individual claim in New Mexico

2021See id. (“Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others.

2009See id. {21} Unlike the arbitrary discretion given to police officers and prosecutors condemned in Coates, the aggravated stalking statute has clear guidelines regarding what circumstances will escalate the misdemeanor crime to a felony offense.

2014See, e.g., Van Dang, 2005-NMSC-033, ¶ 7 (addressing standing as a defendant’s reasonable “expectation of privacy”); State v. Villanueva, ¶ 24, 1990-NMCA-051 , 110 N.M. 359 , 796 P.2d 252 (“In ascertaining the standing of an individual to challenge the propriety of a search, the focus is on the person’s legitimate expectations of privacy.”). {18} We apply a two-part test in determining whether a search is an intrusion on a legitimate expectation of privacy: “First, we consider ‘whether the individual’s conduct demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy.’ Second, we consider ‘whether socie

2014See, e.g., Van Dang, 2005-NMSC-033, ¶ 7 (addressing standing as a defendant’s reasonable “expectation of privacy”); State v. Villanueva, ¶ 24, 1990-NMCA-051 , 110 N.M. 359 , 796 P.2d 252 (“In ascertaining the standing of an individual to challenge the propriety of a search, the focus is on the person’s legitimate expectations ofprivacy.”). {18} We apply a two-part test in determining whether a search is an intrusion on a legitimate expectation ofprivacy: “First, we consider ‘whether the individual’s conduct demonstrated a subjective expectation ofprivacy.’ Second, we consider ‘whether society

2009See Fate v. Owens, 2001-NMCA-040, ¶ 23 , 130 N.M. 503 , 27 P.3d 990 (stating that “[i]n order to constitute an individual claim, as opposed to a partnership claim, the breach [of fiduciary duty by the general partner] must cause an injury separate and distinct from an injury suffered by the partnership” (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2009See Fate v. Owens, 2001-NMCA-040, ¶ 23 , 130 N.M. 503 , 27 P.3d 990 (stating that “[i]n order to constitute an individual claim, as opposed to a partnership claim, the breach [of fiduciary duty by the general partner] must cause an injury separate and distinct from an injury suffered by the partnership” (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2006State Univ., 2002-NMSC-009, ¶¶ 1, 14 , 132 N.M. 156 , 45 P.3d 876 (state constitutional sovereign immunity bars an individual claim for monetary damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act filed against the state in state court). {8} As will be further discussed in this opinion, the effect of Alden, if any, upon claims filed in state court under the Takings and Contracts Clauses lies at the heart of this controversy.

2006State Univ., 2002-NMSC-009, ¶¶ 1, 14 , 132 N.M. 156 , 45 P.3d 876 (state constitutional sovereign immunity bars an individual claim for monetary damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act filed against the state in state court). {8} As will be further discussed in this opinion, the effect of Alden, if any, upon claims filed in state court under the Takings and Contracts Clauses lies at the heart of this controversy.

2014See, e.g., Van Dang, 2005-NMSC-033, ¶ 7 (addressing standing as a defendant’s reasonable “expectation of privacy”); State v. Villanueva, ¶ 24, 1990-NMCA-051 , 110 N.M. 359 , 796 P.2d 252 (“In ascertaining the standing of an individual to challenge the propriety of a search, the focus is on the person’s legitimate expectations ofprivacy.”). {18} We apply a two-part test in determining whether a search is an intrusion on a legitimate expectation ofprivacy: “First, we consider ‘whether the individual’s conduct demonstrated a subjective expectation ofprivacy.’ Second, we consider ‘whether society

2014See, e.g., Van Dang, 2005-NMSC-033, ¶ 7 (addressing standing as a defendant’s reasonable “expectation of privacy”); State v. Villanueva, ¶ 24, 1990-NMCA-051 , 110 N.M. 359 , 796 P.2d 252 (“In ascertaining the standing of an individual to challenge the propriety of a search, the focus is on the person’s legitimate expectations ofprivacy.”). {18} We apply a two-part test in determining whether a search is an intrusion on a legitimate expectation ofprivacy: “First, we consider ‘whether the individual’s conduct demonstrated a subjective expectation ofprivacy.’ Second, we consider ‘whether society

2015This holding is consistent with the analysis of implied acquittal and collateral estoppel applied in the majority of jurisdictions and discussed with approval by our own Supreme Court in Torrez, 2013-NMSC-034, ¶ 13 (“[CJourts have refused to imply an acquittal unless a conviction of one crime logically excludes guilt of another crime.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2009See McMinn v. MBF Operating Acquisition Corp., 2007-NMSC-040, ¶ 20 , 142 N.M. 160 , 164 P.3d 41 (applying holding and rationale adopted in Walta).

