individual claim in Georgia

2020See also Maldonado v. Ochsner Clinic Foundation, 493 F3d 521, 524 (II) (B) (5th Cir. 2007) (class certification denied to uninsured patients who claimed that chargemaster rates were unreasonable because “[t]he amount patients were charged and the amount that [was] ‘reasonable’ for the services they received [was] necessarily an individual inquiry that [would] depend on the specific circumstances of each class member, the time frame in which care was provided, and both [the defendant hospital’s] and other hospitals’ costs at that time”); Eufaula Hosp.

2018The trial court certified the class before us as including "[a]ll persons who have had a hospital lien filed pursuant to OCGA § 44-14-470 et seq. by TMC for the years 2007 to present against a cause of action they possessed and which lien was filed in an amount in excess of what is a reasonable charge for the care and treatment rendered." (Emphasis *311 supplied.) As the Fifth Circuit has concluded, however, "[t]he amount patients were charged and the amount that is 'reasonable' for the services they received is necessarily an individual inquiry that will depend on the specific circumstances o

1973Scott v. Haddock, 11 Ga. 258 ; Allen v. Solomon, 54 Ga. 483 ; Hardeman v. Ellis, 162 Ga. 664, 682 ( 135 SE 195 ) and cases cited; Wright v. Thompson, 190 Ga. 173, 177 ( 8 SE2d 640 ); Crummey v. Crummey, 190 Ga. 774 ( 10 SE2d 859 ); Parnelle v. Cavanaugh, 191 Ga. 464 ( 12 SE2d 877 ); Gammage v. Perry, 29 Ga. App. 427 ( 116 SE 126 ).

1973Scott v. Haddock, 11 Ga. 258 ; Allen v. Solomon, 54 Ga. 483 ; Hardeman v. Ellis, 162 Ga. 664, 682 ( 135 SE 195 ) and cases cited; Wright v. Thompson, 190 Ga. 173, 177 ( 8 SE2d 640 ); Crummey v. Crummey, 190 Ga. 774 ( 10 SE2d 859 ); Parnelle v. Cavanaugh, 191 Ga. 464 ( 12 SE2d 877 ); Gammage v. Perry, 29 Ga. App. 427 ( 116 SE 126 ).

2005When the alleged violation of the FBPA is a misrepresentation, as alleged in this case, the Act “incorporates] the ‘reliance’ element of the common law tort of misrepresentation into the causation element of an individual claim.” Id. at 87 .

2005“Therefore, under [OCGA § 10-1-399] when the alleged violation of the FBPA is a misrepresentation, the claimant is not entitled to recover if he had an equal and ample opportunity to ascertain the truth but failed to exercise proper diligence to do so.” Zeeman v. Black, supra, 156 Ga. App. at 87 .

2026In Appellants’ stream-of-consciousness style briefing, they appear to concede that “under the set of facts set forth in their pleadings, Plaintiffs/Appellants could not establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (as ruled by the trial court)[.]” Accordingly, we do not review this ruling. 2 Coast, Inc. v. Turner, 324 Ga. App. 762, 765 ( 751 SE2d 555 ) (2013) (“A plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.”).

2026In Appellants’ stream-of-consciousness style briefing, they appear to concede that “under the set of facts set forth in their pleadings, Plaintiffs/Appellants could not establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (as ruled by the trial court)[.]” Accordingly, we do not review this ruling. 2 Coast, Inc. v. Turner, 324 Ga. App. 762, 765 ( 751 SE2d 555 ) (2013) (“A plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.”).

2024But given our remand of this case under our holding in Division 2, defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated a trial court must be consider all of the relevant factors together with such other circumstances as may also be relevant and that the trial courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process of these factors). 35 See Adams, 364 Ga. App. at 873 (2) (e) (holding that given the trial court’s failures to properly calculate and account for all times encompassed by the total delay and to determine and clearly identify the relative weight to be attributed to e

2024But given our remand of this case under our holding in Division 2, defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated a trial court must be consider all of the relevant factors together with such other circumstances as may also be relevant and that the trial courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process of these factors). 35 See Adams, 364 Ga. App. at 873 (2) (e) (holding that given the trial court’s failures to properly calculate and account for all times encompassed by the total delay and to determine and clearly identify the relative weight to be attributed to e

2020Thus, even if a jury could, hypothetically, come up with an as- yet-to-be-determined “formula for arriving at a reasonable charge” (by comparing TMC’s chargemaster rates to market rates, actual amounts collected by TMC from insurance companies, or some other number), Bowden, supra, 348 Ga. App. at 178 (2) (b), the answer to the question of what specifically constitutes a reasonable charge in each class member’s case would still “require[ ] an individual analysis of each medical service provided each class member.” Eufaula, supra, 32 S3d at 43.

2011Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 55 (2) (b) ( 663 SE2d 189 ) (2008).

