individual hearing in Illinois

2012In this regard, the supreme court continued, as follows: “With respect to the proffered evidence of the impairment of defendant’s emotional development, this court has repeatedly held that ‘information about a defendant’s mental or psychological impairment is not inherently mitigating.’ [Citation.] As we explained in [People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 382 , 677 N.E.2d 859, 864-65 (1997)], ‘[a]t sentencing, a judge or jury considering evidence of this nature might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence find

2012In this regard, the supreme court continued, as follows: “With respect to the proffered evidence of the impairment of defendant’s emotional development, this court has repeatedly held that ‘information about a defendant’s mental or psychological impairment is not inherently mitigating.’ [Citation.] As we explained in [People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 382 , 677 N.E.2d 859, 864-65 (1997)], ‘[a]t sentencing, a judge or jury considering evidence of this nature might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence find

2002“Even if we were to consider defendant’s alleged psychological and neurological impairments as mitigating factors, ‘[mjitigation evidence of a defendant’s cognitive abilities and mental health does not preclude imposition of a death sentence when that evidence is outweighed by aggravating evidence.’ ” Madej, 177 Ill. 2d at 139-40 , quoting People v. Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d 261, 286 (1997).

2002"Even if we were to consider defendant's alleged psychological and neurological impairments as mitigating factors, `[m]itigation evidence of a defendant's cognitive abilities and mental health does not preclude imposition of a death sentence when that evidence is outweighed by aggravating evidence.'" Madej, 177 Ill.2d at 139-40 , 226 Ill.Dec. 453 , 685 N.E.2d 908 , quoting People v. Pulliam, 176 Ill.2d 261, 286 , 223 Ill.Dec. 610 , 680 N.E.2d 343 (1997).

2021The plaintiffs in Levy and Zokoych were shareholders attempting to bring individual and derivative actions for breaches of fiduciary duties. ¶ 91 “In Illinois, a shareholder may bring a derivative action and an individual claim at the same time if he has suffered a different injury from his fellow shareholders.” Levy, 268 Ill.

2020“Recovery in the former inures to the corporation while recovery in the latter inures to the individual shareholder or class of shareholders.” Id. at 670 . ¶ 33 “In Illinois, a shareholder may bring a derivative action and an individual claim at the same time[.]” Levy v. Markal Sales Corp, 268 Ill.

1998In light of the aggravating evidence adduced in this case, we believe that even if we were to deem the alleged psychological evidence as mitigating, such evidence would not “preclude imposition of a death sentence when that evidence is outweighed by [the] aggravating evidence.” People v. Pulliam , 176 Ill. 2d 261, 286 (1997), citing People v. Wilson , 164 Ill. 2d 436, 460 (1994).

1998In light of the aggravating evidence adduced in this case, we believe that even if we were to deem the alleged psychological evidence as mitigating, such evidence would not “preclude imposition of a death sentence when that evidence is outweighed by [the] aggravating evidence.” People v. Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d 261, 286 (1997), citing People v. Wilson, 164 Ill. 2d 436, 460 (1994).

1997As we explained in Tenner, "[a]t sentencing, a judge or jury considering evidence of this nature might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness.” Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d at 382 (citing People v. Foster, 168 Ill. 2d 465, 491 (1995), People v. Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d 445, 467-68 (1995), and People v. Jones, 144 Ill. 2d 242, 272-73 (1991)).

1997As we explained in Tenner , “[a]t sentencing, a judge or jury considering evidence of this nature might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness.” Tenner , 175 Ill. 2d at 382 (citing People v. Foster , 168 Ill. 2d 465, 491 (1995), People v. Mahaffey , 165 Ill. 2d 445, 467-68 (1995), and People v. Jones , 144 Ill. 2d 242, 272-73 (1991)).

2023A trial court may consider mental health issues as aggravating or mitigating factors, depending “on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) - 28 - No. 1-22-1177 People v. Madej, 177 Ill.2d 116, 139 (1997).

2019Instead, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that a judge at sentencing may consider mental health issues as either aggravating or mitigating depending “on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 139 , 685 N.E.2d 908, 920 (1997).