2009See McMinn v. MBF Operating Acquisition Corp., 2007-NMSC-040, ¶ 20 , 142 N.M. 160 , 164 P.3d 41 (applying holding and rationale adopted in Walta).

2008Ct., 36 Cal.4th 148 , 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 76 , 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (2005). {17} Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not met the evidentiary burden of proving that his damages are outweighed by the cost of bringing an individual claim.

2008Ct., 36 Cal.4th 148 , 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 76 , 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (2005). {17} Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not met the evidentiary burden of proving that his damages are outweighed by the cost of bringing an individual claim.

2001The trial court must resolve conflicts in the evidence, but '“[w]hether that evidence complies with constitutional requirements is ... a legal question reviewed by the appellate court on a de novo basis.” Id. (quoting State v. Vargas, 120 N.M. 416, 418 , 902 P.2d 571, 573 (Ct.App.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)). {7} “In ascertaining the standing of an individual to challenge the propriety of a search, the focus is on the person’s legitimate expectations of privacy.” State v. Villanueva, 110 N.M. 359, 365 , 796 P.2d 252, 258 (Ct.App.1990).

2001The trial court must resolve conflicts in the evidence, but '“[w]hether that evidence complies with constitutional requirements is ... a legal question reviewed by the appellate court on a de novo basis.” Id. (quoting State v. Vargas, 120 N.M. 416, 418 , 902 P.2d 571, 573 (Ct.App.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)). {7} “In ascertaining the standing of an individual to challenge the propriety of a search, the focus is on the person’s legitimate expectations of privacy.” State v. Villanueva, 110 N.M. 359, 365 , 796 P.2d 252, 258 (Ct.App.1990).

2001First Nat’l Bank v. Sanchez, 112 N.M. 317, 325 , 815 P.2d 613, 621 (1991) (citations omitted).

2001First Nat’l Bank v. Sanchez, 112 N.M. 317, 325 , 815 P.2d 613, 621 (1991) (citations omitted).

1999See Luboyeski v. Hill, 117 N.M. 380, 382 , 872 P.2d 353, 355 (1994) (“[Individual defendants cannot be sued in district court under the [NMHRA] unless and until the complainant exhausts [his or] her administrative remedies against them.”). {11} We next examine the district court’s order granting the Union partial summary judgment.

1999See Luboyeski v. Hill, 117 N.M. 380, 382 , 872 P.2d 353, 355 (1994) (“[Individual defendants cannot be sued in district court under the [NMHRA] unless and until the complainant exhausts [his or] her administrative remedies against them.”). {11} We next examine the district court’s order granting the Union partial summary judgment.

1997Litman v. Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc., 611 A.2d 12, 15 (Del.Ch.1992).

1991See Daniels Ins., Inc. v. Daon Corp., 106 N.M. 328, 331 , 742 P.2d 540, 543 (Ct.App.1987); Stephen v. Phillips, 101 N.M. 790, 792 , 689 P.2d 939, 941 (Ct.App.1984); see also 1 A. Bromberg & L.

1991See Daniels Ins., Inc. v. Daon Corp., 106 N.M. 328, 331 , 742 P.2d 540, 543 (Ct.App.1987); Stephen v. Phillips, 101 N.M. 790, 792 , 689 P.2d 939, 941 (Ct.App.1984); see also 1 A. Bromberg & L.

1991See Daniels Ins., Inc. v. Daon Corp., 106 N.M. 328, 331 , 742 P.2d 540, 543 (Ct.App.1987); Stephen v. Phillips, 101 N.M. 790, 792 , 689 P.2d 939, 941 (Ct.App.1984); see also 1 A. Bromberg & L.

1991See Daniels Ins., Inc. v. Daon Corp., 106 N.M. 328, 331 , 742 P.2d 540, 543 (Ct.App.1987); Stephen v. Phillips, 101 N.M. 790, 792 , 689 P.2d 939, 941 (Ct.App.1984); see also 1 A. Bromberg & L.