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15 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 2001–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Geiger v. Backesgreen2 sentences2017“An officer has reasonable suspicion if, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the officer’s position would be justified by some objective manifestation to believe that the person stopped engaged in or was about to engage in criminal activity.” Knox, 2016 ND 15, ¶ 7 , 873 N.W.2d 664 . “[L]aw enforcement officers do not have to analyze the individual factors of a case in a vacuum.” Musselman, 2016 ND 111, ¶ 13 , 881 N.W.2d 201 . “[Ojfficers are to assess the situation as it unfolds and, based upon inferences and deductions drawn from their experience and training, make 2016In Geiger v. Backes , 444 N.W.2d 692, 693 (N.D. 1989), this Court noted law enforcement officers do not have to analyze the individual factors of a case in a vacuum. | 5 | 5 |
Whelan v. A.O.green2 sentences2015We have held the “determination of the least restrictive treatment available is initially made by the executive director of the Department, but the individual may challenge his continued commitment if the statutory requirements are being violated.” Interest of Whitetail , 2013 ND 143, ¶ 6 , 835 N.W.2d 827 ; see also Whelan v. A.O. , 2011 ND 26, ¶ 7 , 793 N.W.2d 471 ; Interest of P.F. , 2008 ND 37 , ¶ 24, 744 N.W.2d 724 ; In re G.R.H. , 2006 ND 56, ¶¶ 22, 27 , 711 N.W.2d 587 . 2015We have held the “determination of the least restrictive treatment available is initially made by the executive director of the Department, but the individual may challenge his continued commitment if the statutory requirements' are being violated.” Interest of Whitetail, 2013 ND 143, ¶ 6 , 835 N.W.2d 827 ; see also Whelan v. A.O., 2011 ND 26, ¶ 7 , 793 N.W.2d 471 ; Interest of P.F., 2008 ND 37 , ¶24, 744 N.W.2d 724 ; In re G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, ¶¶ 22, 27 , 711 N.W.2d 587 . | 3 | 3 |
Whelan v. A.O.green2 sentences2015We have held the “determination of the least restrictive treatment available is initially made by the executive director of the Department, but the individual may challenge his continued commitment if the statutory requirements are being violated.” Interest of Whitetail , 2013 ND 143, ¶ 6 , 835 N.W.2d 827 ; see also Whelan v. A.O. , 2011 ND 26, ¶ 7 , 793 N.W.2d 471 ; Interest of P.F. , 2008 ND 37 , ¶ 24, 744 N.W.2d 724 ; In re G.R.H. , 2006 ND 56, ¶¶ 22, 27 , 711 N.W.2d 587 . 2015We have held the “determination of the least restrictive treatment available is initially made by the executive director of the Department, but the individual may challenge his continued commitment if the statutory requirements' are being violated.” Interest of Whitetail, 2013 ND 143, ¶ 6 , 835 N.W.2d 827 ; see also Whelan v. A.O., 2011 ND 26, ¶ 7 , 793 N.W.2d 471 ; Interest of P.F., 2008 ND 37 , ¶24, 744 N.W.2d 724 ; In re G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, ¶¶ 22, 27 , 711 N.W.2d 587 . | 3 | 3 |
In Re GRHgreen2 sentences2015We have held the “determination of the least restrictive treatment available is initially made by the executive director of the Department, but the individual may challenge his continued commitment if the statutory requirements' are being violated.” Interest of Whitetail, 2013 ND 143, ¶ 6 , 835 N.W.2d 827 ; see also Whelan v. A.O., 2011 ND 26, ¶ 7 , 793 N.W.2d 471 ; Interest of P.F., 2008 ND 37 , ¶24, 744 N.W.2d 724 ; In re G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, ¶¶ 22, 27 , 711 N.W.2d 587 . 2015We have held the “determination of the least restrictive treatment available is initially made by the executive director of the Department, but the individual may challenge his continued commitment if the statutory requirements' are being violated.” Interest of Whitetail, 2013 ND 143, ¶ 6 , 835 N.W.2d 827 ; see also Whelan v. A.O., 2011 ND 26, ¶ 7 , 793 N.W.2d 471 ; Interest of P.F., 2008 ND 37 , ¶24, 744 N.W.2d 724 ; In re G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, ¶¶ 22, 27 , 711 N.W.2d 587 . | 3 | 3 |
Bailey v. Gardebringgreen2 sentences2008See, e.g. , Youngberg v. Romeo , 457 U.S. 307, 322-25 (1982) (a civilly committed individual had a constitutionally protected interest in reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints, and minimally adequate training as reasonably may be required by these interests; decisions about what is minimally adequate or reasonable training may be left to a professional decisionmaker to decide, but limited judicial review of that decision is available); Bailey v. Gardebring , 940 F.2d 1150, 1154 (8th Cir. 1991) (claim for psychiatric treatment can succeed only if 2008See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-25 , 102 S.Ct. 2452 , 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (a civilly committed individual had a constitutionally protected interest in reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints, and minimally adequate training as reasonably may be required by these interests; decisions about what is minimally adequate or reasonable training may be left to a professional decisionmaker to decide, but limited judicial review of that decision is available); Bailey v. Gardebring, 940 F.2d 1150, 1154 (8th Cir.1991) (claim for psychiatric | 3 | 3 |
