individual claim in Arizona

2017The superior court may not certify a judgment unless it is, in fact, "final," that is, "an ultimate disposition of an individual claim." Davis, 168 Ariz. at 304 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 (1956)).

2012In other words, the court's order must result in “‘an ultimate disposition of an individual claim.’ ” Id, quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 , 76 S.Ct. 895 , 100 L.Ed. 1297 (1956). 2 ¶ 9 We review a trial court’s Rule 54(b) determination de novo.

2019P., arguing that there remained unresolved claims against DC. ¶22 Rule 54(b) provides that if an action involves multiple claims or parties, then "the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines there is no just reason for delay and recites that the judgment is entered under Rule 54(b)." In the context of Rule 54(b), a final judgment is "an ultimate disposition of an individual claim." Davis v. Cessna Aircraft Corp. , 168 Ariz. 301 , 304, 812 P.2d 1119 , 1122 (App. 1991) (final disposition of individ

2019P., arguing that there remained unresolved claims against DC. ¶22 Rule 54(b) provides that if an action involves multiple claims or parties, then "the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines there is no just reason for delay and recites that the judgment is entered under Rule 54(b)." In the context of Rule 54(b), a final judgment is "an ultimate disposition of an individual claim." Davis v. Cessna Aircraft Corp. , 168 Ariz. 301 , 304, 812 P.2d 1119 , 1122 (App. 1991) (final disposition of individ

2007Rather, “ ‘[a] final judgment ... decides and disposes of the cause on its merits, leaving no question open for judicial determination.’” Id., quoting Decker v. City of Tucson, 4 Ariz.App. 270, 272 , 419 P.2d 400, 402 (1966); see also Kim v. Mansoori, 214 Ariz. 457, ¶ 6 , 153 P.3d 1086, 1088 (App.2007) (final judgment disposes of at least one claim in a multiclaim action); Davis v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 168 Ariz. 301, 304 , 812 P.2d 1119, 1122 (App.1991) (final judgment is “ ‘an ultimate disposition of an individual claim’ ”), quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 , 76 S.C

2007Rather, “ ‘[a] final judgment ... decides and disposes of the cause on its merits, leaving no question open for judicial determination.’” Id., quoting Decker v. City of Tucson, 4 Ariz.App. 270, 272 , 419 P.2d 400, 402 (1966); see also Kim v. Mansoori, 214 Ariz. 457, ¶ 6 , 153 P.3d 1086, 1088 (App.2007) (final judgment disposes of at least one claim in a multiclaim action); Davis v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 168 Ariz. 301, 304 , 812 P.2d 1119, 1122 (App.1991) (final judgment is “ ‘an ultimate disposition of an individual claim’ ”), quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 , 76 S.C

2007Rather, “ ‘[a] final judgment ... decides and disposes of the cause on its merits, leaving no question open for judicial determination.’” Id., quoting Decker v. City of Tucson, 4 Ariz.App. 270, 272 , 419 P.2d 400, 402 (1966); see also Kim v. Mansoori, 214 Ariz. 457, ¶ 6 , 153 P.3d 1086, 1088 (App.2007) (final judgment disposes of at least one claim in a multiclaim action); Davis v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 168 Ariz. 301, 304 , 812 P.2d 1119, 1122 (App.1991) (final judgment is “ ‘an ultimate disposition of an individual claim’ ”), quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 , 76 S.C

2007Rather, “ ‘[a] final judgment ... decides and disposes of the cause on its merits, leaving no question open for judicial determination.’” Id., quoting Decker v. City of Tucson, 4 Ariz.App. 270, 272 , 419 P.2d 400, 402 (1966); see also Kim v. Mansoori, 214 Ariz. 457, ¶ 6 , 153 P.3d 1086, 1088 (App.2007) (final judgment disposes of at least one claim in a multiclaim action); Davis v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 168 Ariz. 301, 304 , 812 P.2d 1119, 1122 (App.1991) (final judgment is “ ‘an ultimate disposition of an individual claim’ ”), quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 , 76 S.C

2005Id. at 818 , 119 S.Ct. at 1710 , 143 L.Ed.2d at 992-93 . ¶ 22 Because the federal CCE statute “does not explicitly [reveal] whether the individual violation is an element or a means,” id., the Court engaged in a statutory interpretation analysis and concluded that Congress had intended each violation to be treated as an element of the offense.

2005Id. at 818 , 119 S.Ct. at 1710 , 143 L.Ed.2d at 992-93 . ¶ 22 Because the federal CCE statute “does not explicitly [reveal] whether the individual violation is an element or a means,” id., the Court engaged in a statutory interpretation analysis and concluded that Congress had intended each violation to be treated as an element of the offense.

