frustrates the PAGA‘s objectives.

2016It is well established that “ ‘[p]redominance is a comparative concept, and “the necessity for class members to individually establish eligibility and damages does not mean individual fact questions predominate.” ’ ” ( Medrazo, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 99–100, quoting Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 334 ; accord Collins v. Rocha (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232, 238 [“that each class member might be required ultimately to justify an individual claim does not necessarily preclude the maintenance of a class action”]; and see Reyes, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1278 [“it is firmly established that ‘a clas

2016It is well established that “ ‘[predominance is a comparative concept, and “the necessity for class members to individually establish eligibility *1219 and damages does not mean individual fact questions predominate.” ’ ” ( Medrazo, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 99-100, quoting Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 334 ; accord, Collins v. Rocha (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232, 238 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 497 P.2d 225 ] [‘“that each class member might be required ultimately to justify an individual claim does not necessarily preclude the maintenance of a class action”]; see Reyes, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1278 [

2014Even if we were to accept Fry’s’s assertion that the agreement included an implied representative action waiver requiring Ramos to arbitrate his PAGA claim on an individual basis, such a provision would be unenforceable under Iskanian.5 The defendant employer in Iskanian raised a similar argument, asserting that the agreement at issue was not contrary to public policy because it only prohibited “representative claims, not individual PAGA claims for Labor Code violations that an employee suffered.” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 383 .) The California Supreme Court disagreed, stating: “[W]he

2014Even if we were to accept Fry’s’s assertion that the agreement included an implied representative action waiver requiring Ramos to arbitrate his PAGA claim on an individual basis, such a provision would be unenforceable under Iskanian.5 The defendant employer in Iskanian raised a similar argument, asserting that the agreement at issue was not contrary to public policy because it only prohibited “representative claims, not individual PAGA claims for Labor Code violations that an employee suffered.” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 383 .) The California Supreme Court disagreed, stating: “[W]he

1975The court continued: “Of course, ‘although an individual can claim no constitutional right to . . . receive any . . . publicly conferred benefit, the government may not condition . . . receipt of such benefit upon any terms that it may choose to impose, and ... the power of government to withhold benefits from its citizens does not encompass a “lesser” power to grant such benefits upon an arbitrary deprivation of constitutional rights. [Citations.]’ (Vogel v. County of Los Angeles, 68 Cal.2d 18, 21 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 434 P.2d 961 ]; see also, e.g., In re Tucker, 5 Cal.3d 171, 192 [ 95 Cal.Rp

1975The court continued: “Of course, ‘although an individual can claim no constitutional right to . . . receive any . . . publicly conferred benefit, the government may not condition . . . receipt of such benefit upon any terms that it may choose to impose, and ... the power of government to withhold benefits from its citizens does not encompass a “lesser” power to grant such benefits upon an arbitrary deprivation of constitutional rights. [Citations.]’ (Vogel v. County of Los Angeles, 68 Cal.2d 18, 21 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 434 P.2d 961 ]; see also, e.g., In re Tucker, 5 Cal.3d 171, 192 [ 95 Cal.Rp

2026(See Today’s Fresh Start, at pp. 220-221, 223; Richardson v. Perales (1971) 402 U.S. 389, 410 (Richardson).) The combination of adjudicator and investigator functions is “ ‘inquisitorial rather than adversarial.’ ” (Today’s Fresh Start, at pp. 220-221; see also Withrow, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 52 .) In Richardson, for example, the high court rejected a separation-of- functions challenge to a federal Social Security proceeding in which the individual hearing examiner was “charged with 11 developing the facts” as well as adjudicating the applicant’s benefits claim.

2026(See Today’s Fresh Start, at pp. 220-221, 223; Richardson v. Perales (1971) 402 U.S. 389, 410 (Richardson).) The combination of adjudicator and investigator functions is “ ‘inquisitorial rather than adversarial.’ ” (Today’s Fresh Start, at pp. 220-221; see also Withrow, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 52 .) In Richardson, for example, the high court rejected a separation-of- functions challenge to a federal Social Security proceeding in which the individual hearing examiner was “charged with 8 developing the facts” as well as adjudicating the applicant’s benefits claim.

2026(See Today’s Fresh Start, at pp. 220-221, 223; Richardson v. Perales (1971) 402 U.S. 389, 410 (Richardson).) The combination of adjudicator and investigator functions is “ ‘inquisitorial rather than adversarial.’ ” (Today’s Fresh Start, at pp. 220-221; see also Withrow, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 52 .) In Richardson, for example, the high court rejected a separation-of- functions challenge to a federal Social Security proceeding in which the individual hearing examiner was “charged with 8 developing the facts” as well as adjudicating the applicant’s benefits claim.