2002Indeed, this court has repeatedly explained that “[a]t sentencing, a judge or jury considering evidence of this nature [mental deficits] might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness.” People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 382 (1997); see also People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 102 (1999) (“Proof of defendant’s mental handicaps not only could evoke compassion from the trial judge, but also could have demonstrated defendant’s continued d

2002Indeed, this court has repeatedly explained that "[a]t sentencing, a judge or jury considering evidence of this nature [mental deficits] might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness." People v. Tenner, 175 Ill.2d 372, 382 , 222 Ill.Dec. 325 , 677 N.E.2d 859 (1997); see also People v. Evans, 186 Ill.2d 83, 102 , 237 Ill.Dec. 118 , 708 N.E.2d 1158 (1999) ("Proof of defendant's mental handicaps not only could evoke compassion from th

1997As we explained in Tenner, "[a]t sentencing, a judge or jury considering evidence of this nature might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness.” Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d at 382 (citing People v. Foster, 168 Ill. 2d 465, 491 (1995), People v. Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d 445, 467-68 (1995), and People v. Jones, 144 Ill. 2d 242, 272-73 (1991)).

1997As we explained in Tenner , “[a]t sentencing, a judge or jury considering evidence of this nature might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness.” Tenner , 175 Ill. 2d at 382 (citing People v. Foster , 168 Ill. 2d 465, 491 (1995), People v. Mahaffey , 165 Ill. 2d 445, 467-68 (1995), and People v. Jones , 144 Ill. 2d 242, 272-73 (1991)).

2025He concedes that “evidence of brain damage due to lead poisoning is not inherently mitigating.” See People v. Thompson, 222 Ill. 2d 1, 43 (2006) (“A judge or jury considering evidence of [mental or psychological impairments] at sentencing might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness.”).

2024“A judge or jury considering evidence of this nature at sentencing might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness.” People v. Thompson, 222 Ill. 2d 1, 42-43 (2006).

2010See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 573 (1st Cir. 2001) (under fifth prong of Bevill, former corporate officers “may only assert an individual privilege to the extent that communications regarding individual acts and liabilities are segregable from discussions about the corporation” or its business concerns).

2010See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 573 (1st Cir.2001) (under fifth prong of Bevill, former corporate officers "may only assert an individual privilege to the extent that communications regarding individual acts and liabilities are segregable from discussions about the corporation" or its business concerns).

2007See General Acquisition, Inc. v. GenCorp Inc., 23 F.3d 1022, 1028 (6th Cir. 1994) (there is no "'generally acceptable test'" as to what constitutes an individual claim).

2007See General Acquisition, Inc. v. GenCorp Inc., 23 F.3d 1022, 1028 (6th Cir. 1994) (there is no “ ‘generally acceptable test’ ” as to what constitutes an individual claim).

2007While fully cognizant of the United States Supreme Court’s criticism that examination of the individual factors relied upon by police officers is inconsistent with a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis (United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 151 L.

2007While fully cognizant of the United States Supreme Court’s criticism that examination of the individual factors relied upon by police officers is inconsistent with a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis (United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 151 L.

2002Indeed, this court has repeatedly explained that “[a]t sentencing, a judge or jury considering evidence of this nature [mental deficits] might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness.” People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 382 (1997); see also People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 102 (1999) (“Proof of defendant’s mental handicaps not only could evoke compassion from the trial judge, but also could have demonstrated defendant’s continued d

2002Indeed, this court has repeatedly explained that "[a]t sentencing, a judge or jury considering evidence of this nature [mental deficits] might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness." People v. Tenner, 175 Ill.2d 372, 382 , 222 Ill.Dec. 325 , 677 N.E.2d 859 (1997); see also People v. Evans, 186 Ill.2d 83, 102 , 237 Ill.Dec. 118 , 708 N.E.2d 1158 (1999) ("Proof of defendant's mental handicaps not only could evoke compassion from th

2002Indeed, this court has repeatedly explained that “[a]t sentencing, a judge or jury considering evidence of this nature [mental deficits] might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness.” People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 382 (1997); see also People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 102 (1999) (“Proof of defendant’s mental handicaps not only could evoke compassion from the trial judge, but also could have demonstrated defendant’s continued d

2002Indeed, this court has repeatedly explained that "[a]t sentencing, a judge or jury considering evidence of this nature [mental deficits] might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness." People v. Tenner, 175 Ill.2d 372, 382 , 222 Ill.Dec. 325 , 677 N.E.2d 859 (1997); see also People v. Evans, 186 Ill.2d 83, 102 , 237 Ill.Dec. 118 , 708 N.E.2d 1158 (1999) ("Proof of defendant's mental handicaps not only could evoke compassion from th

