individual standard in Kansas

2018No duty exists unless it is established that the agency owed a special duty to the injured party." Kirk v. City of Shawnee, 27 Kan.

2018No duty exists unless it is established that the agency owed a special duty to the injured party." Kirk v. City of Shawnee , 27 Kan.

2019Individual inquiry on a case-by-case basis is necessary to ensure that the appropriate amount of income is considered 'received' when determining 'Domestic Gross Income' for the self-employed." Brand, 273 Kan. at 356 . 8 But here, the parties do not dispute whether Chad received the income from his rental properties.

2018Individual inquiry on a case-by-case basis is necessary to ensure that the appropriate amount of income is considered 'received' when determining 'Domestic Gross Income' for the self-employed." Brand , 273 Kan. at 356 , 44 P.3d 321 .

2015State v. Edwards, 291 Kan. 532, 553 , 243 P.3d 683 (2010).

2015State v. Edwards, 291 Kan. 532, 553 , 243 P.3d 683 (2010).

2026Guein, 309 Kan. at 1254 .

2023In Gary, our Supreme Court held: "[The] defendant did not have an independent, affirmative obligation to incriminate himself at sentencing by revealing his commission of the crime of attempted robbery 3 days prior to sentencing." 282 Kan. at 251 .

2021Wayman v. Amoco Oil Co., 923 F. Supp. 1322 (D.

2021Thomas, 311 Kan. at 411 .

2018See Holt , 300 Kan. at 1003 -04 , 336 P.3d 312 (the State diluted its burden of proof when it told the jury that it was its " 'responsibility ... to decide what is possible and what is probable' "); Magallanez , 290 Kan. at 914 , 235 P.3d 460 (holding that the burden of proof was impermissibly diluted when the prosecutor stated that "the measure of reasonable doubt is 'an individual standard ... a standard that when you believe he's guilty you've passed beyond' "); State v. Brinklow , 288 Kan. 39 , 49-50, 200 P.3d 1225 (2009) (a prosecutor erred by using the phrase "sometimes you just know" to

2018See Holt , 300 Kan. at 1003 -04 , 336 P.3d 312 (the State diluted its burden of proof when it told the jury that it was its " 'responsibility ... to decide what is possible and what is probable' "); Magallanez , 290 Kan. at 914 , 235 P.3d 460 (holding that the burden of proof was impermissibly diluted when the prosecutor stated that "the measure of reasonable doubt is 'an individual standard ... a standard that when you believe he's guilty you've passed beyond' "); State v. Brinklow , 288 Kan. 39 , 49-50, 200 P.3d 1225 (2009) (a prosecutor erred by using the phrase "sometimes you just know" to

2018See Holt , 300 Kan. at 1003 -04 , 336 P.3d 312 (the State diluted its burden of proof when it told the jury that it was its " 'responsibility ... to decide what is possible and what is probable' "); Magallanez , 290 Kan. at 914 , 235 P.3d 460 (holding that the burden of proof was impermissibly diluted when the prosecutor stated that "the measure of reasonable doubt is 'an individual standard ... a standard that when you believe he's guilty you've passed beyond' "); State v. Brinklow , 288 Kan. 39 , 49-50, 200 P.3d 1225 (2009) (a prosecutor erred by using the phrase "sometimes you just know" to

2018See Holt , 300 Kan. at 1003 -04 , 336 P.3d 312 (the State diluted its burden of proof when it told the jury that it was its " 'responsibility ... to decide what is possible and what is probable' "); Magallanez , 290 Kan. at 914 , 235 P.3d 460 (holding that the burden of proof was impermissibly diluted when the prosecutor stated that "the measure of reasonable doubt is 'an individual standard ... a standard that when you believe he's guilty you've passed beyond' "); State v. Brinklow , 288 Kan. 39 , 49-50, 200 P.3d 1225 (2009) (a prosecutor erred by using the phrase "sometimes you just know" to

2017Bird, 298 Kan. at 398 .

2015See K.S.A. 21-4721; State v. Huerta, 291 Kan. 831 , Syl. ¶ 3, 247 P.3d 1043 (2011) (constitutional infirmity not subject to direct appeal in individual presumptive case); State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, 841-42 , 190 P.3d 207 (2008) (if sentence scheme itself is not being challenged as constitutionally infirm, court lacks jurisdiction to consider individual presumptive sentence); State v. Clemons, 273 Kan. 328, 343-44 , 45 P.3d 384 (2002) (no jurisdiction to consider whether individual presumptive sentence was cruel and unusual punishment).

