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21 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1974–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In the Matter of Evelyn Halpern v. Warren C. Schwartz, Trustee in Bankruptcygreen2 sentences1995In Halpern v. Swartz, 426 F.2d 102 , 105 (2d Cir. 1970), the court gave two reasons why an issue must be essential to the judgment before collateral estoppel applies: "First, the decision on an issue not essential to the prior judgment may not have been afforded the careful deliberation and analysis normally applied to essential issues, since a different disposition of the inessential issue would not affect the judgment. . . . 1993In Halpern v. Swartz, 426 F.2d 102 , 105 (2d Cir. 1970), the court gave two reasons why an issue must be essential to the judgment before collateral estoppel applies: `First, the decision on an issue not essential to the prior judgment may not have been afforded the careful deliberation and analysis normally applied to essential issues, since a different disposition of the inessential issue would not affect the judgment . . . . | 1 | 3 |
State v. Sotogreen2 sentences2025The rationale behind this rule is sound: [T]he trial court is uniquely situated to entertain a motion to set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence because, unlike an appellate court, the trial [court] has had the same opportunity as the jury to view the witnesses, to assess their credibility and to determine the weight that should be given to their evidence. . . . [T]he trial judge can gauge the tenor of the trial, as [an appellate court], on the written record, cannot, and can detect those factors, if any, that could improperly have influenced the jury.’’ (Emphasis omit- ted; 2025The rationale behind this rule is sound: [T]he trial court is uniquely situated to entertain a motion to set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence because, unlike an appellate court, the trial [court] has had the same opportunity as the jury to view the witnesses, to assess their credibility and to determine the weight that should be given to their evidence. . . . [T]he trial judge can gauge the tenor of the trial, as [an appellate court], on the written record, cannot, and can detect those factors, if any, that could improperly have influenced the jury.’’ (Emphasis omit- ted; | 1 | 2 |
State v. Waltongreen2 sentences2025The rationale behind this rule is sound: [T]he trial court is uniquely situated to entertain a motion to set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence because, unlike an appellate court, the trial [court] has had the same opportunity as the jury to view the witnesses, to assess their credibility and to determine the weight that should be given to their evidence. . . . [T]he trial judge can gauge the tenor of the trial, as [an appellate court], on the written record, cannot, and can detect those factors, if any, that could improperly have influenced the jury.’’ (Emphasis omit- ted; 2021The rationale behind this rule is sound: [T]he trial court is uniquely situated to entertain a motion to set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence because, unlike an appellate court, the trial [court] has had the same opportunity as the jury to view the witnesses, to assess their credibility and to determine the weight that should be given to their evidence. . . . [T]he trial judge can gauge the tenor of the trial, as [an appellate court], on the written record, cannot, and can detect those factors, if any, that could improperly have influenced the jury.’’ (Citations omit- ted; | 1 | 2 |
Colonial Investors, LLC v. Furbushgreen2 sentences2025The rationale behind this rule is sound: [T]he trial court is uniquely situated to entertain a motion to set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence because, unlike an appellate court, the trial [court] has had the same opportunity as the jury to view the witnesses, to assess their credibility and to determine the weight that should be given to their evidence. . . . [T]he trial judge can gauge the tenor of the trial, as [an appellate court], on the written record, cannot, and can detect those factors, if any, that could improperly have influenced the jury.’’ (Emphasis omit- ted; 2021The rationale behind this rule is sound: [T]he trial court is uniquely situated to entertain a motion to set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence because, unlike an appellate court, the trial [court] has had the same opportunity as the jury to view the witnesses, to assess their credibility and to determine the weight that should be given to their evidence. . . . [T]he trial judge can gauge the tenor of the trial, as [an appellate court], on the written record, cannot, and can detect those factors, if any, that could improperly have influenced the jury.’’ (Citations omit- ted; | 1 | 2 |
