rationale behind rule (New York) · Go Syfert
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rationale behind rule in New York

35 New York opinions name it 8 courts 1930–2024 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (18)

CaseFollowedCited
International Surplus Lines Insurance v. Certain Underwriters & Underwriting Syndicates at Lloyd's of Londongreen
ohsd · 1994 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001Co. v Certain Underwriters & Underwriting Syndicates at Lloyd’s of London, 868 F Supp 917, 921 [SD Ohio]).

2001Co. v Certain Underwriters & Underwriting Syndicates at Lloyd's of London, 868 F Supp 917, 921 [SD Ohio]).

22
NYP Holdings, Inc. v. McClier Corp.green
nyappdiv · 2009 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024Indeed, the rationale behind the doctrine of equitable subrogation is "that the party who causes injury or damage should be required to bear the loss by reimbursing the insurer for payments made on behalf of the injured party" ( NYP Holdings, Inc. v McClier Corp. , 65 AD3d 186, 189 [1st Dept 2009] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Brown v Bellamy , 170 AD2d 876, 877-878 [3d Dept 1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 853 [1991]).

11
Brown v. Bellamygreen
nyappdiv · 1991 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024Indeed, the rationale behind the doctrine of equitable subrogation is "that the party who causes injury or damage should be required to bear the loss by reimbursing the insurer for payments made on behalf of the injured party" ( NYP Holdings, Inc. v McClier Corp. , 65 AD3d 186, 189 [1st Dept 2009] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Brown v Bellamy , 170 AD2d 876, 877-878 [3d Dept 1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 853 [1991]).

11
TRAVELERS CO. v. Underwritersgreen
ny · 2001 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022Co. v Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London , 96 NY2d 583, 596 [2001] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

11
Davidoff v. Davidoffgreen
nyappdiv · 1983 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020The rationale behind the rule is that since a municipality has miles of sidewalks under its care and control, it would be difficult for it to keep the sidewalks clear of snow at all times" ( De Coufle v Frederick Benedict, Inc. , 93 AD2d 805, 806 [citation omitted]).

11
In Re Air Crash At Belle Harbor, New York On November 12, 2001.green
ca2 · 2007 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017This makes sense because the rationale behind the exception allowing appeals of administrative subpoenas is that an "administrative proceeding is self-contained and, unlike in the - 19 - - 20 - No. 16 case of a grand jury or trial, there is no 'further judicial inquiry which would be halted were the offending [subpoenaed party] permitted to appeal'" (Matter of Air Crash at Belle Harbor, 490 F3d at 105 , quoting Construction Prods.

2017This makes sense because the rationale behind the exception allowing appeals of administrative subpoenas is that an “administrative proceeding is self-contained and, unlike in the case of a grand jury or trial, there is no 'further judicial inquiry which would be halted were the offending [subpoenaed party] permitted to appeal’ ” (In re Air Crash at Belle Harbor, 490 F3d at 105 [emphasis added], quoting Construction Prods.

11
Parker v. Port Authoritygreen
nyappdiv · 1985 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014Turning to the second prong, the issue is whether Lieutenant Hearle is “united in interest” with the City, and whether he can be charged with such notice of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits (see LeBlanc v Skinner, 103 AD3d at 209-210; Matter of Parker v Port Auth. of NY. & N.J., 113 AD2d 763, 765 [2d Dept 1985], citing Connell v Hayden, 83 AD2d 30 [1981] [“The rationale behind this exception is that where the two defendants are united in interest their defenses will be the same and they will either stand or fall together with respect to plainti

11
LeBlanc v. Skinnergreen
nyappdiv · 2012 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Turning to the second prong, the issue is whether Lieutenant Hearle is “united in interest” with the City, and whether he can be charged with such notice of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits (see LeBlanc v Skinner, 103 AD3d at 209-210; Matter of Parker v Port Auth. of NY. & N.J., 113 AD2d 763, 765 [2d Dept 1985], citing Connell v Hayden, 83 AD2d 30 [1981] [“The rationale behind this exception is that where the two defendants are united in interest their defenses will be the same and they will either stand or fall together with respect to plainti

2014Further, “unity of interest will [generally] be found where one of the parties is vicariously liable for the conduct of the other” (Davis v Larhette, 39 AD3d 693, 694 [2d Dept 2007]; LeBlanc v Skinner, 103 AD3d at 210 [“(T)he parties are united in interest where there is a jural or legal relationship giving rise to potential vicarious liability”]).

