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85 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2025 15 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Batchiligreen2 sentences2023“The ‘reasonable and articulable suspicion’ analysis is based on the collection of factors, not on the individual factors themselves.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403 , 2007-Ohio-2204 , 865 N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 19 , citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). {¶ 17} “Police officers may ‘draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that “might well elude an untrained person.” ’ ” Tidwell at ¶ 20 , quoting Arvizu at 273 . 2023“The ‘reasonable and articulable suspicion’ analysis is based on the collection of factors, not on the individual factors themselves.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403 , 2007-Ohio-2204 , 865 N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 19 , citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). {¶ 17} “Police officers may ‘draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that “might well elude an untrained person.” ’ ” Tidwell at ¶ 20 , quoting Arvizu at 273 . | 2 | 25 |
United States v. Arvizured2 sentences2023“The ‘reasonable and articulable suspicion’ analysis is based on the collection of factors, not on the individual factors themselves.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403 , 2007-Ohio-2204 , 865 N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 19 , citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). {¶ 17} “Police officers may ‘draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that “might well elude an untrained person.” ’ ” Tidwell at ¶ 20 , quoting Arvizu at 273 . 2023“The ‘reasonable and articulable suspicion’ analysis is based on the collection of factors, not on the individual factors themselves.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403 , 2007-Ohio-2204 , 865 N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 19 , citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). {¶ 17} “Police officers may ‘draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that “might well elude an untrained person.” ’ ” Tidwell at ¶ 20 , quoting Arvizu at 273 . | 2 | 7 |
State v. Medcalfgreen2 sentences2005In State v. Medcalf (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 142 , 147 , 675 N.E.2d 1268 , 1271 , we explained when an officer possesses probable cause to arrest an individual for a violation of R.C. 4511.19 : "To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual for a violation of R.C. 4511.19 (A), the court must examine whether, at the moment of the arrest, the officer had knowledge from a reasonably trustworthy source of facts and circumstances sufficient to cause a prudent person to believe that the suspect was driving while under the influence of alcohol. * * * * An arrest for drivin 2005In State v. Medcalf (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 142 , 147 , 675 N.E.2d 1268 , 1271 , we explained when an officer possesses probable cause to arrest an individual for a violation of R.C. 4511.19 : "To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual for a violation of R.C. 4511.19 (A), the court must examine whether, at the moment of the arrest, the officer had knowledge from a reasonably trustworthy source of facts and circumstances sufficient to cause a prudent person to believe that the suspect was driving while under the influence of alcohol. * * * * An arrest for drivin | 2 | 6 |
State v. Maysgreen2 sentences2020“In forming reasonable articulable suspicion, law enforcement officers may ‘draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that “might well elude an untrained person.”’” Id. at ¶ 25, quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744 (2002), quoting United States v. Cortez, -10- 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 , 101 S.Ct. 690 (1981). “‘The “reasonable and articulable suspicion” analysis is based on the collection of factors, not on the individual factors themselves.’” (Emphasis sic.) Mays, 11 2019“The ‘reasonable and articulable suspicion’ analysis is based on the collection of factors, not on the individual factors themselves.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406 , 2008-Ohio-4539 , ¶ 12, quoting State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403 , 2007-Ohio-2204 , ¶ 11. | 1 | 11 |
Illinois v. Wardlowgreen2 sentences2022See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (“nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion”). 2022See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (“nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion”). | 1 | 2 |
