individual claim in Alabama

2011Green v. Bradley Construction, Inc., 431 So.2d 1226 (Ala.1983); Stevens v. Lowder, 643 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir.1981).

1994Green v. Bradley Construction, Inc., 431 So.2d 1226 (Ala.1983); Stevens v. Lowder, 643 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1981).

2011Green v. Bradley Construction, Inc., 431 So.2d 1226 (Ala.1983); Stevens v. Lowder, 643 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir.1981).

1994Green v. Bradley Construction, Inc., 431 So.2d 1226 (Ala.1983); Stevens v. Lowder, 643 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1981).

2006In State v. Guthrie , 627 N.W.2d 401 (S.D. 2000), the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that not every communication to a clergyman was privileged under South Dakota's clergy privilege, which provides an individual with a privilege to prevent disclosure of confidential statements made to a member of the clergy in his or her professional capacity as a spiritual advisor.

2006In State v. Guthrie, 627 N.W.2d 401 (S.D.2000), the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that not every communication to a clergyman was privileged under South Dakota’s clergy privilege, which provides an individual with a privilege to prevent disclosure of confidential statements made to a member of the clergy in his or her professional capacity as a spiritual advisor.

2006In any event, Bevill , which involved undisputedly corporate counsel, recognized that "an individual officer may have an individual claim of attorney-client privilege with regard to communications [even] with corporate counsel." 805 F.2d at 125 .

2006In any event, Bevill, which involved undisputedly corporate counsel, recognized that “an individual officer may have an individual claim of attorney-client privilege with regard to communications [even] with corporate counsel.” 805 F.2d at 125 .

1995The corporation is acting as a legal entity and, if an individual corporate agent's conduct, though not fraudulent of itself, combines with the conduct of other corporate agents so as to amount to corporate fraud, the corporation may not escape liability simply by pointing to one innocent link in the chain.' " Leisure American Resorts, Inc. v. Knutilla , 547 So.2d 424 , 426 ([Ala.] 1989) (emphasis in original).

1989In Leisure American Resorts, Inc. v. Knutilla, 547 So.2d 424 (1989), we stated: "It is axiomatic that a corporate employee's individual defense of lack of intent does not of itself end the inquiry with respect to the corporation's requisite intent to defraud.

2012Whether Hamilton Can Recover Damages for Emotional Distress The second issue raised in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in holding that Hamilton “[could not] maintain an individual claim for emotional distress because the evidence is insufficient to show that she was within .the ‘zone of danger,’ and she cannot claim a physical injury to her body as a result of the death of the fetus.” In their summary-judgment motions, the defendants argued that Hamilton could not recover damages for emotional distress because, they said, Hamilton “was not physically injured as a result of the def

2012The defendants noted that, during her deposition, Hamilton testified that she had not been “concerned for [her] life.” 5 In her response to the defendants’ summary-judgment motions, Hamilton stated that she “[did] not dispute that she never feared for her own life and is therefore not entitled to zone of danger damages.” However, Hamilton claimed that she is “entitled to mental anguish damages” under this Court’s decision in Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, supra. Hamilton argued that Taylor “carve[d] out a specific exception” to the zone-of-danger test for cases in which a mother has suffere

2008Rule 54(b) states, in pertinent part: “When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.” A judgment is final for Rule 54(b) purposes when it is “an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims

2008Rule 54(b) states, in pertinent part: “When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.” A judgment is final for Rule 54(b) purposes when it is “an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims

2008In Garrett , we stated that the injury "occurred on the date or dates of exposure," 368 So.2d at 520 ; however, that rule operates to bar an individual claim where one cannot demonstrate "a manifest present injury." Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So.2d 827, 829 (Ala.2001).

2003The oral misrepresentation claims of the plaintiff policyholders fare no better on the issue of uniformity, thus making it almost impossible to determine if a material variation existed between the oral and written misrepresentations as required under Household Retail , supra. Although the trial court found that Alfa agents were trained uniformly and were required to use uniform sales illustrations, the record reflects that the training material Alfa used to explain its minimum-deposit payment plan to its agents does not contain a standardized sales pitch.

