individual claim in Texas

2015Dist., 247 S.W.3d at 714 (by establishing cut-off date for accepting data to determine hospitals’ Medicaid reimbursement rate, agency established “rule” within meaning of APA) and Entertainment Publ’ns, 292 S.W.3d at 721 (“[T]he Comptroller’s statements in the March and April 2008 letters that the Comptroller will uniformly regard brochure-fundraising firms as the sellers and nonprofit entities as the sellers’ agents, without regard to the individual factors considered under the Comptroller’s previous guidelines, are ‘generally applicable’ statements for purposes of the APA.”).

2014Dist., 247 S.W.3d at 714 (by establishing cut-off date for accepting data to determine hospitals’ Medicaid reimbursement rate, agency established “rule” within meaning of APA) and Entertainment Publ’ns, 292 S.W.3d at 721 (“[T]he Comptroller’s statements in the March and April 2008 letters that the Comptroller will uniformly regard brochure-fundraising firms as the sellers and nonprofit entities as the sellers’ agents, without regard to the individual factors considered under the Comptroller’s previous guidelines, are ‘generally applicable’ statements for purposes of the APA.”).

2015Dist., 247 S.W.3d at 714 (by establishing cut-off date for accepting data to determine hospitals’ Medicaid reimbursement rate, agency established “rule” within meaning of APA) and Entertainment Publ’ns, 292 S.W.3d at 721 (“[T]he Comptroller’s statements in the March and April 2008 letters that the Comptroller will uniformly regard brochure-fundraising firms as the sellers and nonprofit entities as the sellers’ agents, without regard to the individual factors considered under the Comptroller’s previous guidelines, are ‘generally applicable’ statements for purposes of the APA.”).

2014Dist., 247 S.W.3d at 714 (by establishing cut-off date for accepting data to determine hospitals’ Medicaid reimbursement rate, agency established “rule” within meaning of APA) and Entertainment Publ’ns, 292 S.W.3d at 721 (“[T]he Comptroller’s statements in the March and April 2008 letters that the Comptroller will uniformly regard brochure-fundraising firms as the sellers and nonprofit entities as the sellers’ agents, without regard to the individual factors considered under the Comptroller’s previous guidelines, are ‘generally applicable’ statements for purposes of the APA.”).

2015These interpretations apply not only to Entertainment and the tax-exempt groups with which it conducts business, but to all brochure-fundraising firms engaging in *722 business across the state.5 Compare Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n v. Amusement & Music Operators of Tex., Inc., 997 S.W.2d 651, 660 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (holding that statements contained in agency memoranda were rules because they imposed binding instructions affecting private rights of all similarly situated persons), with Beacon Nat’l Ins.

2009These interpretations apply not only to Entertainment and the tax-exempt groups with which it conducts business, but to all brochure-fundraising firms engaging in business across the state. 5 Compare Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n v. Amusement & Music Operators of Tex., Inc., 997 S.W.2d 651, 660 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (holding that statements contained in agency memoranda were rules because they imposed binding instructions affecting private rights of all similarly situated persons), with Beacon Nat’l Ins.

2015In Sosna, the Court held that a class action is not rendered moot when the named plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot after the class has been duly certified. 419 U.S., at 399 , 95 S.Ct. 553 .

2015In Sosna, the Court held that a class action is not rendered moot when the named plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot after the class has been duly certified. 419 U.S., at 399 , 95 S.Ct. 553 .

2015In order to avoid this outcome, respondent relies almost entirely upon 23 cases that arose in the context of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 class actions, particularly United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 , 100 S.Ct. 1202 , 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980); Deposit Guaranty Nat.

2015In order to avoid this outcome, respondent relies almost entirely upon 23 cases that arose in the context of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 class actions, particularly United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 , 100 S.Ct. 1202 , 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980); Deposit Guaranty Nat.

2025Although it is an individual defense afforded to the government employee rather than the governmental unit, we have consistently recognized that “the governmental employer’s immunity is not waived if its employee is protected by official immunity.” Id. at 468; see DeWitt v. Harris County, 904 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex. 1995).

2024Comm. on Judiciary, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 117, 61st Leg., R.S. (1969) (describing this section as the “[s]ame as [the] original bill except that it removes the limitation that immunity can not immunize the government”). 23 See DeWitt, 904 S.W.2d at 653 (“Whether the Texas Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity in a given case does not affect whether the governmental employee may assert official immunity as a defense.

