individual challenge in Virginia

30 Virginia opinions name it 9 courts 1925–2025 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

Case	Followed	Cited
Coleman v. City of Richmondgreen vactapp · 1988 · cited in 11 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2000–2001 2 sentences 2001See Coleman v. City of Richmond, 5 Va. App. 459, 463 , 364 S.E.2d 239, 241-42 (1988) (citing Grosso v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 830, 839 , 13 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1941)). 2001See Coleman v. City of Richmond, 5 Va. App. 459, 463 , 364 S.E.2d 239, 241-42 (1988) (citing Grosso v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 830, 839 , 13 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1941)).	11	11
Coleman v. City of Richmondgreen vactapp · 1988 · cited in 10 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 2 sentences 2000See Coleman v. City of Richmond, 5 Va. App. 459, 463 , 364 S.E.2d 239, 241-42 (citation omitted), reh'g denied, 6 Va. App. 296 , 368 S.E.2d 298 (1988). 2000See Coleman v. City of Richmond, 5 Va. App. 459, 463 , 364 S.E.2d 239, 241-42 (citation omitted), reh'g denied, 6 Va. App. 296 , 368 S.E.2d 298 (1988).	10	10
DePriest v. Commonwealthgreen vactapp · 2000 · cited in 2 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2012 2 sentences 2012Thus, “where a statute is constitutional as applied to a litigant, the litigant has no standing to challenge the statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutional on its face, that is, as applied to a third person in a hypothetical situation.” Esper Bonding Co. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 595, 597 , 283 S.E.2d 185, 186 (1981); see also DePriest v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 754, 761 , 537 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2000) (“An individual may challenge the constitutionality of a law only as it applies to him or her.”). 2012Thus, “where a statute is constitutional as applied to a litigant, the litigant has no standing to challenge the statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutional on its face, that is, as applied to a third person in a hypothetical situation.” Esper Bonding Co. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 595, 597 , 283 S.E.2d 185, 186 (1981); see also DePriest v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 754, 761 , 537 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2000) (“An individual may challenge the constitutionality of a law only as it applies to him or her.”).	2	2
California v. Byersgreen scotus · 1971 · cited in 2 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 1974–1976 2 sentences 1976“Inevitably these must be resolved in terms of balancing the public need on the one hand, and the individual claim to constitutional protections on the other; neither interest can be treated lightly.” 402 U.S. at 427 . 1974Inevitably these must be resolved in terms of balancing the public need on the one hand, and the individual claim to constitutional protections on the other; neither interest can be treated lightly.” California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427 (1971).	1	2
Wilkins v. Peninsula Motor Cars, Inc.green va · 2003 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025 1 sentence 2025The court shall not regard any defect or imperfection in the pleading, . . . unless there be omitted something so essential to the action or defense that judgment, according to law and the very right of the cause, cannot be given. 14 See Wilkins v. Peninsula Motor Cars, 266 Va. 558, 562 (2003) (holding that, where complainant sought both punitive damages in tort and treble damages under the VCPA, “[t]he trial court erred in requiring [the plaintiff] to choose between causes of action, when all that was -9- problem created by appellant’s failure to do so is highlighted by the trial court’s obse	1	1