State v. Cruzgreen2 sentences2025The rationale behind this exception is that ‘‘the patient’s desire to recover his health . . . will restrain him from giving inaccurate statements to [those who] advise or treat him.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cruz, 260 Conn. 1, 7, 792 A.2d 823 (2002). 2025The rationale behind this exception is that ‘‘the patient’s desire to recover his health . . . will restrain him from giving inaccurate statements to [those who] advise or treat him.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cruz, 260 Conn. 1, 7, 792 A.2d 823 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Estrella J.C.green1 sentence2018See id., at 74-75 , 148 A.3d 594 ("[u]ndoubtedly, statements may be reasonably pertinent ... to obtaining medical diagnosis or treatment even when that was not the primary purpose of the inquiry that prompted them, or the principal motivation behind their expression" [emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted] ); see also State v. Griswold , supra, 160 Conn. App. at 552-53 , 127 A.3d 189 (same). 7 Because our law permits the rationale behind this exception to be satisfied even if there is an additional purpose, the defendant's argument is not persuasive. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Griffingreen2 sentences2017The rationale behind this rule is sound: "[T]he trial court is uniquely situated to entertain a motion to set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence because, unlike an appellate court, the trial [court] has had the same opportunity as the jury to view the witnesses, to assess their credibility and to determine the weight that should be given to their evidence. ... [T]he trial judge can gauge the tenor of the trial, as [an appellate court], on the written record, cannot, and can detect those factors, if any, that could improperly have influenced the jury." (Citations omitted; int 2017The rationale behind this rule is sound: "[T]he trial court is uniquely situated to entertain a motion to set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence because, unlike an appellate court, the trial [court] has had the same opportunity as the jury to view the witnesses, to assess their credibility and to determine the weight that should be given to their evidence. ... [T]he trial judge can gauge the tenor of the trial, as [an appellate court], on the written record, cannot, and can detect those factors, if any, that could improperly have influenced the jury." (Citations omitted; int | 1 | 1 |
Fermo v. Stategreen1 sentence2010"The rationale behind the principle is that the coercion or the inducement casts a chill over the exercise of guaranteed fundamental constitutional rights." Fermo v. State, 370 So.2d 930, 932 (Miss.1979). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. J. Norman Jonesgreen1 sentence1974See United States v. Johnson, 455 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir.); United States v. Jones, 425 F.2d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 823 , 91 S. Ct. 44 , 27 L. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Samuel Lee Johnson and James Earl Young, Sr.green1 sentence1974See United States v. Johnson, 455 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir.); United States v. Jones, 425 F.2d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 823 , 91 S. Ct. 44 , 27 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Nelson
green
2 sentences1982Id., 354 , citing Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 , 92 S.Ct. 2499 , 33 L.Ed.2d 321 (1972) *Page 669 (Powell, J., concurring.). 1982Id., 354 , citing Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 , 92 S. Ct. 2499 , 33 L. | 2 | 1982–1982 |
Lewis v. City of New Orleans
green
2 sentences1982Id., 354 , citing Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 , 92 S. Ct. 2499 , 33 L. 1982Id., 354 , citing Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 , 92 S. Ct. 2499 , 33 L. | 2 | 1982–1982 |
Brumfield v. Henderson
green
2 sentences1982Id., 354 , citing Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 , 92 S.Ct. 2499 , 33 L.Ed.2d 321 (1972) *Page 669 (Powell, J., concurring.). 1982Id., 354 , citing Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 , 92 S. Ct. 2499 , 33 L. | 2 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Capasso
