rationale behind rule in Michigan

2016The rationale behind this exception is “(1) the self-interested motivation to speak the truth to treating physicians in order to receive proper medical care, and (2) the reasonable necessity of the statement to the diagnosis and treatment of the patient.” People v Meeboer, 439 Mich 310, 322 ; 484 NW2d 621 (1992).

2016The rationale behind this exception is “(1) the self-interested motivation to speak the truth to treating physicians in order to receive proper medical care, and (2) the reasonable necessity of the statement to the diagnosis and treatment of the patient.” People v Meeboer, 439 Mich 310, 322 ; 484 NW2d 621 (1992).

2015Id.

2015Id.

2003South Macomb Disposal Authority v American Ins Co, 243 Mich App 647, 654-655 ; 625 NW2d 40 (2000).

2003South Macomb Disposal Authority v American Ins Co, 243 Mich App 647, 654-655 ; 625 NW2d 40 (2000).

2002The rationale behind the doctrine is the need for finality of judgments and the lack of jurisdiction of an appellate court to modify its judgments except on rehearing. [Internal quotations and citations omitted.] The law of the case doctrine applies “without regard to the correctness of the prior determination.” Driver v Hanley (After Remand), 226 Mich App 558, 565 ; 575 NW2d 31 (1997).

2002The rationale behind the doctrine is the need for finality of judgments and the lack of jurisdiction of an appellate court to modify its judgments except on rehearing. [Internal quotations and citations omitted.] The law of the case doctrine applies “without regard to the correctness of the prior determination.” Driver v Hanley (After Remand), 226 Mich App 558, 565 ; 575 NW2d 31 (1997).

2001The rationale behind this rule “is the fear that a jury will convict the defendant inferentially on the basis of his bad character rather than because he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged.” Crawford, supra at 384 .

2001Webb v Smith (After Sec *655 ond Remand), 224 Mich App 203, 209-210 ; 568 NW2d 378 (1997).

2001Webb v Smith (After Sec *655 ond Remand), 224 Mich App 203, 209-210 ; 568 NW2d 378 (1997).

1998Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 440 Mich 85, 91 ; 485 NW2d 676 (1992).

1998Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 440 Mich 85, 91 ; 485 NW2d 676 (1992).

1998The rationale behind the privilege is that “if the client knows that damaging information could more readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice.” Fisher v United States, 425 US 391, 403 ; 96 S Ct 1569 ; 48 L Ed 2d 39 (1976).

1998The rationale behind the privilege is that “if the client knows that damaging information could more readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice.” Fisher v United States, 425 US 391, 403 ; 96 S Ct 1569 ; 48 L Ed 2d 39 (1976).

1996This Court has stated that § 7(4) was adopted to rectify the inequity noted in Hyde v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 426 Mich 223, 244-246 ; 393 NW2d 847 (1986), i.e., that persons injured by identical conduct in public and private facilities had different rights of recovery.

1996This Court has stated that § 7(4) was adopted to rectify the inequity noted in Hyde v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 426 Mich 223, 244-246 ; 393 NW2d 847 (1986), i.e., that persons injured by identical conduct in public and private facilities had different rights of recovery.

1995Id.

1994The rationale behind this rule derives from the principle that "when an appeal has been taken from a criminal conviction to the court of appeals and death has deprived the accused of his right to [an appellate] decision, the interests of justice ordinarily require that he not stand convicted without resolution of the merits of his appeal, which is an 'integral .part of [our] system for finally adjudicating [his] guilt or innocence.’ Gridin v Illinois, 351 US 12, 18 ; 76 S Ct 585, 590 ; 100 L Ed 891 (1956).” [United States v Asset, 990 F2d 208, 210-211 (CA 5, 1993), quoting United States v Moeh

1994The rationale behind this rule derives from the principle that "when an appeal has been taken from a criminal conviction to the court of appeals and death has deprived the accused of his right to [an appellate] decision, the interests of justice ordinarily require that he not stand convicted without resolution of the merits of his appeal, which is an 'integral .part of [our] system for finally adjudicating [his] guilt or innocence.’ Gridin v Illinois, 351 US 12, 18 ; 76 S Ct 585, 590 ; 100 L Ed 891 (1956).” [United States v Asset, 990 F2d 208, 210-211 (CA 5, 1993), quoting United States v Moeh

1993Id.

