individual violation in Pennsylvania

2015The “going concern” concept of fair value in a dissenting shareholders’ appraisal proceeding and the many individual factors comprising it were aptly described by the Delaware Supreme Court in Tri– Continental Corp. v. Battye, Del., 74 A.2d 71, 76 (1950): The basic concept of value under the appraisal is that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going concern.

2015In Glosser Bros., this Court described the proper methodology to determine the going concern value of a dissenting shareholder’s stock as follows: The “going concern” concept of fair value in a dissenting shareholders' appraisal proceeding and the many individual factors comprising it were aptly described by the Delaware Supreme Court in Tri– Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 76 (Del. 1950): The basic concept of value under the appraisal is that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going concern.

2017Commonwealth v. Nelson, 690 A.2d 728, 731 (Pa. Super. 1997).

2017Commonwealth v. Nelson, 456 Pa.Super. 349 , 690 A.2d 728, 731 (1997).

1975See Pleasant Hills Borough v. Carroll, 182 Pa. Superior Ct. 102 , 125 A. 2d 466 (1956).

1975See Pleasant Hills Borough v. Carroll, 182 Pa. Superior Ct. 102 , 125 A. 2d 466 (1956).

2024We are therefore unable to act on the claims asserted in Appellant’s application for re-argument and, instead, are bound by the certified record, which compels us to review this matter as a violation of the terms of Appellant’s parole on his original, seven-year state sentence. -8- J-S41027-23 As previously stated, in order to find an individual in violation of parole, the trial court is required to “determine whether the parolee violated parole and, if so, whether parole remains a viable means of rehabilitating the defendant and deterring future antisocial conduct, or whether revocation, and

2023As previously stated, in order to find an individual in violation of parole, the trial court is required to “determine whether the parolee violated parole and, if so, whether parole remains a viable means of rehabilitating the defendant and deterring future antisocial conduct, or whether revocation, and thus recommitment, are in order.” Kalichak, 943 A.2d 285 , 290–291 (citation omitted).

2025Individual defendants who are policymakers may be liable under Section 1983 if it is shown that such defendants, “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 725 (emphasis added); see also Barkes, 766 F.3d at 316-17 (same); A.M. ex rel.

2025J.M.K., 372 F.3d at 585-86 (same).11 Thus, the fact that 10 “[T]he pronouncements of the lower federal courts have only persuasive, not binding, effect on the courts of this Commonwealth . . . .” In re Stevenson, 40 A.3d 1212, 1221 (Pa. 2012). 11 A supervisory government official may also be personally liable under Section 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.

2025J.M.K., 372 F.3d at 585-86 (same).11 Thus, the fact that 10 “[T]he pronouncements of the lower federal courts have only persuasive, not binding, effect on the courts of this Commonwealth . . . .” In re Stevenson, 40 A.3d 1212, 1221 (Pa. 2012). 11 A supervisory government official may also be personally liable under Section 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.

2025Individual defendants who are policymakers may be liable under Section 1983 if it is shown that such defendants, “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 725 (emphasis added); see also Barkes, 766 F.3d at 316-17 (same); A.M. ex rel.

2023“The courts of this Commonwealth have long rejected the notion that the sentence of an absconder or delinquent parolee continues to run, as if it were being served, to the point of expiring on its scheduled expiration date.” Commonwealth v. Ortega, 995 A.2d 879, 885 (Pa. Super. 2010), disapproved of on other grounds by Foster, supra. Indeed, as held by this Court in Ortega, if an individual absconds or is otherwise delinquent while on probation, his probationary period will be “extended by his ongoing delinquency.” Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Wright, 116 A.3d 133, 136-137 (Pa. Super. 2015) (

2023“The courts of this Commonwealth have long rejected the notion that the sentence of an absconder or delinquent parolee continues to run, as if it were being served, to the point of expiring on its scheduled expiration date.” Commonwealth v. Ortega, 995 A.2d 879, 885 (Pa. Super. 2010), disapproved of on other grounds by Foster, supra. Indeed, as held by this Court in Ortega, if an individual absconds or is otherwise delinquent while on probation, his probationary period will be “extended by his ongoing delinquency.” Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Wright, 116 A.3d 133, 136-137 (Pa. Super. 2015) (

2016Under the circumstances, for purposes of decision, we will confine ourselves to the arguments outlined in the briefs. 4 We do not dispute the Commonwealth’s argument that each image of child pornography possessed represents a separate, independent crime, see Appellee’s Brief at 12-13, citing Commonwealth v. Davidson, 938 A.2d 198, 219 (Pa. 2007) (“Each use of a minor to create a visual depiction of child pornography constitutes a separate and distinct abuse of that child, and thus represents an individual violation of the statute.”), and appellant in fact was convicted and sentenced for his mu

2016We do not dispute the Commonwealth’s argument that each image of child pornography possessed represents a separate, independent crime, see Appellee’s Brief at 12-13, citing Commonwealth v. Davidson, 595 Pa. 1 , 938 A.2d 198, 219 (2007) ("Each use of a minor to create a visual depiction of child pornography constitutes a separate and distinct abuse of that child, and thus represents an individual violation of the statute.”), and appellant in fact was convicted and sentenced for his multiple crimes.

2015Conn. 2004) (finding that the proposed class, as defined, was “untenable because the court would have to conduct an individual inquiry regarding the merits of each proposed plaintiff’s claim in order to determine class membership”); White v. Williams, 208 F.R.D. 123, 129-30 (D.

2007As noted in United States v. Esch, “the key element of the offense is the use [of] a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of creating a visual depiction of such conduct____Each photograph depended upon a separate and distinct use of [a minor].” Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 542 (10th Cir.1987).

2002With regard to Farago’s broader policy discussion, see, e.g., Farago, 522 Pa. at 416-17 , 562 A.2d at 303 (reasoning that “[t]o allow an individual to claim immunity under this provision but in turn to preclude [his] employer the same benefit of the immunity would indeed undermine the stated purpose of the limited immunity conferred under the Act”), the Commonwealth Court characterized such discussion as dicta and deemed it deficient on the ground that it fails to expressly consider the precept that “a ‘principal may not raise immunity of agent as a defense to claim based on respondeat superio

2002With regard to Farago’s broader policy discussion, see, e.g., Farago, 522 Pa. at 416-17 , 562 A.2d at 303 (reasoning that “[t]o allow an individual to claim immunity under this provision but in turn to preclude [his] employer the same benefit of the immunity would indeed undermine the stated purpose of the limited immunity conferred under the Act”), the Commonwealth Court characterized such discussion as dicta and deemed it deficient on the ground that it fails to expressly consider the precept that “a ‘principal may not raise immunity of agent as a defense to claim based on respondeat superio