rationale behind rule in New Hampshire

2020“The rationale behind the rule is that trial forums should have an opportunity to rule on issues and to correct errors before they are presented to the appellate court.” Mortgage Specialists v. Davey, 153 N.H. 764, 786 (2006) (quotation and brackets omitted).

2020“The rationale behind the rule is that trial forums should have an opportunity to rule on issues and to correct errors before they are presented to the appellate court.” Mortgage Specialists v. Davey, 153 N.H. 764, 786 (2006) (quotation and brackets omitted).

2023State v. Tselios, 134 N.H. 405, 407 (1991).

2022The rationale behind the principle of academic deference is that “courts are ill-equipped to review the largely subjective academic appraisals of the faculty.” Mauriello v. U. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 781 F.2d 46, 50 (3d Cir. 1986).

2022The rationale behind the principle of academic deference is that “courts are ill-equipped to review the largely subjective academic appraisals of the faculty.” Mauriello v. U. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 781 F.2d 46 , 50 (3d Cir. 1986).

2022Therefore, as the Supreme Court has observed, “[p]lainly, [judges] may not override [the faculty’s professional judgment] unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.” Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (holding that “[w]hen judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision . . . they should show great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment”).

2022Therefore, as the Supreme Court has observed, “[p]lainly, [judges] may not override [the faculty’s professional judgment] unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.” Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (holding that “[w]hen judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision . . . they should show great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment”).

2005To determine the nature of a cause of action for statute of limitations purposes, we look not to “the form of the action but .. .[rather] its substance.” Gould v. Concord Hospital, 126 N.H. 405, 407 (1985) (quotation and brackets omitted).

2002The rationale behind this presumption stems from the principle that enacting ordinances “is a legislative function and judging the wisdom of the legislation is not the function of this court.” Quirk, 140 N.H. at 129 (quotations, citations, ellipses and brackets omitted).

1999“The rationale behind this rule is the notion that this evidence has slight probative value but has a tendency to be highly prejudicial or to confuse the issues.” Cohn v. Papke, 655 F.2d 191, 194 (9th Cir. 1981).

1991Although we recognize our long-standing rule that parties may not have judicial review of matters not raised at the earliest possible time, see Sklar Realty v. Town of Merrimack, 125 N.H. 321, 328 , 480 A.2d 149, 153 (1984), the rationale behind the rule is that trial forums should have an opportunity to rule on issues and to correct errors before they are presented to the appellate court.

1991Although we recognize our long-standing rule that parties may not have judicial review of matters not raised at the earliest possible time, see Sklar Realty v. Town of Merrimack, 125 N.H. 321, 328 , 480 A.2d 149, 153 (1984), the rationale behind the rule is that trial forums should have an opportunity to rule on issues and to correct errors before they are presented to the appellate court.