individual immunity in Michigan

2026“A brief, on-the-scene detention of an individual is not a violation of the Fourth -3- Amendment as long as the officer can articulate a reasonable suspicion for the detention.” People v Custer, 465 Mich 319, 327 ; 630 NW2d 870 (2001).

2026“A brief, on-the-scene detention of an individual is not a violation of the Fourth -3- Amendment as long as the officer can articulate a reasonable suspicion for the detention.” People v Custer, 465 Mich 319, 327 ; 630 NW2d 870 (2001).

2023It is therefore often necessary for an individual with a claim against the state, including ELCRA and PWDCRA claimants, to consult the COCA to ascertain which courts possess jurisdiction over their claims. 65 See, e.g., McCahan, 492 Mich at 744 & n 24. 66 Plaintiff says that it is “wholly illogical” that the Legislature would require a plaintiff to file a notice of intent with the clerk of the Court of Claims before a claim can be filed in the circuit court.

2023It is therefore often necessary for an individual with a claim against the state, including ELCRA and PWDCRA claimants, to consult the COCA to ascertain which courts possess jurisdiction over their claims. 65 See, e.g., McCahan, 492 Mich at 744 & n 24. 66 Plaintiff says that it is “wholly illogical” that the Legislature would require a plaintiff to file a notice of intent with the clerk of the Court of Claims before a claim can be filed in the circuit court.

2008The language of this requested instruction was lifted word-for-word from our Supreme Court’s decision in Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109, 133-134 ; 683 NW2d 611 (2004).

2005Next, it is important to take notice of the fact that footnote 17 is not a general proposition enunciated by our Supreme Court, but rather it is tied directly to one factor, factor d, and the Court emphasized that the enumerated factors are “not meant to be exclusive nor are any of the individual factors meant to be dispositive by themselves.” Kreiner, supra at 133-134 .

2025Seling, 531 US at 267 .

2025We further note that while plaintiff frames gross negligence as an individual claim, negligence constitutes a theory of liability, not a separate claim, Heaton, 286 Mich App at 534 .

2025The law is clear that, in considering whether a nominally civil remedy rises to the level of a criminal penalty for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, we consider only the statutory language, and not the specific penalties as applied in a particular case. [United States v Melvin, 918 F3d 1296 , 1299 n 3 (CA 11, 2017).] Nor, as the Seling Court held in reliance on Hudson, can a statutory punishment that is determined to be civil, “be deemed punitive ‘as applied’ to a single individual in violation of the Double Jeopardy” Clause.

2023People v Mead, 503 Mich 205, 214 ; 931 NW2d 557 (2019).

2023People v Mead, 503 Mich 205, 214 ; 931 NW2d 557 (2019).

2022See, e.g., People v Kosik, 303 Mich App 146, 150-154 ; 841 NW2d 906 (2013); People v Railer, 288 Mich App 213, 216-219 ; 792 NW2d 776 (2010). 4 “Credible threat,” for purposes of an aggravated stalking offense, is defined as “a threat to kill another individual or a threat to inflict physical injury upon another individual that is made in any manner or in any context that causes the individual hearing or receiving the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the safety of another individual.” MCL 750.411i(1)(b). -7- movements” or “forcibly confine[s] the person as to interfere with t

2022See, e.g., People v Kosik, 303 Mich App 146, 150-154 ; 841 NW2d 906 (2013); People v Railer, 288 Mich App 213, 216-219 ; 792 NW2d 776 (2010). 4 “Credible threat,” for purposes of an aggravated stalking offense, is defined as “a threat to kill another individual or a threat to inflict physical injury upon another individual that is made in any manner or in any context that causes the individual hearing or receiving the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the safety of another individual.” MCL 750.411i(1)(b). -7- movements” or “forcibly confine[s] the person as to interfere with t

2021Rather, “severance should be granted ‘only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.’ ” Hana, 447 Mich at 359-360 , quoting Zafiro v United States, 506 US 534, 538 ; 113 S Ct 933 , 122 L Ed 2d 317 (1993). “[R]eversible prejudice exists when one of the defendant’s substantive rights, such as the opportunity to present an individual defense, is violated.” Hana, 447 Mich at 360 (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he dual-jury procedure is a pa