Youngberg v. Romeo Ex Rel. Romeogreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-25 , 102 S.Ct. 2452 , 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (a civilly committed individual had a constitutionally protected interest in reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints, and minimally adequate training as reasonably may be required by these interests; decisions about what is minimally adequate or reasonable training may be left to a professional decisionmaker to decide, but limited judicial review of that decision is available); Bailey v. Gardebring, 940 F.2d 1150, 1154 (8th Cir.1991) (claim for psychiatric 2008See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-25 , 102 S.Ct. 2452 , 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (a civilly committed individual had a constitutionally protected interest in reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints, and minimally adequate training as reasonably may be required by these interests; decisions about what is minimally adequate or reasonable training may be left to a professional decisionmaker to decide, but limited judicial review of that decision is available); Bailey v. Gardebring, 940 F.2d 1150, 1154 (8th Cir.1991) (claim for psychiatric | 3 | 3 |
In Interest of Pfgreen2 sentences2015We have held the “determination of the least restrictive treatment available is initially made by the executive director of the Department, but the individual may challenge his continued commitment if the statutory requirements are being violated.” Interest of Whitetail , 2013 ND 143, ¶ 6 , 835 N.W.2d 827 ; see also Whelan v. A.O. , 2011 ND 26, ¶ 7 , 793 N.W.2d 471 ; Interest of P.F. , 2008 ND 37 , ¶ 24, 744 N.W.2d 724 ; In re G.R.H. , 2006 ND 56, ¶¶ 22, 27 , 711 N.W.2d 587 . 2015We have held the “determination of the least restrictive treatment available is initially made by the executive director of the Department, but the individual may challenge his continued commitment if the statutory requirements' are being violated.” Interest of Whitetail, 2013 ND 143, ¶ 6 , 835 N.W.2d 827 ; see also Whelan v. A.O., 2011 ND 26, ¶ 7 , 793 N.W.2d 471 ; Interest of P.F., 2008 ND 37 , ¶24, 744 N.W.2d 724 ; In re G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, ¶¶ 22, 27 , 711 N.W.2d 587 . | 1 | 3 |
Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota v. O'Donnellgreen2 sentences2015We have held the “determination of the least restrictive treatment available is initially made by the executive director of the Department, but the individual may challenge his continued commitment if the statutory requirements are being violated.” Interest of Whitetail , 2013 ND 143, ¶ 6 , 835 N.W.2d 827 ; see also Whelan v. A.O. , 2011 ND 26, ¶ 7 , 793 N.W.2d 471 ; Interest of P.F. , 2008 ND 37 , ¶ 24, 744 N.W.2d 724 ; In re G.R.H. , 2006 ND 56, ¶¶ 22, 27 , 711 N.W.2d 587 . 2015We have held the “determination of the least restrictive treatment available is initially made by the executive director of the Department, but the individual may challenge his continued commitment if the statutory requirements' are being violated.” Interest of Whitetail, 2013 ND 143, ¶ 6 , 835 N.W.2d 827 ; see also Whelan v. A.O., 2011 ND 26, ¶ 7 , 793 N.W.2d 471 ; Interest of P.F., 2008 ND 37 , ¶24, 744 N.W.2d 724 ; In re G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, ¶¶ 22, 27 , 711 N.W.2d 587 . | 1 | 3 |
Plumhoff v. Rickardgreen2 sentences2019State v. Oien , 2006 ND 138 , ¶ 8, 717 N.W.2d 593 ; State v. Fischer , 270 N.W.2d 345 , 349 (N.D. 1978) (citing Mancusi v. DeForte , 392 U.S. 364 , 366, 88 S.Ct. 2120 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968) ("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights, and ... may be enforced by exclusion of evidence only at the instance of one whose own protection was infringed by the search and seizure.")) ( abrogated on other grounds); Plumhoff v. Rickard , 572 U.S. 765 , 778, 134 S.Ct. 2012 , 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014) ("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted."). [¶8] "The rig 2019State v. Oien , 2006 ND 138 , ¶ 8, 717 N.W.2d 593 ; State v. Fischer , 270 N.W.2d 345 , 349 (N.D. 1978) (citing Mancusi v. DeForte , 392 U.S. 364 , 366, 88 S.Ct. 2120 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968) ("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights, and ... may be enforced by exclusion of evidence only at the instance of one whose own protection was infringed by the search and seizure.")) ( abrogated on other grounds); Plumhoff v. Rickard , 572 U.S. 765 , 778, 134 S.Ct. 2012 , 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014) ("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted."). [¶8] "The rig | 1 | 1 |