11
Davis v. Larhettegreen
nyappdiv · 2007 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014Further, “unity of interest will [generally] be found where one of the parties is vicariously liable for the conduct of the other” (Davis v Larhette, 39 AD3d 693, 694 [2d Dept 2007]; LeBlanc v Skinner, 103 AD3d at 210 [“(T)he parties are united in interest where there is a jural or legal relationship giving rise to potential vicarious liability”]).

11
Cobbs v. Lefrak Organization, Inc.green
nyappdiv · 1981 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012The rationale behind the doctrine of anticipatory breach is that it gives the nonrepudiating party an opportunity to treat a repudiation as an anticipatory breach without having to futilely tender performance or wait for the other party’s time for performance to arrive (see Cooper v Bosse, 85 AD2d 616, 618 [1981]).

11
U.S. Underwriters Insurance v. City Club Hotel, LLCgreen
ny · 2004 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
1 sentence

2011Co. v City Club Hotel, LLC, 3 NY3d 592, 597-598 [2004] [the rationale behind the exception is that an insurer’s duty to defend its insured extends to the defense of any action arising out of the occurrence, including a defense against that insurer’s declaratory judgment action].) There have been instances where an insured, who took the affirmative step of commencing a declaratory judgment action to settle its rights under a policy, was able to recover attorneys’ fees (see City of New York v Zurich-American Ins.

11
Seifert v. Caverlygreen
nysupct · 1892 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
1 sentence

2009The burden then falls upon the addressee to present evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption and establish nonreceipt.” (Citations omitted.) The rationale behind the presumption is that “the failure of the mails is not to be ascribed to the parties” (Seifert v Caverly, 18 NYS 327, 328 [1892]).

11
United States v. Harrissgreen
scotus · 1954 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
1 sentence

2004First, the statute must provide sufficient'notice of what conduct is prohibited; second, the statute must not be written in such a manner as to permit or encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” (People v Bright, supra at 382 .) With respect to the first prong, the rationale behind the requirement that a penal statute provide sufficient notice is the notion “that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably .understand to be proscribed.” (I d. [internal quotation marks omitted], citing United States v Harriss, 347 US 612, 617 [1954].) For th

11
Alkinburgh v. Glessinggreen
nyappdiv · 1997 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
1 sentence

1997In determining whether to award preverdict interest “[i]t is not the theory of the claim that controls” (Loeb v Teitelbaum, 112 Misc 2d 1039, 1041 ; see also, Alkinburgh v Glessing, 240 AD2d 904 ).

11
Margolies v. Lawrencegreen
nycivct · 1971 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
11
People v. Minutogreen
nybataviacityct · 1972 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988
11
People v. Johnsongreen
ny · 1984 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988
11
United States v. Bryantgreen
med · 1968 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 1976–1976
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (34)

CaseCitedYears
Connell v. Hayden green
nyappdiv · 1981
2 sentences

2014Turning to the second prong, the issue is whether Lieutenant Hearle is “united in interest” with the City, and whether he can be charged with such notice of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits (see LeBlanc v Skinner, 103 AD3d at 209-210; Matter of Parker v Port Auth. of NY. & N.J., 113 AD2d 763, 765 [2d Dept 1985], citing Connell v Hayden, 83 AD2d 30 [1981] [“The rationale behind this exception is that where the two defendants are united in interest their defenses will be the same and they will either stand or fall together with respect to plainti

1994Timely service upon one of two such defendants gives sufficient notice to enable him to investigate all the defenses which are available to both defendants within the period of limitations” (Connell v Hayden, 83 AD2d 30, 41 ; see, Scheff v St.

21994–2014
Molloy v. . Starin green
ny · 1908
1 sentence

2023Strict liability for damages arising from the vicious propensities and vicious acts of an animal has been extended to a person who, although not its owner, harbors the animal ( see Molloy v Starin , 191 NY 21, 28 ; Brice v Bauer , 108 NY 428 ; Matthew H. v County of Nassau , 131 AD3d at 144 ).