City of Cincinnati v. Bawtenheimergreen2 sentences2011Neither a partnership, a corporation, nor any other collective entity is shielded by the Fifth Amendment from the compelled production of an organization’s records.’” Quinlan v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Div. of Consumer Fin. (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 113, 122 , 678 N.E.2d 225 , quoting Cincinnati v. Bawtenheimer (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 260, 264 , 586 N.E.2d 1065, fn. 2 . {¶ 64} Appellees asked, “what is the business of Tri-Monex, Inc.,” a question that is purely related to the corporation and not personal under any proper reading of Fifth Amendment law governing corporate and private –20– privilege 2011Neither a partnership, a corporation, nor any other collective entity is shielded by the Fifth Amendment from the compelled production of an organization’s records.’” Quinlan v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Div. of Consumer Fin. (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 113, 122 , 678 N.E.2d 225 , quoting Cincinnati v. Bawtenheimer (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 260, 264 , 586 N.E.2d 1065, fn. 2 . {¶ 64} Appellees asked, “what is the business of Tri-Monex, Inc.,” a question that is purely related to the corporation and not personal under any proper reading of Fifth Amendment law governing corporate and private –20– privilege | 1 | 2 |
State v. Waregreen1 sentence2025See State v. Ware, 2019-Ohio-3885, ¶ 42 (4th Dist.) (“if a statute is unambiguous in the scope of its application, it is not objectively reasonable for an officer to charge an individual with a violation of that statute within the context of the Fourth Amendment”). | 1 | 1 |
Roosevelt Properties Co. v. Kinneygreen1 sentence2023The Hawkinses argue that the lack of an individual exception violates their constitutional rights. {¶ 24} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a regularly enacted statute “ ‘is presumed to be constitutional and is therefore entitled to the benefit of every presumption in favor of its constitutionality.’ ” Roosevelt Properties Co. v. Kinney, 12 Ohio St.3d 7, 13 (1984), quoting State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Cheryl Sinclair v. Lauderdale County, Tenn.green1 sentence2019See, e.g., Sinclair v. Lauderdale Cty., Tennessee, 6th Cir. No. 15-6134, 652 Fed.Appx. 429 , United States v. Stanbridge, 813 F.3d 1032, 1037 (7th Cir. 2016), United States v. Alvarado- Zarzo, 782 F.3d 246, 250 (5th Cir. 2015), State v. Eldridge, 790 S.E.2d 740, 743-44 (N.C. App. 2016), State v. Cortez, 512 S.W.3d 915, 924-25 (Tex. App. 2017), State v. Rand, 209 So.3d 660 , 665-66 (Fla. App. 2017). “[A]n officer can gain no Fourth Amendment advantage through a sloppy study of the laws he is duty-bound to enforce.” Heien, 135 S.Ct. at 539-540 . {¶43} The traffic stop initiated by Officer Rhodes | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Eldridgegreen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Marco Alvarado-Zarzagreen1 sentence2019See, e.g., Sinclair v. Lauderdale Cty., Tennessee, 6th Cir. No. 15-6134, 652 Fed.Appx. 429 , United States v. Stanbridge, 813 F.3d 1032, 1037 (7th Cir. 2016), United States v. Alvarado- Zarzo, 782 F.3d 246, 250 (5th Cir. 2015), State v. Eldridge, 790 S.E.2d 740, 743-44 (N.C. App. 2016), State v. Cortez, 512 S.W.3d 915, 924-25 (Tex. App. 2017), State v. Rand, 209 So.3d 660 , 665-66 (Fla. App. 2017). “[A]n officer can gain no Fourth Amendment advantage through a sloppy study of the laws he is duty-bound to enforce.” Heien, 135 S.Ct. at 539-540 . {¶43} The traffic stop initiated by Officer Rhodes | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Cortezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Arnettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| The United States of America v. Hector G. Camacho, the United States of America v. Jose Dolores Raygozagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Raygoza v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Fernandezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dinan v. Board of Zoning Appealsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Agriss v. Roadway Express, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Adair v. Wozniakgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Burgungreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Berkemer v. McCarty
green
2 sentences2009The "reasonable and articulable suspicion" analysis is based on the collection of factors, not the individual factors themselves.' (Emphasis sic.) (Citation omitted). {¶ 15} "As the United States Supreme Court elaborated in Berkemer v. McCarty , a police officer who lacks probable cause but whose observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular person's behavior is criminal may detain the person briefly to investigate the circumstances that provoked the suspicion. 468 U.S. at 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 . {¶ 16} "`[T]he stop and inquiry must be "reasonably related in sco 2009The "reasonable and articulable suspicion" analysis is based on the collection of factors, not the individual factors themselves.' (Emphasis sic.) (Citation omitted). {¶ 15} "As the United States Supreme Court elaborated in Berkemer v. McCarty , a police officer who lacks probable cause but whose observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular person's behavior is criminal may detain the person briefly to investigate the circumstances that provoked the suspicion. 468 U.S. at 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 . {¶ 16} "`[T]he stop and inquiry must be "reasonably related in sco | 6 | 2008–2017 |