1993Id.

1991Lee v Florida, 392 US 378 ; 88 S Ct 2096 ; 20 L Ed 2d 1166 (1968); People v Warner, 401 Mich 186, 201 ; 258 NW2d 385 (1977). 22 The rationale behind this exception is that the information is reliable because the declarant would not make a statement against the declarant’s own interest if it were not true.

1991Lee v Florida, 392 US 378 ; 88 S Ct 2096 ; 20 L Ed 2d 1166 (1968); People v Warner, 401 Mich 186, 201 ; 258 NW2d 385 (1977). 22 The rationale behind this exception is that the information is reliable because the declarant would not make a statement against the declarant’s own interest if it were not true.

1991Lee v Florida, 392 US 378 ; 88 S Ct 2096 ; 20 L Ed 2d 1166 (1968); People v Warner, 401 Mich 186, 201 ; 258 NW2d 385 (1977). 22 The rationale behind this exception is that the information is reliable because the declarant would not make a statement against the declarant’s own interest if it were not true.

1991Lee v Florida, 392 US 378 ; 88 S Ct 2096 ; 20 L Ed 2d 1166 (1968); People v Warner, 401 Mich 186, 201 ; 258 NW2d 385 (1977). 22 The rationale behind this exception is that the information is reliable because the declarant would not make a statement against the declarant’s own interest if it were not true.

1990A defense under the objective approach is grounded on "`whether the police conduct revealed in a particular case falls below the standards, to which the common feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental power.'" Russell, supra at 441 , quoting Sherman v United States at 382.

1988However, in People v Drew, 83 Mich App 57, 62-63 ; 268 NW2d 284 (1978), this Court held that a trial court’s instruction to the jury regarding the use of a defendant’s prior conviction, despite the defendant’s request not to give the instruction, was harmless error because the instruction favored defendant and the evidence adduced at trial was overwhelming in respect to his guilt.

1988However, in People v Drew, 83 Mich App 57, 62-63 ; 268 NW2d 284 (1978), this Court held that a trial court’s instruction to the jury regarding the use of a defendant’s prior conviction, despite the defendant’s request not to give the instruction, was harmless error because the instruction favored defendant and the evidence adduced at trial was overwhelming in respect to his guilt.

1987Whether the utility has located its transmission facilities by virtue of an easement, franchise, plat, or other grant is irrelevant; all are treated identically.” The rationale behind the rule was explained by the Court in New Orleans Gaslight Co v The Drainage Commission of New Orleans, 197 US 453, 460-462 ; 25 S Ct 471 ; 49 L Ed 831 (1905): "The police power, in so far as its exercise is essential to the health of the community, it has been held cannot be contracted away ....

1987Whether the utility has located its transmission facilities by virtue of an easement, franchise, plat, or other grant is irrelevant; all are treated identically.” The rationale behind the rule was explained by the Court in New Orleans Gaslight Co v The Drainage Commission of New Orleans, 197 US 453, 460-462 ; 25 S Ct 471 ; 49 L Ed 831 (1905): "The police power, in so far as its exercise is essential to the health of the community, it has been held cannot be contracted away ....

1982The rationale behind the rule was first stated in People v Quick, 58 Mich 321, 322-323 ; 25 NW 302 (1885) and adhered to in McGillen #1, supra, 265-266: "We have held on several occasions that the defendant has a right to know in advance of the trial what witnesses are to be produced against him, so far as then known, and to have any new witnesses endorsed on the information as soon as discovered.

1982The rationale behind the rule was first stated in People v Quick, 58 Mich 321, 322-323 ; 25 NW 302 (1885) and adhered to in McGillen #1, supra, 265-266: "We have held on several occasions that the defendant has a right to know in advance of the trial what witnesses are to be produced against him, so far as then known, and to have any new witnesses endorsed on the information as soon as discovered.

1982The rationale behind the rule was first stated in People v Quick, 58 Mich 321, 322-323 ; 25 NW 302 (1885) and adhered to in McGillen #1, supra, 265-266: "We have held on several occasions that the defendant has a right to know in advance of the trial what witnesses are to be produced against him, so far as then known, and to have any new witnesses endorsed on the information as soon as discovered.