Mancusi v. DeFortegreen2 sentences2019State v. Oien , 2006 ND 138 , ¶ 8, 717 N.W.2d 593 ; State v. Fischer , 270 N.W.2d 345 , 349 (N.D. 1978) (citing Mancusi v. DeForte , 392 U.S. 364 , 366, 88 S.Ct. 2120 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968) ("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights, and ... may be enforced by exclusion of evidence only at the instance of one whose own protection was infringed by the search and seizure.")) ( abrogated on other grounds); Plumhoff v. Rickard , 572 U.S. 765 , 778, 134 S.Ct. 2012 , 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014) ("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted."). [¶8] "The rig 2019State v. Oien , 2006 ND 138 , ¶ 8, 717 N.W.2d 593 ; State v. Fischer , 270 N.W.2d 345 , 349 (N.D. 1978) (citing Mancusi v. DeForte , 392 U.S. 364 , 366, 88 S.Ct. 2120 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968) ("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights, and ... may be enforced by exclusion of evidence only at the instance of one whose own protection was infringed by the search and seizure.")) ( abrogated on other grounds); Plumhoff v. Rickard , 572 U.S. 765 , 778, 134 S.Ct. 2012 , 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014) ("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted."). [¶8] "The rig | 1 | 1 |
Enget v. J.T.N.green1 sentence2013See In re J.T.N., 2011 ND 231 , ¶ 8, 807 N.W.2d 570 . [¶ 6] If a court finds a person is a sexually dangerous individual, N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13 requires that the individual be placed in an appropriate treatment facility or program which “must be the least restrictive available treatment facility or program necessary to achieve the purposes of this chapter.” The determination of the least restrictive treatment available is initially made by the executive director of the Department, but the individual may challenge his continued commitment if the statutory requirements are being violated. | 1 | 1 |
Matter of J.T.N.green1 sentence2013See In re J.T.N., 2011 ND 231 , ¶ 8, 807 N.W.2d 570 . [¶ 6] If a court finds a person is a sexually dangerous individual, N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13 requires that the individual be placed in an appropriate treatment facility or program which “must be the least restrictive available treatment facility or program necessary to achieve the purposes of this chapter.” The determination of the least restrictive treatment available is initially made by the executive director of the Department, but the individual may challenge his continued commitment if the statutory requirements are being violated. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Binder v. Whitetail
green
2 sentences2015We have held the “determination of the least restrictive treatment available is initially made by the executive director of the Department, but the individual may challenge his continued commitment if the statutory requirements' are being violated.” Interest of Whitetail, 2013 ND 143, ¶ 6 , 835 N.W.2d 827 ; see also Whelan v. A.O., 2011 ND 26, ¶ 7 , 793 N.W.2d 471 ; Interest of P.F., 2008 ND 37 , ¶24, 744 N.W.2d 724 ; In re G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, ¶¶ 22, 27 , 711 N.W.2d 587 . 2015We have held the “determination of the least restrictive treatment available is initially made by the executive director of the Department, but the individual may challenge his continued commitment if the statutory requirements' are being violated.” Interest of Whitetail, 2013 ND 143, ¶ 6 , 835 N.W.2d 827 ; see also Whelan v. A.O., 2011 ND 26, ¶ 7 , 793 N.W.2d 471 ; Interest of P.F., 2008 ND 37 , ¶24, 744 N.W.2d 724 ; In re G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, ¶¶ 22, 27 , 711 N.W.2d 587 . | 3 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Oien
green
2 sentences2019State v. Oien , 2006 ND 138 , ¶ 8, 717 N.W.2d 593 ; State v. Fischer , 270 N.W.2d 345 , 349 (N.D. 1978) (citing Mancusi v. DeForte , 392 U.S. 364 , 366, 88 S.Ct. 2120 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968) ("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights, and ... may be enforced by exclusion of evidence only at the instance of one whose own protection was infringed by the search and seizure.")) ( abrogated on other grounds); Plumhoff v. Rickard , 572 U.S. 765 , 778, 134 S.Ct. 2012 , 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014) ("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted."). [¶8] "The rig 2019State v. Oien , 2006 ND 138 , ¶ 8, 717 N.W.2d 593 ; State v. Fischer , 270 N.W.2d 345 , 349 (N.D. 1978) (citing Mancusi v. DeForte , 392 U.S. 364 , 366, 88 S.Ct. 2120 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968) ("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights, and ... may be enforced by exclusion of evidence only at the instance of one whose own protection was infringed by the search and seizure.")) ( abrogated on other grounds); Plumhoff v. Rickard , 572 U.S. 765 , 778, 134 S.Ct. 2012 , 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014) ("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted."). [¶8] "The rig | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Matthews
green
2 sentences2019State v. Matthews , 2003 ND 108 , ¶ 10, 665 N.W.2d 28 . 2019State v. Matthews , 2003 ND 108 , ¶ 10, 665 N.W.2d 28 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Fischer
green