Esper Bonding Co. v. Commonwealthgreen va · 1981 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012 2 sentences 2012Thus, “where a statute is constitutional as applied to a litigant, the litigant has no standing to challenge the statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutional on its face, that is, as applied to a third person in a hypothetical situation.” Esper Bonding Co. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 595, 597 , 283 S.E.2d 185, 186 (1981); see also DePriest v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 754, 761 , 537 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2000) (“An individual may challenge the constitutionality of a law only as it applies to him or her.”). 2012Thus, “where a statute is constitutional as applied to a litigant, the litigant has no standing to challenge the statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutional on its face, that is, as applied to a third person in a hypothetical situation.” Esper Bonding Co. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 595, 597 , 283 S.E.2d 185, 186 (1981); see also DePriest v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 754, 761 , 537 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2000) (“An individual may challenge the constitutionality of a law only as it applies to him or her.”).	1	1
Rales v. Blasband Ex Rel. Easco Hand Tools, Inc.red del · 1993 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 1 sentence 2001Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932 (Del. 1993).	1	1
Coastal Pharmaceutical Co. v. Goldmangreen va · 1973 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001In Coastal Pharmaceutical Co. v. Goldman, 213 Va. 831, 837 , 195 S.E.2d 848, 853 (1973), this Court noted: [W]e are aware of the several definitions of a “close corporation” written by various scholars on and off the bench, [but] . . . [w]e fear the most precise definition may be imperfect to every occasion, and we find it unnecessary to choose among the scholars or to write a hard and fast definition of our own. 2001In Coastal Pharmaceutical Co. v. Goldman, 213 Va. 831, 837 , 195 S.E.2d 848, 853 (1973), this Court noted: [W]e are aware of the several definitions of a “close corporation” written by various scholars on and off the bench, [but] . . . [w]e fear the most precise definition may be imperfect to every occasion, and we find it unnecessary to choose among the scholars or to write a hard and fast definition of our own.	1	1
Grosso v. Commonwealthgreen va · 1941 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001See Coleman v. City of Richmond, 5 Va. App. 459, 463 , 364 S.E.2d 239, 241-42 (1988) (citing Grosso v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 830, 839 , 13 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1941)). 2001See Coleman v. City of Richmond, 5 Va. App. 459, 463 , 364 S.E.2d 239, 241-42 (1988) (citing Grosso v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 830, 839 , 13 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1941)).	1	1
Wass v. Commonwealthgreen vactapp · 1987 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989 1 sentence 1989In considering the proper opinion, the Court is not unmindful of the portion of Wass v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 27, 33 (1987), as follows: However, no single factor alone may necessarily establish custody for Miranda purposes, and not all factors may be relevant in a given case.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (15)

Case	Cited	Years
James v. Jane green va · 1980 2 sentences 2010Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-195.3 In James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 53 (1980), the Supreme Court in its discussion of sovereign immunity recognized that valid reasons still exist for state employee immunity, but also said the argument for immunity “does not have the same strength it had in past years” because of the intrusion of government into areas formerly private and because of the tremendous increase in the number of state employees. 1985In James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43 (1980), the Supreme Court in analyzing the problem spoke thusly: It is proper that a distinction be made between the state, whose immunity is absolute unless waived, and the employees and officials of the state, whose immunity is qualified, depending on the function they perform and the manner of performance.	2	1985–2010
Seling v. Young green scotus · 2001 2 sentences 2005The Supreme Court then reversed the Court of Appeals, and held that an act, "found to be civil, cannot be deemed punitive `as applied' to a single individual in violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses and provide cause for release." Id. at 267 , 121 S.Ct. 727 . 2005The Supreme Court then reversed the Court of Appeals, and held that an act, "found to be civil, cannot be deemed punitive `as applied' to a single individual in violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses and provide cause for release." Id. at 267 , 121 S.Ct. 727 .	2	2005–2007