2015See K.S.A. 21-4721; State v. Huerta, 291 Kan. 831 , Syl. ¶ 3, 247 P.3d 1043 (2011) (constitutional infirmity not subject to direct appeal in individual presumptive case); State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, 841-42 , 190 P.3d 207 (2008) (if sentence scheme itself is not being challenged as constitutionally infirm, court lacks jurisdiction to consider individual presumptive sentence); State v. Clemons, 273 Kan. 328, 343-44 , 45 P.3d 384 (2002) (no jurisdiction to consider whether individual presumptive sentence was cruel and unusual punishment).

2015See K.S.A. 21-4721; State v. Huerta, 291 Kan. 831 , Syl. ¶ 3, 247 P.3d 1043 (2011) (constitutional infirmity not subject to direct appeal in individual presumptive case); State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, 841-42 , 190 P.3d 207 (2008) (if sentence scheme itself is not being challenged as constitutionally infirm, court lacks jurisdiction to consider individual presumptive sentence); State v. Clemons, 273 Kan. 328, 343-44 , 45 P.3d 384 (2002) (no jurisdiction to consider whether individual presumptive sentence was cruel and unusual punishment).

2015See K.S.A. 21-4721; State v. Huerta, 291 Kan. 831 , Syl. ¶ 3, 247 P.3d 1043 (2011) (constitutional infirmity not subject to direct appeal in individual presumptive case); State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, 841-42 , 190 P.3d 207 (2008) (if sentence scheme itself is not being challenged as constitutionally infirm, court lacks jurisdiction to consider individual presumptive sentence); State v. Clemons, 273 Kan. 328, 343-44 , 45 P.3d 384 (2002) (no jurisdiction to consider whether individual presumptive sentence was cruel and unusual punishment).

2015See K.S.A. 21-4721; State v. Huerta, 291 Kan. 831 , Syl. ¶ 3, 247 P.3d 1043 (2011) (constitutional infirmity not subject to direct appeal in individual presumptive case); State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, 841-42 , 190 P.3d 207 (2008) (if sentence scheme itself is not being challenged as constitutionally infirm, court lacks jurisdiction to consider individual presumptive sentence); State v. Clemons, 273 Kan. 328, 343-44 , 45 P.3d 384 (2002) (no jurisdiction to consider whether individual presumptive sentence was cruel and unusual punishment).

2015See K.S.A. 21-4721; State v. Huerta, 291 Kan. 831 , Syl. ¶ 3, 247 P.3d 1043 (2011) (constitutional infirmity not subject to direct appeal in individual presumptive case); State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, 841-42 , 190 P.3d 207 (2008) (if sentence scheme itself is not being challenged as constitutionally infirm, court lacks jurisdiction to consider individual presumptive sentence); State v. Clemons, 273 Kan. 328, 343-44 , 45 P.3d 384 (2002) (no jurisdiction to consider whether individual presumptive sentence was cruel and unusual punishment).

2014Barlow, 703 F.3d at 506 (citing Baker, 137 F.3d at 1440 ).

2014Barlow, 703 F.3d at 506 (citing Baker, 137 F.3d at 1440 ).

2010Instead, the situation surrounding the giving of a confession may dissipate the import of an individual factor that might otherwise have a coercive effect. [Citation omitted.] Even after analyzing such dilution, if any, a single factor or a combination of factors considered together may inevitably lead to a conclusion that under the totality of circumstances a suspect's will was overborne and the confession was not therefore a free and voluntary act. [Citation omitted.]' [Citation omitted.]" Sharp, 289 Kan. at 81 , 210 P.3d 590 .

2010Instead, the situation surrounding the giving of a confession may dissipate the import of an individual factor that might otherwise have a coercive effect. [Citation omitted.] Even after analyzing such dilution, if any, a single factor or a combination of factors considered together may inevitably lead to a conclusion that under the totality of circumstances a suspect's will was overborne and the confession was not therefore a free and voluntary act. [Citation omitted.]' [Citation omitted.]" Sharp, 289 Kan. at 81 , 210 P.3d 590 .

2000Jarboe v. Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs, 262 Kan. 615, 631 , 938 P.2d 1293 (1997).

2000Jarboe v. Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs, 262 Kan. 615, 631 , 938 P.2d 1293 (1997).

1993In the July order, the KCC determined that “studies of approximately 100 wells were sufficient to make a projection from which it issued a field-wide order” rather than conduct an individual hearing on each unit. 244 Kan. at 163 ., Mesa argues that, in light of the KCC order, its decision to drill an additional well cannot,, as a matter..of law, constitute a breach of any . implied obligation of good faith.

1991In State v. Meinert, a majority of this court held the phrase “unjustifiable physical pain,” 225 Kan. at 819 , to be unconstitutionally vague because it could cover anything from a minor spanking or slapping to a severe beating, depending upon the personal beliefs of the individual hearing the case.