1982The rationale behind the exception was stated in People v Raider, 256 Mich 131, 135-136 ; 239 NW 387 (1931): "Obviously the exceptions were founded upon the recognized inclination or inducement of those close to the accused, by community of interest in the crime or relationship, to perjure themselves, if they deem it necessary, in his behalf, and the incongruity of requiring the prosecution to make such witnesses its own.” This case illustrates the wisdom of this reasoning.

1982The rationale behind the exception was stated in People v Raider, 256 Mich 131, 135-136 ; 239 NW 387 (1931): "Obviously the exceptions were founded upon the recognized inclination or inducement of those close to the accused, by community of interest in the crime or relationship, to perjure themselves, if they deem it necessary, in his behalf, and the incongruity of requiring the prosecution to make such witnesses its own.” This case illustrates the wisdom of this reasoning.

1981First, we are not dealing with the common-law right of indemnity that was involved in Whiteman, supra. There was not the sort of special relationship, such as employment or bailment, between Detroit General and the state which would support an indemnity claim.

1979The rationale behind this rule was considered in People v Hall, 40 Mich App 329, 335 ; 198 NW2d 762 (1972), quoting People v Superior Court of Yolo County, 3 Cal 3d 807, 817-818; 478 P2d 449 ; 91 Cal Rptr 729 (1970): " 'The difficulty is that from the viewpoint of the observer, an innocent gesture can often be mistaken for a guilty movement.

1979The rationale behind this rule was considered in People v Hall, 40 Mich App 329, 335 ; 198 NW2d 762 (1972), quoting People v Superior Court of Yolo County, 3 Cal 3d 807, 817-818; 478 P2d 449 ; 91 Cal Rptr 729 (1970): " 'The difficulty is that from the viewpoint of the observer, an innocent gesture can often be mistaken for a guilty movement.

1979The rationale behind this rule was considered in People v Hall, 40 Mich App 329, 335 ; 198 NW2d 762 (1972), quoting People v Superior Court of Yolo County, 3 Cal 3d 807, 817-818; 478 P2d 449 ; 91 Cal Rptr 729 (1970): "`The difficulty is that from the viewpoint of the observer, an innocent gesture can often be mistaken for a guilty movement.

1979The rationale behind this rule was considered in People v Hall, 40 Mich App 329, 335 ; 198 NW2d 762 (1972), quoting People v Superior Court of Yolo County, 3 Cal 3d 807, 817-818; 478 P2d 449 ; 91 Cal Rptr 729 (1970): " 'The difficulty is that from the viewpoint of the observer, an innocent gesture can often be mistaken for a guilty movement.

1979Waldren, supra. We see no reason to distinguish between a shipowner’s failure to provide a seaman with adequate gear or adequate shipmates and failure to provide him with adequate training for the job at hand.

1979Such a finding neither comports with logic nor the rationale behind the rule, see footnote 8, supra 9 The second error we find in the Court of Appeals opinion is the gratuitous and incorrect statement that: "Her post-injury wages, however, do establish an earning capacity which presumably continues.

1979Such a finding neither comports with logic nor the rationale behind the rule, see footnote 8, supra. [9] The second error we find in the Court of Appeals opinion is the gratuitous and incorrect statement that: *350 "Her post-injury wages, however, do establish an earning capacity which presumably continues.

1975Thomas Canning Co v Pere Marquette R Co, 211 Mich 326 ; 178 NW 851 (1920), accurately described the rationale behind this rule: "The bailee having the exclusive possession of the property has the exclusive means of showing what was done and what came of it.” We find this rationale to be of primary importance in all bailments where the bailee has exclusive control of the bailed property, regardless of the manner in which the loss was occasioned.

1975Thomas Canning Co v Pere Marquette R Co, 211 Mich 326 ; 178 NW 851 (1920), accurately described the rationale behind this rule: "The bailee having the exclusive possession of the property has the exclusive means of showing what was done and what came of it.” We find this rationale to be of primary importance in all bailments where the bailee has exclusive control of the bailed property, regardless of the manner in which the loss was occasioned.