Beck v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2000In deciding whether probable cause existed to support an officer's arrest of an individual for a violation of R.C. 4511.19 , the court must determine "whether, at the moment of the arrest, the officer had knowledge from a reasonably trustworthy source of facts and circumstances sufficient to cause a prudent person to believe that the suspect was driving while under the influence of alcohol." State v. Medcalf (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 142 , 147 citing Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89 , 91 , 85 S.Ct. 223 , 225 , 13 L.Ed.2d 142 , 146 ; State v. Timson (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 122 , at paragraph one of 2000In deciding whether probable cause existed to support an officer's arrest of an individual for a violation of R.C. 4511.19 , the court must determine "whether, at the moment of the arrest, the officer had knowledge from a reasonably trustworthy source of facts and circumstances sufficient to cause a prudent person to believe that the suspect was driving while under the influence of alcohol." State v. Medcalf (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 142 , 147 citing Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89 , 91 , 85 S.Ct. 223 , 225 , 13 L.Ed.2d 142 , 146 ; State v. Timson (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 122 , at paragraph one of | 5 | 1996–2000 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2008“The ‘reasonable and articulable suspicion’ analysis is based on the collection of factors, not on the individual factors themselves.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 19. {¶ 13} As the United States Supreme Court elaborated in Berkemer v. McCarty, a police officer who lacks probable cause but whose observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular person’s behavior is criminal may detain the person briefly to investigate the circumstances that provoked the suspicion. 468 U.S. at 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 . {¶ 14} “ ‘[T]he stop and inquiry must be “reasonably related in scope t 2008“The ‘reasonable and articulable suspicion’ analysis is based on the collection of factors, not on the individual factors themselves.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 19. {¶ 13} As the United States Supreme Court elaborated in Berkemer v. McCarty, a police officer who lacks probable cause but whose observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular person’s behavior is criminal may detain the person briefly to investigate the circumstances that provoked the suspicion. 468 U.S. at 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 . {¶ 14} “ ‘[T]he stop and inquiry must be “reasonably related in scope t | 3 | 2008–2017 |
Seling v. Young
green
2 sentences2022Young, 531 U.S. at 267 , 121 S.Ct. 727 , 148 L.Ed.2d 734 . 2022Young, 531 U.S. at 267 , 121 S.Ct. 727 , 148 L.Ed.2d 734 . | 2 | 2008–2022 |
In re the Detention of Turay
green
2 sentences2022Reversing, the Supreme Court held that because the state law was civil in nature, see In re Detention of Turay (1999), 139 Wash.2d 379, 414 , 986 P.2d 790 , it could not be deemed punitive “as applied” to a single individual in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 2022Reversing, the Supreme Court held that because the state law was civil in nature, see In re Detention of Turay (1999), 139 Wash.2d 379, 414 , 986 P.2d 790 , it could not be deemed punitive “as applied” to a single individual in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. | 2 | 2008–2022 |
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce
green
2 sentences2008“The ‘reasonable and articulable suspicion’ analysis is based on the collection of factors, not on the individual factors themselves.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 19. {¶ 13} As the United States Supreme Court elaborated in Berkemer v. McCarty, a police officer who lacks probable cause but whose observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular person’s behavior is criminal may detain the person briefly to investigate the circumstances that provoked the suspicion. 468 U.S. at 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 . {¶ 14} “ ‘[T]he stop and inquiry must be “reasonably related in scope t 2008“The ‘reasonable and articulable suspicion’ analysis is based on the collection of factors, not on the individual factors themselves.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 19. {¶ 13} As the United States Supreme Court elaborated in Berkemer v. McCarty, a police officer who lacks probable cause but whose observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular person’s behavior is criminal may detain the person briefly to investigate the circumstances that provoked the suspicion. 468 U.S. at 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 . {¶ 14} “ ‘[T]he stop and inquiry must be “reasonably related in scope t | 2 | 2008–2017 |