2026(See Today’s Fresh Start, at pp. 220-221, 223; Richardson v. Perales (1971) 402 U.S. 389, 410 (Richardson).) The combination of adjudicator and investigator functions is “ ‘inquisitorial rather than adversarial.’ ” (Today’s Fresh Start, at pp. 220-221; see also Withrow, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 52 .) In Richardson, for example, the high court rejected a separation-of- functions challenge to a federal Social Security proceeding in which the individual hearing examiner was “charged with 8 developing the facts” as well as adjudicating the applicant’s benefits claim.

2025(Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 6 pp. 384-389.) It reasoned that a PAGA claim lies outside the FAA’s coverage because “the FAA aims to ensure an efficient forum for the resolution of private disputes, whereas a PAGA action is a dispute between an employer and [a] state [a]gency.” (Id. at p. 384.) Following the decision in Iskanian, California courts unanimously endorsed the view espoused in Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123-1124 , that every PAGA action is a representative action on behalf of the state and that “a single representative PAGA claim cannot be split into an a

2025(Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 6 pp. 384-389.) It reasoned that a PAGA claim lies outside the FAA’s coverage because “the FAA aims to ensure an efficient forum for the resolution of private disputes, whereas a PAGA action is a dispute between an employer and [a] state [a]gency.” (Id. at p. 384.) Following the decision in Iskanian, California courts unanimously endorsed the view espoused in Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123-1124 , that every PAGA action is a representative action on behalf of the state and that “a single representative PAGA claim cannot be split into an a

2025(Id. at p. 1116; Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 980 .) 4 A PAGA claim is “ ‘legally and conceptually different’ ” from an employee’s individual claim for damages and statutory penalties.

2025(Id. at p. 1116; Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 980 .) 4 A PAGA claim is “ ‘legally and conceptually different’ ” from an employee’s individual claim for damages and statutory penalties.

2014(See Ardon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 247-251, discussing, among others, City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447 (San Jose), Woosley v. State of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 758 , and County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Oronoz) (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 353 ; see also McWilliams, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 619 .) As here applicable, the thread of this line of decisions is that a representative plaintiff can file a claim on behalf of a class under section 910; each class member need not file an individual claim.

2011The court “reject[ed] the suggested necessity for filing an individual claim for each member of the purported class.” (City of San Jose, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 457 .) The court reasoned that “[t]o require such detailed information in advance of the complaint would severely restrict the maintenance of appropriate class actions—contrary to recognized policy favoring them.” (Ibid.; see Code Civ.

2018Cornerstone cites the observation in Arguelles-Romero v. Superior Court (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 825 , 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 ( Arguelles-Romero ) that a $16,000 recovery "is not so small that individuals would not be willing to spend the time and effort to pursue an individual claim for the amount, particularly when the prospect of an award of statutory attorney fees is also possible." ( Id. at p. 844, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 .) It appears to contend that any recovery above the $25,000 threshold set by the Legislature for a "limited civil case" matter (see Code Civ.

2018(Gentry, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 458 .) Indeed, the Gentry court observed that "wage and hour cases will generally satisfy the 'modest' recovery factor because they 'usually involve[] workers at the lower end of the pay scale.' " (Garrido, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 846 , quoting Gentry, supra, at pp. 457–458.) Muro's claims here fall within these general parameters.5 5 Cornerstone cites the observation in Arguelles-Romero v. Superior Court (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 825 (Arguelles-Romero) that a $16,000 recovery "is not so small that individuals would not be willing to spend the time and effort

2016It is well established that “ ‘[predominance is a comparative concept, and “the necessity for class members to individually establish eligibility *1219 and damages does not mean individual fact questions predominate.” ’ ” ( Medrazo, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 99-100, quoting Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 334 ; accord, Collins v. Rocha (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232, 238 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 497 P.2d 225 ] [‘“that each class member might be required ultimately to justify an individual claim does not necessarily preclude the maintenance of a class action”]; see Reyes, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1278 [

2016It is well established that “ ‘[predominance is a comparative concept, and “the necessity for class members to individually establish eligibility *1219 and damages does not mean individual fact questions predominate.” ’ ” ( Medrazo, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 99-100, quoting Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 334 ; accord, Collins v. Rocha (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232, 238 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 497 P.2d 225 ] [‘“that each class member might be required ultimately to justify an individual claim does not necessarily preclude the maintenance of a class action”]; see Reyes, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1278 [

2013Co. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 580, 590 .) Here, as analyzed, the overwhelming majority of factors establish that plaintiffs are independent contractors.

2013Co. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 580, 590 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 213 ].) 5.