1997Perlman v. Shurett , 567 So.2d 1296 , 1297 (Ala. 1990).

1989Compare id. at 1144 ("There is no showing in the record of the plaintiff's justifiable reliance upon the alleged fraudulent representations of Clokey") (emphasis added) with id. at 1145 ("The actual or imputed knowledge of the Holmans ... precludes any finding of a reasonable reliance upon the alleged representation of Clokey") (emphasis added). [3] "Red flag," in the intentional fraud scenario, is a phrase most recently appearing in Padgett v. Hughes, 535 So.2d 140 (Ala.1988). [4] Among the more prominent of such laws are the Securities Act of 1933 (currently 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa); the Secur

1989Compare id. at 1144 ("There is no showing in the record of the plaintiff's justifiable reliance upon the alleged fraudulent representations of Clokey") (emphasis added) with id. at 1145 ("The actual or imputed knowledge of the Holmans ... precludes any finding of a reasonable reliance upon the alleged representation of Clokey") (emphasis added). [3] "Red flag," in the intentional fraud scenario, is a phrase most recently appearing in Padgett v. Hughes, 535 So.2d 140 (Ala.1988). [4] Among the more prominent of such laws are the Securities Act of 1933 (currently 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa); the Secur

1981"They cannot represent a class of whom they are not a part." Bailey v. Patterson , 369 U.S. 31 , 32-33 , 82 S.Ct. 549 , 550-51 , 7 L.Ed.2d 512 (1962).

1981"They cannot represent a class of whom they are not a part." Bailey v. Patterson , 369 U.S. 31 , 32-33 , 82 S.Ct. 549 , 550-51 , 7 L.Ed.2d 512 (1962).

1932Section 8662, Code; Rose v. Magro, 220 Ala. 120, 123 , 124 So. 296 ; Alabama Clay Products Co. v. Mathews, 220 Ala. 549, 551 , 126 So. 869 .

1932Section 8662, Code; Rose v. Magro, 220 Ala. 120, 123 , 124 So. 296 ; Alabama Clay Products Co. v. Mathews, 220 Ala. 549, 551 , 126 So. 869 .

1932Section 8662, Code; Rose v. Magro, 220 Ala. 120, 123 , 124 So. 296 ; Alabama Clay Products Co. v. Mathews, 220 Ala. 549, 551 , 126 So. 869 .

1932Section 8662, Code; Rose v. Magro, 220 Ala. 120, 123 , 124 So. 296 ; Alabama Clay Products Co. v. Mathews, 220 Ala. 549, 551 , 126 So. 869 .

1927Co. v. Carlock, 196 Ala. 659 , 72 So. 261 ; Corona Coal Co. v. Huckelbey, 204 Ala. 508 , 86 So. 25 ).

1927Co. v. Carlock, 196 Ala. 659 , 72 So. 261 ; Corona Coal Co. v. Huckelbey, 204 Ala. 508 , 86 So. 25 ).

1927While, under the authorities, defendant, jointly sued on a joint liability, may set off an individual claim due one of them from the plaintiff (Depoyster Lumber Co. v. Commercial Lumber Co. et al., 213 Ala. 327 , 104 So. 798 ; Locke, Adm’r, v. Locke, 57 Ala. 473 ), still good pleading requires that the plea show to whom the debt is due (Central of Ga. Ry.

1927While, under the authorities, defendant, jointly sued on a joint liability, may set off an individual claim due one of them from the plaintiff (Depoyster Lumber Co. v. Commercial Lumber Co. et al., 213 Ala. 327 , 104 So. 798 ; Locke, Adm’r, v. Locke, 57 Ala. 473 ), still good pleading requires that the plea show to whom the debt is due (Central of Ga. Ry.

1927While, under the authorities, defendant, jointly sued on a joint liability, may set off an individual claim due one of them from the plaintiff (Depoyster Lumber Co. v. Commercial Lumber Co. et al., 213 Ala. 327 , 104 So. 798 ; Locke, Adm’r, v. Locke, 57 Ala. 473 ), still good pleading requires that the plea show to whom the debt is due (Central of Ga. Ry.