12023–2023
Brice v. . Bauer green
ny · 1888
1 sentence

2023Strict liability for damages arising from the vicious propensities and vicious acts of an animal has been extended to a person who, although not its owner, harbors the animal ( see Molloy v Starin , 191 NY 21, 28 ; Brice v Bauer , 108 NY 428 ; Matthew H. v County of Nassau , 131 AD3d at 144 ).

12023–2023
Matthew H. v. County of Nassau green
nyappdiv · 2015
1 sentence

2023Strict liability for damages arising from the vicious propensities and vicious acts of an animal has been extended to a person who, although not its owner, harbors the animal ( see Molloy v Starin , 191 NY 21, 28 ; Brice v Bauer , 108 NY 428 ; Matthew H. v County of Nassau , 131 AD3d at 144 ).

12023–2023
United States v. Construction Products Research, Inc. Five Star Products, Inc. And H. Nash Babcock green
ca2 · 1996
1 sentence

2017Research, Inc., 73 F3d at 469 ).

12017–2017
City of New York v. Zurich-American Insurance Group green
nyappdiv · 2006
1 sentence

2011Group, 5 Misc 3d 1008[A] , 2004 NY Slip Op 51273[U] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2004], affd 27 AD3d 609 [2d Dept 2006]).

12011–2011
Schoepflin v. . Coffey green
ny · 1900
1 sentence

2010The rationale behind this rule is that each person who repeats the defamatory statement is responsible for the resulting damages (see Schoepflin, 162 NY at 18 ).

12010–2010
People v. Bright green
ny · 1988
2 sentences

2004First, the statute must provide sufficient'notice of what conduct is prohibited; second, the statute must not be written in such a manner as to permit or encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” (People v Bright, supra at 382 .) With respect to the first prong, the rationale behind the requirement that a penal statute provide sufficient notice is the notion “that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably .understand to be proscribed.” (I d. [internal quotation marks omitted], citing United States v Harriss, 347 US 612, 617 [1954].) For th

2004First, the statute must provide sufficient'notice of what conduct is prohibited; second, the statute must not be written in such a manner as to permit or encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” (People v Bright, supra at 382 .) With respect to the first prong, the rationale behind the requirement that a penal statute provide sufficient notice is the notion “that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably .understand to be proscribed.” (I d. [internal quotation marks omitted], citing United States v Harriss, 347 US 612, 617 [1954].) For th

12004–2004
People v. Alvino green
ny · 1987
2 sentences

2004(See People v Alvino, 71 NY2d 233 [1987].) The rationale behind this rule is to prevent a jury from drawing the impermissible inference that since the defendant has done something in the past, he must be guilty presently.

2004(See People v Alvino, supra.) A determination of the admission of such evidence as per Molineux is a question of law.

12004–2004
Zegman v. State green
nyclaimsct · 1979
1 sentence

1997Auth., 121 AD2d 425 ; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C5001:2, at 358). 4 The rationale behind the rule is that compensatory damages are unliquidated (Zegman v State of New York, 99 Misc 2d 473 ), not easily quantified and not easily divided into specific time periods (see, McIntosh v Irving Trust Co., 873 F Supp 872 ).

11997–1997
Loeb v. Teitelbaum green
nycivct · 1982
1 sentence

1997In determining whether to award preverdict interest “[i]t is not the theory of the claim that controls” (Loeb v Teitelbaum, 112 Misc 2d 1039, 1041 ; see also, Alkinburgh v Glessing, 240 AD2d 904 ).

11997–1997
Chase v. New York City Transit Authority green
nyappdiv · 1986
1 sentence

1997Auth., 121 AD2d 425 ; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C5001:2, at 358). 4 The rationale behind the rule is that compensatory damages are unliquidated (Zegman v State of New York, 99 Misc 2d 473 ), not easily quantified and not easily divided into specific time periods (see, McIntosh v Irving Trust Co., 873 F Supp 872 ).

11997–1997
McIntosh v. Irving Trust Co. green
nysd · 1995
1 sentence

1997Auth., 121 AD2d 425 ; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C5001:2, at 358). 4 The rationale behind the rule is that compensatory damages are unliquidated (Zegman v State of New York, 99 Misc 2d 473 ), not easily quantified and not easily divided into specific time periods (see, McIntosh v Irving Trust Co., 873 F Supp 872 ).