Randolph v. Wright green va · 1886 2 sentences 1927In the field of wills, where there is none but the individual standard of meaning to be considered, this principle is seen in unrestricted operation; and its full sanction has often been judicially avowed.’ ” In Randolph v. Wright, 81 Va. 608 , it is said: “Parol evidence of the circumstances, situation and connection of the testator, and his transactions between making his will and his death, are admissible to throw light on his intention. 1925In the field of wills, where there is none but the individual standard of meaning to be considered, this principle is seen in unrestricted operation; and its full sanction has often been judicially avowed.” To the same effect are the holdings in Randolph v. Wright, 81 Va. 608 ; Senger v. Senger, 81 Va. 687 ; McCabe v. Cary's Executor, 135 Va. 428 , 116 S. E. 485 ; Starke v. Berry, 118 Va. 706 , 88 S. E. 68 ; Swan v. Swan’s Ex’or, 136 Va. 496 , 117 S. E. 858 .	2	1925–1927
Katz v. United States green scotus · 1967 1 sentence 2014Id. at 353 [ 88 S.Ct. at 512 ]. [ (Footnote and citations omitted).] Thus, an individual can claim Fourth Amendment protection under this test only if (1) the individual has a subjective expectation of privacy and (2) the individual has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy that is justifiable under the circumstances.	1	2014–2014
Simmons v. Miller green va · 2001 1 sentence 2007Id. at 574 .	1	2007–2007
Kansas v. Crane green scotus · 2002 2 sentences 2005In Crane , Michael Crane was determined to be a sexually violent predator and was civilly committed by a Kansas state court. 534 U.S. at 411 , 122 S.Ct. 867 . 2005In Crane , Michael Crane was determined to be a sexually violent predator and was civilly committed by a Kansas state court. 534 U.S. at 411 , 122 S.Ct. 867 .	1	2005–2005
United States v. Arvizu green scotus · 2002 2 sentences 2002In rejecting the individual analysis of each factor considered by the border patrol agent, the Supreme Court stated in Arvizu “Terry, however, precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis.” Id., 122 S. Ct. at 748 . 2002In rejecting the individual analysis of each factor considered by the border patrol agent, the Supreme Court stated in Arvizu “Terry, however, precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis.” Id., 122 S. Ct. at 748 .	1	2002–2002
Greenspan v. Osheroff green va · 1986 1 sentence 2000Plaintiff relies on a circuit court case and a Virginia Supreme Court case, Greenspan v. Osheroff, 232 Va. 388 (1986), that allowed damages to an individual for a violation of this statute.	1	2000–2000
Johnson v. Plaisance neutral vacccharlottesv · 1991 1 sentence 2000While the Circuit Court case, Johnson v. Plaisance, 25 Va. Cir. 264 (Charlottesville 1991) (Swett, J.), is persuasive, it is not binding on this court.	1	2000–2000
Morrison v. Virginia Commonwealth University green vaccrichmondcty · 1995 1 sentence 1997In fact, when the individual factors set out in § 23-7.4(B) are considered, more of those factors seem to favor in-state status for the .present plaintiff than they did for the plaintiff in Morrison, supra, in which the court reversed VCU’s decision and ordered that in-state status be granted.	1	1997–1997
People v. Cal. Safe Deposit & Tr. Co. green cal · 1914 2 sentences 1932And the defendant in a suit by an administrator upon an indebtedness accrued after the grant of letters cannot be allowed to set off a claim which he may have against the deceased; because to do so would give him an undue advantage over other creditors, if the estate should prove insolvent.” A statement of an exception to the general rule requiring mutuality in debts may be found in the very interesting and exhaustive discussion in the case of People v. California Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 168 Cal. 241 , 141 Pac. 1181 , which is reported in L. 1932And the defendant in a suit by an administrator upon an indebtedness accrued after the grant of letters cannot be allowed to set off a claim which he may have against the deceased; because to do so would give him an undue advantage over other creditors, if the estate should prove insolvent.” A statement of an exception to the general rule requiring mutuality in debts may be found in the very interesting and exhaustive discussion in the case of People v. California Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 168 Cal. 241 , 141 Pac. 1181 , which is reported in L.	1	1932–1932