neutral
1 sentence2025The rationale behind this rule is sound: [T]he trial court is uniquely situated to entertain a motion to set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence because, unlike an appellate court, the trial [court] has had the same opportunity as the jury to view the witnesses, to assess their credibility and to determine the weight that should be given to their evidence. . . . [T]he trial judge can gauge the tenor of the trial, as [an appellate court], on the written record, cannot, and can detect those factors, if any, that could improperly have influenced the jury.’’ (Emphasis omit- ted; | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Hanna v. Capitol Region Mental Health Center
green
2 sentences2009As such, the rationale behind this exception to sovereign immunity cannot apply to the plaintiffs claims against the state, and “the ‘in excess of statutory authority’ analysis is irrelevant. ” Hanna v. Capitol Region Mental *77 Health Center, 74 Conn. App. 264 , 271 n.7, 812 A.2d 95 (2002). 2009As such, the rationale behind this exception to sovereign immunity cannot apply to the plaintiffs claims against the state, and “the ‘in excess of statutory authority’ analysis is irrelevant. ” Hanna v. Capitol Region Mental *77 Health Center, 74 Conn. App. 264 , 271 n.7, 812 A.2d 95 (2002). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Whipper
green
2 sentences2002State v. Whipper, 258 Conn. 229, 263 , 780 A.2d 53 (2001). 2002State v. Whipper, 258 Conn. 229, 263 , 780 A.2d 53 (2001). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
City National Bank v. Stoeckel
green
1 sentence1995Id., 739 . 4 In Stoeckel , our Supreme Court explicitly held that if a judgment lien is not filed within the statutory period following a final judgment of the trial court, that judgment lien cannot be found to perfect a prejudgment attachment. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Tenney v. Brandhove
green
1 sentence1995In any event Justice Frankfurter set forth the rationale behind the doctrine in Tenney v. Brandhove 341 U.S. 367 , 377 (1951) Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the public good. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Halpern v. Board of Education
green
2 sentences1993"The rationale behind such rule is that each court derives its authority from a separate and distinct sovereignty." Id. 1993"Under the practice in some jurisdictions, a state court may exercise its discretion so as to preclude an action from proceeding therein where an identical federal action is pending." Id. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Todd v. Malafronte
green
1 sentence1990Gorham v. Farmington Motor Ins., Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 579-80 , 271 A.2d 94 (1970); Todd v. Malafronte, 3 Conn. App. 16, 23 , 484 A.2d 468 (1984). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Duhan
neutral
1 sentence1990Gorham v. Farmington Motor Ins., Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 579-80 , 271 A.2d 94 (1970); Todd v. Malafronte, 3 Conn. App. 16, 23 , 484 A.2d 468 (1984). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc.
green
2 sentences1990Gorham v. Farmington Motor Ins., Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 579-80 , 271 A.2d 94 (1970); Todd v. Malafronte, 3 Conn. App. 16, 23 , 484 A.2d 468 (1984). 1990Gorham v. Farmington Motor Ins., Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 579-80 , 271 A.2d 94 (1970); Todd v. Malafronte, 3 Conn. App. 16, 23 , 484 A.2d 468 (1984). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Jacobs v. Button
green
2 sentences1988The rationale behind this rule is that “[a] stock split in no way alters the substance of the [testatrix’s] total interest or rights in the corporation. . . . [It] is merely a dividing up of the outstanding shares of a corporation into a greater number of units without disturbing the stockholder’s original proportional participating interest in the corporation.” Egavian v. Egavian, 102 R.I. 740, 746 , 232 A.2d 789 (1967), quoted in Bostwick v. Hurstel, 364 Mass. 282, 287 , 304 N.E.2d 186 (1973); see also Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Young, supra, 368-69 ; Jacobs v. Button, 79 Conn. 360 , 65 A 1988The rationale behind this rule is that “[a] stock split in no way alters the substance of the [testatrix’s] total interest or rights in the corporation. . . . [It] is merely a dividing up of the outstanding shares of a corporation into a greater number of units without disturbing the stockholder’s original proportional participating interest in the corporation.” Egavian v. Egavian, 102 R.I. 740, 746 , 232 A.2d 789 (1967), quoted in Bostwick v. Hurstel, 364 Mass. 282, 287 , 304 N.E.2d 186 (1973); see also Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Young, supra, 368-69 ; Jacobs v. Button, 79 Conn. 360 , 65 A | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Bostwick v. Hurstel