11997–1997
Cohen v. Cohen neutral
ny · 1957
1 sentence

1995The rationale behind this principle is that one may not receive the benefits of a judgment or order and at the same time challenge it by seeking appellate review (see, Cohen v Cohen, 3 NY2d 339, 346 ).

11995–1995
People v. Leyva green
ny · 1975
1 sentence

1995First, the rationale behind the presumption, as expressed by its sponsors, is that the Legislature did not believe that persons transporting dealership quantities of contraband were likely to drive around with innocent friends or that they would pick up strangers (see, People v Leyva, 38 NY2d 160, 166-167 , citing 1972 Interim Report of Temp St Commn to Evaluate Drug Laws, NY Legis Doc No. 10, at 69; Donnino, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law § 200.25, at 45).

11995–1995
Houston v. Lack green
scotus · 1988
1 sentence

1993Briefly stated, the holding of Houston is that because of the unique difficulties facing prison pro se litigants, who "cannot take the steps other litigants can take to monitor the processing of their notices of appeal” ( 487 US, at 270 ) — or, pursuant to Dory, other time-critical legal documents — filing of such documents is complete when they are turned over by the inmate to those prison officials responsible for placing them in the mail. 2 The rationale behind this rule and its reasonableness under the language of the applicable Federal statutes are fully set forth in the decisions cited a

11993–1993
Rene Boas & Associates v. Vernier green
nyappdiv · 1965
11987–1987
Salzman Sign Co. v. Beck green
ny · 1961
11987–1987
Ando v.Woodberry green
ny · 1960
11987–1987
Mazanti v. Wright's Underwear Co. neutral
nyappdiv · 1943
11983–1983
People v. Sacchitella neutral
nyappdiv · 1968
11983–1983
People v. Weyant neutral
nyappdiv · 1979
11983–1983
Barrella v. Richmond Memorial Hospital green
nyappdiv · 1982
11983–1983
Lomber v. Farrow yellow
nyappdiv · 1982
11983–1983
Williams v. . City of New York green
· 1915
11983–1983
Borgia v. City of New York green
ny · 1962
11983–1983
Columbia & Puget Sound Railroad v. Hawthorne green
scotus · 1892
11981–1981
State v. Woodruff green
iowa · 1929
11980–1980
United States v. Salvucci green
scotus · 1980
11980–1980
Taylor v. Louisiana green
scotus · 1975
11976–1976
People v. Miller green
ny · 1952
11976–1976
In re the Estate of Perez green
nysurct · 1972
11974–1974
Checketts v. Collings green
utah · 1931
11971–1971
United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Rosenberg Brothers & Co. green
scotus · 1928
11930–1930

Where else courts name it

IL 127 (1972–2026) CA 103 (1961–2025) OH 87 (1956–2026) IN 80 (1978–2025) TX 79 (1964–2022) PA 67 (1965–2024) AR 47 (1982–2026) FL 42 (1971–2024) AL 36 (1980–2025) NY 35 (1930–2024) TN 34 (1981–2025) MD 28 (1978–2025) LA 28 (1980–2024) WA 28 (1972–2026) MI 25 (1975–2016) IA 25 (1967–2025) MO 25 (1980–2021) WV 24 (1978–2024) MS 23 (1985–2023) AZ 21 (1969–2021) CT 21 (1974–2025) MT 20 (1969–2022) KY 18 (1979–2024) KS 18 (1975–2025) MA 17 (1979–2025) OR 17 (1975–2026) RI 16 (1984–2024) NC 15 (1980–2025) VA 15 (1993–2022) NM 14 (1989–2025) CO 13 (1976–2022) WI 13 (1963–2017) NH 12 (1991–2023) OK 11 (1981–2002) DC 11 (1977–2004) UT 11 (1989–2021) ID 10 (1991–2025) GA 10 (1978–2022) NJ 9 (1965–2015) ME 9 (1975–2020) SC 8 (1989–2025) AK 7 (1979–1994) SD 7 (1986–2016) WY 7 (1983–2020) HI 6 (1998–2021) MN 5 (1956–2017) NE 4 (1982–2007) VT 3 (2023–2024) DE 3 (1975–1980) NV 2 (1984–1992) ND 2 (2009–2009)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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