2005The trier of fact does not need to agree on which acts constitute the requisite number.” Thus, in contrast to the federal CCE statute, § 13-1417 “does ... explicitly tell us whether the individual violation is an element or a means.” Richardson, 526 U.S. at 818 , 119 S.Ct. at 1710 , 143 L.Ed.2d at 993 ; see State v. Johnson, 243 Wis.2d 365 , 627 N.W.2d 455, ¶ 14 (2001) (noting that, unlike the CCE statute at issue in Richardson, Wisconsin’s statute “is unambiguous as to the elements of the offense and the question of what the jury must be unanimous about before convicting a defendant of repeat

2005The trier of fact does not need to agree on which acts constitute the requisite number.” Thus, in contrast to the federal CCE statute, § 13-1417 “does ... explicitly tell us whether the individual violation is an element or a means.” Richardson, 526 U.S. at 818 , 119 S.Ct. at 1710 , 143 L.Ed.2d at 993 ; see State v. Johnson, 243 Wis.2d 365 , 627 N.W.2d 455, ¶ 14 (2001) (noting that, unlike the CCE statute at issue in Richardson, Wisconsin’s statute “is unambiguous as to the elements of the offense and the question of what the jury must be unanimous about before convicting a defendant of repeat

1976Our Supreme Court said in State v. Bainch, 109 Ariz. 77 , 505 P.2d 248 (1973); “The fact that an officer may be suspicious of an individual is not the test as *463 to whether Miranda warnings must be given prior to questioning, nor is the mere presence of a police officer to be considered a restraint on the suspect’s liberty.

1976Our Supreme Court said in State v. Bainch, 109 Ariz. 77 , 505 P.2d 248 (1973); “The fact that an officer may be suspicious of an individual is not the test as *463 to whether Miranda warnings must be given prior to questioning, nor is the mere presence of a police officer to be considered a restraint on the suspect’s liberty.

2009Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 . ¶ 9 Although Johnson cites authority suggesting that, standing alone, the individual factors listed above might not warrant a pat-down search, he cites none where all, or even most, of these factors are present. 4 For example, Johnson relies heavily on United States v. Davis, 94 F.3d 1465, 1467 (10th Cir.1996), in which the Tenth Circuit Court *556 of Appeals concluded a Terry stop was unjustified when the defendant, a known criminal, walked away from officers who had asked him to stop, kept his hands in his pockets, and approached an establishment known

2009But there was no evidence the defendant in Davis was part of an organization whose members are often armed, nor that he was carrying anything, like the police scanner in this case, that might arouse suspicion when viewed in light of all the surrounding circumstances. 94 F.3d at 1468-70 .

2001City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.3d 447 , 115 Cal.Rptr. 797 , 525 P.2d 701 (1974). [9] Ultimately, the California court held that " `claimant,' as used in section 910, must be equated with the class itself and therefore [we] reject the suggested necessity for filing an individual claim for each member of the purported class.

2001City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.3d 447 , 115 Cal.Rptr. 797 , 525 P.2d 701 (1974). [9] Ultimately, the California court held that " `claimant,' as used in section 910, must be equated with the class itself and therefore [we] reject the suggested necessity for filing an individual claim for each member of the purported class.

2014See In re James P., 214 Ariz. 420, 425, ¶ 24 , 153 P.3d 1049, 1054 (App. 2007) (reviewing court “will not reweigh the evidence”).

2014See In re James P., 214 Ariz. 420, 425, ¶ 24 , 153 P.3d 1049, 1054 (App. 2007) (reviewing court “will not reweigh the evidence”).

2010In analyzing a statute, we attempt to give it meaning consistent with “the statutory scheme as a whole.” State v. Ross, 214 Ariz. 280, 283, ¶ 22 , 151 P.3d 1261, 1264 (App.2007) (quoting Hughes v. Jorgenson, 203 Ariz. 71, 73, ¶ 11 , 50 P.3d 821, 823 (2002)). ¶ 13 The opportunity for hearing guaranteed pursuant to § 36-529(D) allows the individual to challenge the determination that she “should be involuntarily hospitalized for evaluation,” A.R.S. § 36-529(D) (emphasis added), not the determination that she should be evaluated.

2010In analyzing a statute, we attempt to give it meaning consistent with “the statutory scheme as a whole.” State v. Ross, 214 Ariz. 280, 283, ¶ 22 , 151 P.3d 1261, 1264 (App.2007) (quoting Hughes v. Jorgenson, 203 Ariz. 71, 73, ¶ 11 , 50 P.3d 821, 823 (2002)). ¶ 13 The opportunity for hearing guaranteed pursuant to § 36-529(D) allows the individual to challenge the determination that she “should be involuntarily hospitalized for evaluation,” A.R.S. § 36-529(D) (emphasis added), not the determination that she should be evaluated.

2010In analyzing a statute, we attempt to give it meaning consistent with “the statutory scheme as a whole.” State v. Ross, 214 Ariz. 280, 283, ¶ 22 , 151 P.3d 1261, 1264 (App.2007) (quoting Hughes v. Jorgenson, 203 Ariz. 71, 73, ¶ 11 , 50 P.3d 821, 823 (2002)). ¶ 13 The opportunity for hearing guaranteed pursuant to § 36-529(D) allows the individual to challenge the determination that she “should be involuntarily hospitalized for evaluation,” A.R.S. § 36-529(D) (emphasis added), not the determination that she should be evaluated.