2011See Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 281 Ga. 137 (1) ( 637 SE2d 14 ) (2006) (reliance element of common law tort of misrepresentation is incorporated into the causation element of an individual claim under the FBPA); City Dodge, Inc. v. Gardner, 232 Ga. 766, 769-770, n. 1 ( 208 SE2d 794 ) (1974) (justifiable reliance is essential element of fraud claim); Real Estate Intl., Inc. v. Buggay, 220 Ga. App. 449 (3) ( 469 SE2d 242 ) (1996) (justifiable reliance is essential element of negligent misrepresentation claim).

2011See Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 281 Ga. 137 (1) ( 637 SE2d 14 ) (2006) (reliance element of common law tort of misrepresentation is incorporated into the causation element of an individual claim under the FBPA); City Dodge, Inc. v. Gardner, 232 Ga. 766, 769-770, n. 1 ( 208 SE2d 794 ) (1974) (justifiable reliance is essential element of fraud claim); Real Estate Intl., Inc. v. Buggay, 220 Ga. App. 449 (3) ( 469 SE2d 242 ) (1996) (justifiable reliance is essential element of negligent misrepresentation claim).

2011See Ferguson, 303 Ga. App. at 346 (2) (d). (e) We now balance each of the Barker-Doggett factors, noting that none of the individual factors is a necessary or sufficient condition to finding a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial.

2011See Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 281 Ga. 137 (1) ( 637 SE2d 14 ) (2006) (reliance element of common law tort of misrepresentation is incorporated into the causation element of an individual claim under the FBPA); City Dodge, Inc. v. Gardner, 232 Ga. 766, 769-770, n. 1 ( 208 SE2d 794 ) (1974) (justifiable reliance is essential element of fraud claim); Real Estate Intl., Inc. v. Buggay, 220 Ga. App. 449 (3) ( 469 SE2d 242 ) (1996) (justifiable reliance is essential element of negligent misrepresentation claim).

2011See Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 281 Ga. 137 (1) ( 637 SE2d 14 ) (2006) (reliance element of common law tort of misrepresentation is incorporated into the causation element of an individual claim under the FBPA); City Dodge, Inc. v. Gardner, 232 Ga. 766, 769-770, n. 1 ( 208 SE2d 794 ) (1974) (justifiable reliance is essential element of fraud claim); Real Estate Intl., Inc. v. Buggay, 220 Ga. App. 449 (3) ( 469 SE2d 242 ) (1996) (justifiable reliance is essential element of negligent misrepresentation claim).

2008See Holsey, 281 Ga. at 812, n. 1 (holding that the combined effect of trial counsel’s various professional deficiencies should be considered).

2008See Holsey, 281 Ga. at 812, n. 1 (holding that the combined effect of trial counsel’s various professional deficiencies should be considered).

2004Co., 446 U. S. 1, 7 (100 SC 1460, 64 LE2d 1) (1980) (construing the identical provisions of Federal Eule of Civil Procedure 54 (b)).

1999Often, such a determination cannot be made absent a traffic stop, so that the officer may examine and measure the break in the windshield. “[A]n investigative stop can be utilized to determine if a law is being broken.” (Emphasis in original.) Jordan v. State, 223 Ga. App. 176, 178 (1) ( 477 SE2d 583 ) (1996).

1999Often, such a determination cannot be made absent a traffic stop, so that the officer may examine and measure the break in the windshield. “[A]n investigative stop can be utilized to determine if a law is being broken.” (Emphasis in original.) Jordan v. State, 223 Ga. App. 176, 178 (1) ( 477 SE2d 583 ) (1996).

1990State v. Madigan, 249 Ga. 571, 574 (fn. 2), supra. Nor is this a case such as Durden v. State, 187 Ga. App. 154, 157 , supra, in which the State omitted from its written report the “quantifying substance of its forensic case against the defendant. . . .” Decided July 16, 1990.

1973Scott v. Haddock, 11 Ga. 258 ; Allen v. Solomon, 54 Ga. 483 ; Hardeman v. Ellis, 162 Ga. 664, 682 ( 135 SE 195 ) and cases cited; Wright v. Thompson, 190 Ga. 173, 177 ( 8 SE2d 640 ); Crummey v. Crummey, 190 Ga. 774 ( 10 SE2d 859 ); Parnelle v. Cavanaugh, 191 Ga. 464 ( 12 SE2d 877 ); Gammage v. Perry, 29 Ga. App. 427 ( 116 SE 126 ).

1973Scott v. Haddock, 11 Ga. 258 ; Allen v. Solomon, 54 Ga. 483 ; Hardeman v. Ellis, 162 Ga. 664, 682 ( 135 SE 195 ) and cases cited; Wright v. Thompson, 190 Ga. 173, 177 ( 8 SE2d 640 ); Crummey v. Crummey, 190 Ga. 774 ( 10 SE2d 859 ); Parnelle v. Cavanaugh, 191 Ga. 464 ( 12 SE2d 877 ); Gammage v. Perry, 29 Ga. App. 427 ( 116 SE 126 ).