2021Rather, “severance should be granted ‘only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.’ ” Hana, 447 Mich at 359-360 , quoting Zafiro v United States, 506 US 534, 538 ; 113 S Ct 933 , 122 L Ed 2d 317 (1993). “[R]eversible prejudice exists when one of the defendant’s substantive rights, such as the opportunity to present an individual defense, is violated.” Hana, 447 Mich at 360 (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he dual-jury procedure is a pa

2016To set aside a foreclosure by advertisement—as occurred in this case—a plaintiff must allege facts to support three essential elements of the claim: (1) fraud or irregularity in the foreclosure procedure, (2) prejudice to the mortgagor, and (3) a causal relationship between the alleged fraud or irregularity and the alleged prejudice, i.e., that the mortgagor would have been in a better position to preserve the property interest absent the fraud or irregularity. [Diem v Sallie Mae Home Loans, Inc, 307 Mich App 204, 210-211 ; 859 NW2d 238 (2014).] See also Kim v JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 493 Mich

2016To set aside a foreclosure by advertisement—as occurred in this case—a plaintiff must allege facts to support three essential elements of the claim: (1) fraud or irregularity in the foreclosure procedure, (2) prejudice to the mortgagor, and (3) a causal relationship between the alleged fraud or irregularity and the alleged prejudice, i.e., that the mortgagor would have been in a better position to preserve the property interest absent the fraud or irregularity. [Diem v Sallie Mae Home Loans, Inc, 307 Mich App 204, 210-211 ; 859 NW2d 238 (2014).] See also Kim v JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 493 Mich

2016To set aside a foreclosure by advertisement—as occurred in this case—a plaintiff must allege facts to support three essential elements of the claim: (1) fraud or irregularity in the foreclosure procedure, (2) prejudice to the mortgagor, and (3) a causal relationship between the alleged fraud or irregularity and the alleged prejudice, i.e., that the mortgagor would have been in a better position to preserve the property interest absent the fraud or irregularity. [Diem v Sallie Mae Home Loans, Inc, 307 Mich App 204, 210-211 ; 859 NW2d 238 (2014).] See also Kim v JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 493 Mich

2016To set aside a foreclosure by advertisement—as occurred in this case—a plaintiff must allege facts to support three essential elements of the claim: (1) fraud or irregularity in the foreclosure procedure, (2) prejudice to the mortgagor, and (3) a causal relationship between the alleged fraud or irregularity and the alleged prejudice, i.e., that the mortgagor would have been in a better position to preserve the property interest absent the fraud or irregularity. [Diem v Sallie Mae Home Loans, Inc, 307 Mich App 204, 210-211 ; 859 NW2d 238 (2014).] See also Kim v JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 493 Mich

2015Under the majority’s holding 2 Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Masters, 460 Mich 105, 109 ; 595 NW2d 832 (1999). 3 See Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed.). 4 1 Hume, Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects (1760), p 368. 3 MCL 333.26424(g) provides that an individual may claim immunity “for providing a registered qualifying patient or a registered primary caregiver with [anything imaginable] for purposes of a qualifying patient’s medical use of marihuana.” Because this interpretation fails to provide any discernable independent meaning to the phrase “marihuana paraphernalia,” the majority’s interpretat

2015Under the majority’s holding 2 Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Masters, 460 Mich 105, 109 ; 595 NW2d 832 (1999). 3 See Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed.). 4 1 Hume, Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects (1760), p 368. 3 MCL 333.26424(g) provides that an individual may claim immunity “for providing a registered qualifying patient or a registered primary caregiver with [anything imaginable] for purposes of a qualifying patient’s medical use of marihuana.” Because this interpretation fails to provide any discernable independent meaning to the phrase “marihuana paraphernalia,” the majority’s interpretat

2006See, e.g., Thew, supra (discussing the time between the defendant’s commission of criminal sexual conduct and the murder of the victim); Gimotty, supra (noting the causal connection between the commission of retail fraud and a murder committed while the defendant was attempting to flee from the scene); Oliver, supra (holding that a defendant who was driving unpursued at normal highway speeds had not broken the chain of events linking the commission of a robbery and the murder of a State Police trooper).