Senger v. Senger's Ex'or green va · 1886 1 sentence 1925In the field of wills, where there is none but the individual standard of meaning to be considered, this principle is seen in unrestricted operation; and its full sanction has often been judicially avowed.” To the same effect are the holdings in Randolph v. Wright, 81 Va. 608 ; Senger v. Senger, 81 Va. 687 ; McCabe v. Cary's Executor, 135 Va. 428 , 116 S. E. 485 ; Starke v. Berry, 118 Va. 706 , 88 S. E. 68 ; Swan v. Swan’s Ex’or, 136 Va. 496 , 117 S. E. 858 .	1	1925–1925
Starke v. Berry's Executors neutral va · 1916 2 sentences 1925In the field of wills, where there is none but the individual standard of meaning to be considered, this principle is seen in unrestricted operation; and its full sanction has often been judicially avowed.” To the same effect are the holdings in Randolph v. Wright, 81 Va. 608 ; Senger v. Senger, 81 Va. 687 ; McCabe v. Cary's Executor, 135 Va. 428 , 116 S. E. 485 ; Starke v. Berry, 118 Va. 706 , 88 S. E. 68 ; Swan v. Swan’s Ex’or, 136 Va. 496 , 117 S. E. 858 . 1925In the field of wills, where there is none but the individual standard of meaning to be considered, this principle is seen in unrestricted operation; and its full sanction has often been judicially avowed.” To the same effect are the holdings in Randolph v. Wright, 81 Va. 608 ; Senger v. Senger, 81 Va. 687 ; McCabe v. Cary's Executor, 135 Va. 428 , 116 S. E. 485 ; Starke v. Berry, 118 Va. 706 , 88 S. E. 68 ; Swan v. Swan’s Ex’or, 136 Va. 496 , 117 S. E. 858 .	1	1925–1925
McCabe v. Cary's green va · 1923 2 sentences 1925In the field of wills, where there is none but the individual standard of meaning to be considered, this principle is seen in unrestricted operation; and its full sanction has often been judicially avowed.” To the same effect are the holdings in Randolph v. Wright, 81 Va. 608 ; Senger v. Senger, 81 Va. 687 ; McCabe v. Cary's Executor, 135 Va. 428 , 116 S. E. 485 ; Starke v. Berry, 118 Va. 706 , 88 S. E. 68 ; Swan v. Swan’s Ex’or, 136 Va. 496 , 117 S. E. 858 . 1925In the field of wills, where there is none but the individual standard of meaning to be considered, this principle is seen in unrestricted operation; and its full sanction has often been judicially avowed.” To the same effect are the holdings in Randolph v. Wright, 81 Va. 608 ; Senger v. Senger, 81 Va. 687 ; McCabe v. Cary's Executor, 135 Va. 428 , 116 S. E. 485 ; Starke v. Berry, 118 Va. 706 , 88 S. E. 68 ; Swan v. Swan’s Ex’or, 136 Va. 496 , 117 S. E. 858 .	1	1925–1925
Swan v. Swan's green va · 1923 2 sentences 1925In the field of wills, where there is none but the individual standard of meaning to be considered, this principle is seen in unrestricted operation; and its full sanction has often been judicially avowed.” To the same effect are the holdings in Randolph v. Wright, 81 Va. 608 ; Senger v. Senger, 81 Va. 687 ; McCabe v. Cary's Executor, 135 Va. 428 , 116 S. E. 485 ; Starke v. Berry, 118 Va. 706 , 88 S. E. 68 ; Swan v. Swan’s Ex’or, 136 Va. 496 , 117 S. E. 858 . 1925In the field of wills, where there is none but the individual standard of meaning to be considered, this principle is seen in unrestricted operation; and its full sanction has often been judicially avowed.” To the same effect are the holdings in Randolph v. Wright, 81 Va. 608 ; Senger v. Senger, 81 Va. 687 ; McCabe v. Cary's Executor, 135 Va. 428 , 116 S. E. 485 ; Starke v. Berry, 118 Va. 706 , 88 S. E. 68 ; Swan v. Swan’s Ex’or, 136 Va. 496 , 117 S. E. 858 .	1	1925–1925

Statutes the citing opinions construe

VA § Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-29 (10) VA § Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-361 (10)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 206 (1896–2026) IL 94 (1903–2026) NY 82 (1889–2026) OH 80 (1982–2025) NJ 70 (1910–2026) TX 68 (1919–2025) NC 56 (1874–2026) MS 56 (1974–2025) PA 47 (1909–2026) CO 45 (1978–2026) OR 38 (1938–2022) MD 37 (1980–2026) MI 37 (1918–2026) AZ 35 (1974–2025) FL 34 (1933–2026) MO 32 (1869–2025) VA 30 (1925–2025) NM 28 (1990–2022) WA 28 (1895–2023) IN 28 (1934–2020) ID 27 (1925–2023) WI 26 (1866–2026) GA 24 (1905–2026) KS 23 (1914–2026) IA 22 (1923–2025) AL 21 (1927–2017) MA 21 (1908–2025) CT 19 (1931–2022) UT 18 (1918–2024) TN 15 (1946–2026) ND 15 (2001–2019) SC 14 (1970–2026) OK 12 (1897–2017) LA 11 (1939–2018) ME 10 (1981–2020) AK 10 (1977–2024) DE 9 (1986–2022) WY 9 (1923–2019) HI 9 (1960–2020) MN 7 (1972–2016) KY 7 (1944–2020) DC 7 (1972–2007) MT 6 (1988–2010) WV 5 (1938–2017) NV 5 (1955–2019) VT 5 (1914–2025) AR 4 (1993–2010) SD 4 (1982–2006) NE 3 (1933–2022) NH 2 (2016–2020) RI 2 (2006–2022) PR 2 (1945–1961)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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