State v. Evans
green
2 sentences2008Thus, "a police officer who lacks probable cause but whose observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular person's behavior is criminal may detain the person briefly to investigate the circumstances that provoked the suspicion." Mays at ¶ 13 , citing Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), 468 U.S. 420 , 439 . {¶ 11} "Probable cause is a stricter standard than reasonable and articulable suspicion." Mays at ¶ 23, citing State v. Evans (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 405 , 411 . 2008Thus, "a police officer who lacks probable cause but whose observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular person's behavior is criminal may detain the person briefly to investigate the circumstances that provoked the suspicion." Mays at ¶ 13, citing Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), 468 U.S. 420 , 439 . {¶ 17} "Probable cause is a stricter standard than reasonable and articulable suspicion." Id. at ¶ 23, citing State v. Evans (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 405 , 411 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Rakas v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2007Id. 2001Id. | 2 | 2001–2007 |
Chicago Transit Authority v. Yellow Cab Co.
green
2 sentences2001Appellant relies upon Decker v. Rightnour (Feb. 5, 1992), Summit App. No. 15195, unreported, 1992 WL 20657 , and an Illinois case, Chicago Transit Auth. v. Yellow Cab Co. (1984), 123 Ill. 2001Appellant relies upon Decker v. Rightnour (Feb. 5, 1992), Summit App. No. 15195, unreported, 1992 WL 20657 , and an Illinois case, Chicago Transit Auth. v. Yellow Cab Co. (1984), 123 Ill. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Atwell v. State
green
2 sentences1999Atwell v. State (1973), 35 Ohio App.2d 221 , 226-227 . 1990Atwell v. State (1973), 35 Ohio App. 2d 221, 226-227 . | 2 | 1990–1999 |
In re Disqualification of Maschari
green
1 sentence2025In re Disqualification of Maschari, 1999-Ohio-8, ¶ 3 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Mansaray v. State
green
1 sentence2023Mansaray held that “[w]hen a defendant seeks a declaration that he is a wrongfully imprisoned individual and seeks to satisfy R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) by proving that an error in procedure resulted in his release, the error in procedure must have occurred subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment.” Id. at syllabus. {¶ 19} In addition, the 2019 amendments to R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) provided: In addition to any other application of the provisions of this division regarding an error in procedure that occurred prior to, during, or after sentencing, as those provisions exist on and aft | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022The Midland parties contended that the differences required a significant amount of individual analysis in each case, especially with respect to different defenses like “bona-fide error” and “statute of limitations.” Moreover, the Midland parties emphasized that even if Colvin had passed the lower bar of the class certification requirement of commonality, “A predominance inquiry is far more demanding than the Civ.R. 23(A) commonality requirement and focuses on the legal or factual questions that qualify each class member’s case as a genuine controversy.” Williams v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Setliff v. Morris Pontiac, Inc., 08ca009364 (2-2-2009)
green
1 sentence2022Setliff, 2009-Ohio-400, ¶ 5 . {¶41} In certifying Class C, the trial court found that all of the plaintiffs were exposed to the same allegedly fraudulent conduct, namely a standardized fee that was deducted from their settlements. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Skaggs
neutral
1 sentence2021Crawford 9 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS No. 3-20-13, 2021-Ohio-2803, at ¶ 22 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Andrews
green
2 sentences2021The determination as to whether “an objective and particularized suspicion that criminal activity was afoot must be based on * * * a totality of the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87 , 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991); State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403 , 2007-Ohio-2204 , 865 N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 19 (“[t]he ‘reasonable and articulable suspicion’ analysis is based on the collection of factors, not on the individual factors themselves”). {¶20} The facts available to Officers Pecnik and Merrifield in the present case readily support the conclusion that the investigatory detent 2021The determination as to whether “an objective and particularized suspicion that criminal activity was afoot must be based on * * * a totality of the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87 , 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991); State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403 , 2007-Ohio-2204 , 865 N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 19 (“[t]he ‘reasonable and articulable suspicion’ analysis is based on the collection of factors, not on the individual factors themselves”). {¶20} The facts available to Officers Pecnik and Merrifield in the present case readily support the conclusion that the investigatory detent | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Belvin