2006See, e.g., Thew, supra (discussing the time between the defendant's commission of criminal sexual conduct and the murder of the victim); Gimotty, supra (noting the causal connection between the commission of retail fraud and a murder committed while the defendant was attempting to flee from the scene); Oliver, supra (holding that a defendant who was driving unpursued at normal highway speeds had not broken the chain of events linking the commission of a robbery and the murder of a State Police trooper). [14] But see Franks v. State, 636 P.2d 361 (Okla.Crim.App., 1981).

2006See, e.g., Thew, supra (discussing the time between the defendant’s commission of criminal sexual conduct and the murder of the victim); Gimotty, supra (noting the causal connection between the commission of retail fraud and a murder committed while the defendant was attempting to flee from the scene); Oliver, supra (holding that a defendant who was driving unpursued at normal highway speeds had not broken the chain of events linking the commission of a robbery and the murder of a State Police trooper).

2004We hold only that where suspicion of criminal activity has focused on a specific individual by a standard more probable than not, and it is alleged that the evidence sought was created, retained, and employed in ongoing criminal activity over a four-year period, the magistrate could reasonably conclude that there was a “fair probabil ity” that the evidence would be retained in the residence of the accused. [Russo, supra at 613-614 .] The majority’s use of quotations from Russo to establish probable cause in this case amounts to a profile search, clearly not sanctioned by the Russo Court.

2004We hold only that where suspicion of criminal activity has focused on a specific individual by a standard more probable than not, and it is alleged that the evidence sought was created, retained, and employed in ongoing criminal activity over a four-year period, the magistrate could reasonably conclude that there was a "fair probability" that the evidence would be retained in the residence of the accused. [ Russo, supra at 613-614 , 487 N.W.2d 698 .] The majority's use of quotations from Russo to establish probable cause in this case amounts to a profile search, clearly not sanctioned by the R

2004NOTES [1] People v. Goldston, 470 Mich. 523 , 682 N.W.2d 479 (2004). [2] U.S. Const., Am.

2004NOTES [1] People v. Goldston, 470 Mich. 523 , 682 N.W.2d 479 (2004). [2] U.S. Const., Am.

2001Conversely, provocation should not be required to rise to the level of intentional torture to be a valid defense. [ Id. at 318 , 896 P.2d 439 .] The court also cited with approval the following language from the Illinois Court of Appeals in Robinson: "As commonly understood, provocation means an act or process of provoking, stimulation or excitement....

2001Conversely, provocation should not be required to rise to the level of intentional torture to be a valid defense. [ Id. at 318 , 896 P.2d 439 .] The court also cited with approval the following language from the Illinois Court of Appeals in Robinson: "As commonly understood, provocation means an act or process of provoking, stimulation or excitement....

2001Michigan v Summers, 452 US 692, 699-700 ; 101 S Ct 2587 ; 69 L Ed 2d 340 (1981); People v Shabaz, 424 Mich 42, 56-57 ; 378 NW2d 451 (1985).

2001Michigan v Summers, 452 US 692, 699-700 ; 101 S Ct 2587 ; 69 L Ed 2d 340 (1981); People v Shabaz, 424 Mich 42, 56-57 ; 378 NW2d 451 (1985).

2001Michigan v Summers, 452 US 692, 699-700 ; 101 S Ct 2587 ; 69 L Ed 2d 340 (1981); People v Shabaz, 424 Mich 42, 56-57 ; 378 NW2d 451 (1985).

2001Michigan v Summers, 452 US 692, 699-700 ; 101 S Ct 2587 ; 69 L Ed 2d 340 (1981); People v Shabaz, 424 Mich 42, 56-57 ; 378 NW2d 451 (1985).

2000See also Helmus v Dep’t of Transportation, 238 Mich App 250, 256 ; 604 NW2d 793 (1999); *398 Zine v Chrysler Corp, 236 Mich App 261, 286 ; 600 NW2d 384 (1999); Rid-ley v Detroit, 231 Mich App 381, 389 ; 590 NW2d 69 (1998); Ross v Glaser, 220 Mich App 183, 193 ; 559 NW2d 331 (1996).

2000See also Helmus v Dep’t of Transportation, 238 Mich App 250, 256 ; 604 NW2d 793 (1999); *398 Zine v Chrysler Corp, 236 Mich App 261, 286 ; 600 NW2d 384 (1999); Rid-ley v Detroit, 231 Mich App 381, 389 ; 590 NW2d 69 (1998); Ross v Glaser, 220 Mich App 183, 193 ; 559 NW2d 331 (1996).