2010In analyzing a statute, we attempt to give it meaning consistent with “the statutory scheme as a whole.” State v. Ross, 214 Ariz. 280, 283, ¶ 22 , 151 P.3d 1261, 1264 (App.2007) (quoting Hughes v. Jorgenson, 203 Ariz. 71, 73, ¶ 11 , 50 P.3d 821, 823 (2002)). ¶ 13 The opportunity for hearing guaranteed pursuant to § 36-529(D) allows the individual to challenge the determination that she “should be involuntarily hospitalized for evaluation,” A.R.S. § 36-529(D) (emphasis added), not the determination that she should be evaluated.

2009Ill, appeal from the adverse ruling on class certification. 445 U.S. at 404 n. 10, 100 S.Ct. 1202 ; see also Dugas, 99 F.3d at 727-28 (distinguishing Roper and Geraghty and stating that those eases do not apply to situations where a plaintiff accepts an offer of judgment); Walding v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 577 So.2d 853, 855 (Ala.1991) (stating that Roper is “inapposite” because the plaintiff in that case “did not consent to the court’s entry of judgment”); Russell v. Sheahan, 324 Or. 445 , 927 P.2d 591, 596 (1996) (same).

2009Ill, appeal from the adverse ruling on class certification. 445 U.S. at 404 n. 10, 100 S.Ct. 1202 ; see also Dugas, 99 F.3d at 727-28 (distinguishing Roper and Geraghty and stating that those eases do not apply to situations where a plaintiff accepts an offer of judgment); Walding v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 577 So.2d 853, 855 (Ala.1991) (stating that Roper is “inapposite” because the plaintiff in that case “did not consent to the court’s entry of judgment”); Russell v. Sheahan, 324 Or. 445 , 927 P.2d 591, 596 (1996) (same).

2009See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000); Gonzales-Rivera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 22 F.3d 1441, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1994); but see United States v. Pearce, 531 F.3d 374, 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (listing as fact supporting reasonable suspicion that defendant had “glance[d] towards” officer before placing hand in small of back and backing away). 3 Although Trevizo was uncertain if the scanner was on or off, even assuming that were significantly relevant to assessing whether Johnson was armed and dangerous, Johnson easily could have turned the scanner off

2009Ill, appeal from the adverse ruling on class certification. 445 U.S. at 404 n. 10, 100 S.Ct. 1202 ; see also Dugas, 99 F.3d at 727-28 (distinguishing Roper and Geraghty and stating that those eases do not apply to situations where a plaintiff accepts an offer of judgment); Walding v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 577 So.2d 853, 855 (Ala.1991) (stating that Roper is “inapposite” because the plaintiff in that case “did not consent to the court’s entry of judgment”); Russell v. Sheahan, 324 Or. 445 , 927 P.2d 591, 596 (1996) (same).

2009Ill, appeal from the adverse ruling on class certification. 445 U.S. at 404 n. 10, 100 S.Ct. 1202 ; see also Dugas, 99 F.3d at 727-28 (distinguishing Roper and Geraghty and stating that those eases do not apply to situations where a plaintiff accepts an offer of judgment); Walding v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 577 So.2d 853, 855 (Ala.1991) (stating that Roper is “inapposite” because the plaintiff in that case “did not consent to the court’s entry of judgment”); Russell v. Sheahan, 324 Or. 445 , 927 P.2d 591, 596 (1996) (same).

2009Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522, 527 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that orders and rulings that merge with consent judgments “are subject to the general rule of non-appealability”). ¶ 13 Moreover, the fact that the offer tendered by the District did not include the word “action” does not mean, as the Douglas-es argue, that the scope of the judgment was limited solely to the Douglases’ individual claim.

2009Under that doctrine, if an appellate court determined that the litigation would be summarily concluded because individual claims were so small that “no lawyer of competence [would] undertake [such a] complex and costly ease,” it treated the denial of class certification as a “final order.” Eisen, 370 F.2d at 120; see also Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 , 295 n. 6 (2d Cir.1968) (finding appellate jurisdiction under § 1291 when absent class certification, “the litigation will very likely terminate without reaching the merits”). ¶ 10 The death knell doctrine did not automatically allow an appe

2009See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000); Gonzales-Rivera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 22 F.3d 1441, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1994); but see United States v. Pearce, 531 F.3d 374, 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (listing as fact supporting reasonable suspicion that defendant had “glance[d] towards” officer before placing hand in small of back and backing away). 3 Although Trevizo was uncertain if the scanner was on or off, even assuming that were significantly relevant to assessing whether Johnson was armed and dangerous, Johnson easily could have turned the scanner off