2015Gov't Code § 143.015. 27 See Clark, 197 S.W.3d at 318 n. 5 (presuming that reference to “the arbitration panel” within section 143.1016, subsection (j), which applies to municipalities with populations of 1.5 million or more and closely mirrors section 143.057, subsection (j), necessarily refers to the individual hearing examiner who rendered the decision). 28 Tex. Loc.

2013See Clark, 197 S.W.3d at 318 n. 5 (presuming that reference to "the arbitration panel” within section 143.1016, subsection (j), which applies to municipalities with populations of 1.5 million or more and closely mirrors section 143.057, subsection (j), necessarily refers to the individual hearing examiner who rendered the decision). 28 .

2012See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 529 So.2d 577, 591 (Miss.1988) (noting "certain requirements of specificity in the [Ake] motion ... such as the name and specific cost for the expert and the purpose and value of such an individual to the defense.”).

2012See, e.g., Johnson v. State , 529 So.2d 577, 591 (Miss. 1988) (noting "certain requirements of specificity in the [ Ake ] motion . . . such as the name and specific cost for the expert and the purpose and value of such an individual to the defense.").

2010While standing to assert the latter type of claim ordinarily cannot exist without standing to assert the former, see Grant, 324 F.3d at 390 & n.9, in certain circumstances courts have reasoned that the expiration of a plaintiff’s individual claim during the litigation does not necessarily deprive him of a justiciable interest in pursuing certification of the class (and, if successful, ultimately representing it in prosecuting the class claims13).

2010While standing to assert the latter type of claim ordinarily cannot exist without standing to assert the former, see Grant , 324 F.3d at 390 & n.9, in certain circumstances courts have reasoned that the expiration of a plaintiff's individual claim during the litigation does not necessarily deprive him of a justiciable interest in pursuing certification of the class (and, if successful, ultimately representing it in prosecuting the class claims (13) ).

2009Chapman v. State, 115 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim.

2009Chapman v. State , 115 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim.

2005See, e.g., Horton v. State, 16 S.W.3d 848, 853-854 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.) (finding that nervous behavior alone was not enough for reasonable suspicion); Gamble v. State, 8 S.W.3d 452 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (walking away from police in residential neighborhood at night, without other circumstances giving rise to suspicion, was not enough to justify frisk).

2005See , e.g. , Horton v. State , 16 S.W.3d 848, 853-854 (Tex. App.--Austin 2000, no pet.) (finding that nervous behavior alone was not enough for reasonable suspicion); Gamble v. State, 8 S.W.3d 452 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (walking away from police in residential neighborhood at night, without other circumstances giving rise to suspicion, was not enough to justify frisk).

2025Carey v. Bank of Am., N.A., 904 F. Supp. 2d 617, 620 (N.D.

2023In considering whether a plaintiff’s administrative charge satisfies this requirement as to an individual claim, we look “slightly beyond its four corners, to its substance rather than its label” to determine “the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Id. at 789 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2023The Fifth Circuit has described the appropriate review as “a fact-specific inquiry into what EEOC investigations [the administrative charge] can reasonably be expected to trigger.” Id. at 792.

2022GOV’T CODE §§ 57.002(a) (“A court shall appoint a certified court interpreter . . . for an individual who has a hearing impairment . . . if a motion for the appointment of an interpreter or provider is filed by a party . . . .”), 57.002(b) (“A court may, on its own motion, appoint a certified court interpreter . . . for an individual who has a hearing impairment . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Shren- Yee Cheng, 315 S.W.3d at 671–72 (rejecting argument that trial court had duty to appoint interpreter sua sponte).

2021See In re Greyhound Lines, 138 S.W.3d at 21 (holding plaintiff’s claim an individual claim because she did not allege a company-wide policy of discrimination and therefore discovery was limited to terminal where plaintiff worked and to employees similarly situated).

2021See In re Greyhound Lines, 138 S.W.3d at 21 (holding plaintiff’s claim an individual claim because she did not allege a company-wide policy of discrimination and therefore discovery was limited to terminal where plaintiff worked and to employees similarly situated).

2018See Pitts, 653 F.3d at 1092 ; Stein, 772 F.3d at 704–05.