individual claim in Massachusetts

2025See Laramie v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 488 Mass. 399 , 417 (2021) ("We do not review an individual instruction in isolation"); Selmark Assocs. v. Ehrlich, 467 Mass. 525, 547 (2014).

2025Accord United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 (1st Cir. 2009) (judge has discretion to hear juror testimony "to determine whether ethnically biased statements were made during jury deliberations"). [11] Although this trial occurred before our decision in Ralph R., we held in McCowen, 458 Mass. at 496-497 , a case decided a decade before this trial, that a judge's duty to investigate claims of bias extends beyond identifying any actually biased juror to investigating "whether the statements so infected the deliberative process with racially or ethnically charged language or stereotypes that i

2025Accord United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 (1st Cir. 2009) (judge has discretion to hear juror testimony "to determine whether ethnically biased statements were made during jury deliberations"). [11] Although this trial occurred before our decision in Ralph R., we held in McCowen, 458 Mass. at 496-497 , a case decided a decade before this trial, that a judge's duty to investigate claims of bias extends beyond identifying any actually biased juror to investigating "whether the statements so infected the deliberative process with racially or ethnically charged language or stereotypes that i

2024See id.

2023See Commonwealth v. Harris, 481 Mass. 767, 780 (2019).

2020See, e.g., Gannon v. Boston, 476 Mass. 786, 793-795 (2017) (identifying elements of handicap discrimination, and describing burden- shifting framework for proving handicap discrimination claim); Somers v. Converged Access, Inc., 454 Mass. 582, 595-599 (2009) (same for age discrimination).

2020See Slama v. Attorney Gen., 384 Mass. 620, 624 (1981) ("Representative standing is generally limited to cases in which it is difficult or impossible for the actual rightholders to assert their claims").

2020See, e.g., Gannon v. Boston, 476 Mass. 786, 793-795 (2017) (identifying elements of handicap discrimination, and describing burden- shifting framework for proving handicap discrimination claim); Somers v. Converged Access, Inc., 454 Mass. 582, 595-599 (2009) (same for age discrimination).

2019See, e.g., United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty , 445 U.S. 388 , 404, 100 S.Ct. 1202 , 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980) ("an action brought on behalf of a class does not become moot upon expiration of the named plaintiff's substantive claim, even though class certification has been denied").

2019See, e.g., United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty , 445 U.S. 388 , 404, 100 S.Ct. 1202 , 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980) ("an action brought on behalf of a class does not become moot upon expiration of the named plaintiff's substantive claim, even though class certification has been denied").

2014As a general rule, “[i]f an individual ‘may not maintain the action on [his or her] own behalf, he or she may not seek relief on behalf of a class.’ ” Barbara F. v. Bristol Div. of Juvenile Court Dept., 432 Mass. 1024 (2000) (rescript), quoting Doe v. The Governor, 381 Mass. 702, 704-05 (1980); but see Weld v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 434 Mass. 81, 88 (2001) (holding that suitability of class representative should be analyzed “as a matter of civil procedure under rule 23 rather than as a matter of standing,” and that named plaintiff could represent class in suit against three defendant manufactur

2014As a general rule, “[i]f an individual ‘may not maintain the action on [his or her] own behalf, he or she may not seek relief on behalf of a class.’ ” Barbara F. v. Bristol Div. of Juvenile Court Dept., 432 Mass. 1024 (2000) (rescript), quoting Doe v. The Governor, 381 Mass. 702, 704-05 (1980); but see Weld v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 434 Mass. 81, 88 (2001) (holding that suitability of class representative should be analyzed “as a matter of civil procedure under rule 23 rather than as a matter of standing,” and that named plaintiff could represent class in suit against three defendant manufactur

2000See Commonwealth v. Fall River Motor Sales, Inc., 409 Mass. at 313-314 ; Commonwealth v. AmCan Enterprises, Inc., 47 Mass. App. Ct. 330, 338-340 (1999).

2000See Commonwealth v. Fall River Motor Sales, Inc., 409 Mass. at 313-314 ; Commonwealth v. AmCan Enterprises, Inc., 47 Mass. App. Ct. 330, 338-340 (1999).

1995The court does not agree. “(A) judge may be justified in certifying a class despite the mootness of the named representative’s claims” where “a defendant’s voluntary cessation of allegedly wrongful conduct toward the named plaintiff . . . moots [s] his or her claim.” Gonzales v. Commissioner of Correction, 407 Mass. 448, 452 (1990).

1995See McCormack, 617 F.Supp. at 1526 ; Martin, 689 P.2d at 382 .

1995The defendants rely primarily on Doe v. Gaughan, 808 F.2d 871 , 872 n.l (1st Cir. 1986), and Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1356 (1st Cir. 1985), contending that a class action is not superior to other methods of adjudication because the plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials, and because any benefits granted to the plaintiffs in their individual actions would consequently inure to all others that are similarly situated.