green
1 sentence2020State v. Belvin, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25987, 2014-Ohio-3634, ¶ 8 ; Terry at 22 . “[T]he Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). {¶ 21} Stanton argues that the totality of the circumstances consisted of only two facts: the officers believed the parked Buick may have fled from them two days prior, and Stanton was walking near the Buick in an area where other cars also were parked. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
United States v. Cortez
green
2 sentences2020“In forming reasonable articulable suspicion, law enforcement officers may ‘draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that “might well elude an untrained person.”’” Id. at ¶ 25, quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744 (2002), quoting United States v. Cortez, -10- 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 , 101 S.Ct. 690 (1981). “‘The “reasonable and articulable suspicion” analysis is based on the collection of factors, not on the individual factors themselves.’” (Emphasis sic.) Mays, 11 2020“In forming reasonable articulable suspicion, law enforcement officers may ‘draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that “might well elude an untrained person.”’” Id. at ¶ 25, quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744 (2002), quoting United States v. Cortez, -10- 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 , 101 S.Ct. 690 (1981). “‘The “reasonable and articulable suspicion” analysis is based on the collection of factors, not on the individual factors themselves.’” (Emphasis sic.) Mays, 11 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
United States v. LeShawn Stanbridge
green
1 sentence2019See, e.g., Sinclair v. Lauderdale Cty., Tennessee, 6th Cir. No. 15-6134, 652 Fed.Appx. 429 , United States v. Stanbridge, 813 F.3d 1032, 1037 (7th Cir. 2016), United States v. Alvarado- Zarzo, 782 F.3d 246, 250 (5th Cir. 2015), State v. Eldridge, 790 S.E.2d 740, 743-44 (N.C. App. 2016), State v. Cortez, 512 S.W.3d 915, 924-25 (Tex. App. 2017), State v. Rand, 209 So.3d 660 , 665-66 (Fla. App. 2017). “[A]n officer can gain no Fourth Amendment advantage through a sloppy study of the laws he is duty-bound to enforce.” Heien, 135 S.Ct. at 539-540 . {¶43} The traffic stop initiated by Officer Rhodes | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Heien v. North Carolina
green
1 sentence2019See, e.g., Sinclair v. Lauderdale Cty., Tennessee, 6th Cir. No. 15-6134, 652 Fed.Appx. 429 , United States v. Stanbridge, 813 F.3d 1032, 1037 (7th Cir. 2016), United States v. Alvarado- Zarzo, 782 F.3d 246, 250 (5th Cir. 2015), State v. Eldridge, 790 S.E.2d 740, 743-44 (N.C. App. 2016), State v. Cortez, 512 S.W.3d 915, 924-25 (Tex. App. 2017), State v. Rand, 209 So.3d 660 , 665-66 (Fla. App. 2017). “[A]n officer can gain no Fourth Amendment advantage through a sloppy study of the laws he is duty-bound to enforce.” Heien, 135 S.Ct. at 539-540 . {¶43} The traffic stop initiated by Officer Rhodes | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Bloom v. Leech, Admr. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State of Florida v. Ricky Alphonso Rand green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Richardson, Unpublished Decision (6-10-2005) neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| McCubbrey v. Boise Cascade Home & Land Corp. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Click v. Eckle green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Department green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| In re C.W. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| In re A.R.R. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Booth v. Booth green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Bayer green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Wilson v. United States green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Quinlan v. State of Ohio Department of Commerce neutral | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Ruble v. Ream, Unpublished Decision (10-29-2003) green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Pattison v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 88556 (6-21-2007) neutral | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Youngbird v. Whirlpool Corp. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Fish red | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc. yellow | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Dorsey v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Thompson green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.