2002Indeed, this court has repeatedly explained that “[a]t sentencing, a judge or jury considering evidence of this nature [mental deficits] might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness.” People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 382 (1997); see also People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 102 (1999) (“Proof of defendant’s mental handicaps not only could evoke compassion from the trial judge, but also could have demonstrated defendant’s continued d

2002Indeed, this court has repeatedly explained that "[a]t sentencing, a judge or jury considering evidence of this nature [mental deficits] might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness." People v. Tenner, 175 Ill.2d 372, 382 , 222 Ill.Dec. 325 , 677 N.E.2d 859 (1997); see also People v. Evans, 186 Ill.2d 83, 102 , 237 Ill.Dec. 118 , 708 N.E.2d 1158 (1999) ("Proof of defendant's mental handicaps not only could evoke compassion from th

2002Indeed, this court has repeatedly explained that “[a]t sentencing, a judge or jury considering evidence of this nature [mental deficits] might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness.” People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 382 (1997); see also People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 102 (1999) (“Proof of defendant’s mental handicaps not only could evoke compassion from the trial judge, but also could have demonstrated defendant’s continued d

2002Indeed, this court has repeatedly explained that "[a]t sentencing, a judge or jury considering evidence of this nature [mental deficits] might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness." People v. Tenner, 175 Ill.2d 372, 382 , 222 Ill.Dec. 325 , 677 N.E.2d 859 (1997); see also People v. Evans, 186 Ill.2d 83, 102 , 237 Ill.Dec. 118 , 708 N.E.2d 1158 (1999) ("Proof of defendant's mental handicaps not only could evoke compassion from th

2023Further, although defendant emphasizes his rehabilitative potential by virtue of not committing more offenses while imprisoned, “good behavior in prison need not offset otherwise substantial aggravating evidence against the defendant.” People v. Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d 151, 189 (2002). ¶ 77 “While the court may not disregard mitigating evidence, it determines the weight of such evidence. *** We presume the court considered all mitigating factors on the record absent an affirmative indication to the contrary.” Contursi, 2019 IL App (1st) 162894, ¶ 24 .

2006Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d at 190 ; Macri, 185 Ill. 2d at 66 .

2020App. 3d at 690 (quoting Caparos v. Morton, 364 Ill.

2008Caparos, 364 Ill.

2014App. 3d at 523 ; see Geier, 226 Ill.

2007Geier, 226 Ill.

2026See, e.g., People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 406 (1998) (noting that our supreme court “has repeatedly held that information about a defendant’s mental or psychological impairment is not inherently mitigating” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d - 15 - 372, 382 (1997) (“At sentencing, a judge *** considering evidence of [a defendant’s mental or psychological impairment] might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates poss

2012In this regard, the supreme court continued, as follows: “With respect to the proffered evidence of the impairment of defendant’s emotional development, this court has repeatedly held that ‘information about a defendant’s mental or psychological impairment is not inherently mitigating.’ [Citation.] As we explained in [People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 382 , 677 N.E.2d 859, 864-65 (1997)], ‘[a]t sentencing, a judge or jury considering evidence of this nature might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence find

2026“For a judgment to be ‘final,’ it must provide for the ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of an action involving multiple claims.” In re Estate of Stark, 374 Ill.

2014App. 3d at 379 . ¶ 21 “For a judgment to be ‘final,’ it must provide for the ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of an action involving multiple claims.” Estate of Stark, 374 Ill.

2020App. 3d 355, 371 (1994). “[A] shareholder who has a direct and personal interest in a cause of action may bring suit in an individual capacity even if the corporation’s rights are also implicated.” Davis v. Dyson, 387 Ill.

2020“Rather, for a shareholder to have standing to bring an individual claim, the shareholder must allege an injury that is ‘separate and distinct from that suffered by other shareholders,’ or an injury that involves a contractual right that exists independently of any corporate right.” Davis, 387 Ill.

2018App. 3d at 610 (quoting In re A.P., 179 Ill. 2d 184, 199 (1997)).

2017App. 3d at 610 , 263 Ill.Dec. 274 , 768 N.E.2d 34 (quoting In re A.P. , 179 Ill. 2d 184 , 199, 227 Ill.Dec. 949 , 688 N.E.2d 642 (1997) ).

2005California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427 , 29 L.

2005California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427 , 29 L.