1 sentence2019State v. Oien , 2006 ND 138 , ¶ 8, 717 N.W.2d 593 ; State v. Fischer , 270 N.W.2d 345 , 349 (N.D. 1978) (citing Mancusi v. DeForte , 392 U.S. 364 , 366, 88 S.Ct. 2120 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968) ("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights, and ... may be enforced by exclusion of evidence only at the instance of one whose own protection was infringed by the search and seizure.")) ( abrogated on other grounds); Plumhoff v. Rickard , 572 U.S. 765 , 778, 134 S.Ct. 2012 , 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014) ("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted."). [¶8] "The rig | 1 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. Cowan
green
1 sentence2019"An individual may challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment if it violates the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy, or involves an unreasonable physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area, in order to find something or obtain information." United States v. Cowan , 674 F.3d 947 , 955 (8th Cir. 2012) (citations and quotations omitted). [¶16] Searches without a warrant are not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the government can show the search falls under an exception to the search warrant requirement. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Musselman
neutral
2 sentences2017“An officer has reasonable suspicion if, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the officer’s position would be justified by some objective manifestation to believe that the person stopped engaged in or was about to engage in criminal activity.” Knox, 2016 ND 15, ¶ 7 , 873 N.W.2d 664 . “[L]aw enforcement officers do not have to analyze the individual factors of a case in a vacuum.” Musselman, 2016 ND 111, ¶ 13 , 881 N.W.2d 201 . “[Ojfficers are to assess the situation as it unfolds and, based upon inferences and deductions drawn from their experience and training, make 2017“An officer has reasonable suspicion if, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the officer’s position would be justified by some objective manifestation to believe that the person stopped engaged in or was about to engage in criminal activity.” Knox, 2016 ND 15, ¶ 7 , 873 N.W.2d 664 . “[L]aw enforcement officers do not have to analyze the individual factors of a case in a vacuum.” Musselman, 2016 ND 111, ¶ 13 , 881 N.W.2d 201 . “[Ojfficers are to assess the situation as it unfolds and, based upon inferences and deductions drawn from their experience and training, make | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Knox
green
2 sentences2017“An officer has reasonable suspicion if, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the officer’s position would be justified by some objective manifestation to believe that the person stopped engaged in or was about to engage in criminal activity.” Knox, 2016 ND 15, ¶ 7 , 873 N.W.2d 664 . “[L]aw enforcement officers do not have to analyze the individual factors of a case in a vacuum.” Musselman, 2016 ND 111, ¶ 13 , 881 N.W.2d 201 . “[Ojfficers are to assess the situation as it unfolds and, based upon inferences and deductions drawn from their experience and training, make 2017“An officer has reasonable suspicion if, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the officer’s position would be justified by some objective manifestation to believe that the person stopped engaged in or was about to engage in criminal activity.” Knox, 2016 ND 15, ¶ 7 , 873 N.W.2d 664 . “[L]aw enforcement officers do not have to analyze the individual factors of a case in a vacuum.” Musselman, 2016 ND 111, ¶ 13 , 881 N.W.2d 201 . “[Ojfficers are to assess the situation as it unfolds and, based upon inferences and deductions drawn from their experience and training, make | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper
green
2 sentences2001Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 , 100 S.Ct. 1166 , 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980), is relied upon heavily by DeCoteau in arguing this case is not moot. 2001Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 , 100 S.Ct. 1166 , 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980), is relied upon heavily by DeCoteau in arguing this case is not moot. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty
green
2 sentences2001In United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 , 100 S.Ct. 1202 , 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980), the Supreme Court further ruled a trial court’s denial of a motion for *436 certification of a class may be reviewed on appeal when the named plaintiffs personal claim becomes moot after the certification ruling because the “proposed representative retains a ‘personal stake’ in obtaining class certification” in addition to the individual claim on the merits. [¶ 12] The third case, Deposit Guar. 2001In United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 , 100 S.Ct. 1202 , 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980), the Supreme Court further ruled a trial court’s denial of a motion for *436 certification of a class may be reviewed on appeal when the named plaintiffs personal claim becomes moot after the certification ruling because the “proposed representative retains a ‘personal stake’ in obtaining class certification” in addition to the individual claim on the merits. [¶ 12] The third case, Deposit Guar. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.