green
2 sentences1988The rationale behind this rule is that “[a] stock split in no way alters the substance of the [testatrix’s] total interest or rights in the corporation. . . . [It] is merely a dividing up of the outstanding shares of a corporation into a greater number of units without disturbing the stockholder’s original proportional participating interest in the corporation.” Egavian v. Egavian, 102 R.I. 740, 746 , 232 A.2d 789 (1967), quoted in Bostwick v. Hurstel, 364 Mass. 282, 287 , 304 N.E.2d 186 (1973); see also Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Young, supra, 368-69 ; Jacobs v. Button, 79 Conn. 360 , 65 A 1988The rationale behind this rule is that “[a] stock split in no way alters the substance of the [testatrix’s] total interest or rights in the corporation. . . . [It] is merely a dividing up of the outstanding shares of a corporation into a greater number of units without disturbing the stockholder’s original proportional participating interest in the corporation.” Egavian v. Egavian, 102 R.I. 740, 746 , 232 A.2d 789 (1967), quoted in Bostwick v. Hurstel, 364 Mass. 282, 287 , 304 N.E.2d 186 (1973); see also Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Young, supra, 368-69 ; Jacobs v. Button, 79 Conn. 360 , 65 A | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Egavian v. Egavian
green
2 sentences1988The rationale behind this rule is that “[a] stock split in no way alters the substance of the [testatrix’s] total interest or rights in the corporation. . . . [It] is merely a dividing up of the outstanding shares of a corporation into a greater number of units without disturbing the stockholder’s original proportional participating interest in the corporation.” Egavian v. Egavian, 102 R.I. 740, 746 , 232 A.2d 789 (1967), quoted in Bostwick v. Hurstel, 364 Mass. 282, 287 , 304 N.E.2d 186 (1973); see also Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Young, supra, 368-69 ; Jacobs v. Button, 79 Conn. 360 , 65 A 1988The rationale behind this rule is that “[a] stock split in no way alters the substance of the [testatrix’s] total interest or rights in the corporation. . . . [It] is merely a dividing up of the outstanding shares of a corporation into a greater number of units without disturbing the stockholder’s original proportional participating interest in the corporation.” Egavian v. Egavian, 102 R.I. 740, 746 , 232 A.2d 789 (1967), quoted in Bostwick v. Hurstel, 364 Mass. 282, 287 , 304 N.E.2d 186 (1973); see also Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Young, supra, 368-69 ; Jacobs v. Button, 79 Conn. 360 , 65 A | 1 | 1988–1988 |
The People v. Izzo
green
1 sentence1986To acquaint the juror with his duties and responsibilities in a new environment and to increase his understanding of the processes of a trial can hardly be objectionable in itself.” People v. Izzo, supra, 334 . 3 In light of these principles, the defendant’s claim that his fundamental constitutional right to an impartial jury is involved is not supported and an Evans review is not required. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Duhan
neutral
2 sentences1984The rationale behind this rule is that police officers, owing to their training and experience, should exercise a higher degree of restraint than ordinary citizens.” State v. Duhan, 38 Conn. Sup. 665, 668 , 460 A.2d 496 (1982). 1984The rationale behind this rule is that police officers, owing to their training and experience, should exercise a higher degree of restraint than ordinary citizens.” State v. Duhan, 38 Conn. Sup. 665, 668 , 460 A.2d 496 (1982). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Berend v. J. F. Pritchard & Co.
green
2 sentences1974See United States v. Johnson, 455 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir.); United States v. Jones, 425 F.2d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 823 , 91 S. Ct. 44 , 27 L. 1974See United States v. Johnson, 455 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir.); United States v. Jones, 425 F.2d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 823 , 91 S. Ct. 44 , 27 L. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.